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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Chris Lu
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77a9dd4b9e |
s3: route per-key object authorization through a shared helper (#11072)
* s3: share the per-key object authorization across copy and delete AuthorizeCopySource and AuthorizeObjectDelete both authorize a key the request URL does not name by evaluating the bucket policy and IAM against a synthetic per-key request; only the method and action differed. Extract that into authorizeObjectKeyAction and make the two callers thin wrappers. No behavior change. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Qo7p6VsoWxMo8816ogJFk5 * s3: route POST Object uploads through the shared object authorization POST Object uploads (presigned-POST / HTML form) authorized the write with only the coarse per-identity Write action, unlike the other write paths which also check the resolved object against the bucket policy and IAM. Route POST through authorizeObjectKeyAction via a new AuthorizeObjectWrite so it is authorized like the equivalent PUT. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Qo7p6VsoWxMo8816ogJFk5 * s3: test POST Object per-key authorization Drives a signed POST upload and checks the per-key authorization decision for a denied, permitted, and admin caller. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Qo7p6VsoWxMo8816ogJFk5 |
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Chris Lu
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f5f1dcbd8c |
s3: keep verifying the request host when externalUrl is set (#10970)
* s3: keep verifying the request host when externalUrl is set externalUrl was the only host candidate once set, so a client that dialed the gateway directly instead of through the proxy always got SignatureDoesNotMatch. Make it lead the candidate walk instead: every candidate still needs a valid signature, and the request-derived hosts are already trusted when the flag is unset, so a mixed proxy plus in-cluster topology can now advertise a public endpoint and verify both planes. * s3: cover virtual-hosted addressing behind externalUrl The old pin also rejected an external client that signed bucket.api.example.com, since only the bare externalUrl host was ever tried. The candidate walk covers it; pin the case down. |
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Chris Lu
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368b2035b2 |
s3: deny anonymous access when the identity config loads no identities (#10954)
* s3: deny anonymous requests when the identity config loads no identities Naming a config file is the operator asking for authentication. A file that yields no identity - an unpopulated secret mount, or a mistyped top-level key the proto parser silently drops - left the gateway open to every anonymous caller: ListBuckets returned 200, and anonymous PUT could create buckets and write objects. * s3: name the unknown top-level keys in an identity config The proto parser discards what it does not recognise, so a mistyped "identites" loads as an empty config. Naming the dropped keys at startup turns the resulting lockout into a one-line diagnosis. * s3: isolate the auth-enforcement tests from AWS environment credentials * s3: use a singular "identity" as the unrecognised-key example Codespell rejects the misspelling the example used. * s3: cover the empty identity config alongside the unrecognised key * s3: cover a config file whose body is an empty object |
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Chris Lu
|
69cc2869ad |
Fixes from the review of the admin bucket policy UI (#10907)
* admin: treat a missing S3 Tables policy as an empty load, not an error
The bucket/table policy GET relayed the backend's 404 NoSuchPolicy to the
dialog, whose loader treats any non-OK response as a load failure and
keeps Save and Delete blocked. A bucket or table without a policy could
never be given one. Return policy null instead, the same contract
ShowBucketPolicy uses for classic buckets.
* admin: reject policy documents the structured editor would misread
A top-level JSON array passed the object guard (typeof [] is 'object')
and loaded as a zero-statement policy, which the next commit would
rewrite to an empty document. Object elements in Action/Resource were
coerced to '[object Object]' and saved that way on the s3tables surface,
which stores policies verbatim. Both now throw, which routes the
document to the JSON tab like other unrepresentable shapes.
* admin: let the JSON tab save documents the structured editor can't model
Save with the JSON tab active required a round-trip through
policyDocToEditorState, so exactly the documents the dialogs shunt to
'JSON tab only' mode (unrepresentable Effect, Resource+NotResource, and
the like) could never be saved - Delete was the only mutation left.
Invalid JSON still blocks; an unrepresentable document now saves and the
editor state stays marked unparsed.
* admin: pin the policy editor to what each consumer's backend supports
The s3tables evaluator has no NotResource/NotPrincipal fields - it
silently drops them, turning Allow+NotResource into allow-everything and
making Deny+NotPrincipal inert - and it only matches s3tables: actions
against s3tables ARNs, while the editor suggested s3: actions and
arn:aws:s3::: resources. New registerPolicyEditor knobs: allowNegation
hides the Not* modes and routes documents using them to the JSON tab;
resourceSuggestions pins the Resource autocomplete to the open
resource's ARN; the S3 Tables dialogs get an s3tables-only action
datalist. requirePrincipal now also hides NotPrincipal, which
policy_engine.ValidateBucketPolicy always rejects, and the client-side
check requires Principal specifically to match that server rule.
* admin: save S3 Tables policies from a button, not form submission
The multi-input structured editor sits inside a form whose Save button
was type=submit, so Enter in any single-line editor input - accepting an
autocomplete suggestion, say - implicitly submitted whatever half-built
statement the editor held, and the backend stores the document verbatim.
A lone statement with no Principal matches nobody, locking out every
non-owner. Save is now an ordinary button and the form ignores
submission.
* admin: block zero-statement policy saves
Committing the active tab before the emptiness check made 'Policy JSON
is required' dead code: an empty editor serializes to {"Statement":[]},
which the s3tables backend stores verbatim - evaluated default-deny for
every non-owner, while the statement-count column keeps showing 'Not
configured'. All three policy dialogs now refuse a save with no
statements and point at Delete instead. The classic bucket modal only
gained a clearer message; the server already rejected the document.
* admin: guard S3 Tables policy mutations against stale and overlapping requests
The save/delete completions ran against whatever resource the shared
modal happened to show by then: a slow PUT for one bucket would hide the
modal mid-edit of another and misattribute its alerts, a late DELETE
cleared the shared textarea over the newly opened resource with its
loaded flag set, and nothing stopped a double-click from firing two
overlapping mutations. Ported the classic modal's pattern: capture the
target on start, flag the mutation in flight with the buttons disabled,
and only touch the UI when the completion still matches the open
resource. Success now reloads the page, which also keeps the Policy
column's statement count honest.
* admin: confirm before deleting an S3 Tables policy
Delete Policy sat next to Save and fired on a single click; with
default-allow enabled one stray click silently dropped the resource
policy and left the bucket open to every principal. Same confirmation
the classic bucket modal already has.
* admin: let a corrupt stored bucket policy be shown, fixed, and deleted
A stored document the decoder rejects made the policy GET 500, and with
the loaded flag never set the modal blocked both Save and Delete - the
one policy an operator most needs to remove was the one they couldn't,
even though the delete path never reads the document. The GET now
returns the raw bytes alongside a null policy; the dialog hands them to
the JSON tab and unblocks the buttons.
* admin: url-encode the bucket name in the policy API calls
The filer lists any directory under the buckets path, names S3 would
never allow included; one carrying '#' or '%' broke the fetch URL or
addressed a different name than the modal shows.
* admin: drop stale edit-policy responses on the IAM policies page
The same race the bucket and S3 Tables dialogs already guard against:
open one policy's editor while its GET stalls, open another, and the
late response populates the editor under the second policy's name -
Update then saves the first policy's statements over the second.
* admin: warn before a bucket policy save drops unsupported fields
The editor tracks unmodeled top-level keys precisely so
confirmPolicyFieldDiscard can warn before the server's Version+Statement
decode discards them, but only the IAM page called it; the bucket modal
saved a pasted document with e.g. a console-generated Id without a word
while the editor kept displaying the field.
* s3: enforce the bucket policy size cap on both surfaces
The 20KB cap lived only in the admin UI, so a larger policy stored via
the S3 API displayed there but could never be re-saved, desyncing the
two writers the cap comment claimed could not desync. The constant now
lives in policy_engine next to the shared validator and PutBucketPolicy
rejects oversized documents with PolicyTooLarge, matching AWS.
* admin: ship the policy editor's fieldset styles with the editor
The .policy-stmt-* rules that undo Bootstrap's full-width legend reset
stayed behind in policies.templ when the editor markup moved to the
shared script, so the bucket and S3 Tables dialogs rendered Actions/
Resource/Principal as full-width jumbo headings. PolicyDatalists is the
component every consumer already renders once; the styles live there
now.
* s3: mirror bucket policy changes into the IAM store from the metadata subscription
The advanced-IAM path appends the bucket-policy:<bucket> document to
every STS/session evaluation, but only this gateway's own PutBucketPolicy
maintained that mirror - a policy tightened or created through the admin
UI (or another gateway) never reached it, so revoked access stayed live
indefinitely, and the delete side was an unimplemented TODO in any case.
The metadata subscription now diffs the stored policy on every bucket
entry change and updates or removes the mirror, covering all writers and
deletion with one mechanism; IAMManager gains the missing
RemoveBucketPolicy.
* admin: deduplicate the bucket policy write path
Set and Delete carried line-for-line identical filer closures;
bucketPolicyMutation already treats nil as clear-the-key. The shared
helper sits below Set's validation, since ValidatePolicy cannot take the
nil document Delete passes.
* s3: drop ValidateBucketPolicy's re-checks of ValidatePolicy rules
Both callers run ValidatePolicy first, which already enforces the
version and at-least-one-statement rules; the duplicates were dead code
with drifted error text.
* admin: seed a new statement's Resource from the pinned suggestions
A fresh statement on the S3 Tables dialogs started with no resource row
at all; seed it with the broadest pinned ARN the same way cfg.bucket
already seeds the classic modal.
* admin: refuse to save Not* fields the backend would silently drop
Hiding the NotResource/NotPrincipal modes was not enough where negation
is disallowed: the JSON tab accepts any valid document (that is its
job), and a statement's Advanced-fields box can reintroduce the keys, so
an s3tables save could still store fields the evaluator drops - turning
Allow+NotResource into allow-everything. commitPolicyActiveTab now runs
a final document-level check over what would actually be saved; Delete
stays available for cleanup.
* s3: move the IAM bucket policy mirror on a bucket rename
A same-directory rename delivers one event carrying both entries, and
the byte-equality short-circuit skipped the new name's mirror when the
policy was unchanged - while the replayed delete for the old name
removed its mirror, leaving the renamed bucket unmirrored. The mirror
decision is now a pure function that removes the old name and writes the
new one regardless of byte equality, with the rename cases unit tested.
* s3: backfill the IAM bucket policy mirror on lazy bucket loads
The metadata subscription only mirrors changes, so a policy that
predates the IAM integration never reached the bucket-policy:<bucket>
mirror and its grants did not bind on the IAM path until the policy was
next modified. The gateway is deliberately lazy at startup (nothing
lists all buckets), so the backfill hooks the same place a bucket's
policy first becomes known: the cold bucket-config load. EnsureBucketPolicy
writes only when no mirror is stored, so repeat loads cost one cached
read.
* s3: reconcile the bucket policy backfill against concurrent changes
The backfill's check-then-write could race an event-driven mirror update
or removal and re-store bytes that were already stale, with no later
event to heal it. EnsureBucketPolicy now reports whether it wrote, and a
write is reconciled against a fresh authoritative entry read: a changed
policy is re-mirrored, a removed one is removed. Anything changing after
that read fires its own event, which finds the backfill's write already
present and supersedes it. The backfill also carries the entry's raw
bytes rather than a re-marshaled document, so the reconcile can
byte-compare.
* s3: prime the bucket policy mirror before advanced-IAM authorization
The backfill ran from the lazy bucket-config load, but IAM authorization
evaluates the bucket-policy:<bucket> mirror before any handler runs - a
grant carried only by a not-yet-mirrored policy denied forever, and the
denied request never reached the code that would have loaded the bucket.
authorizeWithIAM now primes the bucket config first (an in-memory cache
hit once warm), and the backfill runs synchronously on the cold load so
the very first authorization already sees the mirror.
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Chris Lu
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96304b6870 |
S3: source config credentials from the environment, and let the chart point at an existing secret (#10868)
* s3: resolve ${VAR} in static config credentials from the environment
A deployment that keeps its S3 keys in a secret store had no way to hand
them to the gateway: -config takes a file, so the keys had to be written
into that file. Let a key in the static config name an environment
variable instead, and drop any credential whose reference stays unset so
the placeholder never becomes a usable key.
* helm: source the generated s3 identities from an existing secret
The only way to reuse credentials that already live in a Secret was to
hand-author the whole seaweedfs_s3_config JSON, since the literal keys in
values.yaml end up in git and a lookup-based keyRef renders empty under
helm template and Argo CD. Let s3.credentials.admin/read name a Secret and
its keys instead: the generated config references them as ${VAR} and the
gateway resolves them from the environment, so nothing is read from the
cluster at render time.
* s3: treat an empty environment value as an unresolved credential reference
A secret store can hand over a key that exists but is blank. Resolving it
would leave an access key whose signing secret is empty, so count it as
unresolved and drop the credential.
* helm: render the s3 secret when only the all-in-one auth flag is set
The all-in-one deployment mounts the s3 secret whenever any of the three
enableAuth flags is set, but the secret itself only rendered for the s3 and
filer flags, so allInOne.s3.enableAuth on its own left the pod waiting on a
secret nothing creates.
* helm ci: check the credential wiring on every workload that mounts it
The render check only looked at the standalone s3 deployment and only at
one of the four variables, so a helper that bound a variable to the wrong
secret key would still pass.
* helm: create the all-in-one s3 secret for every flag that mounts it
The all-in-one pod mounts the secret on any of the three enableAuth flags,
so keying its creation off allInOne.s3.enableAuth alone still left
filer.s3.enableAuth without filer.s3.enabled pointing at a secret nothing
creates. Mirror the deployment's own condition instead, and check each
flag renders both the mount and the secret.
* s3: reject a malformed credential reference instead of keying on it
A typo such as ${MY-VAR} matches no substitution, so it survived expansion
and the placeholder itself became the access key the gateway accepted.
Require every ${ in a static credential to open a well-formed reference.
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Chris Lu
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2d9ea0285c |
s3: add the RenameObject endpoint (#10659)
* s3: add the RenameObject endpoint
PUT /{bucket}/{key}?renameObject with x-amz-rename-source moves an object
through the filer's AtomicRenameEntry, so no bytes are read or rewritten and
the ETag, tags and SSE keys travel with the entry.
Only unversioned buckets: a versioned rename would have to rebuild the
.versions chain, and AWS offers RenameObject on directory buckets, which
cannot be versioned. The source arrives in a header, so it is authorized
separately for read and delete; both keys are locked, in key order, across the
precondition checks and the move.
* s3: let a matched source ETag precondition settle its date precondition
RFC 7232 has an ETag precondition outrank the date precondition on its own
side, and AWS documents the same for CopyObject: a matching
x-amz-copy-source-if-match with a failing x-amz-copy-source-if-unmodified-since
copies rather than returning 412. The source check evaluated all four headers in
sequence, so the date header could still veto a decided ETag match.
validateConditionalHeadersForReads already applies this precedence; the source
path now matches it.
* s3: cover a rename source named as a directory without a trailing slash
Renaming a directory would move a whole subtree, so it has to stay a missing
key whether or not the caller wrote the trailing slash.
* s3: accept a bare object key as the RenameObject source
AWS spells x-amz-rename-source both ways. Its CLI, Java and Rust examples pass
the bare source key, and only a second CLI example and the boto3 conditional
example pass bucket/key; the API reference's own example is a bare key too. The
header was read as bucket/key only, so the form AWS leads with was rejected with
InvalidArgument and the endpoint was unusable as documented.
A value is now read as a literal key first — the only reading that can never
name the wrong object — and as bucket-qualified second, when it carries the
request's own bucket and the literal key does not exist. That costs one extra
lookup only for a source that starts with the bucket's own name.
Another bucket's name in the source is no longer a distinct error: RenameObject
moves within one bucket, so it is simply part of a key this bucket does not
hold, and it reports NoSuchKey.
* s3: only a proven absence picks the other reading of a rename source
A source that resolves to a directory is not a miss to fall through on: the
literal path is still what the caller named, so answering for it beats renaming
a different object under the bucket-qualified reading. With a directory at
bucket/source.txt and an object at source.txt, a rename naming the former moved
the latter.
A failed lookup is not a proof of absence either, so a blip can no longer
redirect a rename to the other reading.
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Chris Lu
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b452a5e41b |
s3: honor a bucket owner recorded as an identity (#10567)
* s3: resolve a bucket owner recorded as an identity The admin UI and weed shell record a bucket's owner as an identity name in s3-identity-id and never write the account id the S3 API stores alongside it, so such a bucket looked unowned: its ACL owner fell back to the default admin account, and under the default BucketOwnerEnforced ownership every object uploaded to it was stamped with that account instead of the bucket owner. Resolve the identity to its account when no account id is recorded, in the one place both the bucket metadata and the bucket config derive the owner from. * s3: drop the recorded account when the bucket owner is reassigned Changing the owner of a bucket created through the S3 API left its old account id behind, and that outranks the identity when the owner is resolved, so the new owner never took effect for object ownership or the bucket ACL. |
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Chris Lu
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cc2775d9f2 |
s3: register an identity's inline account instead of collapsing it into admin (#10548)
* s3: register an identity's inline account instead of collapsing it into admin Credential stores persist an account inline on the identity and never emit a top-level accounts list, so every user created through the IAM API or the admin UI with an email hit the "non exist account ID" branch and was given the shared admin account. Distinct users then presented the same owner id, so ownership checks could not tell them apart and each passed for the others' buckets. Treat an id missing from the account map as undeclared rather than invalid: register it, keeping an email another account already claimed. Both load paths now resolve the account through one helper. * s3: refresh an undeclared account from the identity that carries it The merge path starts from the live account cache, so an identity upserted with the same account id but a new email or display name kept the cached copy: the new address never reached the email index and the replaced one still resolved. Changing a user's email through the admin UI takes exactly that path. An account registered from an inline block is only described by the identity carrying it, so refresh it and move its email claim. Accounts from a top-level list and the predefined defaults are marked declared and stay authoritative. * s3: let an account reclaim an email once its holder moves away Two identities can carry the same email, and the second to load leaves the lookup with the first. Returning early when the incoming metadata matches the cached account meant the loser never re-ran the claim, so an address freed by the holder's update resolved to nobody until the loser itself changed. Re-index on the unchanged path, which is a no-op while another account still holds the address. |
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Chris Lu
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1ce106e69d |
s3: audit the assumed-role principal and the STS caller (#10519)
* s3: log the requester's principal ARN in the audit entry An STS session authenticates as an opaque session subject, so requester alone gave an operator no way back to the assumed role or the session name. Record the principal ARN next to the identity name and emit it as requester_arn. * s3: record the caller identity in the STS handlers AssumeRole, GetFederationToken and GetCallerIdentity verify the caller themselves and are not wrapped by the auth middleware that records the identity, so every audit entry for minting a session had an empty requester. * s3: resolve the audit principal ARN the way policy evaluation does A JWT-authenticated identity carries no PrincipalArn — the auth layer hands the principal over in a request header — so reading the field directly left requester_arn empty for OIDC callers. buildPrincipalARN is the resolver the policy path already uses: header first, then the identity's own ARN, then a synthesized user ARN for legacy identities that have none. |
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Chris Lu
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0002e5cc7f |
s3api: load document-style policies from the advanced IAM config (#10481)
* s3api: load document-style policies from the advanced IAM config The advanced IAM file doubles as the S3 identity config when only -s3.iam.config is given. protojson drops its "document" field, so every policy landed with empty content and warned "skipping invalid policy" on each reload. Worse, if the same file also declares identities the empty content sticks in the policy map and fails the whole runtime policy sync into the IAM manager, so policies created later never reach it. * iam: skip an unparsable policy instead of failing the whole runtime sync One policy the engine cannot parse aborted SyncRuntimePolicies before it touched anything, so every other policy stayed unsynced and the engine kept serving whatever it last held. * s3api: reject a non-role RoleArn in AssumeRole as a bad request arn:aws:iam:::user/name can never resolve to a role, but the handler ran it through the trust-policy check and answered "not authorized to assume role", pointing the caller at a permission problem they do not have. * s3api: build the policy content before touching the entry Deleting "document" up front meant a marshal failure left the policy with neither field, so a later rewrite would emit it with no definition at all. * iam: pin the fail-closed handling of an unparsable policy Say in the comment that dropping it from the desired set deletes it from the engine on purpose, and cover it with a test. * s3api: widen the non-role RoleArn test to canonical ARN shapes The reported ARN omits the account id; a user ARN that carries one, and a non-principal ARN, must be rejected the same way. |
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Lars Lehtonen
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2bea4dd610 | chore(weed/s3api): prune dead code (#10462) | ||
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Chris Lu
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62c4333074 |
s3: list the buckets an attached IAM policy grants (#10458)
* s3: list the buckets an attached IAM policy grants ListBuckets served an identity authorized by an attached IAM policy only the buckets it had created itself. A user granted s3:ListBucket on a bucket someone else provisioned could GetObject and ListObjectsV2 against it, but the bucket never showed up in the listing any S3 client uses to build its bucket picker. The owner-index fast path is only valid for an identity whose grants name every bucket it can reach, and the routing check assumed a policy could never be enumerated. Read the names out of the policy instead: statements that allow s3:ListBucket on a concrete bucket ARN become candidates, and the per-bucket permission re-check still decides what is listed. A policy that can reach a bucket it does not name -- a wildcard resource, a policy variable, a NotResource, an STS session policy -- falls back to the full scan, which evaluates the policy per bucket. * s3: share the attached policy name lookup authorizeWithIAM and the ListBuckets enumeration both built an identity's policy names the same way, its own plus the ones from its enabled groups. Pull that into one helper so group eligibility is decided in a single place. * s3: read policy actions the way the IAM authorizer matches them The IAM authorizer matches action names case-insensitively, so a policy granting "S3:LISTBUCKET" or "S3:*" authorizes a list. The ListBuckets classifier read those actions with the local case-sensitive matcher and found no grant, so once the owner index was ready the buckets that policy allows dropped out of the listing. Match the action the looser way in the classifier: case-insensitive, and true for any pattern holding a policy variable. Over-matching only costs a candidate the per-bucket permission check then rejects, while under-matching hides a bucket the caller can read. * s3: infer a multipart grant in any case The classifier matches action patterns case-insensitively but looked the requested action up in a canonical-cased set, so "S3:UPLOADPART" missed the s3:PutObject inference that the authorizer makes. Key the set for lookup in lower case, matching how the IAM authorizer holds it. |
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Chris Lu
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6b6e6d8547 |
s3: apply filer identity changes despite a static config file (#10392)
* s3: apply filer identity changes despite a static config file A -config file with inline identities disabled the metadata-subscription reload entirely, leaving the best-effort filer->s3 push as the only way s3.configure changes could reach a running gateway. Reload on IAM events regardless: the merge keeps the file's identities protected, and a full credential-manager snapshot now also drops dynamic identities the store no longer has, so revocation works without a restart. * s3: log identity propagation failures as warnings * s3: retry failed IAM reloads and reconcile policies and groups An event-driven reload that fails now hands off to a coalescing retry loop, so a transient filer error cannot strand a revoked credential until the next IAM event. Full-state merges also drop dynamic policies the store no longer has, keeping the static file's, and treat the group snapshot as authoritative even when empty. * s3: serialize IAM configuration loads The SIGHUP file reload, subscription reloads, the retry loop, and the postgres poll run on different goroutines. Without an end-to-end lock a load holding an older store snapshot can commit after a newer one and revert it. Hold reloadMu from snapshot through commit in both load entry points; partial merges from pushed updates stay lock-free and self-heal through the next event-driven reload. * s3: keep static-file groups through full-state reconciliation Group names from the static config file are tracked like identities and policies, and a full snapshot that does not carry them keeps the current definition and its memberships instead of dropping them. * credential: include groups in postgres configuration snapshots Full-state reconciliation treats absent groups as deleted, so a snapshot that never carries them would erase every dynamic group. * s3: revoke static-file groups dropped from the config file A file reload is authoritative for the file's group set while keeping dynamic groups, mirroring how full snapshots are authoritative for dynamic groups while keeping the file's. * credential: fail filer snapshots on unreadable entries A skipped identity or policy file made the load report success with an incomplete snapshot, which reconciliation reads as deletion and the retry loop never sees. Unparseable content is still skipped: it is durable, matches boot behavior, and must not block reloads forever. * s3: ignore groups in static config files Groups are managed through the IAM API and the dynamic store; no deployment defines them in a bootstrap config file. Ignoring them with a warning removes the two-directional group merge: full snapshots are plainly authoritative and file reloads never touch groups. |
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Chris Lu
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17af32f3ff |
s3: paginate ListBuckets and serve it from a bucket owner index (#10214)
* s3: paginate ListBuckets with max-buckets, continuation-token, and prefix ListBuckets buffered every bucket entry into one slice and one XML body, which falls over with very large bucket counts. Page through the filer listing instead, cap each response at 10000 buckets like AWS, and honor max-buckets, prefix, and an opaque keyset continuation-token. * s3: maintain a bucket owner index under /buckets/.system/owners Map each bucket owner to its buckets as zero-length entries at /buckets/.system/owners/<owner>/<bucket>, with Crtime mirroring the bucket's creation time. The bucket handlers write the index synchronously, the /buckets metadata subscription reconciles changes made elsewhere (weed shell, other gateways, direct filer operations), and a startup backfill indexes pre-existing buckets before writing a ready marker. Owner names are path-escaped so no identity name can escape the index directory. * s3: serve ListBuckets from the bucket owner index Once the owner index is ready, non-admin identities list their owned buckets straight from it, merged with any buckets their legacy actions name explicitly, so ListBuckets costs O(own buckets) instead of a scan of the global /buckets directory. Admins, identities with a bare List grant or wildcard action patterns, and policy-authorized identities whose grants cannot be enumerated keep the paged scan; policy-routed identities get their owned buckets, matching AWS ListBuckets returning only the caller's buckets. * s3: keep dot-prefixed names under /buckets out of bucket surfaces Dot-prefixed entries (.system) can never be valid bucket names, so refuse to resolve them as buckets and skip them in the shell bucket listing, matching what ListBuckets and the admin UI already do. * test: cover ListBuckets pagination and the owner index end to end * s3: fail closed on a nil identity when routing ListBuckets * s3: decide the IAM authorization mechanism in one place VerifyActionPermission and the ListBuckets owner-index routing each re-derived the session-token / attached-policy / legacy-actions split; extract the decision so the two cannot drift. * s3: heal the owner index on concurrent bucket recreation too The mkdir-lost-the-race path answers BucketAlreadyOwnedByYou just like the up-front existence check, so give it the same index repair. * s3: drop owner-index records for buckets deleted during backfill A bucket removed between the backfill reading its page and writing the index record became a permanent phantom in its owner's listing: the delete's own cleanup ran before the record existed. After indexing each page, re-list the same name range and remove records whose bucket is gone; deletes landing after the re-list find the record and remove it themselves. * s3: add ContinuationToken and Prefix to the ListBuckets schema Keep AmazonS3.xsd aligned with the generated ListAllMyBucketsResult so a regeneration does not drop the pagination fields. |
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Chris Lu
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c46526822b |
s3: embedded IAM inline policy honors prefix-scoped resources (#10192)
* s3: embedded IAM inline policy honors prefix-scoped resources getActions stripped the trailing wildcard from a resource like arn:aws:s3:::bucket/prefix/*, producing a non-wildcard action (Write:bucket/prefix) that CanDo only ever matched at bucket level, so PutObject under the prefix was denied. Preserve the object path with its wildcard (Write:bucket/prefix/*) to match objects under the prefix, matching the standalone iamapi behavior. * s3: prune bucket-confined wildcard actions on bucket delete actionScopedToBucket treated any wildcard as multi-bucket, so a prefix-scoped action like Write:bucket/prefix/* survived deletion of its own bucket and could re-grant access if the bucket was recreated. Scope the wildcard check to the bucket segment only: a wildcard in the object path stays scoped to its bucket, while one in the bucket segment does not. |
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Chris Lu
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3b9e196e5f |
sts: enforce session-policy explicit deny during role chaining (#10103)
* sts: enforce session-policy explicit deny during role chaining A chained AssumeRole caller authenticates with an STS session token whose inline session policy can explicitly deny sts:AssumeRole. The deny check only evaluated the caller's named policies, so such a session could still chain into any role its trust policy admits. Validate the session token in the deny check and honor an explicit Deny in the inline session policy too. * test(sts): integration coverage for AssumeRole authorization Add an end-to-end AssumeRole authorization test (real weed mini + boto3): a non-admin caller assumes a role its trust policy admits, an explicit identity-side deny is blocked, and a session policy's explicit deny blocks role chaining. * sts: skip OIDC tokens and reject revoked sessions in the chaining deny check Review follow-ups on the session-policy deny check: - Guard session validation with !isOIDCToken so a bearer token our STS service cannot validate does not error into a false deny. - Reject a revoked session before evaluating its policy, restoring the revocation enforcement the AssumeRole path lost when it stopped routing through IsActionAllowed. |
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Chris Lu
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88a4a939aa |
fix(sts): authorize AssumeRole by the role's trust policy (#10097)
* fix(sts): authorize AssumeRole by the role's trust policy The role's trust policy already declares who may assume it, but the caller also had to pass an identity-side sts:AssumeRole check that only the Admin action could satisfy — legacy static identities have no way to express sts:AssumeRole on a role. So assuming any role required a full admin identity. Drop the redundant check and let the trust policy be the authority; scope it to specific principals to restrict who can assume. * sts: resolve caller principal ARN for the trust-policy check A legacy static identity can reach AssumeRole without a PrincipalArn set; passing the empty value would miss a trust policy that names a concrete principal. Resolve it to the canonical user ARN, sharing the logic GetCallerIdentity already used inline. * sts: enforce explicit identity-side deny for AssumeRole Authorizing a named role by its trust policy alone dropped identity-side evaluation entirely, so a caller whose attached policy explicitly denies sts:AssumeRole could still assume any role the trust policy admits. Re-check the caller's policies through the IAM manager for an explicit deny (deny-always-wins) without requiring an allow; the trust policy stays the allow authority. |
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Chris Lu
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089acfbf36 |
fix(s3api): apply static config file updates on reload (#10096)
A config-file reload (SIGHUP) routed through MergeS3ApiConfiguration, which skips identities marked static so dynamic admin/filer updates can't clobber them. That also blocked the config file itself from updating its own identities, so editing a secretKey and reloading had no effect. Thread a fromStaticFile flag from the file-load path into the merge: the authoritative file overwrites its static identities (and reapplies service accounts under them), while dynamic updates still leave them immutable. Mark the rebuilt identities static in the merge so a concurrent RemoveIdentity never observes them as removable mid-reload. |
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Chris Lu
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14d247703a |
s3: register account-less identities' synthesized account so ACL/owner ids resolve (#9971)
* s3: register account-less identities' synthesized account in the lookup #9962 gave each account-less identity a distinct account id derived from its name (instead of collapsing into admin), but never registered that account in the id->account map. GetAccountNameById then returned empty for such ids, so ACL grantee validation rejected canonical grants to the caller's own account with InvalidRequest, and bucket/object owner display was dropped as 'owner is invalid'. This broke a canned PutObjectAcl by an account-less identity (e.g. TestVersionedObjectAcl with the default 'some_admin_user' identity): ValidateAndTransferGrants -> GetAccountNameById -> 'account id is not exists' -> 400 InvalidRequest. Register the synthesized account at config load so its id resolves to a display name. Add a regression test. * s3: reuse explicitly-configured account for account-less identity Address review: if an account with the same id as an account-less identity's synthesized account is explicitly configured (custom display name/email), reuse it instead of the synthesized one. Add a test. |
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Chris Lu
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e64c821139 |
s3: give account-less identities a distinct owner instead of admin (#9962)
* s3: stop collapsing account-less identities into the admin account Identities configured without an account block all defaulted to the shared admin account, so distinct users got the same owner id and ownership checks could not tell them apart. checkAccessByOwnership also treated that id as an admin bypass, so any account-less caller passed ownership for any bucket. Give such identities a distinct account id from their name, and decide the ownership admin bypass by Admin capability rather than by the account id. isUserAdmin is now nil-safe. * s3: use the context identity in isUserAdmin before re-authenticating The Auth middleware already verifies and stores the identity in the request context. Read it there first so the ownership/admin checks don't re-run signature verification, which is redundant and fails once the request body has been consumed. * s3: nil-guard the context identity in isUserAdmin A non-nil interface wrapping a typed-nil *Identity passes the type assertion; guard against it before calling isAdmin(). * s3: trim verbose comments |
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Chris Lu
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3e8ec879c4 |
s3: keep dynamic IAM live when -iam.config is set (#9817)
* s3: keep dynamic IAM live when -iam.config is set -iam.config was treated like a static -config identity file: it set useStaticConfig, which makes the filer metadata subscription skip reloads. Identities and policies created at runtime (the IAM gRPC API) then never took effect, so advanced IAM (OIDC/STS) and dynamic IAM were mutually exclusive. Gate useStaticConfig on whether inline identities were actually loaded. An OIDC/STS-only config carries none, so it keeps the dynamic credential store live; a -config identity file still freezes its identities as before. * s3: mark static identities on config reload too A -config reload (grace.OnReload) re-reads the file, but only the startup path marked its identities static, so identities added to the file and reloaded were left unprotected from dynamic filer updates. Move the marking into loadS3ApiConfigurationFromFile and make it additive and scoped to the file's identities, so a reload protects newly added ones without freezing dynamic filer-managed identities. * s3: sync reloaded static identities into the credential manager After marking a (re)loaded config file's identities static, push the updated set into the credential manager so reloaded identities still appear in listings and survive later dynamic merges. Centralize the sync in loadS3ApiConfigurationFromFile and drop the now-redundant call in the reload hook. |
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Chris Lu
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160e68dd65 |
fix(s3api): keep ListBucket resource ARN at bucket level (#9792)
* fix(s3api): keep ListBucket resource ARN at bucket level ListObjects with ?prefix= was denied for IAM users granted s3:ListBucket on the bucket ARN. authRequestWithAuthType promotes the prefix into object so the legacy CanDo path can honor prefix-scoped Action strings, and that promoted object leaked into the policy resource ARN, producing arn:aws:s3:::bucket/<prefix> which never matches a bucket-level statement. Keep the resource bucket-level for List in the bucket-policy and IAM-attached-policy evaluators; prefix scoping stays in the s3:prefix Condition. The CanDo path is untouched. * fix(s3api): resolve List action at bucket level when prefix is promoted The IAM evaluator built a bucket-level resource ARN but still passed the prefix-promoted object to ResolveS3Action, so listing with a prefix made hasObject true and misresolved ListBucketVersions/ListBucketMultipartUploads to ListBucket. Resolve the action against the same zeroed object, and trim the resource-ARN comments. |
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Chris Lu
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8e4022d5c7 |
fix(s3api): authorize DeleteObjects per key so object-scoped policies match (#9793)
Bulk DeleteObjects carries the keys in the request body, so the route Auth middleware ran a single bucket-level check with object="", building the resource ARN as arn:aws:s3:::<bucket>. That never matches an s3:DeleteObject policy scoped to <bucket>/*, so the entire batch was denied even though the single-key DELETE worked with the same credentials. Defer authorization to the handler and check each key via AuthorizeBatchDeleteKey, mirroring AuthorizeCopySource: a synthetic DELETE /<bucket>/<key> request resolves s3:DeleteObject (or s3:DeleteObjectVersion when a versionId is given) against the object ARN. Denied keys come back as per-key errors while authorized keys still delete, matching AWS semantics. |
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Chris Lu
|
16717b0bf4 |
fix(s3): authenticate JWT unsigned-streaming uploads (#9729)
A bearer-token client whose SDK appends a CRC32 trailer sends an unsigned-streaming PUT (STREAMING-UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD-TRAILER) with no SigV4 signature, so getRequestAuthType classifies it as authTypeStreamingUnsigned. The auth dispatch ignored the bearer token and fell back to anonymous, and newChunkedReader tried to verify the bearer token as a SigV4 seed signature and failed, so the body could not be decoded either. Dispatch the streaming-unsigned auth on whatever credential is present (SigV4 / JWT / anonymous), and skip the SigV4 seed-signature recompute for JWT requests in the chunked reader. |
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Chris Lu
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685571d93f |
fix(s3): allow anonymous unsigned-streaming PutObject (#9727)
Modern botocore attaches a CRC32 trailer to plain PutObject, turning the payload into STREAMING-UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD-TRAILER. An anonymous upload then carries that header but no Authorization, so it was classified as authTypeStreamingUnsigned and sent straight to SigV4 verification, which rejected it as AccessDenied while explicit credentials kept working. Fall back to the anonymous identity when an unsigned-streaming request carries no signature, mirroring the plain anonymous path. The request stays classified as unsigned-streaming so the chunked body is still decoded. |
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Mmx233andChris Lu
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9b9fdb5b76 |
fix(s3): sync IAM policies to advanced IAM Manager policy engine (#9577)
* fix(s3): sync IAM policies to advanced IAM Manager policy engine * test(s3): add unit tests for PutPolicy/DeletePolicy IAM Manager sync * fix(s3): flush loaded policies in SetIAMIntegration, drop extra reload Sync the policies already loaded from the credential store into the IAM Manager's engine from SetIAMIntegration itself, instead of re-running a full LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromCredentialManager after setup. This covers both startup orderings without a second filer round-trip or racing the async loader goroutine: if the load won, the policies are in memory to push; if SetIAMIntegration won, the load's own sync runs afterward. Move the runtime PutPolicy/DeletePolicy sync out of the iam.m write lock so the per-request auth RLock path isn't blocked by the policy recompile. * fix(s3): serialize IAM manager policy resync to avoid stale snapshots SyncRuntimePolicies replaces the manager's full policy set, so applying a policy view captured before a later mutation can resurrect a deleted policy or drop a new one. Funnel every path (PutPolicy, DeletePolicy, SetIAMIntegration, and the credential-manager load) through a single resyncIAMManagerPolicies that serializes on a dedicated mutex and reads iam.policies fresh at apply time, so the live map always wins regardless of interleaving. The load now installs the config into iam.policies before resyncing, closing the window where the manager held policies the map didn't yet have. --------- Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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Chris Lu
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285025eb73 |
s3api: support group inline policies + Condition enforcement (#9569)
* test(s3api): cover IAM inline policy aws:SourceIp + group inline gap Unit tests under weed/s3api/ drive PutUserPolicy / PutGroupPolicy → reload → VerifyActionPermission with a synthetic 127.0.0.1 request and assert that the policy's IpAddress condition flips the outcome. The user-policy cases pass on master (hydrateRuntimePolicies already routes inline docs through the policy engine, so Condition blocks are honored end- to-end). The group-policy case fails: PutGroupPolicy still returns NotImplemented, so a group inline doc never lands in the engine. Integration counterparts live under test/s3/iam/ and exercise the same paths against a live SeaweedFS S3+IAM endpoint. * s3api: support group inline policies + Condition enforcement PutGroupPolicy/GetGroupPolicy/DeleteGroupPolicy/ListGroupPolicies used to return NotImplemented in embedded IAM mode, so anything attached to a group as an inline doc — including aws:SourceIp or any other Condition — was simply unreachable. Wire the four endpoints to the credential-store methods that were already in place (memory, postgres, filer_etc all implement GroupInlinePolicyStore). On every config reload, hydrateRuntimePolicies now also walks LoadGroupInlinePolicies, registers each doc in the IAM policy engine under __inline_group_policy__/<group>/<policy>, and appends that key to Group.PolicyNames so evaluateIAMPolicies picks it up through its existing group walk. PutGroupPolicy/DeleteGroupPolicy are added to the ReloadConfiguration trigger list in DoActions. Side fix: MemoryStore.LoadConfiguration now surfaces store.groups too. Without it iam.groups never repopulated on a memory-store reload, so group policy evaluation silently no-op'd whether the policy was inline or attached. The existing tests didn't notice because no test reloaded through cm after creating a group. The NotImplemented unit test is inverted to drive the new round-trip. * s3api: drop redundant refreshIAMConfiguration from Put/DeleteGroupPolicy DoActions already triggers ReloadConfiguration for both actions via the explicit reload list, so calling refreshIAMConfiguration inline runs the load twice per request. Per PR review. * s3api: scope group-policy resource names per test; tighten deny polling - Integration test resource names get a per-test suffix so retried or parallel CI jobs don't trip EntityAlreadyExists / BucketAlreadyExists. - Deny-path Eventually loops gate on AccessDenied via a typed helper rather than any non-nil error; transient setup errors no longer end the wait prematurely. - ListGroupPolicies returns ServiceFailure when the credential manager is nil, matching Put/Get/DeleteGroupPolicy. * test(s3 iam): cover both IPv4 and IPv6 loopback in allow CIDRs CI runners with happy-eyeballs resolve `localhost` to ::1 first, in which case a 127.0.0.0/8-only allow would silently never match and the deny-driven enforcement test would hang for the allow case. Add ::1/128 to every loopback-matching policy so the allow path works regardless of which loopback family the SDK lands on. |
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Chris Lu
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d57de6dc20 |
fix(s3): keep anonymous access working with EnableIam default (fixes #9557) (#9567)
fix(s3): keep anonymous access working with EnableIam default `docker run seaweedfs` (and `weed mini` with no config) start with EnableIam=true but no IAM config file and no identities. The advanced-IAM init path was failing in 4.25 because of the missing STS signing key, which masked a latent bug: SetIAMIntegration unconditionally flipped isAuthEnabled to true, and isEnabled() also treated a non-nil iamIntegration as auth-on. Once the mini SSE-S3 KEK landed in 4.26 the STS fallback started succeeding, the integration got installed end to end, and every anonymous S3 request bounced as AccessDenied. Separate the two concerns: SetIAMIntegration just plumbs in the OIDC / embedded-IAM machinery, and a new EnableAuthEnforcement opts in to enforcement. The startup path calls it only when -s3.iam.config is actually provided, so operators with explicit IAM configs still get auth (preserves #7726). isEnabled() now reads isAuthEnabled only. |
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Chris Lu
|
c61d227613 |
s3api: verify source permission on CopyObject and UploadPartCopy (#9555)
* s3api: verify source permission on CopyObject and UploadPartCopy The Auth middleware only authorized the destination because routes key on the request URL. The source from X-Amz-Copy-Source was never evaluated, so an STS session token scoped to one prefix could copy from any other prefix in the same bucket. Add AuthorizeCopySource on IdentityAccessManagement to run the full bucket-policy + IAM/identity flow against the source, using a synthetic GetObject request so action resolution lands on s3:GetObject (or s3:GetObjectVersion when a source versionId is supplied). Both CopyObjectHandler and CopyObjectPartHandler now invoke it before reading the source. * s3api: preserve presigned-URL session token on copy-source check Presigned CopyObject / UploadPartCopy requests carry the STS session token in the query string (X-Amz-Security-Token), not in a header. Rebuilding the synthetic source URL from scratch dropped that token, so the source authorization would fall through to non-STS paths and miss session policy enforcement. Forward X-Amz-Security-Token from the original query (alongside versionId), still excluding unrelated params like uploadId/partNumber that would steer ResolveS3Action away from s3:GetObject. |
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Chris Lu
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6b94701213 |
mini: quieter startup with a docker-compose-style progress board (#9524)
* mini: quieter startup with a docker-compose-style progress board Replaces noisy startup/shutdown logs with a single in-place progress table on a TTY (or one line per state change off-TTY). Each component renders as `pending -> starting -> ready` during startup and `stopping -> stopped` during shutdown, with elapsed time on transition. Also folds in a few cleanups uncovered while making this readable: - route the admin.go startup prints through glog so quietMiniLogs() filters them under mini but standalone weed admin still shows them - generate a dev SSE-S3 KEK + passphrase on first run via WEED_S3_SSE_KEK and WEED_S3_SSE_KEK_PASSPHRASE env vars (viper.Set has a nested-key conflict between s3.sse.kek and s3.sse.kek.passphrase); persisted under the data folder so restarts reuse the same key - demote worker/master gRPC Recv 'context canceled' to V(1); those are the normal shutdown signal, not Errors/Warnings - drop the 'Optimized Settings' block and the 'credentials loaded from environment variables' message from the welcome banner - only show the credentials setup hints when no S3 identities exist (new s3api.HasAnyIdentity accessor backed by an atomic.Bool) - use S3_BUCKET in the credentials hint so it pairs with AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID / AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY - reorder running-services list to master / volume / filer / webdav / s3 / iceberg / admin * mini: refuse in-memory-only SSE-S3 dev keys; surface admin serve errors loadOrCreateMiniHexSecret returns "" when os.WriteFile fails, so SSE-S3 won't encrypt data under a KEK that the next restart can't reproduce (which would orphan whatever was written this run). The caller already treats "" as "skip setting WEED_S3_SSE_* env vars", so SSE-S3 and IAM just stay disabled for this run. startAdminServer's serve goroutine used to only log ListenAndServe failures, so a bind error left the caller blocked on ctx.Done() with no listener. Forward the error through a buffered channel and select on it alongside ctx.Done(). * ci(s3-proxy-signature): match weed mini's new progress-board ready line The readiness probe grepped for "S3 (gateway|service).*(started|ready)", which matched weed mini's old "S3 service is ready at ..." line. Mini now emits " S3 ready (Xs)" from its progress board, so the old pattern misses and the test timed out at the 30-second wait. Widen the alternation to also accept "S3\s+ready". The curl HEAD fallback already covers any remaining cases. |
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Yoann KatchourineandChris Lu
|
1127672d10 |
fix(s3api,iamapi): avoid full SaveConfiguration when creating a single IAM user (#9261)
* fix(s3api,iamapi): avoid full SaveConfiguration when creating a single IAM user
When CreateUser was called, both the embedded IAM path (s3api_embedded_iam.go)
and the standalone IAM path (iamapi_management_handlers.go) would:
1. Load the full config (all N users)
2. Append the new user
3. Call SaveConfiguration, which re-writes ALL N user files in the filer_etc
store, triggering N file-change events and N reload cycles.
The fix replaces the full-save path with credentialManager.CreateUser, which
writes only the single new user's file. Set changed=false to skip the redundant
SaveConfiguration call, and add "CreateUser" to the reload-after-targeted-write
block so the in-memory config is refreshed.
Also adds a nil guard around iama.iam.GetCredentialManager() in DoActions to
avoid a nil-pointer panic in legacy test fixtures that leave iam unset.
Add SetCredentialManagerForTest to IdentityAccessManagement so tests can inject
an in-memory credential store without touching production code paths.
* test(s3api,iamapi): regression tests for CreateUser targeted-write fix
Add TestCreateUserDoesNotSaveAllUsers (iamapi) and
TestEmbeddedIamCreateUserDoesNotSaveAllUsers (s3api) to guard against the
regression where CreateUser would call SaveConfiguration and re-write all
N existing user files.
Both tests:
- Pre-populate 3 existing users
- Invoke CreateUser via the HTTP API
- Assert PutS3ApiConfiguration (full-config save) was NOT called
- Assert the new user is visible in the credential store
- Assert all pre-existing users are still intact
Also update TestEmbeddedIamExecuteAction to verify persistence via the
credential manager directly (mockConfig is no longer updated on CreateUser
since we skip the SaveConfiguration path).
* refactor(s3api,iamapi): share credential-error to IAM-code mapping
Move the credentialErrToIamErrCode helper from weed/iamapi to
weed/s3api as exported CredentialErrToIamErrCode and call it from
both the standalone IAM handler (iamapi) and the embedded IAM
handler (s3api). Previously the standalone path used the helper
while the embedded path duplicated the same switch inline; the two
sites could drift out of sync.
Also extend the mapping to cover ErrUserNotFound and
ErrAccessKeyNotFound (404 NoSuchEntity) so non-CreateUser callers
that opt into the helper get the right HTTP status.
* test(s3api): seed credential store explicitly in CreateUser regression
Previously the test relied on getS3ApiConfigurationFunc's syncOnce
side effect to populate the credential store with mockConfig
identities. If that fixture ever stopped seeding, the post-test
"pre-existing users still exist" assertion would silently start
passing for the wrong reason (the users were never created).
Seed cm.SaveConfiguration directly and assert the seed precondition
before the API call so any seeding regression fails loudly.
* fix(s3api): honor skipPersist in embedded CreateUser targeted path
ExecuteAction documents that skipPersist=true means "the changed
configuration is not saved to the persistent store", but the
targeted credentialManager.CreateUser added for the avoid-bulk-save
fix ran unconditionally. Gate it on !skipPersist so no-persist
callers don't silently leak a write to the credential store. Leave
changed=true in the skipPersist branch so the tail's existing
`if changed { if !skipPersist { ... } }` block keeps suppressing
persistence the same way it does for every other action.
Add TestEmbeddedIamCreateUserSkipPersist to pin the contract: a
CreateUser invocation with skipPersist=true must not call
PutS3ApiConfiguration and must not leave the user in the
credential store.
---------
Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com>
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Chris Lu
|
cce98fcecf |
fix(s3): strip client-supplied X-SeaweedFS-Principal/Session-Token in AuthSignatureOnly (#9120)
* fix(s3): strip client-supplied X-SeaweedFS-Principal/Session-Token in AuthSignatureOnly AuthSignatureOnly is the only auth gate in front of S3Tables routes (incl. CreateTableBucket) and UnifiedPostHandler, but unlike authenticateRequestInternal it did not clear the internal IAM trust headers before running signature verification. S3Tables authorizeIAMAction reads X-SeaweedFS-Principal directly from the request and prefers it over the authenticated identity's PrincipalArn, so a signed low-privilege caller could append that header after signing (unsigned header, SigV4 still verifies) and have IAM policy evaluated against a spoofed principal, bypassing authorization. Clear both X-SeaweedFS-Principal and X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token at the top of AuthSignatureOnly, mirroring the existing guard in authenticateRequestInternal. Add a regression test covering the header-injection path. * refactor(s3): route AuthSignatureOnly through authenticateRequestInternal Addresses review feedback: both entry points were independently maintaining the internal-IAM-header stripping and the auth-type dispatch switch. Collapse AuthSignatureOnly into a thin wrapper around authenticateRequestInternal so the security-critical header scrub and the signature-verify switch live in one place. Post-auth behavior unique to AuthSignatureOnly (AmzAccountId header) stays inline. No functional change beyond two harmless telemetry tweaks that now match authenticateRequestInternal: the per-branch glog verbosity shifts from V(3) to V(4), and the anonymous-found path now sets AmzAuthType. * refactor(s3): centralize X-SeaweedFS-Principal/Session-Token header names Introduce SeaweedFSPrincipalHeader and SeaweedFSSessionTokenHeader in weed/s3api/s3_constants so the trust-header literals are defined once and referenced consistently by the auth scrub, JWT auth path, bucket policy principal resolution, IAM authorization, and S3Tables IAM evaluation. Replace every remaining usage in weed/s3api and weed/s3api/s3tables. This removes the drift risk the reviewer called out: adding another call site with a typo can no longer silently bypass the scrub. Pure rename, no behavior change. No-op integration-test helper in test/s3/iam/s3_iam_framework.go left untouched (separate module, and the server now strips the client-supplied value regardless). |
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Chris Lu
|
40c1797f8e |
fix(s3): allow anonymous ListBuckets with prefix-scoped List action (#9073)
* fix(s3): allow anonymous ListBuckets with prefix-scoped List action An anonymous identity holding a prefix-scoped action such as "List:prefix-*" was denied at the auth middleware before ListBucketsHandler could apply the per-bucket visibility check. The middleware called CanDo with an empty bucket, which never matches a scoped action, so every anonymous ListBuckets request returned 403 even though matching buckets should have been visible. Defer ListBuckets authorization to the handler for the anonymous identity when it actually carries a List action, mirroring the existing behavior for authenticated users. Anonymous identities with no List action continue to be rejected at the global layer, preserving the secure-by-default posture. Fixes #9072 * refactor(s3): make hasListAction a method on Identity Addresses PR review — consistent with existing CanDo/isAdmin methods and also treats Admin identities as implicitly having List permission. |
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Chris Lu
|
7aaa431bb4 |
s3api: prune bucket-scoped IAM actions on DeleteBucket (#9054)
* s3api: prune bucket-scoped IAM actions on DeleteBucket DeleteBucket removed the bucket directory and collection but left behind any identity actions configured via s3.configure that were scoped to that bucket (e.g. Read:bucket, Write:bucket/prefix), leaving stale auth metadata that users expected to be cleaned up along with the bucket. After a successful delete, strip actions whose resource is exactly the bucket or a prefix under it, save via the credential manager, and let the existing filer metadata subscription fan the reload out to every S3 server. Wildcarded resources and global actions are preserved since they may cover other buckets; static identities are left untouched. Fixes #5310 * s3api: address review feedback on bucket IAM prune - Apply per-identity updates via credentialManager.UpdateUser instead of a full LoadConfiguration/SaveConfiguration round-trip, so the prune no longer clobbers concurrent IAM edits made by s3.configure or the IAM API during a DeleteBucket. - Use a 30s bounded background context for the post-delete cleanup so it survives client disconnect — the bucket is already gone by then and this is best-effort bookkeeping. - Skip static identities via IsStaticIdentity, since the credential store never persists them and UpdateUser would return NotFound. |
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Chris Lu
|
d1823d3784 |
fix(s3): include static identities in listing operations (#8903)
* fix(s3): include static identities in listing operations Static identities loaded from -s3.config file were only stored in the S3 API server's in-memory state. Listing operations (s3.configure shell command, aws iam list-users) queried the credential manager which only returned dynamic identities from the backend store. Register static identities with the credential manager after loading so they are included in LoadConfiguration and ListUsers results, and filtered out before SaveConfiguration to avoid persisting them to the dynamic store. Fixes https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/discussions/8896 * fix: avoid mutating caller's config and defensive copies - SaveConfiguration: use shallow struct copy instead of mutating the caller's config.Identities field - SetStaticIdentities: skip nil entries to avoid panics - GetStaticIdentities: defensively copy PolicyNames slice to avoid aliasing the original * fix: filter nil static identities and sync on config reload - SetStaticIdentities: filter nil entries from the stored slice (not just from staticNames) to prevent panics in LoadConfiguration/ListUsers - Extract updateCredentialManagerStaticIdentities helper and call it from both startup and the grace.OnReload handler so the credential manager's static snapshot stays current after config file reloads * fix: add mutex for static identity fields and fix ListUsers for store callers - Add sync.RWMutex to protect staticIdentities/staticNames against concurrent reads during config reload - Revert CredentialManager.ListUsers to return only store users, since internal callers (e.g. DeletePolicy) look up each user in the store and fail on non-existent static entries - Merge static usernames in the filer gRPC ListUsers handler instead, via the new GetStaticUsernames method - Fix CI: TestIAMPolicyManagement/managed_policy_crud_lifecycle was failing because DeletePolicy iterated static users that don't exist in the store * fix: show static identities in admin UI and weed shell The admin UI and weed shell s3.configure command query the filer's credential manager via gRPC, which is a separate instance from the S3 server's credential manager. Static identities were only registered on the S3 server's credential manager, so they never appeared in the filer's responses. - Add CredentialManager.LoadS3ConfigFile to parse a static S3 config file and register its identities - Add FilerOptions.s3ConfigFile so the filer can load the same static config that the S3 server uses - Wire s3ConfigFile through in weed mini and weed server modes - Merge static usernames in filer gRPC ListUsers handler - Add CredentialManager.GetStaticUsernames helper - Add sync.RWMutex to protect concurrent access to static identity fields - Avoid importing weed/filer from weed/credential (which pulled in filer store init() registrations and broke test isolation) - Add docker/compose/s3_static_users_example.json * fix(admin): make static users read-only in admin UI Static users loaded from the -s3.config file should not be editable or deletable through the admin UI since they are managed via the config file. - Add IsStatic field to ObjectStoreUser, set from credential manager - Hide edit, delete, and access key buttons for static users in the users table template - Show a "static" badge next to static user names - Return 403 Forbidden from UpdateUser and DeleteUser API handlers when the target user is a static identity * fix(admin): show details for static users GetObjectStoreUserDetails called credentialManager.GetUser which only queries the dynamic store. For static users this returned ErrUserNotFound. Fall back to GetStaticIdentity when the store lookup fails. * fix(admin): load static S3 identities in admin server The admin server has its own credential manager (gRPC store) which is a separate instance from the S3 server's and filer's. It had no static identity data, so IsStaticIdentity returned false (edit/delete buttons shown) and GetStaticIdentity returned nil (details page failed). Pass the -s3.config file path through to the admin server and call LoadS3ConfigFile on its credential manager, matching the approach used for the filer. * fix: use protobuf is_static field instead of passing config file path The previous approach passed -s3.config file path to every component (filer, admin). This is wrong because the admin server should not need to know about S3 config files. Instead, add an is_static field to the Identity protobuf message. The field is set when static identities are serialized (in GetStaticIdentities and LoadS3ConfigFile). Any gRPC client that loads configuration via GetConfiguration automatically sees which identities are static, without needing the config file. - Add is_static field (tag 8) to iam_pb.Identity proto message - Set IsStatic=true in GetStaticIdentities and LoadS3ConfigFile - Admin GetObjectStoreUsers reads identity.IsStatic from proto - Admin IsStaticUser helper loads config via gRPC to check the flag - Filer GetUser gRPC handler falls back to GetStaticIdentity - Remove s3ConfigFile from AdminOptions and NewAdminServer signature |
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Chris Lu
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995dfc4d5d |
chore: remove ~50k lines of unreachable dead code (#8913)
* chore: remove unreachable dead code across the codebase Remove ~50,000 lines of unreachable code identified by static analysis. Major removals: - weed/filer/redis_lua: entire unused Redis Lua filer store implementation - weed/wdclient/net2, resource_pool: unused connection/resource pool packages - weed/plugin/worker/lifecycle: unused lifecycle plugin worker - weed/s3api: unused S3 policy templates, presigned URL IAM, streaming copy, multipart IAM, key rotation, and various SSE helper functions - weed/mq/kafka: unused partition mapping, compression, schema, and protocol functions - weed/mq/offset: unused SQL storage and migration code - weed/worker: unused registry, task, and monitoring functions - weed/query: unused SQL engine, parquet scanner, and type functions - weed/shell: unused EC proportional rebalance functions - weed/storage/erasure_coding/distribution: unused distribution analysis functions - Individual unreachable functions removed from 150+ files across admin, credential, filer, iam, kms, mount, mq, operation, pb, s3api, server, shell, storage, topology, and util packages * fix(s3): reset shared memory store in IAM test to prevent flaky failure TestLoadIAMManagerFromConfig_EmptyConfigWithFallbackKey was flaky because the MemoryStore credential backend is a singleton registered via init(). Earlier tests that create anonymous identities pollute the shared store, causing LookupAnonymous() to unexpectedly return true. Fix by calling Reset() on the memory store before the test runs. * style: run gofmt on changed files * fix: restore KMS functions used by integration tests * fix(plugin): prevent panic on send to closed worker session channel The Plugin.sendToWorker method could panic with "send on closed channel" when a worker disconnected while a message was being sent. The race was between streamSession.close() closing the outgoing channel and sendToWorker writing to it concurrently. Add a done channel to streamSession that is closed before the outgoing channel, and check it in sendToWorker's select to safely detect closed sessions without panicking. |
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Chris Lu
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6ccda3e809 |
fix(s3): allow deleting the anonymous user from admin webui (#8706)
Remove the block that prevented deleting the "anonymous" identity and stop auto-creating it when absent. If no anonymous identity exists (or it is disabled), LookupAnonymous returns not-found and both auth paths return ErrAccessDenied for anonymous requests. To enable anonymous access, explicitly create the "anonymous" user. To revoke it, delete the user like any other identity. Closes #8694 |
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Chris Lu
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992db11d2b |
iam: add IAM group management (#8560)
* iam: add Group message to protobuf schema Add Group message (name, members, policy_names, disabled) and add groups field to S3ApiConfiguration for IAM group management support (issue #7742). * iam: add group CRUD to CredentialStore interface and all backends Add group management methods (CreateGroup, GetGroup, DeleteGroup, ListGroups, UpdateGroup) to the CredentialStore interface with implementations for memory, filer_etc, postgres, and grpc stores. Wire group loading/saving into filer_etc LoadConfiguration and SaveConfiguration. * iam: add group IAM response types Add XML response types for group management IAM actions: CreateGroup, DeleteGroup, GetGroup, ListGroups, AddUserToGroup, RemoveUserFromGroup, AttachGroupPolicy, DetachGroupPolicy, ListAttachedGroupPolicies, ListGroupsForUser. * iam: add group management handlers to embedded IAM API Add CreateGroup, DeleteGroup, GetGroup, ListGroups, AddUserToGroup, RemoveUserFromGroup, AttachGroupPolicy, DetachGroupPolicy, ListAttachedGroupPolicies, and ListGroupsForUser handlers with dispatch in ExecuteAction. * iam: add group management handlers to standalone IAM API Add group handlers (CreateGroup, DeleteGroup, GetGroup, ListGroups, AddUserToGroup, RemoveUserFromGroup, AttachGroupPolicy, DetachGroupPolicy, ListAttachedGroupPolicies, ListGroupsForUser) and wire into DoActions dispatch. Also add helper functions for user/policy side effects. * iam: integrate group policies into authorization Add groups and userGroups reverse index to IdentityAccessManagement. Populate both maps during ReplaceS3ApiConfiguration and MergeS3ApiConfiguration. Modify evaluateIAMPolicies to evaluate policies from user's enabled groups in addition to user policies. Update VerifyActionPermission to consider group policies when checking hasAttachedPolicies. * iam: add group side effects on user deletion and rename When a user is deleted, remove them from all groups they belong to. When a user is renamed, update group membership references. Applied to both embedded and standalone IAM handlers. * iam: watch /etc/iam/groups directory for config changes Add groups directory to the filer subscription watcher so group file changes trigger IAM configuration reloads. * admin: add group management page to admin UI Add groups page with CRUD operations, member management, policy attachment, and enable/disable toggle. Register routes in admin handlers and add Groups entry to sidebar navigation. * test: add IAM group management integration tests Add comprehensive integration tests for group CRUD, membership, policy attachment, policy enforcement, disabled group behavior, user deletion side effects, and multi-group membership. Add "group" test type to CI matrix in s3-iam-tests workflow. * iam: address PR review comments for group management - Fix XSS vulnerability in groups.templ: replace innerHTML string concatenation with DOM APIs (createElement/textContent) for rendering member and policy lists - Use userGroups reverse index in embedded IAM ListGroupsForUser for O(1) lookup instead of iterating all groups - Add buildUserGroupsIndex helper in standalone IAM handlers; use it in ListGroupsForUser and removeUserFromAllGroups for efficient lookup - Add note about gRPC store load-modify-save race condition limitation * iam: add defensive copies, validation, and XSS fixes for group management - Memory store: clone groups on store/retrieve to prevent mutation - Admin dash: deep copy groups before mutation, validate user/policy exists - HTTP handlers: translate credential errors to proper HTTP status codes, use *bool for Enabled field to distinguish missing vs false - Groups templ: use data attributes + event delegation instead of inline onclick for XSS safety, prevent stale async responses * iam: add explicit group methods to PropagatingCredentialStore Add CreateGroup, GetGroup, DeleteGroup, ListGroups, and UpdateGroup methods instead of relying on embedded interface fallthrough. Group changes propagate via filer subscription so no RPC propagation needed. * iam: detect postgres unique constraint violation and add groups index Return ErrGroupAlreadyExists when INSERT hits SQLState 23505 instead of a generic error. Add index on groups(disabled) for filtered queries. * iam: add Marker field to group list response types Add Marker string field to GetGroupResult, ListGroupsResult, ListAttachedGroupPoliciesResult, and ListGroupsForUserResult to match AWS IAM pagination response format. * iam: check group attachment before policy deletion Reject DeletePolicy if the policy is attached to any group, matching AWS IAM behavior. Add PolicyArn to ListAttachedGroupPolicies response. * iam: include group policies in IAM authorization Merge policy names from user's enabled groups into the IAMIdentity used for authorization, so group-attached policies are evaluated alongside user-attached policies. * iam: check for name collision before renaming user in UpdateUser Scan identities and inline policies for newUserName before mutating, returning EntityAlreadyExists if a collision is found. Reuse the already-loaded policies instead of loading them again inside the loop. * test: use t.Cleanup for bucket cleanup in group policy test * iam: wrap ErrUserNotInGroup sentinel in RemoveGroupMember error Wrap credential.ErrUserNotInGroup so errors.Is works in groupErrorToHTTPStatus, returning proper 400 instead of 500. * admin: regenerate groups_templ.go with XSS-safe data attributes Regenerated from groups.templ which uses data-group-name attributes instead of inline onclick with string interpolation. * iam: add input validation and persist groups during migration - Validate nil/empty group name in CreateGroup and UpdateGroup - Save groups in migrateToMultiFile so they survive legacy migration * admin: use groupErrorToHTTPStatus in GetGroupMembers and GetGroupPolicies * iam: short-circuit UpdateUser when newUserName equals current name * iam: require empty PolicyNames before group deletion Reject DeleteGroup when group has attached policies, matching the existing members check. Also fix GetGroup error handling in DeletePolicy to only skip ErrGroupNotFound, not all errors. * ci: add weed/pb/** to S3 IAM test trigger paths * test: replace time.Sleep with require.Eventually for propagation waits Use polling with timeout instead of fixed sleeps to reduce flakiness in integration tests waiting for IAM policy propagation. * fix: use credentialManager.GetPolicy for AttachGroupPolicy validation Policies created via CreatePolicy through credentialManager are stored in the credential store, not in s3cfg.Policies (which only has static config policies). Change AttachGroupPolicy to use credentialManager.GetPolicy() for policy existence validation. * feat: add UpdateGroup handler to embedded IAM API Add UpdateGroup action to enable/disable groups and rename groups via the IAM API. This is a SeaweedFS extension (not in AWS SDK) used by tests to toggle group disabled status. * fix: authenticate raw IAM API calls in group tests The embedded IAM endpoint rejects anonymous requests. Replace callIAMAPI with callIAMAPIAuthenticated that uses JWT bearer token authentication via the test framework. * feat: add UpdateGroup handler to standalone IAM API Mirror the embedded IAM UpdateGroup handler in the standalone IAM API for parity. * fix: add omitempty to Marker XML tags in group responses Non-truncated responses should not emit an empty <Marker/> element. * fix: distinguish backend errors from missing policies in AttachGroupPolicy Return ServiceFailure for credential manager errors instead of masking them as NoSuchEntity. Also switch ListGroupsForUser to use s3cfg.Groups instead of in-memory reverse index to avoid stale data. Add duplicate name check to UpdateGroup rename. * fix: standalone IAM AttachGroupPolicy uses persisted policy store Check managed policies from GetPolicies() instead of s3cfg.Policies so dynamically created policies are found. Also add duplicate name check to UpdateGroup rename. * fix: rollback inline policies on UpdateUser PutPolicies failure If PutPolicies fails after moving inline policies to the new username, restore both the identity name and the inline policies map to their original state to avoid a partial-write window. * fix: correct test cleanup ordering for group tests Replace scattered defers with single ordered t.Cleanup in each test to ensure resources are torn down in reverse-creation order: remove membership, detach policies, delete access keys, delete users, delete groups, delete policies. Move bucket cleanup to parent test scope and delete objects before bucket. * fix: move identity nil check before map lookup and refine hasAttachedPolicies Move the nil check on identity before accessing identity.Name to prevent panic. Also refine hasAttachedPolicies to only consider groups that are enabled and have actual policies attached, so membership in a no-policy group doesn't incorrectly trigger IAM authorization. * fix: fail group reload on unreadable or corrupt group files Return errors instead of logging and continuing when group files cannot be read or unmarshaled. This prevents silently applying a partial IAM config with missing group memberships or policies. * fix: use errors.Is for sql.ErrNoRows comparison in postgres group store * docs: explain why group methods skip propagateChange Group changes propagate to S3 servers via filer subscription (watching /etc/iam/groups/) rather than gRPC RPCs, since there are no group-specific RPCs in the S3 cache protocol. * fix: remove unused policyNameFromArn and strings import * fix: update service account ParentUser on user rename When renaming a user via UpdateUser, also update ParentUser references in service accounts to prevent them from becoming orphaned after the next configuration reload. * fix: wrap DetachGroupPolicy error with ErrPolicyNotAttached sentinel Use credential.ErrPolicyNotAttached so groupErrorToHTTPStatus maps it to 400 instead of falling back to 500. * fix: use admin S3 client for bucket cleanup in enforcement test The user S3 client may lack permissions by cleanup time since the user is removed from the group in an earlier subtest. Use the admin S3 client to ensure bucket and object cleanup always succeeds. * fix: add nil guard for group param in propagating store log calls Prevent potential nil dereference when logging group.Name in CreateGroup and UpdateGroup of PropagatingCredentialStore. * fix: validate Disabled field in UpdateGroup handlers Reject values other than "true" or "false" with InvalidInputException instead of silently treating them as false. * fix: seed mergedGroups from existing groups in MergeS3ApiConfiguration Previously the merge started with empty group maps, dropping any static-file groups. Now seeds from existing iam.groups before overlaying dynamic config, and builds the reverse index after merging to avoid stale entries from overridden groups. * fix: use errors.Is for filer_pb.ErrNotFound comparison in group loading Replace direct equality (==) with errors.Is() to correctly match wrapped errors, consistent with the rest of the codebase. * fix: add ErrUserNotFound and ErrPolicyNotFound to groupErrorToHTTPStatus Map these sentinel errors to 404 so AddGroupMember and AttachGroupPolicy return proper HTTP status codes. * fix: log cleanup errors in group integration tests Replace fire-and-forget cleanup calls with error-checked versions that log failures via t.Logf for debugging visibility. * fix: prevent duplicate group test runs in CI matrix The basic lane's -run "TestIAM" regex also matched TestIAMGroup* tests, causing them to run in both the basic and group lanes. Replace with explicit test function names. * fix: add GIN index on groups.members JSONB for membership lookups Without this index, ListGroupsForUser and membership queries require full table scans on the groups table. * fix: handle cross-directory moves in IAM config subscription When a file is moved out of an IAM directory (e.g., /etc/iam/groups), the dir variable was overwritten with NewParentPath, causing the source directory change to be missed. Now also notifies handlers about the source directory for cross-directory moves. * fix: validate members/policies before deleting group in admin handler AdminServer.DeleteGroup now checks for attached members and policies before delegating to credentialManager, matching the IAM handler guards. * fix: merge groups by name instead of blind append during filer load Match the identity loader's merge behavior: find existing group by name and replace, only append when no match exists. Prevents duplicates when legacy and multi-file configs overlap. * fix: check DeleteEntry response error when cleaning obsolete group files Capture and log resp.Error from filer DeleteEntry calls during group file cleanup, matching the pattern used in deleteGroupFile. * fix: verify source user exists before no-op check in UpdateUser Reorder UpdateUser to find the source identity first and return NoSuchEntityException if not found, before checking if the rename is a no-op. Previously a non-existent user renamed to itself would incorrectly return success. * fix: update service account parent refs on user rename in embedded IAM The embedded IAM UpdateUser handler updated group membership but not service account ParentUser fields, unlike the standalone handler. * fix: replay source-side events for all handlers on cross-dir moves Pass nil newEntry to bucket, IAM, and circuit-breaker handlers for the source directory during cross-directory moves, so all watchers can clear caches for the moved-away resource. * fix: don't seed mergedGroups from existing iam.groups in merge Groups are always dynamic (from filer), never static (from s3.config). Seeding from iam.groups caused stale deleted groups to persist. Now only uses config.Groups from the dynamic filer config. * fix: add deferred user cleanup in TestIAMGroupUserDeletionSideEffect Register t.Cleanup for the created user so it gets cleaned up even if the test fails before the inline DeleteUser call. * fix: assert UpdateGroup HTTP status in disabled group tests Add require.Equal checks for 200 status after UpdateGroup calls so the test fails immediately on API errors rather than relying on the subsequent Eventually timeout. * fix: trim whitespace from group name in filer store operations Trim leading/trailing whitespace from group.Name before validation in CreateGroup and UpdateGroup to prevent whitespace-only filenames. Also merge groups by name during multi-file load to prevent duplicates. * fix: add nil/empty group validation in gRPC store Guard CreateGroup and UpdateGroup against nil group or empty name to prevent panics and invalid persistence. * fix: add nil/empty group validation in postgres store Guard CreateGroup and UpdateGroup against nil group or empty name to prevent panics from nil member access and empty-name row inserts. * fix: add name collision check in embedded IAM UpdateUser The embedded IAM handler renamed users without checking if the target name already existed, unlike the standalone handler. * fix: add ErrGroupNotEmpty sentinel and map to HTTP 409 AdminServer.DeleteGroup now wraps conflict errors with ErrGroupNotEmpty, and groupErrorToHTTPStatus maps it to 409 Conflict instead of 500. * fix: use appropriate error message in GetGroupDetails based on status Return "Group not found" only for 404, use "Failed to retrieve group" for other error statuses instead of always saying "Group not found". * fix: use backend-normalized group.Name in CreateGroup response After credentialManager.CreateGroup may normalize the name (e.g., trim whitespace), use group.Name instead of the raw input for the returned GroupData to ensure consistency. * fix: add nil/empty group validation in memory store Guard CreateGroup and UpdateGroup against nil group or empty name to prevent panics from nil pointer dereference on map access. * fix: reorder embedded IAM UpdateUser to verify source first Find the source identity before checking for collisions, matching the standalone handler's logic. Previously a non-existent user renamed to an existing name would get EntityAlreadyExists instead of NoSuchEntity. * fix: handle same-directory renames in metadata subscription Replay a delete event for the old entry name during same-directory renames so handlers like onBucketMetadataChange can clean up stale state for the old name. * fix: abort GetGroups on non-ErrGroupNotFound errors Only skip groups that return ErrGroupNotFound. Other errors (e.g., transient backend failures) now abort the handler and return the error to the caller instead of silently producing partial results. * fix: add aria-label and title to icon-only group action buttons Add accessible labels to View and Delete buttons so screen readers and tooltips provide meaningful context. * fix: validate group name in saveGroup to prevent invalid filenames Trim whitespace and reject empty names before writing group JSON files, preventing creation of files like ".json". * fix: add /etc/iam/groups to filer subscription watched directories The groups directory was missing from the watched directories list, so S3 servers in a cluster would not detect group changes made by other servers via filer. The onIamConfigChange handler already had code to handle group directory changes but it was never triggered. * add direct gRPC propagation for group changes to S3 servers Groups now have the same dual propagation as identities and policies: direct gRPC push via propagateChange + async filer subscription. - Add PutGroup/RemoveGroup proto messages and RPCs - Add PutGroup/RemoveGroup in-memory cache methods on IAM - Add PutGroup/RemoveGroup gRPC server handlers - Update PropagatingCredentialStore to call propagateChange on group mutations * reduce log verbosity for config load summary Change ReplaceS3ApiConfiguration log from Infof to V(1).Infof to avoid noisy output on every config reload. * admin: show user groups in view and edit user modals - Add Groups field to UserDetails and populate from credential manager - Show groups as badges in user details view modal - Add group management to edit user modal: display current groups, add to group via dropdown, remove from group via badge x button * fix: remove duplicate showAlert that broke modal-alerts.js admin.js defined showAlert(type, message) which overwrote the modal-alerts.js version showAlert(message, type), causing broken unstyled alert boxes. Remove the duplicate and swap all callers in admin.js to use the correct (message, type) argument order. * fix: unwrap groups API response in edit user modal The /api/groups endpoint returns {"groups": [...]}, not a bare array. * Update object_store_users_templ.go * test: assert AccessDenied error code in group denial tests Replace plain assert.Error checks with awserr.Error type assertion and AccessDenied code verification, matching the pattern used in other IAM integration tests. * fix: propagate GetGroups errors in ShowGroups handler getGroupsPageData was swallowing errors and returning an empty page with 200 status. Now returns the error so ShowGroups can respond with a proper error status. * fix: reject AttachGroupPolicy when credential manager is nil Previously skipped policy existence validation when credentialManager was nil, allowing attachment of nonexistent policies. Now returns a ServiceFailureException error. * fix: preserve groups during partial MergeS3ApiConfiguration updates UpsertIdentity calls MergeS3ApiConfiguration with a partial config containing only the updated identity (nil Groups). This was wiping all in-memory group state. Now only replaces groups when config.Groups is non-nil (full config reload). * fix: propagate errors from group lookup in GetObjectStoreUserDetails ListGroups and GetGroup errors were silently ignored, potentially showing incomplete group data in the UI. * fix: use DOM APIs for group badge remove button to prevent XSS Replace innerHTML with onclick string interpolation with DOM createElement + addEventListener pattern. Also add aria-label and title to the add-to-group button. * fix: snapshot group policies under RLock to prevent concurrent map access evaluateIAMPolicies was copying the map reference via groupMap := iam.groups under RLock then iterating after RUnlock, while PutGroup mutates the map in-place. Now copies the needed policy names into a slice while holding the lock. * fix: add nil IAM check to PutGroup and RemoveGroup gRPC handlers Match the nil guard pattern used by PutPolicy/DeletePolicy to prevent nil pointer dereference when IAM is not initialized. |
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Chris Lu
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f9311a3422 |
s3api: fix static IAM policy enforcement after reload (#8532)
* s3api: honor attached IAM policies over legacy actions * s3api: hydrate IAM policy docs during config reload * s3api: use policy-aware auth when listing buckets * credential: propagate context through filer_etc policy reads * credential: make legacy policy deletes durable * s3api: exercise managed policy runtime loader * s3api: allow static IAM users without session tokens * iam: deny unmatched attached policies under default allow * iam: load embedded policy files from filer store * s3api: require session tokens for IAM presigning * s3api: sync runtime policies into zero-config IAM * credential: respect context in policy file loads * credential: serialize legacy policy deletes * iam: align filer policy store naming * s3api: use authenticated principals for presigning * iam: deep copy policy conditions * s3api: require request creation in policy tests * filer: keep ReadInsideFiler as the context-aware API * iam: harden filer policy store writes * credential: strengthen legacy policy serialization test * credential: forward runtime policy loaders through wrapper * s3api: harden runtime policy merging * iam: require typed already-exists errors |
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Chris Lu
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1b6e96614d |
s3api: cache parsed IAM policy engines for fallback auth
Previously, evaluateIAMPolicies created a new PolicyEngine and re-parsed the JSON policy document for every policy on every request. This adds a shared iamPolicyEngine field that caches compiled policies, kept in sync by PutPolicy, DeletePolicy, and bulk config reload paths. - PutPolicy deletes the old cache entry before setting the new one, so a parse failure on update does not leave a stale allow. - Log warnings when policy compilation fails instead of silently discarding errors. - Add test for valid-to-invalid policy update regression. |
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SrikanthBhandary
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4eb45ecc5e |
s3api: add IAM policy fallback authorization tests (#8518)
* s3api: add IAM policy fallback auth with tests * s3api: use policy engine for IAM fallback evaluation |
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Chris Lu
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4f647e1036 |
Worker set its working directory (#8461)
* set working directory * consolidate to worker directory * working directory * correct directory name * refactoring to use wildcard matcher * simplify * cleaning ec working directory * fix reference * clean * adjust test |
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3d81d5bef7 |
Fix S3 signature verification behind reverse proxies (#8444)
* Fix S3 signature verification behind reverse proxies When SeaweedFS is deployed behind a reverse proxy (e.g. nginx, Kong, Traefik), AWS S3 Signature V4 verification fails because the Host header the client signed with (e.g. "localhost:9000") differs from the Host header SeaweedFS receives on the backend (e.g. "seaweedfs:8333"). This commit adds a new -s3.externalUrl parameter (and S3_EXTERNAL_URL environment variable) that tells SeaweedFS what public-facing URL clients use to connect. When set, SeaweedFS uses this host value for signature verification instead of the Host header from the incoming request. New parameter: -s3.externalUrl (flag) or S3_EXTERNAL_URL (environment variable) Example: -s3.externalUrl=http://localhost:9000 Example: S3_EXTERNAL_URL=https://s3.example.com The environment variable is particularly useful in Docker/Kubernetes deployments where the external URL is injected via container config. The flag takes precedence over the environment variable when both are set. At startup, the URL is parsed and default ports are stripped to match AWS SDK behavior (port 80 for HTTP, port 443 for HTTPS), so "http://s3.example.com:80" and "http://s3.example.com" are equivalent. Bugs fixed: - Default port stripping was removed by a prior PR, causing signature mismatches when clients connect on standard ports (80/443) - X-Forwarded-Port was ignored when X-Forwarded-Host was not present - Scheme detection now uses proper precedence: X-Forwarded-Proto > TLS connection > URL scheme > "http" - Test expectations for standard port stripping were incorrect - expectedHost field in TestSignatureV4WithForwardedPort was declared but never actually checked (self-referential test) * Add Docker integration test for S3 proxy signature verification Docker Compose setup with nginx reverse proxy to validate that the -s3.externalUrl parameter (or S3_EXTERNAL_URL env var) correctly resolves S3 signature verification when SeaweedFS runs behind a proxy. The test uses nginx proxying port 9000 to SeaweedFS on port 8333, with X-Forwarded-Host/Port/Proto headers set. SeaweedFS is configured with -s3.externalUrl=http://localhost:9000 so it uses "localhost:9000" for signature verification, matching what the AWS CLI signs with. The test can be run with aws CLI on the host or without it by using the amazon/aws-cli Docker image with --network host. Test covers: create-bucket, list-buckets, put-object, head-object, list-objects-v2, get-object, content round-trip integrity, delete-object, and delete-bucket — all through the reverse proxy. * Create s3-proxy-signature-tests.yml * fix CLI * fix CI * Update s3-proxy-signature-tests.yml * address comments * Update Dockerfile * add user * no need for fuse * Update s3-proxy-signature-tests.yml * debug * weed mini * fix health check * health check * fix health checking --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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Chris Lu
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0d8588e3ae |
S3: Implement IAM defaults and STS signing key fallback (#8348)
* S3: Implement IAM defaults and STS signing key fallback logic * S3: Refactor startup order to init SSE-S3 key manager before IAM * S3: Derive STS signing key from KEK using HKDF for security isolation * S3: Document STS signing key fallback in security.toml * fix(s3api): refine anonymous access logic and secure-by-default behavior - Initialize anonymous identity by default in `NewIdentityAccessManagement` to prevent nil pointer exceptions. - Ensure `ReplaceS3ApiConfiguration` preserves the anonymous identity if not present in the new configuration. - Update `NewIdentityAccessManagement` signature to accept `filerClient`. - In legacy mode (no policy engine), anonymous defaults to Deny (no actions), preserving secure-by-default behavior. - Use specific `LookupAnonymous` method instead of generic map lookup. - Update tests to accommodate signature changes and verify improved anonymous handling. * feat(s3api): make IAM configuration optional - Start S3 API server without a configuration file if `EnableIam` option is set. - Default to `Allow` effect for policy engine when no configuration is provided (Zero-Config mode). - Handle empty configuration path gracefully in `loadIAMManagerFromConfig`. - Add integration test `iam_optional_test.go` to verify empty config behavior. * fix(iamapi): fix signature mismatch in NewIdentityAccessManagementWithStore * fix(iamapi): properly initialize FilerClient instead of passing nil * fix(iamapi): properly initialize filer client for IAM management - Instead of passing `nil`, construct a `wdclient.FilerClient` using the provided `Filers` addresses. - Ensure `NewIdentityAccessManagementWithStore` receives a valid `filerClient` to avoid potential nil pointer dereferences or limited functionality. * clean: remove dead code in s3api_server.go * refactor(s3api): improve IAM initialization, safety and anonymous access security * fix(s3api): ensure IAM config loads from filer after client init * fix(s3): resolve test failures in integration, CORS, and tagging tests - Fix CORS tests by providing explicit anonymous permissions config - Fix S3 integration tests by setting admin credentials in init - Align tagging test credentials in CI with IAM defaults - Added goroutine to retry IAM config load in iamapi server * fix(s3): allow anonymous access to health targets and S3 Tables when identities are present * fix(ci): use /healthz for Caddy health check in awscli tests * iam, s3api: expose DefaultAllow from IAM and Policy Engine This allows checking the global "Open by Default" configuration from other components like S3 Tables. * s3api/s3tables: support DefaultAllow in permission logic and handler Updated CheckPermissionWithContext to respect the DefaultAllow flag in PolicyContext. This enables "Open by Default" behavior for unauthenticated access in zero-config environments. Added a targeted unit test to verify the logic. * s3api/s3tables: propagate DefaultAllow through handlers Propagated the DefaultAllow flag to individual handlers for namespaces, buckets, tables, policies, and tagging. This ensures consistent "Open by Default" behavior across all S3 Tables API endpoints. * s3api: wire up DefaultAllow for S3 Tables API initialization Updated registerS3TablesRoutes to query the global IAM configuration and set the DefaultAllow flag on the S3 Tables API server. This completes the end-to-end propagation required for anonymous access in zero-config environments. Added a SetDefaultAllow method to S3TablesApiServer to facilitate this. * s3api: fix tests by adding DefaultAllow to mock IAM integrations The IAMIntegration interface was updated to include DefaultAllow(), breaking several mock implementations in tests. This commit fixes the build errors by adding the missing method to the mocks. * env * ensure ports * env * env * fix default allow * add one more test using non-anonymous user * debug * add more debug * less logs |
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Chris Lu
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cf8e383e1e |
STS: Fallback to Caller Identity when RoleArn is missing in AssumeRole (#8345)
* s3api: make RoleArn optional in AssumeRole * s3api: address PR feedback for optional RoleArn * iam: add configurable default role for AssumeRole * S3 STS: Use caller identity when RoleArn is missing - Fallback to PrincipalArn/Context in AssumeRole if RoleArn is empty - Handle User ARNs in prepareSTSCredentials - Fix PrincipalArn generation for env var credentials * Test: Add unit test for AssumeRole caller identity fallback * fix(s3api): propagate admin permissions to assumed role session when using caller identity fallback * STS: Fix is_admin propagation and optimize IAM policy evaluation for assumed roles - Restore is_admin propagation via JWT req_ctx - Optimize IsActionAllowed to skip role lookups for admin sessions - Ensure session policies are still applied for downscoping - Remove debug logging - Fix syntax errors in cleanup * fix(iam): resolve STS policy bypass for admin sessions - Fixed IsActionAllowed in iam_manager.go to correctly identify and validate internal STS tokens, ensuring session policies are enforced. - Refactored VerifyActionPermission in auth_credentials.go to properly handle session tokens and avoid legacy authorization short-circuits. - Added debug logging for better tracing of policy evaluation and session validation. |
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Chris Lu
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c433fee36a |
s3api: fix AccessDenied by correctly propagating principal ARN in vended tokens (#8330)
* s3api: fix AccessDenied by correctly propagating principal ARN in vended tokens * s3api: update TestLoadS3ApiConfiguration to match standardized ARN format * s3api: address PR review comments (nil-safety and cleanup) * s3api: address second round of PR review comments (cleanups and naming conventions) * s3api: address third round of PR review comments (unify default account ID and duplicate log) * s3api: address fourth round of PR review comments (define defaultAccountID as constant) |
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Chris LuandCopilot
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796f23f68a |
Fix STS InvalidAccessKeyId and request body consumption issues (#8328)
* Fix STS InvalidAccessKeyId and request body consumption in Lakekeeper integration test * Remove debug prints * Add Lakekeeper integration tests to CI * Fix connection refused in CI by binding to 0.0.0.0 * Add timeout to docker run in Lakekeeper integration test * Update weed/s3api/auth_credentials.go Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Chris Lu
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a3b83f8808 |
test: add Trino Iceberg catalog integration test (#8228)
* test: add Trino Iceberg catalog integration test - Create test/s3/catalog_trino/trino_catalog_test.go with TestTrinoIcebergCatalog - Tests integration between Trino SQL engine and SeaweedFS Iceberg REST catalog - Starts weed mini with all services and Trino in Docker container - Validates Iceberg catalog schema creation and listing operations - Uses native S3 filesystem support in Trino with path-style access - Add workflow job to s3-tables-tests.yml for CI execution * fix: preserve AWS environment credentials when replacing S3 configuration When S3 configuration is loaded from filer/db, it replaces the identities list and inadvertently removes AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID credentials that were added from environment variables. This caused auth to remain disabled even though valid credentials were present. Fix by preserving environment-based identities when replacing the configuration and re-adding them after the replacement. This ensures environment credentials persist across configuration reloads and properly enable authentication. * fix: use correct ServerAddress format with gRPC port encoding The admin server couldn't connect to master because the master address was missing the gRPC port information. Use pb.NewServerAddress() which properly encodes both HTTP and gRPC ports in the address string. Changes: - weed/command/mini.go: Use pb.NewServerAddress for master address in admin - test/s3/policy/policy_test.go: Store and use gRPC ports for master/filer addresses This fix applies to: 1. Admin server connection to master (mini.go) 2. Test shell commands that need master/filer addresses (policy_test.go) * move * move * fix: always include gRPC port in server address encoding The NewServerAddress() function was omitting the gRPC port from the address string when it matched the port+10000 convention. However, gRPC port allocation doesn't always follow this convention - when the calculated port is busy, an alternative port is allocated. This caused a bug where: 1. Master's gRPC port was allocated as 50661 (sequential, not port+10000) 2. Address was encoded as '192.168.1.66:50660' (gRPC port omitted) 3. Admin client called ToGrpcAddress() which assumed port+10000 offset 4. Admin tried to connect to 60660 but master was on 50661 → connection failed Fix: Always include explicit gRPC port in address format (host:httpPort.grpcPort) unless gRPC port is 0. This makes addresses unambiguous and works regardless of the port allocation strategy used. Impacts: All server-to-server gRPC connections now use properly formatted addresses. * test: fix Iceberg REST API readiness check The Iceberg REST API endpoints require authentication. When checked without credentials, the API returns 403 Forbidden (not 401 Unauthorized). The readiness check now accepts both auth error codes (401/403) as indicators that the service is up and ready, it just needs credentials. This fixes the 'Iceberg REST API did not become ready' test failure. * Fix AWS SigV4 signature verification for base64-encoded payload hashes AWS SigV4 canonical requests must use hex-encoded SHA256 hashes, but the X-Amz-Content-Sha256 header may be transmitted as base64. Changes: - Added normalizePayloadHash() function to convert base64 to hex - Call normalizePayloadHash() in extractV4AuthInfoFromHeader() - Added encoding/base64 import Fixes 403 Forbidden errors on POST requests to Iceberg REST API when clients send base64-encoded content hashes in the header. Impacted services: Iceberg REST API, S3Tables * Fix AWS SigV4 signature verification for base64-encoded payload hashes AWS SigV4 canonical requests must use hex-encoded SHA256 hashes, but the X-Amz-Content-Sha256 header may be transmitted as base64. Changes: - Added normalizePayloadHash() function to convert base64 to hex - Call normalizePayloadHash() in extractV4AuthInfoFromHeader() - Added encoding/base64 import - Removed unused fmt import Fixes 403 Forbidden errors on POST requests to Iceberg REST API when clients send base64-encoded content hashes in the header. Impacted services: Iceberg REST API, S3Tables * pass sigv4 * s3api: fix identity preservation and logging levels - Ensure environment-based identities are preserved during config replacement - Update accessKeyIdent and nameToIdentity maps correctly - Downgrade informational logs to V(2) to reduce noise * test: fix trino integration test and s3 policy test - Pin Trino image version to 479 - Fix port binding to 0.0.0.0 for Docker connectivity - Fix S3 policy test hang by correctly assigning MiniClusterCtx - Improve port finding robustness in policy tests * ci: pre-pull trino image to avoid timeouts - Pull trinodb/trino:479 after Docker setup - Ensure image is ready before integration tests start * iceberg: remove unused checkAuth and improve logging - Remove unused checkAuth method - Downgrade informational logs to V(2) - Ensure loggingMiddleware uses a status writer for accurate reported codes - Narrow catch-all route to avoid interfering with other subsystems * iceberg: fix build failure by removing unused s3api import * Update iceberg.go * use warehouse * Update trino_catalog_test.go |
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Chris Lu
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1274cf038c |
s3: enforce authentication and JSON error format for Iceberg REST Catalog (#8192)
* s3: enforce authentication and JSON error format for Iceberg REST Catalog * s3/iceberg: align error exception types with OpenAPI spec examples * s3api: refactor AuthenticateRequest to return identity object * s3/iceberg: propagate full identity object to request context * s3/iceberg: differentiate NotAuthorizedException and ForbiddenException * s3/iceberg: reject requests if authenticator is nil to prevent auth bypass * s3/iceberg: refactor Auth middleware to build context incrementally and use switch for error mapping * s3api: update misleading comment for authRequestWithAuthType * s3api: return ErrAccessDenied if IAM is not configured to prevent auth bypass * s3/iceberg: optimize context update in Auth middleware * s3api: export CanDo for external authorization use * s3/iceberg: enforce identity-based authorization in all API handlers * s3api: fix compilation errors by updating internal CanDo references * s3/iceberg: robust identity validation and consistent action usage in handlers * s3api: complete CanDo rename across tests and policy engine integration * s3api: fix integration tests by allowing admin access when auth is disabled and explicit gRPC ports * duckdb * create test bucket |
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Chris Lu
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92800c31a2 | adjust logs and errors |