4 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
4 people	ad89f003a5	s3: end a catalog-vended session with the access key it was vended for (#11945) ... * s3: end a catalog-vended session with the access key it was vended for A table credential the Iceberg catalog vends is a self-contained STS session: it stays valid until it expires (an hour by default) even after the access key that loaded the table is deleted or deactivated, or its identity is removed or disabled. An operator revoking a leaked key cannot cut off the table credentials that key already obtained. Sessions are stateless JWTs, so there is no revocation list to consult. This change follows the same pattern as role sessions, which are already refused once their role's ID no longer matches (checkSessionRoleBinding): a vended session carries the access key it was vended for (src_ak, recorded by the previous change), and validateSTSSessionToken checks it against the identity table held in memory. A session of provider iceberg-catalog that carries a source key is refused (InvalidAccessKeyId, as for an unknown key) once its identity is gone or disabled, or the key is no longer one of that identity's active, unexpired credentials. Scope: - Only catalog-vended sessions are checked; web-identity, AssumeRole and every other STS session are validated as before. - The vendor binds a session to the caller's key only when the caller is a stored identity holding that key. A caller that signed with another STS session's key, an OIDC user, or a request that recorded no key gets an unbound session, as today; binding it would refuse every request made with it. A session minted before this change carries no key and is unbound. - The check is one map lookup under the read lock and a scan of one identity's keys (about 11 ns, 0 allocations, with 1,000 identities). Tests (s3api_iceberg_vended_session_test.go) mint real sessions through the catalog vendor and validate them the way a data-path request is validated: deactivating, expiring or deleting key A ends A's session while the session vended through key B on the same identity keeps working; disabling or deleting the identity ends it; callers that are not a stored identity holding the key get unbound sessions that keep working; other STS sessions are not checked. The first two tests and the third fail without this change. * s3: keep the vended-session key binding when the key dies before vend vendedSessionKeyLive gated the binding, so a key revoked between the request's authentication and the vend skipped it and minted an unbound session that stayed usable until it expired. Every catalog auth path pairs the identity name in context with the key that authenticated, so a stored-identity principal always means the request signed with that identity's own key. Bind whenever the principal is a stored identity: a session bound to a now-dead key is refused on its first request, which is what the binding is for. * s3: gate the vended-session key binding on the authenticated caller type lookupByIdentityName(principal) named only that some identity exists, not that the request signed with a stored key: an STS session or OIDC principal that collides with an identity name got a session bound to its temporary key, which vendedSessionKeyLive then refused on every request. Verifiers now record the verified key as a stored credential, and the vendor binds only when that marker is present — keeping the binding even when the key was revoked between authentication and the vend. * s3: enforce the vended key binding under a dedicated claim Sessions minted before the binding existed carry the caller's key in the audit-only SourceAccessKeyId — including temporary STS keys that can never resolve in the identity table. Enforcing on that field would end live table credentials at upgrade; the binding now travels under BoundAccessKeyId, leaving legacy sessions unbound as before. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3: bind vended sessions to a credential fingerprint The key id alone cannot identify a credential: an operator can delete a key and re-create it under the same id with a different secret, reviving sessions minted for the original. Verifiers now record a fingerprint of the secret at authentication; the session dies unless it still matches. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3: keep recording the caller's key on every catalog session SourceAccessKeyId was unconditional audit metadata before the binding existed; gating it on the stored-credential marker dropped the record for callers that authenticated another way. With the binding under its own claim there is no ambiguity left, so the field records the caller's key again regardless of how it authenticated. * s3: key the vended-session credential fingerprint with the signing key The bound-credential fingerprint travels inside the vended session token. As a plain SHA-256 of the secret it gave any token holder an offline guessing oracle for weak secrets, and CodeQL flags it twice. Store the verified secret in the request marker instead and HMAC it with the STS signing key at vend and at validation. The claim can no longer be mined, and the per-request auth path stops hashing secrets. --------- Co-authored-by: Javier de la Torre <jatorre@lakehousebox.com> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chrislusf@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-10-23 03:58:06 -07:00
3 people	74da88fc29	s3, iceberg: record the access key a request was signed with (#11901) ... * s3, iceberg: record the access key a request was signed with Several access keys can belong to one identity, but nothing downstream of authentication says which one signed a request: the audit log carries the identity name only, and every table credential the Iceberg catalog vends for that identity gets the same session name. When an identity is shared (one key per person or per service), the log cannot tell the holders apart. The verifier that matched a credential now records that credential's access key id in the request's identity holder (verifyV4Signature for header, presigned, streaming and STS requests; both SigV2 verifiers). Nothing re-reads the request for a key, so a second, unverified key elsewhere in the request (a junk X-Amz-Credential on a SigV2 request, a junk SigV4 header on a SigV2 presigned URL) is never recorded. - s3err.AccessLog gains access_key_id (omitempty): a static key's id, or an STS session's temporary key id. Every other field is unchanged. - The Iceberg and Lance catalogs install the holder before authenticating a SigV4 request; a Bearer token records the key it was minted from (the token is verified with a key derived from it); a Lance x-api-key records its key. - VendTableCredentials ends the session name with "-k" and the first 12 hex digits of SHA-256 of the key id (the table part gives way within the 64-character limit; the tag is never cut), and carries the key id in the session token (src_ak, SessionInfo.SourceAccessKeyId). Tests: auth_access_key_attribution_test.go and auth_access_key_shapes_test.go (two keys on one identity, the deny path, SigV2 and presigned SigV2 with a junk key elsewhere, streaming seed, STS session, failed signatures record nothing), s3api_iceberg_session_name_test.go, iceberg and lance Auth tests, sts source_access_key_test.go. * s3: record the access key of a verified POST-policy form and of a retargeted signature Two verified signatures left access_key_id empty in the audit log: - A browser POST upload is verified in PostPolicyBucketHandler from its form fields by doesPolicySignatureV2Match / doesPolicySignatureV4Match, which did not record the key. Both now take the request context and record the credential's key once its signature verifies; a form that fails verification records nothing. - verifyV4Signature refuses a signature that verified for one virtual-hosted bucket but was routed to another. The key was recorded only after that check, so the refusal carried none. It is now recorded as soon as a host candidate verifies. Test: TestPostPolicyUploadRecordsTheSigningKey (SigV4 and SigV2 forms, and a form with a wrong signature) and TestSignedVirtualHostRetargetRecordsTheSigningKey; both fail before this change. * s3: test VendTableCredentials end to end for the caller's access key TestVendTableCredentialsRecordsTheCallersKey mints sessions through VendTableCredentials with a configured STS service, the key recorded the way the catalog's authentication records it, then validates each session token: SourceAccessKeyId and the session name's key tag match the key, and a caller without a key gets an untagged session. It fails if the vendor stops passing either field. --------- Co-authored-by: Javier de la Torre <jatorre@lakehousebox.com> Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-10-21 20:33:08 -07:00
Chris Lu	8d2b417c69	iceberg, lance: vend read-only credentials to callers that may only read (#11859) ... * s3tables: share the UpdateTable authorization gate Extract the validation, load, and permission check from handleUpdateTable into authorizeUpdateTable so the table an update was authorized against is the same snapshot the mutation writes to. Manager gains AuthorizeUpdateTable, mirroring AuthorizeCreateTable, so callers can ask the question without updating anything. * s3tables: share the UpdateView authorization gate Extract the lookup, policy load, and permission check from handleUpdateView into authorizeUpdateView, mirroring authorizeUpdateTable, and expose it as Manager.AuthorizeUpdateView for callers that need the answer without the update. * s3api: scope vended table credentials to read-only on request VendTableCredentials takes a readOnly flag and tablePrefixSessionPolicy emits only s3:GetObject for the table prefix when it is set, keeping the conditioned ListBucket and unconditioned GetBucketLocation statements that reads still need. * iceberg: vend read-only credentials when the caller may not write LoadTable and friends vend storage credentials only for the authority the caller holds: the vend now checks UpdateTable/UpdateView permission and a caller that may only read the catalog entry gets a read-only session. Paths that just passed a write gate (stage-create, view commit) keep the full session. * lance: vend read-only credentials when the caller may not write storage_options vends the same read-only session as the Iceberg catalog when the caller lacks UpdateTable on the table. * lance: keep write credentials for callers authorized to declare A Lance commit is a direct S3 write that never revisits the catalog, so a caller that just passed CreateTable still gets a writable session; the UpdateTable gate applies to describe, the read path. * iceberg, lance: log a failed write check instead of only reading it as denied	2026-10-20 07:16:27 -07:00
Chris Lu	7522e17b6d	iceberg: vend table-scoped credentials to clients that ask for delegation (#10777) ... * iceberg: vend table-scoped credentials to clients that ask for delegation The catalog recognised X-Iceberg-Access-Delegation: vended-credentials and then deliberately said nothing, because it had nothing to vend: it withheld even the S3 endpoint so the client would keep the credentials it was configured with. That left every engine expecting the catalog to hand out access - Snowflake, Databricks, Trino with vending, any multi-tenant setup - needing static S3 keys distributed out of band. Mint an STS session per request instead, scoped by a session policy to the table's own prefix plus the bucket listing needed to resolve it, and return it in the load response config and storage-credentials. The role to assume is named by -s3.iceberg.credentialRole; its trust policy is what decides whether a caller may assume it, and vending stays off until it is set. A failed mint falls back to the old silence rather than handing back an endpoint the client cannot sign for. * iceberg: keep vended credentials inside the table prefix Review follow-ups on credential vending: Listing was granted on the bucket ARN with no condition, so a credential vended for one table could enumerate every other table's object names. Constrain s3:prefix to the table's own prefix, which the S3 gateway already populates for list requests. A table location carrying * or ? would have gone into the policy's resource pattern unescaped and widened the session to sibling prefixes. Refuse to vend for such a location rather than escaping it; nothing the catalog generates contains those characters. DurationSeconds skipped the 900..43200 bounds the other assume-role paths enforce, so -s3.iceberg.credentialDurationSeconds could ask for a session outside them. The check is now shared by all three entry points. * iceberg: return the vended credentials from buildFileIOConfig itself buildStorageConfig was a second name for what buildFileIOConfig already did; it now returns the storage credentials alongside the properties, and callers that only want the properties drop them. * iceberg: split the vended bucket grants, and refuse a whole-bucket scope The prefix condition sat on a statement that also granted GetBucketLocation and ListBucketMultipartUploads, neither of which carries an s3:prefix to satisfy it, so both were denied for every vended credential. GetBucketLocation moves to its own unconditioned statement. ListBucketMultipartUploads is dropped: Iceberg writers complete and abort by upload id, and granting it either leaks in-flight keys bucket-wide or breaks on the same missing prefix. A table whose location has no prefix - one registered at the bucket root - would have been vended read and write over every other table in the bucket. Refuse, the way a location with wildcards is refused.	2026-08-16 12:57:12 -07:00