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c2cdefd06d89f4510dfe06508eee7ea5aa49d607
9824
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Chris Lu
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7dc3835b02 |
s3: an abort answered mid-part no longer leaves the upload completable (#11025)
* s3: reject a part whose upload was aborted while its body was in flight The upload-exists check runs before the part body is read. An abort answered during the read deletes the upload directory, and the part write that follows re-creates it, so the aborted upload is listed nowhere yet completes. Re-check after the write: only createMultipartUpload stamps the destination key on .uploads/<id>, so a directory without it is one the part write resurrected. Drop it along with the part and answer NoSuchUpload. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ByZ49KQdUtHhmjG6SpNczT * s3: reject a copied part whose upload was aborted mid-copy UploadPartCopy has the same window as UploadPart: the upload-exists check runs before the bytes are copied, and the part write that follows re-creates the directory an abort removed. Both the re-encryption and the raw-copy path re-check before answering. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ByZ49KQdUtHhmjG6SpNczT * s3: do not complete an upload whose directory holds no upload record A .uploads/<id> directory that a part write created rather than createMultipartUpload carries no destination key, no owner and no encryption settings. Completing one turned stray parts into an object; answer NoSuchUpload instead. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ByZ49KQdUtHhmjG6SpNczT * s3: log the part left behind when the resurrected directory survives abortMultipartUpload can fail to remove what the part write re-created. The client still hears NoSuchUpload, since the upload is gone either way and a retry would only write another part, but the leftover is worth a line. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ByZ49KQdUtHhmjG6SpNczT |
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Chris Lu
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c858e01a09 |
ec: split the shard-interval recovery into a gather and a rebuild (#11005)
* ec: split the shard-interval recovery into a gather and a rebuild Recovering an interval is now one function doing the local seeding, the waved peer fetch, the shard accounting and the Reed-Solomon rebuild, under a memory budget. Splitting the gather from the rebuild makes the rebuild a plain function over a set of intervals, which is testable on its own and reusable by the parity checks a full scrub wants. The rebuild refuses a parity target, and the caller checks that before the gather so a doomed target costs no fan-out. ReconstructData rebuilds data shards only, so asking it for a parity shard returned no error and left the slot nil, and the caller copied that out as a successful read of zeroes. Only data shard ids reach here today, so this is a guard, not a live fix. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014yMNebkUjSbx9sfUCWJJtq * ec: rebuild only the EC shard the read asked for ReconstructData rebuilds every missing data shard. The gather stops as soon as DataShards intervals are in hand, so on a distributed volume it routinely finishes holding parity where data is missing -- and each of those data shards is then rebuilt into an interval-sized buffer, decoded, and never read. Ask for the one shard the read needs. The budget covers it now too: DataShards gathered plus the one the rebuild allocates. It never covered the rebuild's output, and with ReconstructData that output was up to ParityShards buffers. The required mask is Total() long rather than DataShards. reedsolomon documents both lengths, but its presence scan walks every shard and indexes the short mask past its end, so the documented short form panics whenever a parity shard is absent - which here it usually is. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014yMNebkUjSbx9sfUCWJJtq |
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Chris Lu
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cd5013f116 |
Re-check an EC shard map a failed read has disproved (#11023)
* Re-check an EC shard map a failed read has disproved A read that fails against a cached location drops that shard from the map, which leaves it one short of complete -- and a map one short is trusted for seven more minutes. So a moment's trouble between volume servers cost minutes in which every read of that shard skipped the direct fetch and paid for a Reed-Solomon recovery instead, at DataShards times the memory and the peer load. Mark the map when a read disproves it, and re-check a marked map on the same eleven-second footing as one that never had enough shards to begin with. The mark clears on refresh, so it buys one prompt re-check rather than a master lookup per read. The tiers move into a helper; they were three overlapping conditions in one expression, and the reading of them was not obvious. Rust keeps the entry rather than dropping it -- a dead peer fails fast on the next attempt, and it was the freshness window, not the entry, hiding a shard that had moved. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SM5ARdPvFcnvGWNpBPgNRN * Invalidate the location of an EC shard whose own read failed Recovery fans out to the other shards, so the one whose direct read just failed is the only location nothing ever invalidates: a shard that moved to another server was reconstructed on every read until the map's own window expired, up to thirty-seven minutes for a map still complete. Mark the map there too. The entry stays -- a moved shard's old holder fails fast, and the next refresh is seconds away. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SM5ARdPvFcnvGWNpBPgNRN * Consume the stale mark before the lookup, not after A read that fails while the master is answering has disproved the very map that answer is about to install, and clearing the mark on the refresh's return swallowed it. Clear it where it is acted on instead. A lookup that then fails loses the mark, which costs nothing: the refresh time is only advanced on success, so the next read looks up regardless. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SM5ARdPvFcnvGWNpBPgNRN * Judge the shard map and consume its mark in one critical section Reading the mark and clearing it were two separate acquisitions, so a mark raised between them was cleared by a refresh that had not seen it. In Go that gap was a few instructions; in Rust the mark was read when the read first snapshotted the volume and cleared at the decision point, with the local interval reads in between. Take both under one hold. Rust needs a mutex rather than an atomic to do it, and no longer carries the mark through the snapshot. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SM5ARdPvFcnvGWNpBPgNRN * Put the stale mark back when the lookup does not answer for it Consuming the mark up front assumed the lookup would supersede it. A lookup that fails, or comes back with fewer than DataShards holders, supersedes nothing: the map is unchanged, its refresh time unadvanced, and with the mark gone the map a read had disproved is trusted for its full window again on the strength of a lookup that never landed. Put the mark back on both branches. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SM5ARdPvFcnvGWNpBPgNRN |
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Chris Lu
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624deaf3a4 |
mount: implement fallocate (#11021)
* mount: implement fallocate instead of reporting it unsupported Fallocate answered ENOSYS, so the kernel marked the mount as having no fallocate and returned EOPNOTSUPP. glibc then fell back to its emulation, which preads a byte from every block already inside the file to see if it is allocated; on a write-only descriptor that pread is EBADF, and posix_fallocate returned it. Volume space is assigned when a write is flushed, so nothing can be reserved up front: a range inside the file is answered OK untouched, and one past the end grows the file the way a truncate would. A mode we cannot honor is refused with ENOTSUP, not ENOSYS, so the kernel keeps sending the ones we do. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XG6sAAdkqTwWffqK5h4rH9 * mount: let a fallocate that allocates nothing past the quota and worm guards A range already inside the file, and any FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE request, reserve no space and rewrite no entry, but the preflight refused them with ENOSPC on a full mount and EPERM on a worm-enforced file. Decide the no-op first and guard only the growth. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XG6sAAdkqTwWffqK5h4rH9 * mount: charge a fallocate growth to the uncommitted byte counter Write charges the counter by how much the file grew, so the writes that fill a range fallocate already extended charge nothing and the real-time quota check never sees that data — only the periodic filer refresh does. Count the growth where it happens. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XG6sAAdkqTwWffqK5h4rH9 * mount: charge a truncate-up growth to the uncommitted byte counter Same gap Fallocate had: Write charges the counter by how much the file grew, so the writes that fill a range ftruncate already extended charge nothing and the real-time quota check never sees that data. Count the growth where it happens; a shrink still leaves the counter alone, since it is only ever raised and then reset by the periodic filer refresh. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XG6sAAdkqTwWffqK5h4rH9 |
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Chris Lu
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7bb0a1c127 |
s3: replay a delete whose reply the transport dropped (#11022)
* s3: stop retrying a delete the filer refused for a non-empty folder The filer looked and the children are there, so the answer will not change. retryFilerOp spent six attempts and up to 3.1s of backoff on it before the caller could act on the condition it was already holding. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XqaJrwgXQ5GSUpyzRbe5nD * s3: thread the request context through the unversioned delete path doDeleteEntry issued every DeleteEntry on context.Background(), so an S3 client that hung up left the gateway working on its behalf, out of reach of both cancellation and the per-request retry allowance that DeleteMultipleObjectsHandler installs. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XqaJrwgXQ5GSUpyzRbe5nD * s3: treat a cancelled filer RPC as terminal, not transient isRetryableFilerErr matched context.Canceled and DeadlineExceeded by sentinel, which only holds while the error is still local. Once it has crossed gRPC it is a status, so an abandoned request was retried six times on behalf of a caller that had already gone. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XqaJrwgXQ5GSUpyzRbe5nD * s3: replay a delete whose reply the transport dropped A delete is idempotent at the filer, which answers an entry that is already gone with an empty resp.Error, so a reply lost in transit can be reissued rather than surfaced. Surfaced, it becomes a 500 on the bucket delete, which boto3 resends and is then answered NoSuchBucket, or a per-key InternalError inside the 200 of a multi-object delete, which no SDK retries at all. The replay runs through retryFilerOp, so it draws on the allowance the request already installs rather than paying a backoff per key, and stops for a caller that has gone. rm and rmObject re-enter WithFilerClient per attempt, so each one walks the failover list again on a connection the failed attempt had invalidated; the multi-object loop holds one client for the batch, so there the replay reuses it. Classification stays structural. The filer reports its own refusals in resp.Error, which carries no status and has the deleted path - and, for a recursive delete, the children it stopped on - formatted into it, so no key name can steer the decision either way. rm and rmObject now take the caller's context. Cleanup and rollback paths pass context.Background() deliberately: they have to run whether or not the caller is still waiting. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XqaJrwgXQ5GSUpyzRbe5nD * s3: share one retry allowance across multipart completion cleanup The unused-entry loop deletes once per entry, and each delete now retries, so a filer that stays unavailable held the response for 3.1s per entry after the object was already committed. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XqaJrwgXQ5GSUpyzRbe5nD |
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Chris Lu
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af6f69740c |
Read metadata log chunks the way the mount reads every other chunk (#11018)
* Replay metadata log chunks the way the mount reads every other chunk The subscription's log-chunk replay built its own lookup, which always resolves volume server addresses. A mount started with -volumeServerAccess=filerProxy cannot reach those, so every fresh subscription failed on the previous minute's persisted segment and resubscribed a second later, forever. Take the lookup from the caller instead; the mount hands over the one it uses for file reads, which also keeps publicUrl and the bounded location cache in play. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NGqrxYj7cHUpSrL249n3Z6 * Keep a log chunk read failure off the filer connection A metadata subscriber reads persisted log chunks over HTTP from volume servers and hands whatever went wrong back as the subscription's error. "connection refused" from a volume server then matched the transport patterns that decide a gRPC channel is dead, so every failed replay closed the shared filer ClientConn and cancelled the assign and upload RPCs riding on it with "the client connection is closing". Mark those read failures so they are judged for what they are. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NGqrxYj7cHUpSrL249n3Z6 |
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Chris Lu
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95248f7492 |
Bound the memory an EC shard recovery holds (#11020)
* Reconstruct an EC shard from the shards already on this server recoverOneRemoteEcShardInterval only ever fanned out to the cached shard locations, so a server holding shards of the volume still fetched them over gRPC from itself -- and when the peers were unreachable it could not reconstruct at all, even holding the whole volume on local disk. Seed the Reed-Solomon buffers from the locally mounted shards first; each one is a peer round trip, and an interval-sized buffer, the fan-out no longer needs. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SM5ARdPvFcnvGWNpBPgNRN * Fetch only the EC shards reconstruction still needs The recovery fan-out read every surviving shard, so a 10+4 volume pulled 13 interval-sized buffers to feed Reed-Solomon 10 -- a third more memory held, and a third more load asked of peers that were, by definition, already having trouble. Fetch what is missing, and widen only when some of those reads fail. A shard reporting the needle deleted ends the walk: the rest would only answer the same. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SM5ARdPvFcnvGWNpBPgNRN * Bound the bytes EC recovery holds in flight Recovery is the one read path that multiplies the served bytes: it holds an interval-sized buffer per shard until Reed-Solomon runs, and a peer that is slow to fail keeps them all alive for the whole gRPC timeout. Nothing bounded how many of those fan-outs ran at once, so a transient problem between volume servers turned every read into a DataShards-fold allocation and the server died of it -- 64 concurrent 4MB intervals pin 3.6GB, and that is a small burst. Charge each recovery against a process-wide budget, so a burst queues on the semaphore instead of on the heap. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SM5ARdPvFcnvGWNpBPgNRN * Answer a deleted EC needle as deleted, not as a failed recovery A holder reporting the needle deleted is authoritative: deletes are never invented and never undone. Recovery already collected that flag, then dropped it on the branch where too few shards came back -- so a read of a deleted needle that had to recover surfaced as "cannot recover shard", and the volume server answered 500 where it owed a 404. Carry the flag out of the shortfall, and let it decide ahead of the error it came with. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SM5ARdPvFcnvGWNpBPgNRN * Check the encode run of a locally seeded EC shard in Rust The Rust recovery seeded Reed-Solomon straight from the mounted shards, without the encode-run check the remote reads and Go's readLocalEcShardInterval both apply. A volume remounted from a newer encode between the read's snapshot and its recovery would have fed mixed-generation bytes into the reconstruction. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SM5ARdPvFcnvGWNpBPgNRN * Say what the recovery budget actually guarantees Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SM5ARdPvFcnvGWNpBPgNRN * Seed Rust EC recovery from shards on every local disk find_ec_volume returns the first disk's EcVolume, so a reconciled volume whose shards are split across data dirs had the siblings ignored and could report "cannot recover" while holding enough shards locally. Resolve each shard together with the disk that owns it, the way Go's recovery already does, and check that owner's encode run. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SM5ARdPvFcnvGWNpBPgNRN |
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Chris Lu
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23241cf0f1 |
Let filer.sync move past a chunk the source cluster no longer has (#11019)
* Name the failure when the source cluster cannot locate a chunk's volume LookupFileId formatted a nil err into the message it returned, so the only thing a caller could do with "no locations for this volume" was match on the text. Return a typed error instead. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SRPEP4jRu29FbLSN6bjLaK * Fail a source chunk read on a failure status instead of copying the error page ReadPart never looked at the response status, so a volume server answering 404 for a needle vacuum had removed came back as a successful read whose body was the error page. The caller counted those bytes as file content and reported a size mismatch — a corruption claim about data the source had simply lost — and a 404 from one replica ended the search instead of trying the next. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SRPEP4jRu29FbLSN6bjLaK * Stop retrying a chunk the source cluster can no longer produce A chunk whose volume vacuum has removed fails the same way on every attempt, but the retry loop had no way to say so and kept going forever. The sync job holding it never finished, so it pinned the offset watermark at the event ahead of it and filer.sync never checkpointed again — alive, quiet, and permanently behind. Wait the source out for a grace period long enough to cover a volume server restart or a master failover, then give up and mark the failure permanent. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SRPEP4jRu29FbLSN6bjLaK * Let replication continue past an entry whose source data is gone An entry the source can no longer read holds the sync offset forever: the event fails on every replay, so the checkpoint never moves past it and every later event stays uncheckpointed, however long the sync keeps running. Nothing brings those bytes back, so skip the entry with an error naming it and carry on. Skip only while the source is demonstrably still serving other chunks. A volume with no locations reads the same whether it was vacuumed away or every replica is down, and during a cluster-wide outage that answer comes back for every chunk — skipping then would drop live files wholesale. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SRPEP4jRu29FbLSN6bjLaK * Propagate a missing source chunk instead of waiting when supersession is unverifiable An incremental sink's dated target keys cannot be mapped back to a source path, so nothing here can tell a chunk the source lost from one a later version already replaced. Waiting out the grace period would stall every vacuumed needle for half an hour; hand the failure to the caller, which has the event's real source key. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SRPEP4jRu29FbLSN6bjLaK * Wait out a gone volume once, not once per file it held A volume vacuum removed took every file it held with it, and each chunk was timing its own grace period. With a bounded chunk executor those waits serialize, so one gone volume holding many files stalls the sync for far longer than the grace period — the wedge again, only slower. Track the wait per source volume on the sink instead: the first chunk to find it unlocatable starts the clock, every later chunk inherits it and gives up as soon as it has run out, and a chunk the source does serve clears it. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SRPEP4jRu29FbLSN6bjLaK * Probe the source with a read, not a lookup, before writing an entry off A lookup only proves the source master still has the topology. If every volume server is unreachable while the master still lists them, the probe passed and the sink wrote off an entry whose data was merely out of reach. Read the probe chunk instead, and say in the log that the entry stays unreplicated. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SRPEP4jRu29FbLSN6bjLaK |
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Chris Lu
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60893c5ef3 |
Classify a filer error before a user-controlled path is wrapped into it (#11004)
* util, pb: classify a filer error by the status the server sent DoSeaweedListWithSnapshot wrapped a failed ListEntries with %v, dropping the gRPC status, so IsTransientError fell back to matching substrings against a message that now held the caller's path. Keep the status with %w and let it decide, reading the server's own text rather than the wrapper's. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjDWtZsCoZY6x4pdDmGWxU * s3: keep the bucket and prefix out of the list retry decision A bucket named transport, or a prefix under logs/unavailable/, made a PermissionDenied listing look transient and got it retried; a key holding the not-found sentence suppressed a retry that should have run. Both checks now read the filer's status, and only fall back to the text when there is none. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjDWtZsCoZY6x4pdDmGWxU * filer, s3: classify a delete failure before the path is wrapped into it The filer put the non-empty-folder marker behind its own "delete directory %s" wrapper and the gateway matched it as a substring, so a key named after the marker turned a real delete failure into the demote-the-marker no-op and the request answered 204. Keep the marker leading the message that crosses the wire, turn it back into a sentinel where the response is read, and match that. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjDWtZsCoZY6x4pdDmGWxU |
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Chris Lu
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9e06e1d0f9 |
Report a delete the filer rejected instead of answering success (#11003)
* s3tables: report a delete the filer rejected deleteDirectory discarded DeleteEntryResponse and checked only the transport error, so DeleteTable, DeleteNamespace, DeleteView and DeleteTableBucket answered 200 for a delete the filer refused. Call filer_pb.DoRemove, which reads resp.Error and still treats a missing entry as success. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjDWtZsCoZY6x4pdDmGWxU * admin: report a delete the filer rejected The bucket delete, the file browser handlers and the topic retention purger all discarded DeleteEntryResponse, so a delete the filer refused came back as success. Call filer_pb.DoRemove, which reads resp.Error. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjDWtZsCoZY6x4pdDmGWxU * credential: report a delete the filer rejected DeleteUser, DeletePolicy and the full-sync cleanup loops discarded DeleteEntryResponse, so a rejected delete answered success and left the credential file in place. The service account path in the same store already read resp.Error; the rest now do too, via filer_pb.DoRemove where not-found is already tolerated. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjDWtZsCoZY6x4pdDmGWxU * shell: report a delete the filer rejected remote.configure -delete, remote.cache and the remote metadata sync discarded DeleteEntryResponse, so a rejected delete printed as removed. Call filer_pb.DoRemove, which reads resp.Error. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjDWtZsCoZY6x4pdDmGWxU * mq: report a delete the filer rejected The consumer offset group purge and the coordinator assignment delete discarded DeleteEntryResponse. Call filer_pb.DoRemove, which reads resp.Error. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjDWtZsCoZY6x4pdDmGWxU * iam: count only the revocation entries the filer actually deleted The expiry sweep discarded DeleteEntryResponse, so a rejected delete was counted as purged and the entry stayed. Call filer_pb.DoRemove, which reads resp.Error, matching the role and provider stores beside it. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjDWtZsCoZY6x4pdDmGWxU * mount: fail rmdir when the unary fallback delete was rejected The streaming branch turns DeleteEntryResponse.Error into an error, the unary fallback dropped it, so rmdir of a non-empty directory answered OK off the stream and ENOTEMPTY on it. Surface it in both. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjDWtZsCoZY6x4pdDmGWxU * s3tables: fail DeleteTableBucket when the directory delete is refused The handler only failed when both the leaf entry and the directory delete failed, so a refused bucket directory delete still answered 200 with the bucket in place. The directory is the bucket, so it decides; the leaf entry stays best-effort. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjDWtZsCoZY6x4pdDmGWxU |
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Chris Lu
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742b2f5896 |
s3: share one retry allowance across a batch delete (#11001)
Every key in a multi-object delete drives its own retryFilerOp, so a filer that is briefly unhealthy multiplied one op's ~3.1s of backoff by a key count the client picks. The batch now carries a single allowance in its context, sized to one op's worst case; once it is spent the remaining keys fail fast with a per-key error instead of holding the request goroutine. A single-object delete carries no allowance and keeps its full retries. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjDWtZsCoZY6x4pdDmGWxU |
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Chris Lu
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902a12fd6f |
wdclient: bound the wait for a master leader by the caller's context (#11002)
* wdclient: bound the wait for a master leader by the caller's context WithClient waited on GetMaster with context.Background(), so a caller that arrived while no master leader was known parked in a 200ms poll loop until one appeared, whatever deadline it had already set on the RPC. Each retry above it then left another goroutine in the same wait. Take the context in WithClient and WithClientCustomGetMaster and hand it to GetMaster, and stop the retry loop once it is done. The dial keeps context.Background(): fn brings its own RPC context, so a cancellation seen here cannot be attributed to the shared connection. Call sites pass whatever they hold: the request context in the filer's CollectionList, DeleteCollection and Statistics handlers and in the credential store's propagation, the operation context in the shell's s3.bucket.delete and the kafka gateway's broker and filer discovery, and context.Background() where there is none - the shell commands, the admin dashboard wrapper, and the exclusive locker's initial lease. The locker's release keeps its own uncancelled context so a slow unlock cannot turn into a ghost lock. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjDWtZsCoZY6x4pdDmGWxU * wdclient: test that WithClient gives up with the caller's context Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjDWtZsCoZY6x4pdDmGWxU * wdclient: cut the master retry backoff short when the caller gives up util.Retry sleeps unconditionally between attempts, so a transient error arriving just before the caller's deadline still cost it a full backoff step. Use the context-aware util.RetryWithBackoff, the same helper the volume lookup in this file already uses. Two call sites went with it: the shell's lock-holder lookup builds its three second bound before WithClient so it also covers finding the leader, as its comment already promised, and the filer's post-delete collection cleanup goes back to an uncancelled context - the entry is already gone, so a caller that hung up must not leave the collection behind. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjDWtZsCoZY6x4pdDmGWxU * wdclient: test that a cancel during backoff ends the retry Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjDWtZsCoZY6x4pdDmGWxU |
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Chris Lu
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d850f36513 |
s3: distinguish a failed bucket lookup from a missing bucket on HEAD (#11000)
HeadBucket treated any lookup error as ErrNoSuchBucket, so a transient filer failure answered 404 instead of 500 and clients stopped retrying. Split the two cases the way the bucket policy handlers already do. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjDWtZsCoZY6x4pdDmGWxU |
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Chris Lu
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eed3c27d15 |
volume: cut the memory a server holding millions of volumes still uses (#10999)
* volume: stop the .vif guard depending on which entry the scan handed over A volume has both an .idx and a .vif, and loadExistingVolume skipped a .vif next to an .ecx as EC shard metadata. That was only ever correct because os.ReadDir sorted .idx ahead of .vif: an interrupted encode, where the .idx is still there, has to reach validateEcVolume to be reclaimed. Ask for the .idx instead of trusting the order. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NWpFUwAJcR2KUENrhLc9Sy * volume: walk volume directories in batches instead of listing them whole os.ReadDir builds, and sorts, a slice of every entry before the caller sees the first one. A disk holding millions of volumes has a .dat, .idx and .vif per volume, so each startup scan costs hundreds of MB of peak heap that the runtime is slow to hand back -- and there are several of them before the first volume loads. Walk in batches instead, and keep only the entries each scan acts on: loadAllEcShards now sorts and stats the shard and index files alone rather than every file on the disk. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NWpFUwAJcR2KUENrhLc9Sy * volume: skip the sibling-.dat scan when no EC volume is loaded pruneIncompleteEcWithSiblingDat only ever prunes EC volumes that are loaded, but it first walks every disk and keys a map by every .dat on the server. On a store with no EC volumes at all that is millions of map entries built to answer no question. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NWpFUwAJcR2KUENrhLc9Sy * volume: stop keeping a departure message for every volume The report state held a VolumeShortInformationMessage per volume copy so a departure could be named, but almost no volume ever departs. Hold a handle to the identity instead -- volumes share very few distinct ones -- and build the message on the way out. Measured over a populated report state: 195 -> 83 bytes per volume. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NWpFUwAJcR2KUENrhLc9Sy * rust volume: stop keeping a whole volume message per volume held The send loop kept a VolumeInformationMessage for every volume just to notice mounts and unmounts, and rebuilt the map from scratch on every beat. Keep the identity a delta names, which is what the Go report state keeps for the same reason. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NWpFUwAJcR2KUENrhLc9Sy * rust volume: keep only the EC files the shard scan acts on load_all_ec_shards named every file on the disk twice -- once in the dedup set and once in the sorted vector -- before deciding it only wanted .ec?? and .ecx. Filter while reading instead. Mirrors the same change in loadAllEcShards. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NWpFUwAJcR2KUENrhLc9Sy * volume: share the strings every .vif repeats A tiered volume's .vif names its replication and its backend, and every decode allocates a fresh copy, so a server holding millions of them holds millions of copies of the same handful of names. Route them through the interning table the volume info decode already uses. The remote key names one volume and is left alone. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NWpFUwAJcR2KUENrhLc9Sy |
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Chris Lu
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fdd8bd9478 |
s3: reject a request that names two operations (#10987)
The router matches bucket subresource routes in registration order while the IAM action resolver matches its own list in a different order, so a request carrying two operation subresources is authorized as one operation and served as another. `PUT /bucket?policy&tagging` resolves to s3:PutBucketTagging and runs PutBucketPolicy, letting an identity delegated bucket tagging install an arbitrary bucket policy. The same mismatch reaches PutBucketCors, PutBucketLifecycle, PutBucketVersioning, PutObjectLockConfiguration, PutBucketRequestPayment and the policy and cors deletes. Reject the ambiguity where the other pre-routing checks live, so neither list has to stay in step with the other. Keys that modify an operation rather than select one -- versionId, partNumber, prefix -- still combine freely. |
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Chris Lu
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99cf7a66df |
shell: remove the directories emptied by volume.fsck's filer entry purge (#10992)
* shell: remove the directories emptied by volume.fsck's filer entry purge volume.fsck -findMissingChunksInFiler -reallyDeleteFilerEntries deleted the orphan entries but left their parent directories behind, so a namespace accumulated empty directories that had to be cleaned up by hand. Remember the parent of every purged entry and, once the purge is done, walk up from each one deleting the directories that are now empty. The delete is non-recursive, so the filer itself rejects a directory that still has children; a bucket and a directory that is an S3 object of its own are left alone. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BncsNo2RVANCDtdbw96Kfc * shell: keep a directory volume.fsck saw change under it The empty-directory sweep read the entry to spot an S3 directory key object and then deleted unconditionally, so a directory promoted to an object in between was removed anyway. Delete with the mtime the lookup returned, leaving the filer to skip a directory that has changed since. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BncsNo2RVANCDtdbw96Kfc * shell: leave a directory volume.fsck just saw written for the next run The mtime the delete is conditioned on has second resolution, so a write landing in the same second as the one already on the directory is indistinguishable from it and the directory would still be deleted. Skip a directory modified within the last few seconds. A write after the lookup then always carries a later second than the one the delete carries, and the sweep picks the directory up on the next run. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BncsNo2RVANCDtdbw96Kfc * shell: skip a directory volume.fsck cannot condition a delete on A zero mtime disables the delete's condition at the filer, so a directory whose entry carries none was removed unconditionally and a concurrent promotion to an S3 object went with it. Leave such a directory alone. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BncsNo2RVANCDtdbw96Kfc * shell: hold volume.fsck's quiet period to the cutoff second itself Mtime keeps whole seconds, so a directory whose mtime lands on the cutoff second was written up to a second after it. Skip that directory too, so the quiet period fails closed. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BncsNo2RVANCDtdbw96Kfc |
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Chris Lu
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2a97e08caa |
s3: cover the directory marker key with object lock (#10988)
* s3: enforce object lock when deleting a directory marker The key "dir/" is deleted the unversioned way, ahead of the branches that enforce Object Lock, so a principal with plain delete permission could remove a key the gateway was reporting as COMPLIANCE-retained -- retention set through PutObjectRetention is stored on the directory entry and served back by GetObjectRetention, only the delete ignored it. The same path also takes any key ending in "/" regardless of size, while a PUT only makes a marker of one up to 1KiB. A larger one is a genuine versioned object, and deleting it here dropped its whole history after the versioned delete of the same key had been refused. Enforce in the marker delete itself, so the single, versioned and multi-object delete paths are all covered. * s3: apply object lock headers on a directory marker PUT The trailing-slash branch runs before the versioning and Object Lock handling, so it accepted x-amz-object-lock-* headers and stored none of them: a bucket owner could believe a key was retained while nothing recorded it, and an invalid mode or a past retention date that a regular key rejects came back 200 here. Validate the headers the way the regular path does, store what they ask for beside the owner the same callback already sets, and refuse to replace a key that is already retained. * s3: check every version a marker delete would remove The marker delete clears any history under the key in one recursive removal, while the lock check ahead of it resolves the latest version only. A version retained under an unretained one was taken with the rest, so enforce against each version the removal covers. * test: pin the marker lock refusals to AccessDenied A bare require.Error passes on any failure, including one that has nothing to do with the lock. Assert the code, the key the batch delete reports, and that the marker survives each refusal. * s3: check the history entries a version list leaves out The version list skips an entry without a version id, while the removal takes it with the rest, so an entry an older build left unnamed escaped the check. Walk the history directly instead, and refuse when an unnamed entry is still under a retention or a legal hold of its own. * s3: let a governance bypass reach an unnamed history entry The unnamed branch refused every active retention, so a caller allowed to bypass governance could not clear one, which the named path lets through. Refuse a legal hold and compliance mode as before, and take the bypass into account for governance. * s3: keep the object lock decision in one place The unnamed history entry had to repeat the retention and legal hold rules inline because the enforcement helper only takes a key to look up. Split the part that judges an entry out of it and call that from both. * s3: guard a marker PUT on the entry it replaces The overwrite check resolved the key's latest version, but mkdir builds a fresh entry for the marker itself, dropping the lock metadata the old one carried. Once the key had a history, an unlocked version answered for a retained marker and a plain PUT replaced it. Judge the entry the write is about to replace instead; a versioned write of the same key still adds a version, which is its own to allow. * s3: guard a marker delete on the entry it removes The check ran against the key rather than the entry, so once the key had a history it answered with a version and the retention recorded on the marker itself went unseen. Judge the entry that is about to be removed, the same way the PUT side now does; the versions under it are still covered by the walk that follows. * s3: take the object write lock for a marker PUT The overwrite check read the entry that the mkdir after it replaces, so two marker PUTs could both pass while one was still unlocked. The marker delete already runs under this lock; hold it across the check and the mkdir so the entry cannot change in between, and so the two paths are serialized against each other. |
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Chris Lu
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ab8b34720a |
s3tables: delete only the location the dropped table owns (#10986)
DeleteTable authorizes the named table, then recursively purges the data path derived from its stored MetadataLocation. That location is supplied by the caller at create/register time and never bound to the table, so a tenant allowed to drop one table could point it at a table in a sibling namespace and have the delete destroy that table's catalog entry and data files. A legitimately decoupled location -- a rename source, or a leftover the name was reused over -- has had its catalog attributes stripped, so a surviving metadata marker identifies a path that belongs to another entry. Refuse those, alongside the existing ancestor refusal. |
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Chris Lu
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0b5fff2ccd |
filer, s3: reuse the volume server's guarded remote-storage client builder (#10990)
* volume: build the guarded remote storage client through a shared helper Fold the endpoint validation, credential check and rebinding-safe dialer that FetchAndWriteNeedle applies before dialing a caller-supplied remote storage endpoint into a single BuildGuardedRemoteStorageClient helper, so other callers that dial the same endpoints can reuse it. No behavior change on this path. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AiH1FU3rmshSbFFTbJpaZN * filer: build the remote-mount stream client through the guarded helper streamFromRemote serves a cold remote-only entry straight from its mounted origin. Build its client through BuildGuardedRemoteStorageClient so the same endpoint checks the volume server applies cover this read path too. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AiH1FU3rmshSbFFTbJpaZN * s3: build the remote-mount stream client through the guarded helper openRemoteStream serves a remote-mounted object straight from its origin when the local read cannot. Build its client through the same guarded helper so the endpoint checks apply here as well. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AiH1FU3rmshSbFFTbJpaZN |
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Chris Lu
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28862c866e |
Authorize an Iceberg table create before it writes (#10991)
* s3tables: share one CreateTable authorization gate CreateTable and RegisterTable each carried their own copy of the name validation, policy load and permission check. Fold them into authorizeCreateTable, and expose it on the Manager for callers that write into a table bucket before the table itself is registered. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QiJkka1T2NAWDWq4JQ8Vuy * iceberg: authorize a table create before it writes Stage-create returns before the S3Tables registration that authorizes a create, and the plain create writes its metadata file before reaching it, so a caller who may not create the table could still leave a staged template, a marker and a v1.metadata.json in the target bucket - and get vended credentials for a location of their choosing. Run the CreateTable gate as soon as the table is known to be absent. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QiJkka1T2NAWDWq4JQ8Vuy * iceberg: authorize a create-on-commit the same way A commit against a table that does not exist creates it, writing the metadata file first and only then reaching the registration that checks the caller may create it. Denied callers saw a 500 for what is a 403. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QiJkka1T2NAWDWq4JQ8Vuy * iceberg: pin that identity actions reach the create gate The manager request is built from the caller's own context, so an identity whose actions carry the permission still passes. Worth a test: a fresh context here would silently deny every such caller. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QiJkka1T2NAWDWq4JQ8Vuy |
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Chris Lu
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bc06505b40 |
mount: keep metadata operations working on an unlinked open file (#10989)
* mount: serve metadata ops from the open handle of an unlinked file ftruncate on a descriptor whose file was unlinked failed with ENOENT: maybeReadEntry resolved the inode to a path first, and unlink had already dropped it. GetAttr worked around that with its own handle fallback; SetAttr and the xattr handlers had none. Look the handle up first and let it answer whether or not a name still points at the inode. GetAttr keeps reporting nlink 0 there, now off the empty path. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U1R8BM4bVT46KwPDEj2Ega * mount: read an open handle's attributes under the handle lock too GetAttr held only the LockedEntry lock, which covers the async uploader's chunk appends but not Write or the metadata flush: those rewrite size, times and the whole chunk slice under the handle lock, so FileSize could walk a slice mid-reassignment. The branch this replaced took both locks; take both here, outer handle lock first, as Read and Lseek do. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U1R8BM4bVT46KwPDEj2Ega * mount: report nlink 0 from SetAttr for an unlinked open file The kernel caches the attributes a SETATTR reply carries, so an ftruncate on an unlinked file left fstat reporting nlink 1 until the cache expired, even though GetAttr had it right. Both replies go through the same rule. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U1R8BM4bVT46KwPDEj2Ega |
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Chris Lu
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e9a464840c |
webdav: describe a listed entry the way clients expect (#10993)
* webdav: name the entry, not its path, in a listing DAV:displayname carried the full path of every entry. A client that takes displayname for the child's name - Windows Explorer does - then looks for /dir/name under /dir and finds nothing, so a folder shows up empty while the root, where the two spellings differ only by a leading slash, still lists. Readdir now builds its entries with toFileInfo like stat does, so a listing and a lookup describe a child the same way, and the wrapper that was trimming the sub-folder back off a name goes away with it. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XCeuCWpF9xo9CfyHvCQE9c * webdav: derive an ETag when nothing hashed the entry Uploads through this gateway carry no content MD5, so filer.ETag comes back empty and every file in a PROPFIND answered with an empty DAV:getetag, which is not a valid entity-tag. Report it as unimplemented instead, the way the sub-folder wrapper already did, and webdav falls back to modification time and size. The wrapper's copy went with it - it swallowed the stat error a caller was meant to see. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XCeuCWpF9xo9CfyHvCQE9c |
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Chris Lu
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d8a189f07f |
s3: keep a missing object a 404 under If-Match and If-Unmodified-Since (#10985)
* s3: keep a missing object a 404 under If-Match and If-Unmodified-Since GET and HEAD resolved the target before evaluating the conditional headers, and a missing target failed If-Match and If-Unmodified-Since outright, so absence surfaced as 412 PreconditionFailed. AWS reports the missing object instead: 404 for HeadObject, NoSuchKey for GetObject, and 412 only when a live object fails the condition. Clients cannot tell absence from a stale precondition without an extra racy HEAD, so OpenDAL disabled its four conditional stat/read capabilities against SeaweedFS. A precondition now only fails against an object that exists; a missing one -- including a latest version that is a delete marker -- returns NoSuchKey. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X4kEbuwxd9DFsTnSXjfjgv * s3: evaluate a conditional read against the version the request names GET and HEAD resolved the latest version before evaluating the conditional headers, so a request carrying versionId had its If-Match compared against a different version than the one it was asking for: a live version whose ETag the client held failed once a newer version -- or a delete marker -- became the latest. resolveObjectEntry now resolves the named version on a versioned bucket, the way DELETE already does. A named version that resolves to nothing is left to the handler, which alone knows whether the bucket is versioned and so whether it owes NoSuchVersion. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X4kEbuwxd9DFsTnSXjfjgv |
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Chris Lu
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2d25c39da4 |
volume: resolve the disk IO slow-latency threshold per disk (#10976)
* volume: resolve the disk IO slow-latency threshold per disk volume.toml keys [volume.disk.io.slow.latency] by disk type, but the threshold was chosen once per server by switching on the raw -disk flag. -disk is comma-separated, one entry per -dir, so a multi-disk server matched no case and silently took the hdd threshold. Carry the table on DiskIOProbeConfig and resolve it in CheckDiskSpace from the location's own DiskType. A type with no entry keeps falling back to the hdd threshold. * volume: run the disk IO probe on multi-directory volume servers The probe was disabled whenever more than one -dir was configured, because a single server-wide slow-latency threshold could not describe disks of different types. The threshold is per disk now, and the rest of the probe already is: diskRegistry is keyed by directory, each DiskLocation runs its own CheckDiskSpace, and Store consults isDiskUnavailable per location. * volume: reject duplicate -dir entries Nothing deduplicated -dir, so the same directory listed twice produced two DiskLocations that each loaded every volume in it, appending to the same .dat under two independent locks. Compare directory identity with os.SameFile rather than the path, so a symlink or bind mount aliasing an earlier entry is rejected as well. * volume: cover the per-disk slow-latency handoff SlowLatencyFor has a test, but nothing asserted that CheckDiskSpace feeds it the location's own disk type. Probe through a seam so the resolved threshold is observable, and check hdd, ssd, nvme, the empty type, and an unlisted tag. |
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Chris Lu
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8dcdb70594 |
mount: let a rename remove its source at the source's own version (#10973)
* mount: let a rename remove its source at the source's own version
A rename stamps the source and takes the name away at the same log position,
so the removal reaches the meta cache carrying exactly the version the source
already records. The version gate read that as a write already reflected and
dropped it, while the destination half of the same event still applied -- the
source stayed cached beside the destination, and readdir and stat went on
serving a name the filer no longer had:
gate dropped removal of /winfsp-test-TestRenameOverExisting/src
eventTs=1787761708173717200 record=1787761708173717200
floor=1787761708173717200 tombstone=false
A removal asks a different question from a write. An entry still present at
exactly that version has the write reflected but not its removal, so only a
strictly newer record fences one out; a tombstone is the removal already
reflected and goes on fencing as before.
* mount: sweep a section's vanished name recorded at the snapshot
The refresh deletes the names its listing did not return, but asked the gate
whether a write at the snapshot was reflected. A name recorded at exactly that
version has the write reflected and not its removal, so it survived the sweep
and stayed cached until some later event happened to touch it.
Same reading as the rename source a commit earlier: the call site removes, so
it asks about a removal.
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Chris Lu
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f5f1dcbd8c |
s3: keep verifying the request host when externalUrl is set (#10970)
* s3: keep verifying the request host when externalUrl is set externalUrl was the only host candidate once set, so a client that dialed the gateway directly instead of through the proxy always got SignatureDoesNotMatch. Make it lead the candidate walk instead: every candidate still needs a valid signature, and the request-derived hosts are already trusted when the flag is unset, so a mixed proxy plus in-cluster topology can now advertise a public endpoint and verify both planes. * s3: cover virtual-hosted addressing behind externalUrl The old pin also rejected an external client that signed bucket.api.example.com, since only the bare externalUrl host was ever tried. The candidate walk covers it; pin the case down. |
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Chris Lu
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3431bdcb74 |
s3: fix UploadPartCopy with volume-data encryption (#10971)
* operation: give an encrypted chunk the plaintext ETag With -encryptVolumeData the volume server stores ciphertext, so it cannot echo a Content-MD5 back and the chunk lands with an empty ETag. Every ETag derived from those chunks then comes out empty for a single chunk, or d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e-N for several. The caller already hashes the plaintext to send as Content-MD5, so keep that digest as the chunk ETag instead of dropping it, and compute it for a WantMd5 caller under cipher too. * s3: re-encrypt a part copy from a volume-encrypted source UploadPartCopy raw-copies source chunks when neither side uses SSE, which also caught -encryptVolumeData sources. Those chunks are ciphertext a whole-chunk cipher key decrypts, so copying a byte range out of one and keeping the key leaves a destination that fails authentication on GET, and the copied chunks carry no ETag for the part result to report. Route them through the re-encrypting path already used for SSE: it reads the source as plaintext, hashes the part, and writes the destination under the gateway's own encryption. * s3: fetch only the range a part copy asked for The re-encrypting UploadPartCopy path opened the source at offset 0 and threw the prefix away, so assembling an object part by part read the source once per part. Now that volume-encrypted sources take this path too, that is the common case rather than an SSE corner. The chunk stream already seeks, so hand it the range. * s3: reject an unsatisfiable copy-source-range A part copy has no way to report a short part, so a range reaching past the source cannot be clamped the way a GET clamps one. The fast path silently produced a part shorter than asked for, or an empty one; the re-encrypting path pads with zeros, so a 2 MiB source copied as bytes=1048576-9999999 came back as 1 MiB of data followed by 7.5 MiB of nothing. Answer InvalidRange instead, which is what s3-tests' test_multipart_copy_invalid_range expects. |
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Chris Lu
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da087f77b3 |
mount: stop a replaced rename destination from flushing over the rename (#10965)
* mount: stop a replaced rename destination from flushing over the rename
Rename replaces whatever the destination held, which deletes that entry, but
only the source handle was told. A handle still open on the replaced entry
went on flushing its metadata under that name, and on Windows -- where the
close carrying the flush runs after the application's CloseHandle has already
returned -- the flush landed after the rename and put the destination's old
content back:
dir Rename old_entry:{name:"src"} new_entry:{name:"dst" ... inode:...3416}
doFlush /dst fh 1521468582993181449
/dst saveToStorage 1,6872462993 [0,3)
flushMetadataToFiler /dst inode 11939747521756968515
InsertEntry /dst
The next read of the destination returned the content the rename was supposed
to replace. Unlink already handles this with markHandleDeleted, which raises
the flag under the handle's flush lock so a flush already writing finishes
first and any later one sees it; a rename that replaces an entry deletes it
just the same, so it now does likewise.
Verified on the Windows runner: TestRenameOverExisting 300/300, where the same
loop reproduced the corruption twice without this.
* test/winfsp: say which layer kept a renamed-away name
The failure only reported the stat. Which layer answered narrows the search a
lot: a listing reads no per-path cache, the mount's own forgets within a
second, and a name that survives both is still in the meta cache.
* mount: keep the destination barrier honest when the rename does not happen
Two gaps in the barrier the previous commit put in front of a replaced rename
destination:
The flag was raised before the filer rename, which can still fail. The
destination then stays exactly where it was, with its handle marked deleted
and its dirty metadata silently dropped from then on, so a rename that
returned an error has to put the flag back.
The handle was only found through the path mapping, which Forget drops while
the handle is still open. The source side already falls back to the inode the
entry carries; the destination now does the same, off the entry the sticky-bit
check had already loaded.
* mount: let only the caller that raised a delete mark lift it
Restoring the destination handle after a failed rename cleared isDeleted
outright, so an unlink that marked the same handle in between lost its mark and
a later flush could write the unlinked entry back.
Every raise of the flag already happens under the handle's flush lock, so
counting them there is enough to tell one caller's mark from another's: the
rename lifts only the mark it made itself.
* mount: drain the destination flush before marking it deleted
A flush already queued for the destination belongs to the entry as it stands.
Marking first meant the drain waited on a flush that then skipped its metadata
as deleted and released its handle, so a rename that failed afterwards had
nothing left to restore and the queued update was gone, its chunks orphaned.
Draining first lets that flush finish as itself, before the rename has taken
anything away.
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Chris Lu
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eb3bbfeb1f |
filer: apply the path's storage rule TTL on every write path (#10963)
* filer: cover the storage rule TTL on the object transaction write path An object written through ObjectTransaction used to land with ttlSec 0 even under an fs.configure TTL rule, while the same object written through CreateEntry got the rule's TTL. Guard the shared stamping so the two paths cannot drift apart again. * filer: apply the path's storage rule to an appended entry AppendToEntry resolved the storage option from the path - so its chunks land on a TTL volume under an fs.configure TTL rule - but never stamped the rule's TTL on the entry it creates, leaving an entry that outlives its data. Route it through applyStorageDefaultsToEntry, which now feeds the entry's own TTL into the option so the placement an existing entry's appended chunks get is unchanged. * filer: apply the path's storage rule to a completed TUS upload The PATCH path resolves the storage option from the target, so a TUS upload into an fs.configure TTL prefix writes its chunks to a TTL volume, but completion built the final entry with ttlSec 0 - the entry outlived the data it pointed at. Stamp it through applyStorageDefaultsToEntry, which also subsumes the hand-rolled read-only check and supplies the rule's name-length limit. * filer: apply the destination's storage option TTL to a copied entry The copy handler re-uploads the source's chunks under the destination's storage option, so a copy into an fs.configure TTL prefix already lands its data on a TTL volume. The entry, though, carried the source's ttlSec - 0 for a source outside the prefix, or the source's own TTL where the two rules differ - so it never expired with the data it pointed at. Take the TTL from the same option the chunks were placed with, after the data-only copy has restored the destination's metadata. |
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Chris Lu
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a02c0024e5 |
master: cap the reported capacity at what the disks hold (#10960)
* master: cap the reported capacity at what the disks hold Statistics reported max volume count times the volume size limit, which is how many volumes the cluster is allowed to place, not how much space it has. A cluster given far more slots than its disks can fill reported a capacity it could never reach -- 65536 slots at 30GB read as 1.9PB on a 460GB disk -- and the number never moved, since writing data changes neither the slot count nor the size limit. The volume servers already report each filesystem's total and free bytes in their heartbeats, so bound the answer by what they say is left. * mount: keep the last known sizes when filer statistics fails A failed Statistics call returned before df's answer was filled in, so a mount whose filer or master was briefly unreachable reported an empty filesystem rather than the sizes it already had. * master: drop the disk ceiling when a volume server does not report A cluster part way through an upgrade has volume servers that predate the disk bytes in the heartbeat. Summing only the ones that answered left the quiet server's free space out of the total, and the server holding the room is exactly the one that could make the cluster read as full. Answer with the disks only when every one of them reported. |
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Chris Lu
|
7658305c76 |
mount: name the disk after the mounted path (#10958)
* mount: name the disk after the mounted path Finder and Explorer labelled every mount with the filer address, so two mounts from one filer were indistinguishable. Use the mounted path's last segment, the way df already shows it, and keep the filer address only for a whole-tree mount. * mount: let a given mount option override the default The options from -o were placed before the ones this mount derives, so a volname or iosize given on the command line lost to the derived value. Append them last, matching the Windows adapter. * mount: document what labels the disk |
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Chris Lu
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627b5e9d59 |
shell: parse every collection filter the same way (#10955)
* worker: move the collection filter parser into weed/util/wildcard
The parser sits beside the volume-list filtering it was written for, in
weed/plugin/worker, which imports weed/shell — so the shell commands that
parse the same filter three other ways can never call it. Move it down to
weed/util/wildcard, next to the comma-separated wildcard helper it already
replaced, leaving the behavior unchanged.
* shell: parse every collection filter the same way
The shell parsed a collection filter three ways: compileCollectionPattern
compiled one regex for ec.encode, ec.decode, volume.balance and the tier
commands; volume.list and volume.deleteEmpty matched a single wildcard; and
volume.tier.move, volume.fix.replication and volume.configure.replication
called filepath.Match on their own. None of them took a list, so
"ec.encode -collection=a,b" selected nothing, the same way the admin UI did.
They all go through the shared matcher now: a comma-separated list of names,
"*" and "?" wildcards, "_default" for the collection with no name, and regex
entries. The one thing that stays per-command is what an empty value means -
every collection for -collectionPattern, the unnamed collection for the ec
and tier -collection flag - so compileCollectionPattern keeps that mapping.
The matchers are compiled once per command instead of once per volume, and a
regex entry now has to match the whole name unless it anchors itself, so
-collection=bucket no longer picks up mybucket2.
* shell: keep dots in collection names, and commas inside a regex
A dot no longer marks an entry as a regex, so a collection named "my.bucket"
matches itself and not "my-bucket" - the difference decides which volumes
volume.deleteEmpty and volume.tier.move touch. A dot still counts when it is
quantified, so "bucket.*" stays a prefix regex.
The comma split also leaves alone the commas inside a character class or a
repetition count, so "bucket[0-9]{1,3}" stays one entry instead of becoming
two broken fragments.
* shell: let a regex entry match its own spelling
A collection named after regex syntax, say "logs(2024)", was unreachable:
the entry compiled to a pattern that matches "logs2024" instead. Match the
entry verbatim as well, so naming a collection always selects it, whatever
characters it holds.
* shell: reject a collection filter that names no collection
A value of "," parsed to no entries and then matched every collection, so a
typo widened ec.encode or volume.deleteEmpty to the whole cluster. Only a
genuinely empty filter means "all collections"; anything else has to name one.
* shell: keep commas inside a regex group out of the entry split
The split already left alone the commas inside a character class or a
repetition count, but not the ones inside a group, so "bucket(foo,bar)"
was cut into two fragments that no longer compile.
* shell: cover escaping a collection name that is not a regex
A name like "logs(2024" does not parse as a regex on its own; escaping it,
"logs\(2024", reaches it. Pin that so the escape hatch does not regress.
* shell: split entries only on commas inside a closed regex construct
An unmatched "{" or "[" made the splitter swallow every comma after it, so
"foo{bar,videos" became one entry that matches neither collection - the
silent no-op this filter work exists to remove. A construct now has to close
before its commas stop separating entries.
* shell: skip character classes while scanning a regex group
A ")" inside a class is a literal, so "(a[)],b)" ended its group early and
split into two fragments that no longer compile.
* shell: cover escaping a comma inside a collection name
A comma separates entries, so a name holding one is reached by escaping it.
* shell: follow the regexp parser when scanning a character class
A "]" leading a class is a member of it, and a POSIX class such as
"[:alpha:]" carries its own "]", so stopping at the first one cut a valid
filter like "(a[]),],b)" into fragments and rejected it.
|
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Chris Lu
|
368b2035b2 |
s3: deny anonymous access when the identity config loads no identities (#10954)
* s3: deny anonymous requests when the identity config loads no identities Naming a config file is the operator asking for authentication. A file that yields no identity - an unpopulated secret mount, or a mistyped top-level key the proto parser silently drops - left the gateway open to every anonymous caller: ListBuckets returned 200, and anonymous PUT could create buckets and write objects. * s3: name the unknown top-level keys in an identity config The proto parser discards what it does not recognise, so a mistyped "identites" loads as an empty config. Naming the dropped keys at startup turns the resulting lockout into a one-line diagnosis. * s3: isolate the auth-enforcement tests from AWS environment credentials * s3: use a singular "identity" as the unrecognised-key example Codespell rejects the misspelling the example used. * s3: cover the empty identity config alongside the unrecognised key * s3: cover a config file whose body is an empty object |
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Chris Lu
|
e482e67971 |
admin: accept a list of collections in the task collection filter (#10953)
The collection filter was parsed twice with two syntaxes: the master-side volume listing compiled the whole string as one regex, while EC encode and EC balance detection split it on commas and matched each entry as a wildcard. A volume had to pass both, so "collection-a,collection-b" matched nothing (no collection is named that), and the ALL_COLLECTIONS sentinel, which the master side skips, dropped every volume at the task side. Parse it once, in one place: a comma-separated list where an entry is a name with optional * and ? wildcards, or a regex when it carries regex syntax. A regex entry now has to match the whole name unless it anchors itself, so listing a collection no longer picks up its longer namesakes. |
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|
ef4c9d9178 |
filter volume by local or remote storage name (#10946)
* filter volume by local or remote storage name Signed-off-by: lou <alex1988@outlook.com> * fix SelectsEverything Signed-off-by: lou <alex1988@outlook.com> * keep the proto sync out of this change The branch copied weed/pb/*.proto over their seaweed-volume and Java counterparts and regenerated every .pb.go with a different protoc and protoc-gen-go-grpc. DiskStatus.error arriving that way broke the Rust build, and the rest is toolchain churn in files this change has nothing to say about. --------- Signed-off-by: lou <alex1988@outlook.com> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chrislusf@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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Chris Lu
|
70c3adb983 |
volume: stop read-only volumes from pinning .idx and .sdx (#10950)
A read-only or cloud-tiered volume loads a SortedFileNeedleMap, which held both its .idx and its .sdx open for the life of the process. On a server with ~600K tiered volumes that is 1.2M descriptors before a single read, enough to exhaust the fd limit and take the listeners down. The .dat is not the problem: a tiered volume serves it from the remote backend. Neither index file is needed except while a lookup is in flight, so borrow them from a bounded process-wide pool instead. An idle volume now holds zero descriptors; a busy one keeps its handles hot rather than paying an open() per needle. Reads borrow O_RDONLY, so a volume on a read-only mount answers lookups that previously failed at load. Sync tracks whether a tombstone was appended, which also drops the fsync-per-volume storm at shutdown. |
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Chris Lu
|
b77431c142 |
master: stop hintless small-file assigns from marking volumes full (#10944)
* master: estimate a hintless assign's size from the volume's average file size An assign that carries no dataSize hint charged a flat 1MB per file id against the volume's effective size. A small-file workload overpays by orders of magnitude: bulk-writing 4KB files marks volumes holding a few hundred MB of real data as crowded and then full, so the master grows unnecessary volumes and, once every volume is spuriously full, fails all assigns. Estimate from the volume's own average file size instead, and keep the 1MB fallback only for volumes with no history. * master: decay pending assign sizes for volumes gone quiet The decay that corrects pending assign estimates runs only when a heartbeat reports the volume, and a heartbeat only reports a volume whose content changed. A volume held out of the writable list takes no writes, so once inflated estimates mark every volume full, nothing is ever reported again, nothing decays, and the cluster refuses all writes until a restart. Run the decay from the master's periodic loop for volumes no heartbeat has reported within two pulses, feeding the last reported size back through the same path an unchanged heartbeat would take. * master: trim the comments on the assign size estimate * master: keep the periodic decay out of the replica-dedup window UpdateVolumeSize ignores a report arriving within two seconds of the last one, so replicas of the same volume do not each halve the pending estimate. The periodic decay went through the same path and stamped that window, so a real heartbeat landing right behind it was dropped along with its reported size and compact revision. Only a volume whose content changed is reported at all, so nothing would send that size again and the master kept a stale one. Let the dedup window belong to volume server reports alone. * master: let the decay read the size record under the lock it mutates The periodic decay picked its volumes under a read lock and replayed them under a write one, carrying the size it had read across the gap. A heartbeat landing in between was rolled back: the replay wrote the older size and compact revision over the fresh ones, and a compaction report lost that way is never resent, since only a volume whose content changed is reported. The decay has no size of its own to contribute, so it now reads the record under the same lock it mutates. * master: let a heartbeat that beat the decay stand for the cycle The decay chooses its volumes under a read lock and applies them under a write one. A heartbeat landing in that gap already did the halving the cycle owed, so applying the decay on top of it halved twice and forgot pending bytes the volume has not written yet - the double-halving the replica-dedup window exists to prevent. Both callers now give way to a report already handled for this cycle; only a real report still advances lastUpdateTime, so a quiet volume keeps decaying every pulse. * master: keep genuinely full volumes out of the decay pass A volume the disk really did fill keeps its fullSince set for good, so it was selected every pulse for a decay that cannot help it: UpdateVolumeSize refuses to recover a volume whose reported size is at the limit, and replaying a size that cannot move leaves the record as it found it. Full and quiet is the ordinary resting state of a cluster, so this was most of the pass, taking the layout write lock away from the heartbeats to do nothing. On a million tracked volumes with a hundredth of them phantom-full it costs ten thousand write locks a pulse instead of a million. * master: put the stale-replay test back on the path it guards Giving the decay the dedup window left this test short-circuiting there, so it no longer reached the locked read it was written for and passed with that read removed. Age the record past the window, which is the only case where reading it under the lock is what saves the report. |
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Chris Lu
|
50b388771a |
s3: stop one abandoned request from cancelling every concurrent upload (#10948)
* grpc: a non-cancellable context is no evidence of a stale channel shouldInvalidateConnection only invalidates on Canceled/DeadlineExceeded while the context handed to WithGrpcClient is still live, so that an RPC timing out on its own does not close the shared cached ClientConn and cancel every other in-flight RPC on it. context.Background()/TODO never expire, so Err() stays nil forever and that guard always answered "invalidate" - and Background is what almost every caller passes, the S3 gateway included. One S3 request whose RPC rode an abandoned HTTP request context therefore closed the shared filer connection, and every multipart part in flight died with "the client connection is closing", surfacing to the client as 400 InvalidRequest. Only a cancellable context bounds an RPC attempt, so require one before reading it. A genuinely stale channel (a peer restart behind a stable L4 endpoint) surfaces as Unavailable, which invalidates on its own branch. * grpc: a bystander of a connection teardown is not a stale-channel witness gRPC raises ErrClientConnClosing locally, before an RPC reaches the wire, when this process has already closed the ClientConn. Every caller that touches a channel during another goroutine's teardown gets it, so reading it as a stale-channel signal lets one teardown re-arm itself across the whole herd of callers it just cancelled. The cached-connection version check keeps those callers from closing a replacement channel, but the streaming path invalidates by address alone and has no such guard. * grpc: end a stream without dropping the peer connection under it A streaming caller gets its own ClientConn, but on any error it also drops the cached non-streaming ClientConn every request handler shares with that peer, to recover a peer restart hidden behind a stable L4 endpoint. Any error includes the ordinary ones: a metadata subscription that reached its stop point, a follow callback that refused an event, a caller that gave up. The S3 gateway follows filer metadata on such a stream and reconnects forever, so each ordinary end of it cancelled every S3 request in flight against the filer. Drop the shared channel only for errors that say the peer went away, which is what invalidation is for. * test: close the connections the cascade tests leave cached Each test swaps in a fresh connection cache and restores the previous one, dropping its own entries without closing them, so the ClientConn's transport and reconnect goroutines outlive the fake filer they dialed. * grpc: say why ErrClientConnClosing's deprecation notice does not apply It points at codes.Canceled, which is the code this function exists to disambiguate. Only the message distinguishes a teardown a caller merely walked into, so the sentinel stays. |
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Chris Lu
|
44115c1051 |
filer: stop TUS uploads from turning into garbage (#10945)
* filer: store TUS sub-chunks through the regular chunk writer A TUS sub-chunk was written with one assigned file id, retried up to three times against that same id, and abandoned on failure: an attempt that had landed on some replicas left a needle no session record and no entry ever references, unreclaimable by vacuum. dataToChunkWithSSE, which the regular write path uses per chunk, assigns a fresh file id per attempt and hands back the file ids of failed attempts, which are now freed the way the regular write path frees them. * filer: retry a chunk write on a fresh volume when the server 5xxs The filer's chunk writer assigns a fresh file id per attempt but only retried transient network errors, so a volume filling up and turning read-only mid-write failed the whole request even though the very next assignment would have landed elsewhere. Every other write client already routes this through ShouldReassignUpload; the filer's own write path now does the same, for regular uploads and TUS sub-chunks alike. * filer: export the chunk deletion queue The filer test harness in weed/server builds filer.Filer as a struct literal, so any code path reaching DeleteChunks dereferenced a nil queue. Exported like the neighboring DeletionRetryQueue so the harness can arm it. * filer: complete a TUS upload whose chunk records overlap A PATCH retried while its predecessor was still storing a sub-chunk - a proxy timeout with an immediate retry is enough - records the same range twice. HEAD computes Upload-Offset as the covered watermark and reported the upload fully received, but completion demanded exactly adjacent records and failed every attempt: the client concluded success from offset == length, no entry was created, and the session eventually expired, turning the entire upload into deleted needles for the vacuum to chew through. Completion now validates gapless coverage with the same watermark HEAD uses. A record extending coverage joins the entry - the read path resolves partial overlaps by ModifiedTsNs, and the raced copies carry identical bytes - while a fully covered duplicate is freed once the entry lands. * filer: allow one mutating TUS request per session at a time Nothing stopped two PATCHes from writing the same range concurrently: both loaded the same offset, both passed the conflict check, and both recorded their sub-chunks. A client whose request timed out in a proxy retries immediately while the server side is still storing the buffered sub-chunk, which is exactly that race. A session now accepts one PATCH or DELETE at a time, the way tusd locks uploads; a concurrent one is refused with 423 Locked, which TUS clients retry, and HEAD keeps answering so progress polling is unaffected. The chunk state is loaded under the claim, so a retried PATCH sees every record its predecessor left and conflicts cleanly instead of duplicating data. * test: cover a TUS PATCH raced by its own retry Stalls a PATCH mid-body over a raw connection, retries the same range while it is in flight, and expects the retry refused with 423 Locked; the upload then resumes from the reported offset and the final content must be intact. * filer: never free a TUS duplicate the entry still references Coverage is computed from ranges, so a record fully covered by another is treated as a duplicate no matter which needle it names. A malformed record naming a file id the entry keeps would have had that needle freed right after the entry landed - the corruption this change set exists to stop. The duplicates are now freed in one batch, skipping any file id the entry references; their records go with the session directory. * test: bound the raw TUS connection reads http.ReadResponse on the stalled PATCH's connection blocked until the whole go test timeout if the filer never answered. * filer: free the needles of chunk write attempts a retry replaced A volume server stores the needle locally and only then fans out to the replicas, so a replication failure 5xxs with the data already written. Each attempt assigns its own file id, so once a later attempt lands elsewhere nothing references the earlier ones: the caller only sees the chunk that succeeded, and the failed ids were dropped. They are now freed the way the caller frees them when the whole write fails. Retrying on a 5xx makes this reachable on every read-only or full volume, which is exactly the condition that filled the reporter's volumes. |
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Chris Lu
|
68f0793b6f |
mount: register UNC mount points as WinFsp network file systems (#10943)
A \\server\share -dir was passed to WinFsp as a plain mount point, which treats it as a directory path on an actual remote server and fails. Turn it into the VolumePrefix option instead, so the mount registers with the WinFsp network provider: the UNC path is then reachable from every logon session, which a drive letter mounted from a service is not, and each user can map their own drive letter to it. |
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Chris Lu
|
b3be2f5449 |
filer.backup, filer.sync: stop sharing resume checkpoints across destinations (#10934)
* filer.backup: key the checkpoint by source path and sink destination The checkpoint id hashed only sink name + directory, so two backups to different buckets or endpoints sharing a directory layout advanced one checkpoint: whichever job was running pushed the shared offset forward, and a stopped or failing job later resumed from the other's position, silently skipping changes. Backups of different source paths to the same destination shared a checkpoint the same way. Each sink now reports a destination identity (endpoint or account, bucket or container, directory) and the checkpoint is keyed by the source path plus that identity. Reads fall back to the historical name+directory key when the new key has no value, so existing backups resume where they left off; writes go only to the new key. * filer.sync: include the target path in the offset key The offset stored on the target filer was keyed by source path and source filer signature only, so two syncs from the same source cluster and path to different directories on the same target cluster advanced one shared checkpoint, and the slower one could resume past events it never applied. The target path now participates in the key; "/" keeps the historical form, and a sync with a non-root target path falls back to the historical key once when its own key has no value yet. * join checkpoint key fields with NUL so they cannot alias A path or configuration value spelling out the separator could concatenate two different field tuples to the same checkpoint key. NUL cannot appear in a CLI path argument or any sane configuration value, making the encoding injective. |
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Chris Lu
|
4a2879abad |
admin: show a copyable S3 object URL in the bucket file browser (#10933)
* admin: offer copyable S3 object URLs in the bucket file browser * admin: hide object urls when the bucket type lookup fails * admin: ignore an s3.public_endpoint that is not an absolute http url * mini: build the seeded s3 endpoint with JoinHostPort for ipv6 * admin: reject a query or fragment in s3.public_endpoint * mini: drop the seeded s3 endpoint when a later run disables s3 * admin: reject userinfo and bare delimiters in s3.public_endpoint, redact the warning * mini: pass its s3 endpoint as an admin option instead of mutating viper * admin: keep the rejected s3.public_endpoint value out of the log |
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Chris Lu
|
2a70532d0d |
s3: log each request at -v=2 (#10931)
* s3: log each request at -v=2 * s3: quote requester and path in the access log line * s3: record the post-policy signing identity as the requester |
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Chris Lu
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d2c470af1b |
S3: commit SSE GET status only after the first read succeeds (#10935)
The SSE streaming path kept writing 200/206 from filer metadata before fetching or decrypting anything, so a missing needle or failed decrypt setup surfaced as a broken 200 body. Same deferral as the plain path: the status commits on the first body write, and every failure before that returns to the handler for a clean S3 error response. |
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Chris Lu
|
d9d5fab35b |
S3: commit GET status only after the first read succeeds (#10930)
streamFromVolumeServers wrote the 200/206 status from filer metadata before any byte had been fetched from a volume server, so a missing or corrupted needle surfaced as a broken 200 body and the request metrics recorded a success. Defer the status commit to the first body write: a failed first read now returns a clean 500 before headers, while the wire timing of successful responses is unchanged since net/http buffers the status line until body bytes arrive anyway. |
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MaratKarimovandMarat Karimov
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a3afe4460b |
tarantool: fix upsert data corruption and missing context propagation (#10926)
Co-authored-by: Marat Karimov <karimov_m@inbox.ru> |
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Chris Lu
|
863fec6c3f |
S3: let a key that is a prefix of other keys be an object (#10912)
* filer: keep the sentinel when CreateEntry reports an update failure CreateEntry flattened the error UpdateEntry wraps, so errors.Is stopped matching and ErrExistingIsDirectory and ErrExistingIsFile never reached the S3 mapper, which answered a retryable 500 instead. * s3: let a key that is a prefix of other keys be an object S3 keys are flat, so "a/b" and "a/b/c" are independent objects that coexist in either write order. The filer stores a key as a path, so one of them has to live on the directory the other is nested under. Writing the nested key first refused the prefix key outright. Writing it second promoted the file to a directory, which kept its data but lost the key: an empty object left nothing to recognise it by and disappeared, and one with data listed under a trailing slash it never had. Mark the directory that carries such a key, and write the object onto it when the path is already a directory. The mark makes an empty prefix object visible to listings and readable by GET and HEAD, keeps the empty folder cleaner off it, and lists it under the key it was written with. Deleting the key strips the mark back off along with the data. * filer: keep a TTL off a directory that stands for an object An expired entry is deleted a row at a time, so expiring a directory removes it and leaves everything under it unreachable. Promoting a file to a directory carried its TTL across, and a promoted file is exactly the one that has keys nested under it. Drop the TTL on promotion, and leave one an older build wrote alone. The lifecycle worker still expires the object, through the delete that leaves the directory behind. * s3: delete the null version of a key other keys are nested under The routed delete cannot remove an entry that other keys live under, and answered a retryable 500 rather than falling back to the lock path the unversioned delete already falls back to. That path then looked the entry up under the bucket with the whole key as its name, so the demote wrote it back one directory too high and failed as not found. Fall back on any non-precondition error, and split the key before deleting it. Trailing-slash directory markers with children reach the same delete. * filer: keep the sentinel when MkFile and Mkdir report a create failure Same flattening one layer out: every mkFile caller lost the sentinel, so a CopyObject onto a key that other keys are nested under answered a retryable 500 where a PutObject of the same key answers 409. * s3: copy and rename a key that other keys are nested under Such a key is stored on the directory those keys live in, and copy and rename both refused it: the source lookup maps every directory entry to NoSuchKey, so a key a plain GET serves could not be copied or moved, and the destination side refused it as a directory conflict. The source is read through a view of the entry as the object it names. The destination is written the way a PutObject of that key writes it. A rename at either end copies the object's own data across and strips it off the source key rather than going through AtomicRenameEntry, which moves a directory by moving everything under it - the nested keys are not part of what is being renamed. |
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Chris Lu
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46ce2c45a2 |
mini: reserve the admin gRPC port instead of binding it late (#10928)
* mini: reserve the admin gRPC port instead of binding it late Port selection probes every port with a throwaway listener and closes it. Master, filer, volume and S3 bind a moment later, but the admin waits for all of them first and only then binds its worker gRPC port, roughly two seconds in. That port defaults to the admin http port + 10000, which lands inside the Linux ephemeral range, so one of the cluster's own outgoing gRPC dials can take it during the gap and the admin dies on bind, taking the worker with it. Keep the listener from the availability check and hand it to the admin. * mini: clear the admin gRPC reservation before retaking it A rerun inside one process would otherwise inherit the closed listener of the previous run whenever the reservation fails, and the admin would accept it and only find out inside Serve. * mini: snapshot the admin options for the startup goroutine The cleanup path read the package-level options long after the goroutine started, so a later in-process run could have its reserved listener closed by the previous run. |
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Chris Lu
|
51eb5333d3 |
ec: read a needle's intervals in parallel (#10911)
* ec: read a needle's intervals in parallel A needle spanning more than one EC block gets one interval per block, and consecutive blocks live on different shards. We read those intervals in sequence, so a 4MB chunk landing in a volume's 1MB small-block region cost five round trips to five different servers. Read them concurrently into disjoint slices of a single buffer, at most 8 in flight. Same change in the Rust volume server's phase C. * ec test: seed the random payload instead of the deprecated rand.Read |
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Chris Lu
|
69cc2869ad |
Fixes from the review of the admin bucket policy UI (#10907)
* admin: treat a missing S3 Tables policy as an empty load, not an error
The bucket/table policy GET relayed the backend's 404 NoSuchPolicy to the
dialog, whose loader treats any non-OK response as a load failure and
keeps Save and Delete blocked. A bucket or table without a policy could
never be given one. Return policy null instead, the same contract
ShowBucketPolicy uses for classic buckets.
* admin: reject policy documents the structured editor would misread
A top-level JSON array passed the object guard (typeof [] is 'object')
and loaded as a zero-statement policy, which the next commit would
rewrite to an empty document. Object elements in Action/Resource were
coerced to '[object Object]' and saved that way on the s3tables surface,
which stores policies verbatim. Both now throw, which routes the
document to the JSON tab like other unrepresentable shapes.
* admin: let the JSON tab save documents the structured editor can't model
Save with the JSON tab active required a round-trip through
policyDocToEditorState, so exactly the documents the dialogs shunt to
'JSON tab only' mode (unrepresentable Effect, Resource+NotResource, and
the like) could never be saved - Delete was the only mutation left.
Invalid JSON still blocks; an unrepresentable document now saves and the
editor state stays marked unparsed.
* admin: pin the policy editor to what each consumer's backend supports
The s3tables evaluator has no NotResource/NotPrincipal fields - it
silently drops them, turning Allow+NotResource into allow-everything and
making Deny+NotPrincipal inert - and it only matches s3tables: actions
against s3tables ARNs, while the editor suggested s3: actions and
arn:aws:s3::: resources. New registerPolicyEditor knobs: allowNegation
hides the Not* modes and routes documents using them to the JSON tab;
resourceSuggestions pins the Resource autocomplete to the open
resource's ARN; the S3 Tables dialogs get an s3tables-only action
datalist. requirePrincipal now also hides NotPrincipal, which
policy_engine.ValidateBucketPolicy always rejects, and the client-side
check requires Principal specifically to match that server rule.
* admin: save S3 Tables policies from a button, not form submission
The multi-input structured editor sits inside a form whose Save button
was type=submit, so Enter in any single-line editor input - accepting an
autocomplete suggestion, say - implicitly submitted whatever half-built
statement the editor held, and the backend stores the document verbatim.
A lone statement with no Principal matches nobody, locking out every
non-owner. Save is now an ordinary button and the form ignores
submission.
* admin: block zero-statement policy saves
Committing the active tab before the emptiness check made 'Policy JSON
is required' dead code: an empty editor serializes to {"Statement":[]},
which the s3tables backend stores verbatim - evaluated default-deny for
every non-owner, while the statement-count column keeps showing 'Not
configured'. All three policy dialogs now refuse a save with no
statements and point at Delete instead. The classic bucket modal only
gained a clearer message; the server already rejected the document.
* admin: guard S3 Tables policy mutations against stale and overlapping requests
The save/delete completions ran against whatever resource the shared
modal happened to show by then: a slow PUT for one bucket would hide the
modal mid-edit of another and misattribute its alerts, a late DELETE
cleared the shared textarea over the newly opened resource with its
loaded flag set, and nothing stopped a double-click from firing two
overlapping mutations. Ported the classic modal's pattern: capture the
target on start, flag the mutation in flight with the buttons disabled,
and only touch the UI when the completion still matches the open
resource. Success now reloads the page, which also keeps the Policy
column's statement count honest.
* admin: confirm before deleting an S3 Tables policy
Delete Policy sat next to Save and fired on a single click; with
default-allow enabled one stray click silently dropped the resource
policy and left the bucket open to every principal. Same confirmation
the classic bucket modal already has.
* admin: let a corrupt stored bucket policy be shown, fixed, and deleted
A stored document the decoder rejects made the policy GET 500, and with
the loaded flag never set the modal blocked both Save and Delete - the
one policy an operator most needs to remove was the one they couldn't,
even though the delete path never reads the document. The GET now
returns the raw bytes alongside a null policy; the dialog hands them to
the JSON tab and unblocks the buttons.
* admin: url-encode the bucket name in the policy API calls
The filer lists any directory under the buckets path, names S3 would
never allow included; one carrying '#' or '%' broke the fetch URL or
addressed a different name than the modal shows.
* admin: drop stale edit-policy responses on the IAM policies page
The same race the bucket and S3 Tables dialogs already guard against:
open one policy's editor while its GET stalls, open another, and the
late response populates the editor under the second policy's name -
Update then saves the first policy's statements over the second.
* admin: warn before a bucket policy save drops unsupported fields
The editor tracks unmodeled top-level keys precisely so
confirmPolicyFieldDiscard can warn before the server's Version+Statement
decode discards them, but only the IAM page called it; the bucket modal
saved a pasted document with e.g. a console-generated Id without a word
while the editor kept displaying the field.
* s3: enforce the bucket policy size cap on both surfaces
The 20KB cap lived only in the admin UI, so a larger policy stored via
the S3 API displayed there but could never be re-saved, desyncing the
two writers the cap comment claimed could not desync. The constant now
lives in policy_engine next to the shared validator and PutBucketPolicy
rejects oversized documents with PolicyTooLarge, matching AWS.
* admin: ship the policy editor's fieldset styles with the editor
The .policy-stmt-* rules that undo Bootstrap's full-width legend reset
stayed behind in policies.templ when the editor markup moved to the
shared script, so the bucket and S3 Tables dialogs rendered Actions/
Resource/Principal as full-width jumbo headings. PolicyDatalists is the
component every consumer already renders once; the styles live there
now.
* s3: mirror bucket policy changes into the IAM store from the metadata subscription
The advanced-IAM path appends the bucket-policy:<bucket> document to
every STS/session evaluation, but only this gateway's own PutBucketPolicy
maintained that mirror - a policy tightened or created through the admin
UI (or another gateway) never reached it, so revoked access stayed live
indefinitely, and the delete side was an unimplemented TODO in any case.
The metadata subscription now diffs the stored policy on every bucket
entry change and updates or removes the mirror, covering all writers and
deletion with one mechanism; IAMManager gains the missing
RemoveBucketPolicy.
* admin: deduplicate the bucket policy write path
Set and Delete carried line-for-line identical filer closures;
bucketPolicyMutation already treats nil as clear-the-key. The shared
helper sits below Set's validation, since ValidatePolicy cannot take the
nil document Delete passes.
* s3: drop ValidateBucketPolicy's re-checks of ValidatePolicy rules
Both callers run ValidatePolicy first, which already enforces the
version and at-least-one-statement rules; the duplicates were dead code
with drifted error text.
* admin: seed a new statement's Resource from the pinned suggestions
A fresh statement on the S3 Tables dialogs started with no resource row
at all; seed it with the broadest pinned ARN the same way cfg.bucket
already seeds the classic modal.
* admin: refuse to save Not* fields the backend would silently drop
Hiding the NotResource/NotPrincipal modes was not enough where negation
is disallowed: the JSON tab accepts any valid document (that is its
job), and a statement's Advanced-fields box can reintroduce the keys, so
an s3tables save could still store fields the evaluator drops - turning
Allow+NotResource into allow-everything. commitPolicyActiveTab now runs
a final document-level check over what would actually be saved; Delete
stays available for cleanup.
* s3: move the IAM bucket policy mirror on a bucket rename
A same-directory rename delivers one event carrying both entries, and
the byte-equality short-circuit skipped the new name's mirror when the
policy was unchanged - while the replayed delete for the old name
removed its mirror, leaving the renamed bucket unmirrored. The mirror
decision is now a pure function that removes the old name and writes the
new one regardless of byte equality, with the rename cases unit tested.
* s3: backfill the IAM bucket policy mirror on lazy bucket loads
The metadata subscription only mirrors changes, so a policy that
predates the IAM integration never reached the bucket-policy:<bucket>
mirror and its grants did not bind on the IAM path until the policy was
next modified. The gateway is deliberately lazy at startup (nothing
lists all buckets), so the backfill hooks the same place a bucket's
policy first becomes known: the cold bucket-config load. EnsureBucketPolicy
writes only when no mirror is stored, so repeat loads cost one cached
read.
* s3: reconcile the bucket policy backfill against concurrent changes
The backfill's check-then-write could race an event-driven mirror update
or removal and re-store bytes that were already stale, with no later
event to heal it. EnsureBucketPolicy now reports whether it wrote, and a
write is reconciled against a fresh authoritative entry read: a changed
policy is re-mirrored, a removed one is removed. Anything changing after
that read fires its own event, which finds the backfill's write already
present and supersedes it. The backfill also carries the entry's raw
bytes rather than a re-marshaled document, so the reconcile can
byte-compare.
* s3: prime the bucket policy mirror before advanced-IAM authorization
The backfill ran from the lazy bucket-config load, but IAM authorization
evaluates the bucket-policy:<bucket> mirror before any handler runs - a
grant carried only by a not-yet-mirrored policy denied forever, and the
denied request never reached the code that would have loaded the bucket.
authorizeWithIAM now primes the bucket config first (an in-memory cache
hit once warm), and the backfill runs synchronously on the cold load so
the very first authorization already sees the mirror.
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