4 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Chris LuandClaude Opus 5.5	3cbace2471	s3: expose ReadAcp/WriteAcp in shell and admin UI, log ACL-upload denials (#12396) ... * shell: accept ReadAcp and WriteAcp in per-bucket and service account actions s3.bucket.access, s3.anonymous.set and s3.serviceaccount.create rejected ReadAcp and WriteAcp, so the ACL actions the S3 gateway enforces could not be granted through them. Share one canonical action table across the three commands and list the ACL actions in their help. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * shell: list ReadAcp and WriteAcp in s3.configure and s3.circuitBreaker help The -actions usage of both commands stopped at Admin, so the ACL actions the gateway enforces could only be found in the source. s3.circuitBreaker now prints the actions it actually accepts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * admin: offer ReadAcp and WriteAcp in the object store user permissions The create and edit user forms only offered Read, Write, List, Tagging and Admin among the bucket permissions, so an identity could not be given the ACL actions from the UI even though uploads with x-amz-acl need WriteAcp. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3api: log the WriteAcp denial of an upload that sets an ACL An upload or copy that carries x-amz-acl or an x-amz-grant-* header also needs WriteAcp. When that check denies, the client only sees a bare AccessDenied and nothing reached the log at the default verbosity, so the header was never suspected. Log the identity and the missing action. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3api: quote the key in the ACL upload denial log An object key can carry a decoded newline, which let a caller add forged lines to the default log. Quote the bucket and key, and word the message so it also fits a policy deny, not only a missing grant. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * shell: say ACL uploads need both Write and WriteAcp The s3.configure example granted WriteAcp alone, which still fails the upload's Write check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * shell: parse S3 action lists with one shared helper s3.bucket.access, s3.anonymous.set and s3.serviceaccount.create each had their own validation loop, so a test of the table did not cover the parsing the commands run. They now call canonicalActionList, which skips empty entries and repeats. s3.anonymous.set validates before contacting IAM, and s3.bucket.access still rejects a list with no actions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * admin: keep bucket-scoped actions the user form cannot show When a user has both global and bucket-scoped actions, the edit form shows only the global ones, and saving replaced the identity's actions with what the form rebuilt, deleting the scoped grants. Carry those actions through the save. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * admin: list hidden bucket grants in the user edit form Restoring the bucket-scoped grants the form cannot show kept them active even when an admin narrowed the user's permissions, with no way to see or drop them. Show them as checked boxes under Other Bucket Permissions; unchecking one removes it on save. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * shell: reject an s3.anonymous.set -access list with no actions A blank list such as ",," parsed to nothing and cleared the bucket's anonymous grants. Use "none" for that, as s3.bucket.access does. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3api: skip the ACL upload denial log for anonymous requests Anonymous uploads with ACL headers can be sent by anyone, so logging each denial at the default level lets unauthenticated clients flood the log. Keep the line for named identities. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * admin: count kept bucket grants when checking an edited user for permissions The empty check ran before the checked Other Bucket Permissions were merged, so a user left with only those grants could not be saved. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * admin: list bucket grants of Admin users in the user edit form parseBucketPermissions returned before reading scoped actions when the user had Admin, so removing Admin and saving dropped grants such as WriteAcp:bucket. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * admin: keep unpaired bucket grants as separate checkboxes in the user edit form The form saves every selected permission on every selected bucket, so grants such as ReadAcp:a with WriteAcp:b came back as all four pairs. Show the grants through the picker only when they cover that full product; otherwise list each grant on its own. Opening the form also resets the bucket scope left over from the previous user. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * admin: keep grants the edit pickers have no option for A permission x bucket product was shown through the pickers even when a bucket was not in the bucket list (deleted, prefix or wildcard grants) or a permission had no picker option (DeleteBucket, PutBucketQuota). Saving then dropped those grants. Such grants now go to the checkbox list, global ones included, and are submitted unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * shell: name the s3.bucket.access anonymous example by what it grants Read,Write,List leaves out ReadAcp and WriteAcp, so it is not full access. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * admin: keep unlisted global grants of Admin users in the user edit form parseBucketPermissions returned for Admin before splitting global grants into picker options and the rest, and only raw option values were re-selected. Saving an Admin user dropped s3tables:* and grants with no picker option such as DeleteBucket. Admin users now use the same split. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * admin: keep the /* suffix of bucket grants in the user edit form parseBucketPermissions dropped a trailing /* before matching bucket options, so saving rewrote ReadAcp:bucket/* as ReadAcp:bucket. The bare form also matches bucket-level requests such as GET ?acl, so the save widened the grant. A /* bucket is not a picker option, so the grant now stays in the checkbox list as written. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * shell: test that s3.bucket.access saves ReadAcp and WriteAcp grants Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-11-04 09:55:54 -08:00
Chris Lu	37e6263efe	fix(shell): attach admin JWT for filer IAM gRPC calls (#9536) ... When jwt.filer_signing.key is set, the filer's IamGrpcServer requires a Bearer token on every IAM RPC. The shell's s3.* IAM commands dialed without that header and failed with Unauthenticated. Route them through a small helper that mints a token from the same key viper-loaded from security.toml and appends it as outgoing metadata, matching the credential grpc_store pattern.	2026-05-18 13:42:32 -07:00
Chris Lu	d50889002b	shell: add s3.iam.*, s3.config.show, s3.user.provision; hide legacy commands (#8956) ... * shell: add s3.iam.*, s3.config.show, s3.user.provision; hide legacy commands Add import/export, configuration summary, and a convenience provisioning command: - s3.iam.export: dump full IAM state as JSON (stdout or file) - s3.iam.import: replace IAM state from a JSON file - s3.config.show: human-readable summary (users, policies, service accounts, groups with status and counts) - s3.user.provision: one-step user+policy+credentials creation for common readonly/readwrite/admin roles Hide legacy commands from help listing: - s3.configure: still works but hidden from help output - s3.bucket.access: still works but hidden from help output Both hidden commands remain fully functional for existing scripts. Also adds a Hidden command tag and filters it from printGenericHelp. * shell: address review feedback for s3.iam.*, s3.config.show, s3.user.provision - Simplify joinMax using strings.Join - Fix rolePolicies: remove s3:ListBucket from object-level actions (already covered by bucket-level statement) - Fix admin role: grant s3:* on bucket resource too - Return flag parse errors instead of swallowing them * shell: address missed review feedback for PR 3 - s3.iam.import: require -force flag for destructive IAM overwrite - s3.config.show: add nil guard for resp.Configuration - s3.user.provision: check if user exists before creating policy - s3.user.provision: reject wildcard bucket names (* ?) * shell: distinguish NotFound from transient errors in provision, use %w wrapping - s3.user.provision: check gRPC status code on GetUser error — only proceed on NotFound, abort on transient/network errors - s3.iam.import: use %w for error wrapping to preserve error chains, wrap PutConfiguration error with context * shell: remove duplicate joinMax after PR 8954 merge command_s3_helpers.go defined joinMax which is already in command_s3_user_list.go from the merged PR 8954. * shell: restrict export file permissions, rollback policy on user create failure - s3.iam.export: use os.OpenFile with mode 0600 instead of os.Create to protect exported credentials from other users - s3.user.provision: rollback the created policy if CreateUser fails, with a warning if the rollback itself fails	2026-04-07 14:10:15 -07:00
Chris Lu	ccc662b90b	shell: add s3.bucket.access command for anonymous access policy (#8774) ... * shell: add s3.bucket.access command for anonymous access policy (#7738) Add a new weed shell command to view or change the anonymous access policy of an S3 bucket without external tools. Usage: s3.bucket.access -name <bucket> -access read,list s3.bucket.access -name <bucket> -access none Supported permissions: read, write, list. The command writes a standard bucket policy with Principal "*" and warns if no anonymous IAM identity exists. * shell: fix anonymous identity hint in s3.bucket.access warning The anonymous identity doesn't need IAM actions — the bucket policy controls what anonymous users can do. * shell: only warn about anonymous identity when write access is set Read and list operations use AuthWithPublicRead which evaluates bucket policies directly without requiring the anonymous identity. Only write operations go through the normal auth flow that needs it. * shell: rewrite s3.bucket.access to use IAM actions instead of bucket policies Replace the bucket policy approach with direct IAM identity actions, matching the s3.configure pattern. The user is auto-created if it does not exist. Usage: s3.bucket.access -name <bucket> -user anonymous -access Read,List s3.bucket.access -name <bucket> -user anonymous -access none s3.bucket.access -name <bucket> -user anonymous Actions are stored as "Action:bucket" on the identity, same as s3.configure -actions=Read -buckets=my-bucket. * shell: return flag parse errors instead of swallowing them * shell: normalize action names case-insensitively in s3.bucket.access Accept actions in any case (read, READ, Read) and normalize to canonical form (Read, Write, List, etc.) before storing. This matches the case-insensitive handling of "none" and avoids confusing rejections.	2026-03-25 23:09:53 -07:00