Commit Graph
2 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Chris LuandDevin 446e6f3444 s3tables: scope OIDC-derived account IDs to the token issuer (#11774)
* s3tables: scope OIDC-derived account IDs to the token issuer

Table ownership keyed off the bare sub claim, so two identity providers
issuing the same sub collided on one account - a caller could act on
tables owned by a different provider's user. OIDC bearer tokens now
carry the same issuer-namespaced (sub, iss) hash STS sessions already
expose as aws:userid, and getAccountID prefers it over the raw claims.

Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* s3tables: keep legacy owners working and scrub client-subject claims

- OIDC bearer tokens without a subject are rejected, and a token-supplied
  aws:userid claim is always overwritten with the verified (sub, iss)
  hash, so a forged claim can no longer stand in for the principal.
- Owners written before issuer scoping hold a bare subject; permission
  checks now re-anchor that subject under the caller's issuer, so the
  same (sub, iss) pair keeps its ownership while scoped owners remain
  issuer-isolated. The token issuer is asserted into claims alongside
  sub and carried through PolicyContext.

* s3tables: anchor legacy subjects to the configured issuer set

* s3: enumerate trusted issuers from registered providers too

* s3: fail closed when the OIDC provider store cannot be listed

trustedOIDCIssuers kept the registered issuers when ListOIDCProviders
failed, presenting a partial set as complete. A deployment trusting one
registered issuer A plus a stored issuer B would, on a listing error,
report only A — the single-issuer shape under which a legacy bare
subject re-anchors — letting a caller from A claim a stored subject
that belongs to B and gain owner access.

With no provider store the registered providers are provably complete,
so keep returning them; with a store, a failed listing means the real
set is unknown, so return none.

---------

Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-16 19:48:32 -07:00
Chris Lu ac524e140a s3: enforce role trust policy on direct OIDC bearer authentication (#10302)
A raw OIDC token sent as Authorization: Bearer was validated and mapped
to a role through the provider's roleMapping, then authorized against
the role's attached policies without ever consulting the role's trust
policy. A federated user could act as a role that
AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity would refuse to issue a session for with the
same token. Run the same trust-policy validation before returning the
principal on the bearer path.
2026-07-10 12:14:18 -07:00