[s3] validate indirect filer path inputs (#9931)

* s3: validate indirect filer path inputs

* s3: avoid query parsing on common request path

* filer: scope copy/move source against JWT AllowedPrefixes

maybeCheckJwtAuthorization only checked r.URL.Path, but copy and move read
their source from the cp.from / mv.from query params. A prefix-restricted
token could copy or move data out of a subtree it cannot otherwise reach.
Check every path the request touches, reusing pathHasComponentPrefix so
`..` in the source is collapsed before the prefix match.

* s3: confine iceberg CreateTable location to the catalog bucket

CreateTable derived the metadata bucket and path from the client-supplied
req.Location / req.Name and wrote there directly, so a caller scoped to one
table bucket could place metadata in another bucket (and path.Join collapsed
any `..`). Require the parsed bucket to equal the request's catalog bucket
and reject traversal segments in the table path.

* webdav: clean client path before subFolder confinement

wrappedFs concatenated subFolder + name before the underlying FileSystem
ran path.Clean, so `..` in the request path or COPY/MOVE Destination
resolved across the FilerRootPath confinement boundary. Clean the name as a
rooted path first so traversal segments collapse below subFolder. Only the
non-default -filer.path (non-empty subFolder) setup was affected.

* filer: enforce read-only rule on real write path with destination header

The x-seaweedfs-destination header overrides the path used for storage-rule
matching while the entry is written at r.URL.Path, letting a caller select a
writable rule for a read-only target. When the header is present, also check
the read-only/quota rule against the actual write path.
This commit is contained in:
Chris Lu authored and GitHub committed 2026-06-11 21:56:16 -07:00
1 parent 34f9b91d69
commit 0345658ea8
26 files changed
+508 -24

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@@ -112,6 +112,9 @@ func wormDeleteCondition(worm, bypass bool) *filer_pb.WriteCondition {
// object (serializing the pointer recompute); for object-lock buckets the
// condition gates the delete on the version's WORM guards evaluated on the owner.
func (s3a *S3ApiServer) routedDeleteSpecificVersion(owner pb.ServerAddress, bucket, object, versionId string, worm, bypass bool) s3err.ErrorCode {
if !isValidVersionID(versionId) {
return s3err.ErrInvalidRequest
}
versionFileName := s3a.getVersionFileName(versionId)
versionsPath := s3a.toFilerPath(bucket, object+s3_constants.VersionsFolder)
cond := wormDeleteCondition(worm, bypass)