3 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Chris Lu	6483583491	feat(iam): account-scoped OIDC providers (Phase 3c) (#9323) ... * feat(iam): claim-based policy mode for AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity When the caller passes the sentinel RoleArn arn:aws:iam:::role/sts-claim-based (or omits it entirely) and the matched OIDC provider has policyClaim set, mint a session whose effective policies come from that JWT claim instead of from a server-side role mapping. Accepts string, comma-separated string, or array shapes — MinIO-compatible behaviour for IDPs that already attach policies to the user. Trust-policy validation is skipped in claim-mode: the IDP is the sole authority for both authentication and authorization, mirroring the contract MinIO documents for its DummyRoleARN flow. Concrete-role mode is unchanged and still requires the role definition + trust policy. * fix(iam): trim policy-claim array elements + clean up stale comments Three medium-priority cleanups gemini flagged on the claim-based path: - extractClaimPolicies's array branch was leaving whitespace on each element while the string/comma-separated branch trimmed via splitPolicyClaimString. An IDP that emits ["readonly", " billing "] would create a "billing" policy lookup that didn't match the stored name. Trim every array element, drop empties. - The "synthetic ARN keyed on the session name" comment was wrong — effectiveRoleArn here is the literal sentinel; it's the assumed-role ARN generated downstream that's session-keyed. Reword. - The empty if/else block at the start of validateAssumeRoleWithWebIdentityRequest existed only to host a comment about deferred validation; the comment now lives in the function godoc and the empty branch is gone. Addresses three gemini medium reviews on PR #9322. * feat(iam): account-scoped OIDC providers Add OIDCProviderRecord.AccountID enforcement: when a role lives in account A, the OIDC provider validating the assume-role token must be either global (AccountID="") or also live in account A. Cross-account use is rejected at the IAM-manager layer before reaching the trust policy validator. OIDCProviderStore gains GetProviderByIssuerAndAccount; both the in- memory and filer-backed stores implement it. Static-config-only deployments are unaffected since they don't populate the store. * fix(iam): account-scoped lookup for cross-account check enforceProviderAccountScope was calling GetProviderByIssuer, which returns the first match arbitrarily when multiple providers share an issuer (one global + one per tenant is the canonical setup). On a two-record collision the wrong record could come back first and falsely reject a valid same-account or global-provider request. Use GetProviderByIssuerAndAccount as the primary lookup so the filter happens in the store. On miss, fall back to GetProviderByIssuer purely to distinguish "issuer entirely unknown" (let the STS layer reject) from "issuer registered in a different account" (surface a precise cross-account error). Addresses gemini high-priority review on PR #9323.	2026-05-05 13:06:53 -07:00
Chris Lu	f8973b3ed6	feat(iam): OIDC provider mutations + multi-client + TLS thumbprints (Phase 2b) (#9320) ... * feat(iam): OIDC provider mutations + multi-client + TLS thumbprints - Mutating IAM actions: CreateOpenIDConnectProvider, DeleteOpenIDConnectProvider, AddClientIDToOpenIDConnectProvider, RemoveClientIDFromOpenIDConnectProvider, UpdateOpenIDConnectProviderThumbprint, TagOpenIDConnectProvider, UntagOpenIDConnectProvider. Each enforces AWS-shape input bounds and the read-only mode rejects all mutations. - Multiple client_ids per provider in OIDCConfig (clientIds list, plural) with full backward compatibility — singular clientId still works and is merged into the audience allowlist. Provider factory accepts both. - AWS-compatible TLS thumbprint pinning: when OIDCConfig.Thumbprints is non-empty, JWKS fetches enforce that the negotiated TLS chain contains a certificate whose SHA-1 hex matches the allowlist. Empty list keeps the existing system-trust path. * fix(iam): factor Tags.member.N parser into a helper CreateOpenIDConnectProvider and TagOpenIDConnectProvider were both walking the AWS Tags.member.N.Key / Tags.member.N.Value query-string convention with copy-pasted loops. Factor into extractTags so the parsing rules and the "no tags present" semantics live in one place. Addresses gemini medium review on PR #9320. * fix(iam): sentinel errors for OIDC provider not-found / already-exists The s3api dispatcher was using strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found") and "already exists" to map IAM-manager errors back to AWS error codes. Substring matching on a formatted message couples the API error code to the exact wording of the upstream message — touching the message silently changes the IAM API contract. Define ErrOIDCProviderNotFound and ErrOIDCProviderAlreadyExists in the integration package, fmt.Errorf("%w: ...") them at the four return sites in iam_manager.go and oidc_provider_store.go, and use errors.Is at the s3api call sites. Same control flow, no string-match fragility. Addresses gemini medium review on PR #9320. * fix(iam): surface non-NotFound errors from CreateOIDCProvider lookup Previously CreateOIDCProvider only treated GetProviderByARN's success path as "exists" and silently fell through on any error, including transient backend failures. That hid real problems and still attempted a write. Distinguish ErrOIDCProviderNotFound (the only "safe to create" case) from other errors so we don't mask filer outages or partition issues. * fix(iam): enforce 100-client-ID cap on AddClientIDToOIDCProvider CreateOIDCProvider and the implicit update path through validateOIDC- ProviderRecord both reject lists with more than 100 client IDs, but AddClientIDToOIDCProvider could grow the list past that bound one ID at a time. Refuse the add when the list is already at the cap so the invariant holds across every mutation entry point. * feat(iam): IAM-managed OIDC provider live view in STS service Add a separate, mutex-guarded map of admin-managed OIDC providers on the STS service. The map can be atomically replaced via SetIAMManagedOIDCProvidersByIssuer; AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity lookups consult it first and fall back to the existing static-config map, so records persisted through the IAM API can shadow bootstrap entries without a restart. This is the runtime hook the IAM API and the metadata-subscribe path will both call when the OIDCProviderStore changes (next two commits). * feat(iam): refresh STS service runtime view after OIDC mutations Add IAMManager.RefreshOIDCProvidersFromStore: lists every persisted OIDCProviderRecord, builds a runtime OIDCProvider for each, and atomically publishes the issuer-keyed map into the STS service. Each mutating IAM API call (Create / Delete / AddClientID / RemoveClientID / UpdateThumbprints) now triggers this refresh inline so the local instance picks up the change without waiting for a metadata-subscribe round trip. Tag mutations skip the refresh because tags do not affect token validation. Refresh failures only log; the persisted write has already succeeded by that point, so a transient list error must not surface to the API caller. The peer-instance update path (filer metadata subscription) is added in a follow-up commit. * feat(iam): subscribe to OIDC provider changes on the filer Watch /etc/iam/oidc-providers under the existing s3 metadata-subscribe loop and call RefreshOIDCProvidersFromStore on any create / update / delete / rename. This is the cross-instance update path: S3 server A writes via the IAM API, the filer fans out the metadata change, and S3 servers B..N pick up the new runtime view without a restart. Mirrors the existing onIamConfigChange / onCircuitBreakerConfigChange pattern. The handler short-circuits when the path is unrelated, and when no IAMManager is wired in (static-only configurations).	2026-05-05 11:26:08 -07:00
Chris Lu	4ded97a321	feat(iam): OIDC provider store + read-only IAM API (Phase 2a) (#9319) ... * feat(iam): STS web-identity AWS-fidelity polish - OIDC discovery via .well-known/openid-configuration; falls back to /.well-known/jwks.json when discovery is absent. Reject discovery docs whose issuer claim does not match the configured issuer to defend against issuer-substitution. - ComputeParentUser derives a stable per-identity hash from (sub, iss). Surface as aws:userid in the request context and as a parent_user claim in the session JWT so per-user state survives token rotation. - Per-role MaxSessionDuration (3600..43200) clamps requested DurationSeconds before the STS service applies its own caps. - Tighten RoleSessionName to the AWS contract: 2..64 chars from [\w+=,.@-]. - Populate PackedPolicySize in AssumeRole / AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity / AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity responses as a percentage of the 2048-byte inline session policy budget. * fix(iam): leave omitted DurationSeconds nil so STS default applies capDurationByRole was substituting the role's MaxSessionDuration when the caller omitted DurationSeconds entirely. AWS returns the configured default (typically 1 hour) in that case, not the role's upper bound — a 12h MaxSessionDuration shouldn't silently make every no-duration assume-role mint a 12h session. Return nil when requested is nil; let the downstream calculateSessionDuration in the STS service apply its TokenDuration default. The role-max upper bound still clamps when the request arrives with a concrete value above the cap. Addresses gemini high-priority review on PR #9318. * fix(iam): synchronize OIDCProvider JWKS cache fields jwksCache, jwksFetchedAt, resolvedJWKSUri, and discoveryFailed are mutated lazily on the first token-validate call and refreshed afterwards on TTL expiry. Multiple S3 requests can land here in parallel, so the writes were racing against subsequent reads on every other goroutine. resolvedJWKSUri/discoveryFailed inherited the same un-protected pattern when discovery shipped. Add sync.RWMutex; getPublicKey takes the read lock for the common cache-hit path and promotes to the write lock for misses + refreshes. fetchJWKSLocked / resolveJWKSUriLocked assume the write lock is held by the caller; fetchJWKS keeps the test-friendly entry point that acquires the lock itself. Addresses gemini high-priority review on PR #9318. * fix(iam): trim trailing slash + retry discovery after transient failure Two OIDC discovery edge cases reviewers flagged: 1. Issuer comparison was sensitive to trailing slashes. resolveJWKSUri trims them when building the discovery URL, but the doc.Issuer ↔ p.config.Issuer check did not, so an IDP whose issuer claim drops or adds the slash relative to the configured value would be falsely rejected. Trim a single trailing slash on each side before comparing. 2. discoveryFailed flipped to true on any error and stayed there for the process lifetime. A transient 5xx at startup permanently locked the provider into the /.well-known/jwks.json fallback. Reset the flag at the top of fetchJWKSLocked when no URI has been cached yet, so each JWKS refresh (typically once per TTL = 1h) reattempts discovery. Successful discovery remains cached via resolvedJWKSUri so we don't pay the discovery RTT on every refresh. Addresses gemini security-medium + medium reviews on PR #9318. * fix(iam): require non-empty issuer in OIDC discovery doc The previous "doc.Issuer != "" && ..." guard let a discovery document that omitted the issuer field bypass the issuer-mismatch check entirely, letting the doc steer fetchJWKS at any URL it provided. OIDC Discovery 1.0 §3 mandates the issuer field; treat missing as a hard failure same as mismatched. Trailing-slash equivalence still applies. Adds TestDiscoveryRejectsMissingIssuer alongside the existing TestDiscoveryRejectsIssuerMismatch via a new omitDiscoveryIssuer toggle on fakeIDP. * feat(iam): OIDC provider store + read-only IAM API Add OIDCProviderRecord — the persisted, IAM-managed view of an OIDC identity provider — and an OIDCProviderStore interface with memory and filer implementations mirroring the existing role-store pattern. The store is hydrated at boot from the static STS.Providers list so the new IAM API surfaces the same set the STS service already validates against. Two read-only actions land now: - ListOpenIDConnectProviders -> ARN-only list, AWS-shape XML. - GetOpenIDConnectProvider -> URL, ClientIDList, ThumbprintList, Tags, CreateDate. Mutations (Create/Delete/Add-Remove ClientID/Update Thumbprint), multiple client_ids per provider, and TLS thumbprint pinning come in Phase 2b. * fix(iam): preserve CreatedAt across boots + paginate ListProviders Two medium-priority issues gemini flagged on the read-only IAM API: 1. The static-config bootstrap was setting CreatedAt = time.Now() on every server start, so the IAM GetOpenIDConnectProvider response's CreateDate shifted on each restart even when backed by a persistent store. Look up the existing record via GetProviderByARN first and preserve its CreatedAt; only the UpdatedAt advances. 2. FilerOIDCProviderStore.ListProviders had a hardcoded Limit: 1000 that silently truncated above that. Stream-paginate via StartFromFileName, returning io.EOF naturally and surfacing all other errors instead of swallowing them. Addresses two gemini medium reviews on PR #9319.	2026-05-04 22:15:03 -07:00