4 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Chris Lu	6b379badbb	filer: shut down test filers' meta-log buffers, fixing the 32-bit OOM (#12104) ... * filer: shut down test filers' meta-log buffers, fixing the 32-bit OOM Each log_buffer.NewLogBuffer preallocates five 8 MiB windows and spawns loopFlush/loopInterval goroutines that keep them reachable. The weed/filer tests built ~70 filers and aggregators that almost never called ShutdownLogBuffer, pinning ~2.8 GB plus live churn, and the linux/386 job ran out of its ~4 GiB address space inside newSealedBuffers. - MetaAggregator.Shutdown now retires MetaLogBuffer too: the "aggr" buffer's loops previously outlived the aggregator. - newTestFiler and newTestFilerWithStubStore register t.Cleanup shutdowns; the one-off filer/aggregator literals defer theirs. * filer: wait for the aggregated meta-log buffer to stop in Shutdown ShutdownLogBuffer only signals the stop; loopFlush and its pooled windows exit asynchronously. Match Filer.Shutdown's local-buffer sequence so the aggregator returns with the buffer's memory already released. * filer: cancel test filers' flush context before buffer shutdown The stub-store helpers build real NewFiler instances, so the queued shutdown flush retries appendToFile every ~737ms under flushCtx, which nothing ever cancelled — the buffer and its pool stayed alive past each test. Cancelling first lets the flush drop the window and WaitForShutdown confirms loopFlush exited. * filer: wait for test log buffers to drain after shutdown The stub-flush buffers cannot hang, but without WaitForShutdown their loopFlush goroutines release the pooled windows asynchronously — the memory this PR means to free is still counted as live while the next test allocates.	2026-10-26 13:24:48 -07:00
3 people	a6be3c89c2	filer: support nanosecond timestamps for conditional delete (#11339) (#12071) ... * filer: support nanosecond timestamps for conditional delete (#11339) * shell: fs.verify prune carries the entry mtime in nanoseconds IfNotModifiedAfter now resolves to sub-second precision on the filer, so pass the looked-up mtime_ns along with mtime; the re-lookup check catches same-second rewrites that share the second, and the test mock mirrors the filer's seconds/nanoseconds cutoff. * shell: volume.fsck guards empty-directory deletes with mtime nanoseconds The looked-up mtime_ns joins the seconds in IfNotModifiedAfter so a directory rewritten within the same second is not dropped; the stub filer mirrors the filer's scale heuristic and the race fixtures use a realistic mtime so the nanosecond branch engages. * filer: cover the seconds guard and equality boundary Test second-resolution cutoffs on both sides of the entry's second and the exact-equality nanosecond guard that still deletes. * filer: compare the nanosecond guard as a time, not UnixNano UnixNano overflows for mtimes outside 1678-2262, letting a far-future entry slip past the guard; time.After compares exactly at every epoch. The seconds branch keeps Unix() so a same-second cutoff still deletes. * filer_pb: add explicit if_not_modified_after_ns to DeleteEntryRequest * filer: prefer explicit nanoseconds guard, keep if_not_modified_after as seconds * shell: send seconds and nanoseconds delete cutoffs, skip unexpressible mtimes * filer: merge conditional-delete guards into one nanosecond cutoff DeleteEntryMetaAndData carried both the seconds and nanoseconds guards even though the precedence between them is fixed, so every caller passed a dead parameter. The gRPC handler now folds if_not_modified_after into nanoseconds at the boundary, where (sec+1)*1e9-1 keeps the whole-second cutoff exact, and the filer takes a single ifNotModifiedAfterNs. * filer: hold the conditional-delete cutoff as a time, not int64 nanoseconds A seconds-only guard at or past year 2262 saturated to MaxInt64 nanoseconds (~2262), so a delete whose cutoff matched a far-future mtime was skipped while the request still reported success, and any entry between 2262 and the real cutoff survived pruning. The merged cutoff is now a time.Time, where a whole-second guard maps to the last nanosecond of its second for any int64 second. --------- Co-authored-by: user.email <chrislusf@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com>	2026-10-26 07:51:33 -07:00
Chris Lu	11791fad6a	filer: resolve the collection a bucket delete drops (#11439) ... * filer: resolve the collection a bucket delete drops A bucket delete dropped the collection named after the bucket, which assumes bucket name is collection name. With a collection rule the write path honors, deleting the bucket either orphaned its collection or, when a bucket was named after a shared collection, removed volumes other buckets still write to. Resolve the collection through the same rule chain the write path uses and drop it only when no other bucket resolves there too. A listing failure keeps the collection, the safe side of an unknown. * filer: prove collection exclusivity across all paths before dropping it The sibling-bucket scan missed every non-bucket writer: a broad rule like '/' or '/buckets/', a rule under a surviving bucket, or a rule on an unrelated path can route into the same collection. Check every storage rule's prefix instead, and mirror the grouped gateway's explicit <group>_<bucket> collection, which otherwise resolves a rule-named collection the bucket never wrote to. * s3: let the filer own the collection decision on bucket delete Both entry points deleted a name-derived collection around the filer's own resolved delete, bypassing its exclusivity check and wiping sibling data. The filer now resolves the collection a bucket actually used, including the grouped form. * filer: keep a collection the default write route also uses Rule-less writes outside buckets land in the filer's default collection, so a bucket resolving there shares it with them.	2026-09-25 07:30:42 +08:00
Chris Lu	ba5b14b457	master, filer, s3api: bound the collection deletes that strand a caller (#11026) ... * master: bound each volume server DeleteCollection, and finish the fan-out A collection delete fanned out to every volume server holding it with context.Background(), so a server that accepted the connection and then went quiet held the whole delete open with nothing to end it. Each RPC is bounded now, on the same budget allocateVolumeTimeout gives the other master-to-volume-server admin RPC. The volume server runs the delete to completion regardless of the request context, so giving up costs the confirmation and not the deletion. The walk itself is the caller's, not a per-server one: - It outlives the caller. A cancelled request must not abandon a destructive fan-out part-done, with volumes left behind and no request still running to come back for them. - It no longer stops at the first server that refuses, which left the collection on every server after it in the list. The first failure is still what is reported, and the collection stays in the topology so a later delete comes back for the rest. - It sends one RPC per server rather than one per replica. ListVolumeServers reports a node once for every replica it holds, while DeleteCollection removes the whole collection from the server it reaches, so a collection with thousands of volumes repeated the same whole-collection delete thousands of times over. Both passes run too. Returning after a failed normal pass left the collection's EC shards in place with nothing left to retry them. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EnB1fbryyKc2LetRZxQPTP * master: delete the EC shards behind /col/delete too The HTTP handler carried its own copy of the volume-server walk and only ever ran the normal pass, so a collection deleted through it kept its EC shards. It shares the gRPC path now, which also gets it the bounded RPCs and the one-per-server fan-out. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EnB1fbryyKc2LetRZxQPTP * filer: bound the collection delete a bucket delete leaves behind Deleting a bucket entry deletes its collection afterwards, deliberately detached from the request so a client that hangs up cannot strand the bucket's volumes. Detached meant unbounded, though: with the master down or mid-election the wait for a leader has nothing to end it, so the handler parks, and the client retrying behind it parks another. It keeps outliving the request and now carries a deadline of its own. The budget bounds the wait, not the work: the master keeps deleting on its own fan-out once asked, so giving up costs the confirmation. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EnB1fbryyKc2LetRZxQPTP * s3api: bound the collection RPCs a bucket creation and deletion issue Neither carried a deadline, so a transient failure anywhere down the chain held the S3 request open until the client gave up on it. Both budgets are taken outside the filer failover walk, so one budget covers the whole walk rather than granting each filer a fresh one. The walk itself stops when that budget is spent, and stops without blaming anyone: the caller's own expiry is not evidence against the filer that was answering, and the next filer has no time left to answer in either. Recorded as a filer failure, a slow master upstream would flag every filer in the walk, and the three failures that open the circuit take unrelated object reads down with them. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EnB1fbryyKc2LetRZxQPTP * s3api: a failed collection listing no longer fails a bucket creation PutBucket lists collections to notice a leftover one it is about to reuse. The result feeds a warning and nothing else -- s3a.exists is what decides whether the bucket already exists -- yet a transient failure of that listing returned 500 and refused the creation. It is advisory now, so a failure is logged and the creation continues, exactly as it does when the listing returns false. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EnB1fbryyKc2LetRZxQPTP	2026-08-28 16:32:30 -07:00