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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Chris Lu
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7bb0a1c127 |
s3: replay a delete whose reply the transport dropped (#11022)
* s3: stop retrying a delete the filer refused for a non-empty folder The filer looked and the children are there, so the answer will not change. retryFilerOp spent six attempts and up to 3.1s of backoff on it before the caller could act on the condition it was already holding. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XqaJrwgXQ5GSUpyzRbe5nD * s3: thread the request context through the unversioned delete path doDeleteEntry issued every DeleteEntry on context.Background(), so an S3 client that hung up left the gateway working on its behalf, out of reach of both cancellation and the per-request retry allowance that DeleteMultipleObjectsHandler installs. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XqaJrwgXQ5GSUpyzRbe5nD * s3: treat a cancelled filer RPC as terminal, not transient isRetryableFilerErr matched context.Canceled and DeadlineExceeded by sentinel, which only holds while the error is still local. Once it has crossed gRPC it is a status, so an abandoned request was retried six times on behalf of a caller that had already gone. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XqaJrwgXQ5GSUpyzRbe5nD * s3: replay a delete whose reply the transport dropped A delete is idempotent at the filer, which answers an entry that is already gone with an empty resp.Error, so a reply lost in transit can be reissued rather than surfaced. Surfaced, it becomes a 500 on the bucket delete, which boto3 resends and is then answered NoSuchBucket, or a per-key InternalError inside the 200 of a multi-object delete, which no SDK retries at all. The replay runs through retryFilerOp, so it draws on the allowance the request already installs rather than paying a backoff per key, and stops for a caller that has gone. rm and rmObject re-enter WithFilerClient per attempt, so each one walks the failover list again on a connection the failed attempt had invalidated; the multi-object loop holds one client for the batch, so there the replay reuses it. Classification stays structural. The filer reports its own refusals in resp.Error, which carries no status and has the deleted path - and, for a recursive delete, the children it stopped on - formatted into it, so no key name can steer the decision either way. rm and rmObject now take the caller's context. Cleanup and rollback paths pass context.Background() deliberately: they have to run whether or not the caller is still waiting. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XqaJrwgXQ5GSUpyzRbe5nD * s3: share one retry allowance across multipart completion cleanup The unused-entry loop deletes once per entry, and each delete now retries, so a filer that stays unavailable held the response for 3.1s per entry after the object was already committed. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XqaJrwgXQ5GSUpyzRbe5nD |
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Chris Lu
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3431bdcb74 |
s3: fix UploadPartCopy with volume-data encryption (#10971)
* operation: give an encrypted chunk the plaintext ETag With -encryptVolumeData the volume server stores ciphertext, so it cannot echo a Content-MD5 back and the chunk lands with an empty ETag. Every ETag derived from those chunks then comes out empty for a single chunk, or d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e-N for several. The caller already hashes the plaintext to send as Content-MD5, so keep that digest as the chunk ETag instead of dropping it, and compute it for a WantMd5 caller under cipher too. * s3: re-encrypt a part copy from a volume-encrypted source UploadPartCopy raw-copies source chunks when neither side uses SSE, which also caught -encryptVolumeData sources. Those chunks are ciphertext a whole-chunk cipher key decrypts, so copying a byte range out of one and keeping the key leaves a destination that fails authentication on GET, and the copied chunks carry no ETag for the part result to report. Route them through the re-encrypting path already used for SSE: it reads the source as plaintext, hashes the part, and writes the destination under the gateway's own encryption. * s3: fetch only the range a part copy asked for The re-encrypting UploadPartCopy path opened the source at offset 0 and threw the prefix away, so assembling an object part by part read the source once per part. Now that volume-encrypted sources take this path too, that is the common case rather than an SSE corner. The chunk stream already seeks, so hand it the range. * s3: reject an unsatisfiable copy-source-range A part copy has no way to report a short part, so a range reaching past the source cannot be clamped the way a GET clamps one. The fast path silently produced a part shorter than asked for, or an empty one; the re-encrypting path pads with zeros, so a 2 MiB source copied as bytes=1048576-9999999 came back as 1 MiB of data followed by 7.5 MiB of nothing. Answer InvalidRange instead, which is what s3-tests' test_multipart_copy_invalid_range expects. |
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Chris Lu
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e5edd8be3c |
s3: place multipart part chunks by the destination object's storage rule (#10845)
Multipart parts stage under /buckets/<bucket>/.uploads/<id>/, so the filer resolved filer.conf storage rules against that path when the gateway assigned volumes for them. A rule scoped to a key prefix - fs.configure -locationPrefix=/buckets/b/data/ -ttl=30d - then matched a small object but not the parts of a large one, so an object whose entry carried the rule's TTL had its bytes spread over TTL-less volumes. Assign part chunks against the destination object's filer path instead, the way the x-seaweedfs-destination header made the filer resolve it before the S3 write path moved off the filer proxy. Covers PutObjectPart and both UploadPartCopy paths. The part entry itself is still written under .uploads, so a read-only rule there still rejects it. The lifecycle XML Expiration.Days TTL keeps passing 0 for parts: that rule targets the user-visible object key and would start its clock before CompleteMultipartUpload. |
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Chris Lu
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561768a426 |
[s3]: preserve multipart copy checksums (#9948)
* s3: preserve checksums for copied multipart parts * s3: return checksums from multipart copy * s3: pin the upload's checksum algorithm on copy-part re-stream * s3: note why UploadPartCopy uses the re-stream slow path * s3: explain the TLS proxy in the multipart copy checksum test * s3: cover nil and unknown-algorithm edge cases in copy checksum tests * s3: cover all checksum algorithms in the multipart copy test * s3: run all checksum integration tests, not just presigned |
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Chris Lu
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f9bc6adf98 |
s3: route single-entry object writes to the owner filer, off the DLM (#9629)
s3: route non-versioned object PUT and DELETE off the distributed lock A non-versioned, non-object-lock object write now goes straight to the key's owner filer as a single-mutation ObjectTransaction, which serializes it with the owner's per-path lock and evaluates the precondition, instead of taking a cluster-wide lock. PUT and DELETE use the object's full path as the lock key, so a concurrent create and delete of the same key serialize against each other. The fast path is taken only when the precondition reduces to clauses the filer can evaluate (existence and a single strong-ETag match); time-based conditions, ETag lists, weak ETags, post-create hooks, and an unknown owner fall back to the lock. A routed mutation error other than a failed precondition also falls back, so the lock path stays the authority for the cases it alone covers. PrimaryForKey returns "" until the ring view arrives, keeping writes on the lock until routing is known. |
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Chris Lu
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83b7ea5e7b |
fix(s3): keep server-side copy data in the bucket collection (#9607)
* fix(s3): keep server-side copy data in the bucket collection UploadPartCopy and SSE-C CopyObject assigned destination volumes against r.URL.Path, the S3 request URI. The filer derives a bucket's collection only when the assign path sits under its buckets folder, so an S3 URI routed copied bytes to the default collection instead of the destination bucket's. Assign against the destination's real filer path. * refactor(s3): centralize copy-part path and thread dstPath into SSE-C copy Extract copyPartLocation so the fast path and writeEmptyCopyPart share one definition of the .uploads/<id>/<n>_copy.part location. Pass the destination filer path into copyChunksWithSSEC instead of re-deriving it from the request, and thread it through key rotation so re-encrypt copies also assign in the destination bucket's collection. |
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Chris Lu
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2458f6c81c |
feat(s3api): apply lifecycle TTL at write time (#9377)
* feat(s3api): apply lifecycle TTL at write time The S3 server already has the bucket's lifecycle XML at PUT time (via the cached BucketConfig), so volume-TTL routing is just a per-write decision instead of something that needs a separate filer.conf projection kept in sync via operator commands. - BucketConfig caches the canonical Rules parsed from the lifecycle XML once on load (BucketConfigCache invalidates on Put/Delete Lifecycle, so the rules stay current automatically). - resolveLifecycleTTLForWrite walks the cached rules: longest-prefix match, applies tag and size filters against the request, returns Days * 86400. Versioned buckets, non-Expiration.Days rules, and unevaluable size filters (no Content-Length) yield 0 — the lifecycle worker handles those at scan time. - putToFiler resolves TTL once and passes it through both the AssignVolumeRequest (so chunks land on a TTL volume) and the new entry's Attributes.TtlSec (so the filer's RocksDB compaction also expires the metadata). Lifecycle XML PUT/DELETE now influences write routing immediately — no operator command, no filer.conf bookkeeping. The lifecycle worker remains authoritative for the cases the fast path can't cover (existing objects via bootstrap, versioned buckets, noncurrent retention, abort-MPU, tag/size filters that didn't hold at PUT time). CompleteMultipartUpload and CopyObject still need wiring; left for follow-ups so this PR stays scoped. * perf(s3api): pre-filter and sort lifecycle rules for the per-PUT TTL walk resolveLifecycleTTLForWrite walked every lifecycle rule on every PutObject, including disabled / non-Expiration.Days rules that could never fire on the fast path, and computed "longest prefix wins" via a running max instead of an early exit. Cache a pre-filtered + pre-sorted slice in BucketConfig: - buildTTLFastPathRules drops everything except Status=Enabled + ExpirationDays>0; - sorts by descending prefix length (stable, so equal-length rules keep their XML order). The resolver returns on first prefix+filter match. A bucket whose lifecycle XML has no Expiration.Days rules is now O(1); a typical bucket with one Expiration.Days rule walks one HasPrefix per PUT. The cache is built once per bucket-config load. PutBucketLifecycle / DeleteBucketLifecycle already invalidate the cache, so the fast-path slice stays current automatically. * refactor(s3api): LifecycleTTLResolver object + four review fixes Pulls the per-PUT TTL resolution into a dedicated type so the bucket config holds one object instead of a slice + magic-walk function: - LifecycleTTLResolver wraps the pre-filtered, pre-sorted rules. nil-safe Resolve so the call site doesn't have to special-case buckets with no eligible rules. Four review findings: 1. (high) drop tag-filtered rules from the fast path. Tags are mutable post-PUT via PutObjectTagging but volume TTL is irreversible — an object that matched at write time would still expire after the tag was removed. Worker re-evaluates current tags at scan time. Fast path now keeps only stable predicates: prefix and size. 2. (high) move TTL resolution out of putToFiler. MPU parts, copy-part destinations, and other transient writes called putToFiler with object="" — bucket-wide rules (empty Prefix) matched and bound a TTL clock starting at part-upload time, before CompleteMultipartUpload existed. putToFiler now takes an explicit ttlSec parameter; only the user-visible PutObject paths (PutObjectHandler, postpolicy) feed it from the resolver. MPU and copy-part pass 0. 3. (medium) AWS overlapping-rule precedence is "shorter expiration wins", not "longest prefix wins". Sort by ExpirationDays ascending so the first prefix match is also the shortest applicable rule. 4. (medium) overflow no longer caps at math.MaxInt32 seconds (~68y). A longer policy would have expired early. Return 0 instead so the worker enforces the actual policy on its own schedule. Versioning gate moves into the resolver constructor — versioned buckets get a nil resolver. The five putToFiler callers all updated: PutObjectHandler + postpolicy resolve via lifecycleTTLForObjectWrite, suspended/versioned wrappers pass 0 by construction, MPU part and copy-part SSE pass 0 with a one-line comment about why. * refactor(s3api): drop unused BucketConfig.LifecycleRules field The full canonical rule set was set on every bucket-config load but never read — resolveLifecycleTTLForWrite worked off the resolver's filtered slice, and the lifecycle worker reads bucket entries straight off the meta-log instead of this cache. Remove the field and its s3lifecycle import. * perf(s3api): pre-compute LifecycleTTLResolver hot-path fields Resolve was doing per-call work that's actually constant per bucket- config load: int64 multiplication, max-int32 overflow check, field indirections through *s3lifecycle.Rule. Move it to the constructor and pack the rule into a compact ttlRule (prefix + ttlSec int32 + sizeGT/sizeLT) so the inner loop is HasPrefix → optional size check → return. Drop overflowing rules at construction rather than handling per- resolve: capping would expire long policies early, and returning 0 in the inner loop would prevent any shorter overlapping rule from firing. Drop-at-construction composes correctly with the ascending sort. Benchmarks (Apple M4): NilReceiver 0.99 ns/op 0 B/op OneRuleMatching 2.75 ns/op 0 B/op FiveRulesNoMatch 13.5 ns/op 0 B/op * fix(s3api): refresh LifecycleTTL resolver on bucket-config update storeBucketLifecycleConfiguration writes to Entry.Extended via updateBucketConfig, which clones the cached BucketConfig and calls the user fn, then caches the result. The clone inherits the prior LifecycleTTL pointer and nothing rebuilt it from the new XML, so add/replace/delete of a lifecycle policy left the wrong resolver in cache until eviction. Same gap on the meta-log side: peer-driven updates flowed through updateBucketConfigCacheFromEntry without re-deriving the resolver. Centralize the Entry -> derived-field mapping in one helper that resets every Extended-backed field then repopulates from the entry, and call it from getBucketConfig (initial load), updateBucketConfig (after updateEntry succeeds, before caching), and updateBucketConfigCacheFromEntry (meta-log path). Reset is the load-bearing part: deleting the lifecycle XML must yield a nil resolver, since stamping a stale TTL onto subsequent writes is irreversible. * fix(s3api): PostPolicy passes object size, not multipart wire size lifecycleTTLForObjectWrite was reading r.ContentLength, which on the PostPolicy path is the multipart envelope (form fields + boundaries), not the uploaded object body. A size-filtered rule would evaluate against that inflated total and stamp (or skip) a TTL the policy didn't intend. Take the object size as an explicit parameter. PutObject still passes r.ContentLength (correct there); PostPolicy passes the fileSize already extracted from the form part. Negative size means unknown and continues to skip any size-filtered rule. * fix(s3api): treat Object Lock as versioned for lifecycle TTL fast path Object Lock requires versioning at the API level, but it can be enabled at create time without S3 ever writing the explicit Versioning header. The lifecycle resolver construction site only checked Versioning, so an Object-Lock bucket with no Versioning byte would still get a fast-path resolver and stamp volume TTL onto writes — destroying noncurrent versions when the volume expires. Mirror the OR already used in BucketIsVersioned: ObjectLockConfig non-nil counts as versioned for resolver construction. Existing explicit-Versioning paths are unchanged. |
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Chris Lu
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82cf60a44f |
fix(s3api): re-encrypt UploadPartCopy bytes for the destination's SSE config (#8908) (#9280)
* fix(s3api): re-encrypt UploadPartCopy bytes for the destination's SSE config (#8908) The remaining failure mode in #8908 was that Docker Registry's blob finalization (server-side Move via UploadPartCopy) silently corrupts SSE-S3 multipart objects. Reproduces with `aws s3api upload-part-copy` under bucket-default SSE-S3: the GET on the completed object returns deterministic wrong bytes (correct length, same wrong SHA-256 across runs). The metadata is mathematically self-consistent — every chunk's stored IV equals `calculateIVWithOffset(baseIV_dst, partLocalOffset)` — but the bytes on disk were encrypted with the SOURCE upload's key+baseIV. Root cause: - `copyChunksForRange` (and `createDestinationChunk`) constructs new chunks for UploadPartCopy without copying `SseType` / `SseMetadata`, so destination chunks are written with `SseType=NONE`. - At completion, `completedMultipartChunk` (PR #9224's NONE→SSE_S3 backfill, intended to recover from a different missing-metadata bug) sees those NONE chunks under an SSE-S3 multipart upload and backfills SSE-S3 metadata derived from the destination upload's baseIV. The chunk metadata is now internally consistent and the GET path applies decryption — but the bytes on disk are encrypted with the source upload's key, not the destination's. Decryption produces deterministic garbage. Docker Registry pulls then fail with "Digest did not match". Fix: when either the source object or the destination multipart upload has any SSE configured, take a slow-path UploadPartCopy that (1) opens a plaintext reader of the source range — decrypting the source's per-chunk SSE-S3 metadata if needed via a reused `buildMultipartSSES3Reader`, and (2) feeds that plaintext through `putToFiler`'s existing encryption pipeline by staging the destination upload entry's SSE-S3/SSE-KMS headers on a cloned request. Encryption then matches PutObjectPart's contract: every part starts a fresh CTR stream from counter 0 with `baseIV_dst`, and each internal chunk's metadata records `calculateIVWithOffset(baseIV_dst, chunk.partLocalOffset)`. The `non-SSE → non-SSE` case still takes the existing fast raw-byte copy path — bytes on disk are plaintext on both sides, so chunk-level metadata is irrelevant. Cross-encryption from SSE-KMS / SSE-C sources is left as TODO — the new path returns an explicit error rather than the previous silent corruption. SSE-S3 (the user-reported case) round-trips correctly. Tests: - test/s3/sse/s3_sse_uploadpartcopy_integration_test.go pins three UploadPartCopy shapes against bucket-default SSE-S3: * Docker-Registry-shape 32MB+tail (the user's exact 5-chunk / 2-part metadata layout) * single full-object UploadPartCopy * many small range copies Each round-trips SHA-256. - test/s3/sse/s3_sse_concurrent_repro_test.go covers the parallel multipart-upload shape from the user report (5 blobs in parallel, full GET and chunked range GET both hash-checked) — pre-existing coverage; added here as a regression sentinel. * test(s3-sse): rename UploadPartCopy regression test so CI matches it The CI workflow .github/workflows/s3-sse-tests.yml dispatches on the TEST_PATTERN ".*Multipart.*Integration" — i.e. the test name must contain both "Multipart" and "Integration" for CI to run it. The previous name TestSSES3UploadPartCopyIntegration had only "Integration"; "UploadPart" isn't "Multipart". Rename to TestSSES3MultipartUploadPartCopyIntegration so the regression test actually runs in CI rather than only locally. * fix(s3api): map unsupported UploadPartCopy SSE source to 501, not 500 (review feedback on #9280) openSourcePlaintextReader explicitly rejects SSE-KMS and SSE-C sources (SSE-S3 is the only one wired up in this slow path so far). Earlier the caller blanket-mapped that to ErrInternalError, which collapses "this shape isn't implemented yet" into the same 500 response a real server failure would produce. Clients can no longer tell whether they hit a feature gap or a bug. Introduce a sentinel errCopySourceSSEUnsupported and have copyObjectPartViaReencryption errors.Is-check it; on match, return ErrNotImplemented (501) instead of ErrInternalError (500). Other failures still map to 500. Found by coderabbitai review on PR #9280. * fix(s3api): UploadPartCopy must fail with NoSuchUpload when upload entry is missing (review feedback on #9280) CopyObjectPartHandler's earlier checkUploadId call only verifies that the uploadID's hash prefix matches dstObject; it does not prove the upload directory exists in the filer. The previous logic silently swallowed filer_pb.ErrNotFound from getEntry(uploadDir) and fell through with uploadEntry=nil, which then skipped the destination SSE check and could route a plain-source copy through the raw-byte fast path even though the destination's encryption state is unknown. Treat ErrNotFound as ErrNoSuchUpload so the client sees the right status, matching the AWS S3 contract for UploadPartCopy on a non-existent upload. Found by coderabbitai review on PR #9280. * feat(s3api): set SSE response headers on UploadPartCopy slow path (review feedback on #9280) PutObjectPartHandler writes x-amz-server-side-encryption (and the KMS key-id header for SSE-KMS) on every successful part response so clients can confirm the destination's encryption state. The new UploadPartCopy slow path was missing this — it returned only the ETag in the response body and no SSE response headers. Plumb putToFiler's SSEResponseMetadata back through copyObjectPartViaReencryption to the handler, then call setSSEResponseHeaders before writing the XML response, matching the PutObjectPart contract. Found by gemini-code-assist review on PR #9280. * fix(s3api): map transient filer errors on UploadPartCopy upload-entry fetch to 503 (review feedback on #9280) Earlier non-ErrNotFound errors from getEntry(uploadDir, uploadID) all returned 500 InternalError, which most SDKs treat as fatal — even though a transient filer outage (gRPC Unavailable, leader election in flight, deadline exceeded) is exactly the kind of failure SDK retry logic is supposed to recover from. Add an isTransientFilerError helper that recognises: - context.DeadlineExceeded / context.Canceled - gRPC codes.Unavailable, DeadlineExceeded, ResourceExhausted, Aborted When the upload-entry fetch fails for one of those reasons, return 503 ServiceUnavailable so the client retries; everything else still maps to 500. Log line now also carries dstObject (in addition to dstBucket and uploadID) to make incident triage easier. Found by gemini-code-assist review on PR #9280. |