* volume: gate the admin RPCs that only shell and workers call
checkGrpcAdminAuth covered 19 of the 48 VolumeServer RPCs, so an operator who
sets -whiteList expecting it to cover the gRPC surface gets partial coverage.
Extend it to ten that mutate state and are only ever called by the shell or a
worker: SetState, VolumeCopy, the EC generate/rebuild/copy/unmount/to-volume
pair, both tier moves, and VolumeTailReceiver. That is safe because the same
callers already reach gated RPCs today -- VolumeMarkReadonly, VacuumVolume*,
VolumeEcShardsDelete, VolumeDelete -- so a whitelist deployment already lists
those hosts. Nothing here is on a master or peer path, which is what made the
earlier fail-closed gate break multi-host clusters.
The split is by caller rather than by blast radius: the guard matches a peer IP
against the whitelist, and a whitelist holds masters, shell hosts and workers,
not every peer volume server. Gating a call one volume server makes to another
would break replication, EC and tiering, so those stay open.
Two test fakes embedded a nil grpc.ServerStream and only implemented Send;
they now implement Context, which the streaming RPCs read to authorize.
* volume: fail the build when a gRPC method skips the admin gate
The admin gate is an opt-in list in a 48-method service, which is how it
drifted down to covering 19 of them: nothing tied adding an RPC to deciding
whether it needed the gate.
Parse volume_server.proto, walk the AST of every *VolumeServer method, and
require each RPC to either call checkGrpcAdminAuth or appear in
ungatedVolumeServerRPCs with the reason it stays open. A stale entry naming an
RPC that no longer exists fails too, so the list can't quietly stop exempting
anything.
The exemptions are the cluster-internal calls -- replica sync, EC shard
distribution, vacuum reads, backup, tailing -- plus the read-only and liveness
RPCs. Closing the cluster-internal ones needs a peer identity rather than an
IP whitelist; recording them here makes that a visible decision instead of an
omission.
The AST walk also corrects the count: a line-window scan credits
VacuumVolumeCheck and VolumeServerStatus with a neighbouring function's guard.
* fix(tier): preserve volume data modification time
* fix(tier): best-effort restore of data mtime on download
A failed Chtimes should not abort an otherwise complete tier-down; warn
and continue, matching the EC copy path.
* fix(tier): preserve volume data mtime in rust volume server
Mirror the Go fix: store the source .dat mtime on upload instead of the
upload time, and restore it on the downloaded .dat. Without this a
tiered-then-restored volume loads last_modified_ts_seconds from the
upload/download time, extending its TTL across a restart or remount.
* fix(tier): read source mtime via DiskFile.GetStat()
GetStat() is nil-safe when the backend is closed concurrently and skips a
redundant stat syscall; its cached modTime is the on-disk mtime a reload
reads, since every .dat write or Chtimes is followed by a DiskFile (re)open.
* fix(tier): surface mtime-restore failures on rust tier-down
set_file_mtime now returns io::Result; the tier-down path warns on a
failed restore instead of dropping it silently, so a wrong local .dat
mtime (and the TTL drift it causes) is observable. Matches the Go
download. The EC copy path keeps its best-effort silence.
* Boostrap persistent state for volume servers.
This PR implements logic load/save persistent state information for storages
associated with volume servers, and reporting state changes back to masters
via heartbeat messages.
More work ensues!
See https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/issues/7977 for details.
* Block RPC operations writing to volume servers when maintenance mode is on.
Chris Lu