Commit Graph
2 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Chris Lu 12f283357f fix(iam): four phase-3 follow-ups (provider scoping, public path wrapper, static mirror, claim-mode RoleArn) (#9333)
* fix(iam): scope IAM-managed OIDC provider lookup by role account

Two account-scoped OIDC records sharing an issuer were collapsed into a
single map slot keyed only by the URL. The last-write-wins entry then
served every AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity, so a token destined for account
B's role could be validated by account A's record (its clientIDs and
thumbprints), defeating the per-account isolation the records exist for.

The role-account check in enforceProviderAccountScope still rejected
the cross-account assumption, but only after the wrong record's
audience and TLS pin had already accepted the token.

Refresh now keys IAM-managed records as (issuer, account), and
validation parses the requested role's account up front and matches
the record under that issuer in this order: exact account, global
(account-less), static-config fallback. An unknown account hint
deliberately skips account-scoped entries — picking one arbitrarily is
the bug this commit fixes — and falls through to global or static.

* fix(iam): route public AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity through IAMManager

handleAssumeRoleWithWebIdentity called stsService.AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
directly, bypassing the IAMManager wrapper. The wrapper is where
enforceProviderAccountScope rejects cross-account assumption attempts
and capDurationByRole clamps to the role's MaxSessionDuration; both
silently became no-ops for any AWS-SDK caller hitting the public
endpoint.

Dispatch through the IAMManager (via the existing IAMManagerProvider
interface that other handlers in this file already use) when one is
wired. Embedded test setups without an IAM integration fall back to
the bare STS service unchanged.

* fix(iam): mirror thumbprints, principal-tag keys, and policy claim from static OIDC config

initOIDCProviderStore mirrored only URL and ClientIDs. Once
RefreshOIDCProvidersFromStore ran (on any IAM-managed mutation, or on
boot once the metadata-subscribe loop kicked in),
buildOIDCProviderFromRecord rebuilt the runtime provider from this
truncated record. Because IAM-managed entries take precedence over the
static-config map, the rebuild silently shadowed the bootstrap with a
weaker provider:

- Thumbprints: dropped, so TLS-pinned issuers fell back to the system
  trust store.
- AllowedPrincipalTagKeys: dropped, so principal-tag claims stopped
  reaching the session.
- PolicyClaim: dropped, so claim-based policy mode stopped triggering.

Pull all three from the provider's static Config map at mirror time so
the stored record round-trips to a runtime provider equivalent to the
one the static config produced directly.

* fix(iam): allow empty RoleArn in AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity HTTP handler

Phase 3b advertises that RoleArn MAY be omitted in claim-based policy
mode — the STS service then derives the assumed-role ARN from the
configured policy claim. The HTTP handler still rejected empty RoleArn
up front with MissingParameter, so SDK callers using the documented
omitted-role flow never reached the STS layer.

Drop the pre-check; STS still validates that claim-based mode is
configured and that the IDP emits policies, returning a precise error
when either is missing. The existing error mapping below this point
surfaces those as InvalidParameterValue, matching what an AWS SDK
expects.

* test(iam): update missing-RoleArn STS integration test for the new contract

The previous commit drops the HTTP-layer RoleArn pre-check so claim-based
mode can derive the ARN from a JWT claim. The integration test still
asserted MissingParameter for the missing-RoleArn case, which now
reaches the STS layer and surfaces a JWT-parse error instead. Update
the assertion to match: missing RoleArn alone must no longer surface
as MissingParameter, but a bogus JWT must still be rejected.
2026-05-05 19:14:44 -07:00
Chris Lu 4ded97a321 feat(iam): OIDC provider store + read-only IAM API (Phase 2a) (#9319)
* feat(iam): STS web-identity AWS-fidelity polish

- OIDC discovery via .well-known/openid-configuration; falls back to
  /.well-known/jwks.json when discovery is absent. Reject discovery docs
  whose issuer claim does not match the configured issuer to defend
  against issuer-substitution.
- ComputeParentUser derives a stable per-identity hash from (sub, iss).
  Surface as aws:userid in the request context and as a parent_user
  claim in the session JWT so per-user state survives token rotation.
- Per-role MaxSessionDuration (3600..43200) clamps requested
  DurationSeconds before the STS service applies its own caps.
- Tighten RoleSessionName to the AWS contract: 2..64 chars from
  [\w+=,.@-].
- Populate PackedPolicySize in AssumeRole / AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity /
  AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity responses as a percentage of the 2048-byte
  inline session policy budget.

* fix(iam): leave omitted DurationSeconds nil so STS default applies

capDurationByRole was substituting the role's MaxSessionDuration
when the caller omitted DurationSeconds entirely. AWS returns the
configured default (typically 1 hour) in that case, not the role's
upper bound — a 12h MaxSessionDuration shouldn't silently make every
no-duration assume-role mint a 12h session.

Return nil when requested is nil; let the downstream
calculateSessionDuration in the STS service apply its TokenDuration
default. The role-max upper bound still clamps when the request
arrives with a concrete value above the cap.

Addresses gemini high-priority review on PR #9318.

* fix(iam): synchronize OIDCProvider JWKS cache fields

jwksCache, jwksFetchedAt, resolvedJWKSUri, and discoveryFailed are
mutated lazily on the first token-validate call and refreshed
afterwards on TTL expiry. Multiple S3 requests can land here in
parallel, so the writes were racing against subsequent reads on
every other goroutine. resolvedJWKSUri/discoveryFailed inherited
the same un-protected pattern when discovery shipped.

Add sync.RWMutex; getPublicKey takes the read lock for the
common cache-hit path and promotes to the write lock for misses
+ refreshes. fetchJWKSLocked / resolveJWKSUriLocked assume the
write lock is held by the caller; fetchJWKS keeps the
test-friendly entry point that acquires the lock itself.

Addresses gemini high-priority review on PR #9318.

* fix(iam): trim trailing slash + retry discovery after transient failure

Two OIDC discovery edge cases reviewers flagged:

1. Issuer comparison was sensitive to trailing slashes. resolveJWKSUri
   trims them when building the discovery URL, but the doc.Issuer ↔
   p.config.Issuer check did not, so an IDP whose issuer claim drops or
   adds the slash relative to the configured value would be falsely
   rejected. Trim a single trailing slash on each side before comparing.

2. discoveryFailed flipped to true on any error and stayed there for the
   process lifetime. A transient 5xx at startup permanently locked the
   provider into the /.well-known/jwks.json fallback. Reset the flag at
   the top of fetchJWKSLocked when no URI has been cached yet, so each
   JWKS refresh (typically once per TTL = 1h) reattempts discovery.
   Successful discovery remains cached via resolvedJWKSUri so we don't
   pay the discovery RTT on every refresh.

Addresses gemini security-medium + medium reviews on PR #9318.

* fix(iam): require non-empty issuer in OIDC discovery doc

The previous "doc.Issuer != "" && ..." guard let a discovery document
that omitted the issuer field bypass the issuer-mismatch check
entirely, letting the doc steer fetchJWKS at any URL it provided.
OIDC Discovery 1.0 §3 mandates the issuer field; treat missing as a
hard failure same as mismatched. Trailing-slash equivalence still
applies.

Adds TestDiscoveryRejectsMissingIssuer alongside the existing
TestDiscoveryRejectsIssuerMismatch via a new omitDiscoveryIssuer
toggle on fakeIDP.

* feat(iam): OIDC provider store + read-only IAM API

Add OIDCProviderRecord — the persisted, IAM-managed view of an OIDC
identity provider — and an OIDCProviderStore interface with memory and
filer implementations mirroring the existing role-store pattern.

The store is hydrated at boot from the static STS.Providers list so the
new IAM API surfaces the same set the STS service already validates
against. Two read-only actions land now:

- ListOpenIDConnectProviders -> ARN-only list, AWS-shape XML.
- GetOpenIDConnectProvider   -> URL, ClientIDList, ThumbprintList,
                                Tags, CreateDate.

Mutations (Create/Delete/Add-Remove ClientID/Update Thumbprint), multiple
client_ids per provider, and TLS thumbprint pinning come in Phase 2b.

* fix(iam): preserve CreatedAt across boots + paginate ListProviders

Two medium-priority issues gemini flagged on the read-only IAM API:

1. The static-config bootstrap was setting CreatedAt = time.Now() on
   every server start, so the IAM GetOpenIDConnectProvider response's
   CreateDate shifted on each restart even when backed by a persistent
   store. Look up the existing record via GetProviderByARN first and
   preserve its CreatedAt; only the UpdatedAt advances.

2. FilerOIDCProviderStore.ListProviders had a hardcoded Limit: 1000
   that silently truncated above that. Stream-paginate via
   StartFromFileName, returning io.EOF naturally and surfacing all
   other errors instead of swallowing them.

Addresses two gemini medium reviews on PR #9319.
2026-05-04 22:15:03 -07:00