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2 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Chris LuandClaude Opus 5.5 d0b5529a2d S3 Vectors: weed-vector, weed-worker and the CLI write tables to the filers and volume servers (#12470)
* sw-client: the filer and volume client library

The client the Enterprise repository's VFS and vector engine use, with
the same API: filer gRPC for entries, listings, volume locations,
assignments and remote caching; volume HTTP, plain or TLS, for needle
bytes; chunk resolution for sparse, overlapping and manifest chunks; a
location cache; and the write side. Enterprise-only protocol fields
(license, conditional mutations, hard links, KV listing) are left out.
Compiled against weed/pb/filer.proto like the other worker crates.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* weed-lance-worker: reads straight from the filers and volume servers

direct_read::DirectReads wraps the object store Lance opens so that
entries, listings and bytes come from the filers (gRPC) and the volume
servers (HTTP, signed with the read JWT), whatever the entry holds:
inline content, chunk manifests, sparse or overlapping chunks, the
filer's volume encryption, the gateway's SSE-S3 (sse.rs, with the KEK
from security.toml or the filer) and objects tiered to remote storage.
Writes still go to the inner store. The code and its tests are those of
the Enterprise repository's engine.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* weed-vector: read tables from the filers and volume servers

The engine asks the masters for the filers (and follows the list), takes
jwt.signing.read.key, grpc.client, https.client and the SSE-S3 keys from
security.toml, and opens every table with DirectReads innermost and the
read cache outside it. --masters is required: the gateway finds the
engine through them and the engine finds the filers. Writes still go to
the gateway.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* sse: chunks out of a manifest keep their own SSE-S3 keys

A chunk expanded from a manifest carries its id as fid, so keying the
per-chunk key cache by file_id gave every such chunk the first one's key
and IV. Keyed by the chunk's id however it is carried.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* direct reads: a silent filer is passed over like an unreachable one

Each filer attempt is bounded, so a filer that accepts the connection and
never answers does not hold the read or the startup lookup.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* sw-client: carry the assignment's fsync to the volume upload

The filer's storage rule may want a needle on disk before the volume
answers; the assignment says so and the upload now asks for it, as the
Go uploader does.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* weed-vector: argument tests pass the required masters; connect timeout for filers

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* direct reads: a failed read is tried once more against fresh locations

A fetch that fails forgets the volume locations it was made against; the
request now looks them up again and retries instead of failing on a
volume that moved.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* sw-client: an exclusive create that finds its entry, and needle deletion

create_entry marks ENTRY_ALREADY_EXISTS with EntryExists, so a caller can
tell a lost conditional create from a failure; the transport deletes a
needle whose entry was never created.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* sse: encode chunks as the gateway stores them

EntryEncoder writes SSE-S3 under a fresh object key wrapped by the KEK,
serialized with the IV, key id and commitment the gateway's reader
expects, each chunk under the IV at its offset; and the filer's volume
encryption under a per-chunk key.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* direct storage: writes, deletes and table removal without the gateway

A put uploads its chunks to the volume servers the filer assigns, at
the filer's chunk size, encoded as the bucket and cluster ask, and
creates the entry the gateway would: md5, mime, size, the ETag
attribute, the SSE-S3 attributes. A conditional create is the filer's
exclusive create, so Lance's manifest commit conflicts the same way;
the needles of a create that failed are discarded. A multipart upload
turns parts into chunks and derives its ETag from them. Deletes remove
the entry with its data, and remove_table a table directory. Copy and
rename, which Lance does not use on S3, are not offered.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* vector.proto: Table says whether its bucket encrypts with SSE-S3

The engine writes the table's files itself, so it needs what the S3 write
path knew: whether the bucket declares SSE-S3. storage_options go: the
engine reaches no S3 store.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* s3vectors: send the engine the bucket's SSE-S3 setting

The rule the S3 write path applies to a Lance bucket's files, factored out
of DeclaredBucketEncryption, decides it from the vector bucket's record.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* weed-vector: every table operation goes to the filers and volume servers

Opens, index creation and drops all go through the direct store, so the
engine has no S3 client of its own left to protect: --storage-option,
the endpoint pin and the request-option allowlist go, and lance's own S3
store is built unsigned and never dialed. The bucket's SSE-S3 setting
comes with the table; -encryptVolumeData encrypts chunks for the volume
servers as the gateway's flag does.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* s3vectors tests: the engine takes no credentials

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* s3vectors e2e: the engine writes what the gateway would have

Every leg checks that the entries the engine wrote carry the gateway's
ETag attribute, the hardened leg that their chunks are encrypted for the
volume servers, and a new test that an SSE-S3 bucket's files are written
under keys the gateway unwraps when it serves them over S3.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* cluster plumbing moves to the worker crate for the engine, worker and CLI

security.toml, the gRPC TLS connector and acceptor, the master dialer,
the filer discovery and the storage connection built from them now live
in weed-lance-worker (cluster, security, grpc_tls), where the worker and
the CLI can use them too. The server crate re-exports security and tls
under their old paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* weed-worker, weed-vector-cli: tables through the filers and volume servers

dataset::Storage replaces the S3 credentials every job and the CLI
carried: a table is opened and written through the cluster's storage,
encrypted as its bucket declares (read from the bucket's record on the
filer), and dropped there. Both take --masters and security.toml like the
engine; --access-key and --secret-key go, and with them the catalog's
x-api-key credential, which the cluster token replaces.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* lance catalog: the cluster token alone authenticates a cluster process

The engine, the maintenance worker and the CLI hold the cluster's filer
signing key and reach a table's files themselves. A request presenting
the cluster token and no other credential is theirs: it is authenticated
by the token, runs through the trusted manager, and is vended no S3
credentials.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* worker chart, README and test design follow the worker's new arguments

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* s3vectors tests: the worker and the CLI reach the cluster through the masters

The cluster gets a filer signing key, which the catalog authenticates
the worker and the CLI by; both take --masters in place of S3 keys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* direct storage: encrypted chunks each start their own CTR stream

The gateway encrypts a multipart part from the IV derived for its offset,
from position zero; the encoder encrypted from the exact byte offset of
the object's stream instead, which agreed only at block boundaries. A
part of 3,000 bytes read back wrong; now tested.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* direct storage: keep what a lost reply saved, discard what a failed put left

A create the filer saved but did not answer, or an exclusive create
retried onto this very upload, keeps its chunks and counts as written;
the needles of a put that failed midway are discarded. The report prints
reads as reads.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* weed-worker: the security.toml it is given also holds its signing key

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* worker chart: the Lance worker mounts grpc.client's certificate

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* direct reads: the filer deadline bounds a listing page, not the listing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* weed-vector: security.toml booleans read as viper reads them

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* weed-vector: a filer the master lists badly does not hide the others

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* weed-vector: register with the masters only once ready to serve

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* sse: every chunk after the first is written under a key of its own

Chunks of one object shared a key with IVs derived from their offsets, so
two chunks meeting inside a cipher block shared keystream. The first
chunk stays under the object's key and IV, which is how the gateway reads
an object of one chunk; every other chunk gets a fresh key and IV, as the
gateway's multipart parts have and as it reads an object of several.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* worker chart: the Lance worker is given the filer group

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* s3vectors e2e: the gateway serves engine-written SSE-S3 files of one chunk and of several

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* sw-client: the HTTP transport asks the volume to fsync when the assignment does

write_synced fell back to the trait default, which refuses fsync, so every
upload under a fsync storage rule failed before it was sent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* sw-client: https.client.ca alone vouches for volume servers

With a CA configured, reqwest still trusted the system roots next to it;
weed processes trust only the configured pool.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* sw-client: an empty volume range is read without a request

A zero length underflowed the Range end, and a range past u64::MAX
overflowed it; the first now returns no bytes, the second an error.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* sw-client: a whole-needle answer to a ranged read is cut to the range

A server or proxy that ignores Range answers 200 with the whole needle;
the read returned its first bytes in place of the ones asked for.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* sw-client: a read size past u64::MAX reads to the end of the file

offset + size overflowed before the clamp to the file size.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* sw-client: an SSE-encrypted manifest is refused without a decoder

Only filer-encrypted manifests were; an SSE one went to the protobuf
decoder as ciphertext.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* sw-client: an empty write leaves the staged file size alone

A zero-byte write past the end grew the size to its offset, as a
zero-byte pwrite does not.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* sw-client: the chunk cache keeps no empty chunks

They add no bytes, so nothing evicted them and the map grew with every
distinct empty needle, even at capacity zero.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* sw-client: flushing with a zero chunk size is an error, not a panic

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* weed-vector: an empty master list fails at startup

"" split into one empty address that passed the check, and the engine
then waited two minutes for a filer before a generic error.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* lance cluster: an empty master list fails at startup

Cluster::new took "" as one master, so weed-vector, weed-worker and the
CLI waited two minutes for a filer before a generic error.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* direct storage: a failed create keeps its chunks when the filer cannot be asked

The lookup after a failed create is what tells a lost reply from a
refusal; when it fails too, the entry may be saved, so its chunks stay.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* weed-vector: a gateway-described table takes the shared unsigned store options

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* vector.proto: give sse_s3 a new field number and reserve storage_options

Field 4 held the storage_options map on master; a gateway from that build
would send a length-delimited value the engine cannot decode as a bool.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* weed-vector-cli: open s3:// URIs on the cluster's storage

A table named by its s3:// location skipped the store wrapper and opened
Lance's own S3 store, which has no credentials since the fallback flags
were dropped. It now opens like a namespace table and needs --masters;
local paths keep the plain builder.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* vector: an index id is plain path components, and drop trusts describe()

`resolved()` now refuses an id whose part is empty, `.`, `..` or holds a
`/`, since the colocated path would land elsewhere on the filer; and
`drop_index` no longer repeats the colocation check for the location
describe() already enforced for the configured schemes, which made a drop
on a memory:// table fail in the scheme test configuration.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* vector: a file delete takes only its entry; a table path is plain names

The store's delete of one file no longer asks the filer for a recursive
delete, so a path that names a directory does not take its content with
it, and `remove_table` refuses a location whose bucket or path component
is empty, `.`, `..` or holds a separator, which the filer would resolve
outside the table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* vector: chunks are assigned to the bucket's collection

The filer assigns a chunk's volume from the collection the caller names;
the gateway names the bucket, prefixed by the filer group when the
cluster has one, so a plain assign landed the engine's chunks in the
default collection. The store now asks for `<bucket>` or
`<group>_<bucket>`, with the group taken from the cluster connection.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* vector: a put's content type becomes the entry's mime

Lance sets no content type today, so every entry was written as
application/octet-stream; a put that does carry one now creates the
entry with it, as the gateway does.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* vector: an upload whose create went unanswered is done with

A create the filer took and never answered (a timeout, or a transport
that reports the filer unavailable) may still be applied, so its chunks
are kept, as they already were for a create whose reply was lost. The
upload then records that it is done: a second completion is refused
instead of creating an empty entry, and an abort discards nothing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* vector: an upload dropped unfinished discards its chunks

A request cancelled mid-write drops its multipart upload with neither
complete nor abort called, leaving its needles on the volume servers.
Dropping an upload that still holds chunks now discards them on the
runtime; a completed upload, or one whose completion is in doubt, holds
none.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* s3: a cluster process registers and deregisters in the vector namespace

The Lance catalog ran a cluster-token caller through the trusted manager
for every operation but the vector-namespace write check of register and
deregister, which still used the caller-checked manager and answered 403
for an index of a LANCE bucket. One `manager(r)` now picks the manager
for all three.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* vector: the worker's flags take two dashes

The worker parses its flags with clap and, unlike the engine, does not
accept Go-style single-dash long flags, so the harness's hardened worker
leg and the README's `-encryptVolumeData` did not start it. The README's
commands also gain the `--masters` the worker now requires.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* vector: the CLI takes --encryptVolumeData

An index build or optimize from the CLI wrote its chunks unencrypted for
the volume servers unless the filer itself asked for the cipher; the CLI
now takes the flag the engine and the worker have.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* vector: a bucket's encryption is read when a table is opened

The setting was cached for a minute, so a bucket recreated with SSE-S3
within that minute had its first tables written plain, and a record that
could not be decoded was read as "no encryption". A table open now reads
the bucket's record from the filer, once per open, and an unreadable
record is an error.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* vector: a removed table's files leave the object cache

`remove_table` asked the cache to forget everything under the table, but
the cache was built without invalidation closures, so the call was refused
and its error dropped: a data file read before the drop was still served
afterwards. The cache now supports the invalidation, and a refusal is an
error.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* vector: an abort keeps the chunks it could not discard

`discard_all` stopped at the first chunk a volume server would not give
up and dropped the rest from the upload's state, so a retried abort found
nothing to do and the needles stayed. Every chunk is now attempted, the
ones left are kept for the next abort or the drop, and the upload can no
longer be completed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* vector: a chunk write that fails gives its needle back

When the volume server took the chunk but its answer was lost, the needle
stayed under a file id nothing would ever reference. The assignment is
known before the write, so a failed write now discards it, best effort,
before the error is returned.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* vector: the live worker tests require the cluster's masters

With WEED_LANCE_NAMESPACE set and WEED_MASTERS not, the tests seeded their
tables through lance's own S3 store, which reaches nothing, and failed
before a job ran. The missing variable is now named outright.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* direct storage: only the filer's missing-entry error means not found

Matching any "not found" text read failures such as an unresolved remote
storage as a missing entry, so a delete or a listing reported success over
data that was still there.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* direct storage test: compare the chunks' SSE-S3 IVs

Each chunk's metadata wraps its key under a fresh nonce, so the metadata
differed even if the key and IV were reused.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* direct storage: a filer passed over unanswered keeps the outcome open

When one filer timed out on a create and the next refused it, the refusal
came back without the no-answer mark, so the put discarded chunks the
first filer may still reference.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* lance test: start every concurrent writer before awaiting them

The lazy map spawned each writer only after the previous one finished, so
the commits never overlapped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* direct storage: count failed uploads and deletes

The storage report counted failed reads and lookups but not a volume
upload, an object delete or a table removal that failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* S3 Vectors tests: run weed-vector-cli as the cluster's processes run

The CLI ran without the fixture's environment and outside its directory,
so under VECTOR_READ_JWT it could not read the volumes and under
VECTOR_TLS it found no security.toml.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* direct storage: a filer that fell away leaves the outcome open too

An unavailable error (connection reset, deadline, transport failure) can
arrive after the filer took the request, so a refusal from the next filer
no longer settles a create the first one may still apply: the chunks are
kept, as after a timeout.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* direct storage: a chunk write abandoned in flight gives its needle back

The needle is assigned before the write, so a request cancelled while the
write is in flight left it on the volume server with nothing to name it.
`Source::upload` is now `assign` and `write`, and the upload holds the
assignment across the write in a guard: a write that fails discards it
and one abandoned discards it on the runtime, while a write that returns
hands it to the entry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* lance tests: sign for the namespace as the worker does

The live tests reached the namespace anonymously once the S3 keys went,
and an anonymous caller lists no tables, so detection proposed nothing.
They now take the cluster key from where the worker reads it
(WEED_JWT_FILER_SIGNING_KEY or security.toml) and log at info, so a table
a handler skips says why in the harness output.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* s3tables lifecycle test: run the Lance worker against the cluster

The worker leg of TestLanceTableLifecycle still handed the Rust tests S3
credentials and no masters. The mini cluster now has a cluster key, and
the tests get WEED_MASTERS and that key; passes with
WEED_LANCE_MAINTENANCE=worker (3 fragments became 1, 4 versions removed).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK

* direct storage: name no collection outside a filer group, as the gateway

Without a filer group the gateway leaves the collection to the filer, so a
filer.conf rule for the bucket's path picks it; naming the bucket
overrode that rule, and the chunks landed where a bucket delete does not
look.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* direct storage: a read reports the entry's content type

A put now stores its ContentType as the entry's mime, but get_opts
returned no attributes, so the type did not come back on a read.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-07 10:51:52 -08:00
Chris LuandClaude Opus 5.5 b9bc42c217 s3vectors: vend write credentials to index data only to the vector engine and Lance worker (#12316)
* security: share the filer admin token check

CheckGrpcAdminPeer verifies an admin Bearer token inline. Move the check
into IsFilerAdminToken so an HTTP endpoint can accept the same token.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* lance: recognize the cluster's own components by a signed token

A request whose X-Seaweedfs-Cluster-Token header carries an admin token
signed with jwt.filer_signing.key comes from a component that holds the
cluster key: the vector engine or the Lance maintenance worker. Mark such
a request as trusted. It still authenticates as an identity, which stays
the principal for vended credentials. A dedicated header leaves the
Authorization header to Lance OAuth clients. A gateway with no key
trusts no one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* lance: vend write credentials to a vector bucket's indexes only to trusted callers

An index in a vector bucket's vector namespace is also a Lance table, so
a caller granted s3tables:UpdateTable could describe it, or declare it
again, and get credentials that write the index data without passing the
vector bucket policy. In that namespace both now vend read-only
credentials unless the caller is trusted, and a declare from anyone else
no longer writes the dataset markers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* lance worker: prove the cluster key to the Lance namespace

The gateway now vends write credentials to a vector bucket's indexes only
to callers that send a token signed with jwt.filer_signing.key. The
worker already takes that key for the admin stream; its namespace client
now mints a token from it for every catalog request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* weed-vector: describe the index the gateway created and prove the cluster key

CreateIndex declared a table the gateway had just created, which only
worked because declare is idempotent. Describe it instead. The Lance
namespace vends write credentials to a vector bucket's indexes only to
callers that send a token signed with jwt.filer_signing.key, so take the
key with --filer-signing-key, the same flag the Lance worker has.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* lance worker: keep the cluster key out of Debug output

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* lance: answer a declare of an existing table with its own location

CreateTable succeeds for a name that already exists without looking at
the location requested, and declare kept using that location for the
dataset markers and the vended credentials. Declaring an existing table
with another table's location, such as a vector index, got credentials
to that table's data. Use the location the catalog holds, which
CreateTable now also reports for a new table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* lance: sign cluster tokens with a key derived for the catalog

A cluster token was a filer admin token signed with jwt.filer_signing.key
and, by default, never expired. Sent to the Lance namespace on every
request, often over plain HTTP, a captured one would also authorize the
filer's IAM service. Sign it with a key derived from the cluster key for
this one use, which the admin services do not accept, and mint it with a
five minute lifetime. weed-vector drops its token lifetime flag.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* lance: follow a reloaded jwt.filer_signing.key

The Lance namespace copied the cluster key at startup. A SIGHUP reload
refreshes the gateway's filer guard but not that copy, so after a key
rotation the restarted vector engine and worker were no longer trusted.
Read the key from the guard on every check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* iceberg: keep a vector bucket's indexes read-only

An index in a vector bucket is also a catalog table the Iceberg REST
catalog loads, and LoadTable vended credentials that could write it to
any caller granted s3tables:UpdateTable. A commit staged its metadata
file in the index directory on the same grant. Apply the vector
namespace rule to both, after the caller's own UpdateTable check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* iceberg: confine a created table's location to its namespace before writing

Stage-create skips the registration that confines a location to the
table's namespace, yet vends write credentials for that location. A
caller allowed to create a table in any namespace of a bucket could name
another namespace's prefix, a vector index included, and get write
credentials to it. The non-staged create also wrote its first metadata
file there before the registration refused the location.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* lance: a declare that finds an existing table answers like describe

Creating a name that already exists is idempotent, so a caller allowed
only to create tables could declare someone else's table and get write
credentials to it, and clear its deregistered marker. Describe would have
vended that caller read-only credentials. A declare now looks the name up
first; when it only finds the table, writing needs UpdateTable, as it does
for describe.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 18:49:01 -08:00