* fix(volume): add authentication to destructive gRPC admin endpoints
Three destructive VolumeServer gRPC endpoints (DeleteCollection,
VolumeDelete, VolumeServerLeave) had no authentication checks, unlike
their HTTP counterparts which are protected by the Guard whitelist.
Add IsWhiteListed(host) to security.Guard and a checkGrpcAdminAuth
helper on VolumeServer that extracts the peer IP from gRPC context and
validates it against the guard whitelist. Gate all three endpoints
behind this check.
* fix(volume): tolerate unparseable gRPC peer address in admin auth check
S3 Filer Group integration tests were failing with
PermissionDenied "bad peer address: address @: missing port in address"
when DeleteCollection ran across the in-process gRPC connection
between filer and volume server — the peer addr surfaces as "@" there
and net.SplitHostPort can't parse it. The check rejected before
IsWhiteListed could exercise its allow-all path for empty-whitelist
deployments.
Hand the raw peer string to IsWhiteListed when SplitHostPort fails.
With no whitelist configured (the test environment's mode) it accepts;
with a whitelist configured the unparseable host won't match anything
and the call still gets denied as it should.
Adds three regression tests for IsWhiteListed pinning the empty-config
allow-all, populated-list reject-unknown, and signing-key-only allow-
all branches that the gRPC admin helper relies on.
* refactor(security): dedup checkWhiteList through IsWhiteListed
The HTTP-side checkWhiteList and the gRPC-side IsWhiteListed had the
same lookup logic in two places; future drift was just a matter of
time. Have checkWhiteList delegate so the membership semantics live
in exactly one function.
Behaviour is unchanged: the new path still returns nil for
isEmptyWhiteList (signing-key-only mode) and still rejects unknown
hosts when a whitelist is configured.
Addresses gemini medium review on PR #8876.
* fix(volume): protect remaining state-altering gRPC admin endpoints
DeleteCollection, VolumeDelete, and VolumeServerLeave were the
truly-destructive endpoints, but AllocateVolume, VolumeMount,
VolumeUnmount, VolumeConfigure, VolumeMarkReadonly, and
VolumeMarkWritable also modify server state and should sit behind
the same whitelist gate. Read-only endpoints (VolumeStatus,
VolumeServerStatus, VolumeNeedleStatus, Ping) stay open.
The check is a no-op when no whitelist is configured (the default),
so existing deployments keep working; operators who lock down their
volume servers via guard.white_list now get consistent coverage.
Addresses gemini security-high review on PR #8876.
* fix(volume): typed peer addr + audit log for gRPC admin auth
Prefer a typed *net.TCPAddr when extracting the peer IP — string
parsing was already a fallback for the in-process case but using the
typed form first is cleaner and skips an unnecessary parse on the
common path. Log failed authorization attempts at V(0) so an operator
running with a whitelist sees the host that was rejected (and the
raw remote address in case the IP lookup itself was the failure
mode), matching what the HTTP Guard already does.
Addresses gemini medium review on PR #8876.
* fix(volume): protect vacuum + scrub + EC-shards-delete admin endpoints
Five more master/admin-driven destructive operations live outside
volume_grpc_admin.go and were missing the same whitelist gate:
- VacuumVolumeCompact, VacuumVolumeCommit, VacuumVolumeCleanup
- ScrubVolume
- VolumeEcShardsDelete
VacuumVolumeCheck stays open (read-only). BatchDelete also stays
open: it's the data-plane multi-object delete called from the S3 API
and filer, not an admin operation; gating it would break ordinary S3
DeleteObjects calls.
Addresses gemini security-high review on PR #8876.
* fix(volume): simplify no-peer-info branch in gRPC admin auth
The IsWhiteListed("") fallback was defending against a scenario
that doesn't actually arise — real gRPC connections always populate
peer info. Drop the branch and just deny when peer info is missing,
which is the safer default and matches "if we don't know who the
caller is, refuse".
* fix(volume-rust): mirror gRPC admin auth on the rust volume server
The rust volume server has the same set of destructive admin
endpoints as the Go side and the same Guard infrastructure, but
nothing was wired together — every endpoint accepted unauthenticated
calls regardless of guard configuration. Same vulnerability class
the Go fix on this PR closes; this commit closes it on the rust
side too so the two stacks stay aligned.
Adds VolumeGrpcService::check_grpc_admin_auth that pulls the peer
SocketAddr off the tonic Request and runs Guard::check_whitelist on
its IP, then applies the helper to the same set the Go side covers:
DeleteCollection, AllocateVolume, VolumeMount, VolumeUnmount,
VolumeDelete, VolumeMarkReadonly, VolumeMarkWritable,
VolumeConfigure, VacuumVolumeCompact, VacuumVolumeCommit,
VacuumVolumeCleanup, VolumeServerLeave, ScrubVolume,
VolumeEcShardsDelete. Read-only endpoints stay open; BatchDelete
stays open as a data-plane multi-object delete.
This PR introduces three new metrics...
- `scrub_last_time_seconds`
- `scrub_volume_failures`
- `scrub_shard_failures`
...capturing overall volume scrub results, and allowing to construct alerts
and dashboards to monitor scrubbing progress.
Note that these metrics are aggregated at the volume/EC shard level, and not
intended for fine-grained tracking of scrubbing operations.
* Give the `ScrubVolume()` RPC an option to flag found broken volumes as read-only.
Also exposes this option in the shell `volume.scrub` command.
* Remove redundant test in `TestVolumeMarkReadonlyWritableErrorPaths`.
417051bb slightly rearranges the logic for `VolumeMarkReadonly()` and `VolumeMarkWritable()`,
so calling them for invalid volume IDs will actually yield that error, instead of checking
maintnenance mode first.
Implement index (fast) scrubbing for regular/EC volumes via `ScrubVolume()`/`ScrubEcVolume()`.
Also rearranges existing index test files for reuse across unit tests for different modules.
* Implement RPC skeleton for regular/EC volumes scrubbing.
See https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/issues/8018 for details.
* Minor proto improvements for `ScrubVolume()`, `ScrubEcVolume()`:
- Add fields for scrubbing details in `ScrubVolumeResponse` and `ScrubEcVolumeResponse`,
instead of reporting these through RPC errors.
- Return a list of broken shards when scrubbing EC volumes, via `EcShardInfo'.
Chris Lu