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eea3f232da067c8eb8bde13bb06dbdb5f7da3b20
156
Commits
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eea3f232da |
iam: scope CreateServiceAccount's ParentUser by policy resource (#11736)
* iam: scope CreateServiceAccount's ParentUser by policy resource AuthorizeIamAction evaluated the iam:CreateServiceAccount grant against a hardcoded arn:aws:iam:::* resource, so the policy's Resource never had a say; #11218 then bound the target to the caller outright. Evaluate self-target actions against the target identity's ARN instead: a wildcard resource keeps the deliberate any-target grant, a scoped resource confines issuance to the named parent identity, anything else is denied. buildResourceARN gains the ARN pass-through buildS3ResourceArn already has, so iam: ARNs reach the policy engine intact on the attached-policies route. Closes #11735 * ci: retrigger after unrelated weed/storage metrics flake * iam: fold IAM-ARN matching into awsIAMMatch, drop debug test - remove zz_debug_test.go (local debugging leftover) - fold awsIAMMatchResource into awsIAMMatch: the arn:aws:iam:: value prefix selects case-sensitive matching, so no separate name is needed - trim comments --------- Co-authored-by: batonogov <batonogov@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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602ddb31f2 |
s3: count stored versions as bucket contents on delete (#11775)
* s3: count stored versions as bucket contents A <key>.versions directory holding version entries is user data; skipping it let bucketHasUserObjects report an empty bucket while the recursive delete dropped every stored version. * test: rename stale reserved-folders case in bucket delete test .versions directories are now descended into, so the case only holds because the folder is empty. |
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56fbc3deb5 |
s3api: align S3/IAM error responses with AWS (#11632)
* s3err: add InvalidArgument and AuthorizationHeaderMalformed codes Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: answer unrecognized bucket PUT sub-resources with 501 A PUT on a bucket carrying an unrecognized query (logging, metrics, intelligent-tiering, ...) fell through to the bare CreateBucket route and returned BucketAlreadyOwnedByYou or re-created the bucket. AWS answers these with NotImplemented. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: reject malformed copy-source and multipart PUT parameters A malformed X-Amz-Copy-Source or a non-numeric partNumber fell through to the plain PutObject route and stored the body as a regular object. Answer them with InvalidArgument-class errors instead of writing data. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: verify x-amz-content-sha256 against the streamed body A PUT carrying a hex or base64 payload hash now streams through a verifier that reports a mismatch once the stream is exhausted, instead of storing an object that does not match its declared hash. The error is deferred so intermediate reads that drop (n>0, err) results cannot silently swallow it. Sentinel values (unsigned/streaming payloads) remain exempt and malformed values fail fast. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: map truncated SigV4 headers to the error for the missing field AWS answers an Authorization header missing Credential= with InvalidArgument and one missing or malformed Signature= with AuthorizationHeaderMalformed, instead of a generic MissingFields. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: answer IAM/STS failures in the query-protocol envelope Embedded IAM and STS routes now report authentication, form-parse and authorization failures with the IAM ErrorResponse body instead of the S3 Error envelope, so IAM SDK clients can parse them. Requests signed for s3 keep the S3 envelope, keyed off the credential scope. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: return 403 AccessDenied when the request has no Date Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: answer throttling rejections as SlowDown ErrTooManyRequest and ErrRequestBytesExceed reported made-up codes; AWS serves these throttling rejections as SlowDown. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: reject versionId requests on buckets that never had versioning GET, HEAD and DELETE carrying a non-empty versionId on an unversioned bucket now fail with InvalidArgument instead of being answered as a plain object request. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: answer DeleteObjects over 1000 keys with MalformedXML Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: InvalidArgument for non-numeric or out-of-range part numbers partNumber=abc, 0 and >10000 all resolve to InvalidArgument, matching AWS, instead of InvalidPart. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * iam: correct LimitExceeded, InvalidAction and ServiceFailure mappings LimitExceeded is a conflict (409), an unknown Action is InvalidAction (404) rather than NotImplemented, and internal failures report the IAM receiver fault type. Applies to both the embedded IAM endpoint and the standalone iamapi server. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * iam: refuse DeleteUser while access keys remain Deleting a user with live credentials orphaned its access keys; AWS answers DeleteConflict until they are removed first. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test/s3: add S3/IAM error-response compatibility harness * s3: return InvalidArgument for malformed x-amz-content-sha256 A header value that decodes to neither 32-byte hex nor base64 is a malformed argument, not a hash mismatch. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test: stop spawned mini when readiness times out A slow-starting server otherwise survives the failure path and keeps the S3 port occupied for the next run. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test: register atexit cleanup before setup A failed setup previously skipped cleanup, leaking the bucket and IAM user on persistent servers. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: reject unrouted subresources on the DELETE bucket catch-all PutBucketHandler gained the same guard when the route-level check moved into the handlers; DeleteBucketHandler was missed, so an authorized DELETE /bucket?logging could delete the bucket instead of answering NotImplemented. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test: tolerate unset fixture variables in cleanup and cover DELETE ?logging Cleanup now runs its IAM/multipart steps only when setup reached them, so an early setup failure still removes the bucket. Added a DELETE bucket-subresource case asserting NotImplemented and bucket survival. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test: fail a case when its side-effect check reports a regression A non-empty check note now fails the case, so a deleted bucket or an object created by a malformed request cannot slip through behind a passing status check. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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aa5b337716 |
fix(s3): honor object ACLs for anonymous GET and HEAD (#11605)
* fix(s3): honor object ACLs for anonymous reads Signed-off-by: zhaoyuchen <43179751+zhao-yc@users.noreply.github.com> * s3: drop unsigned session tokens on deferred anonymous reads An unsigned GET/HEAD carrying X-Amz-Security-Token is anonymous, not a session request; strip the token before authentication and authorization so it cannot influence identity or policy evaluation. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: zhaoyuchen <43179751+zhao-yc@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chrislusf@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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a0ee7ba314 |
s3: ignore empty intermediate directories in bucketHasUserObjects (#11490) (#11491)
* s3: ignore empty intermediate directories in bucketHasUserObjects (#11490) * s3: keep nested reserved-named dirs from hiding user objects Reserved folders (.uploads, *.versions) are internal only at the bucket root; deeper entries with those names are user key prefixes and must be walked. Also treat a missing subdirectory as empty via isFilerNotFound (list errors cross gRPC as status errors, not the sentinel), let names containing backslashes count as objects, and walk iteratively so empty chains deeper than the old scan depth no longer report non-empty. * s3: treat reserved-named directories as internal at every level Object listing interprets .uploads and *.versions directories as internal storage wherever they appear, so walking them during the emptiness check would report invisible version remnants as user objects and block deletion. A reserved name on a file still counts, matching listing which only special-cases directories. * s3: count explicit directory objects under reserved names A directory object created by PutObject (MIME or prefix-object marker set) is user data even when named .uploads or *.versions; only a plain directory with a reserved name is internal storage. --------- Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chrislusf@users.noreply.github.com> |
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7129e1178e |
s3: evaluate bucket policy before ACL public-read for anonymous requests (#11471)
* s3: evaluate bucket policy before ACL public-read for anonymous requests AuthWithPublicRead granted anonymous access on a public-read ACL before consulting the bucket policy, so an explicit Deny (e.g. s3:ListBucket) was skipped for anonymous callers while still enforced for authenticated ones. Run the policy engine first: a matching Deny or Allow is honored, otherwise fall through to the ACL grant as before. * s3: defer object-level anonymous requests to the handler's policy recheck Evaluating the bucket policy with a nil entry at middleware time makes tag conditions like s3:ExistingObjectTag/<key> resolve against missing values, so a conditional Deny could wrongly block anonymous Get/Head on a public bucket whose handler recheck would permit it. Object requests now take the ACL grant and let Get/HeadObjectHandler re-evaluate with the fetched entry; only bucket-level requests (List, HeadBucket), which have no such recheck, are decided by the middleware policy verdict. Reading the bucket config first also refreshes the compiled policy on a cache miss, so a remotely deleted policy cannot leave a stale verdict in the engine for nonresident buckets. * s3: recheck bucket policy before serving directory objects handleDirectoryObjectRequest runs before the object handlers' policy recheck, so directory content on a public-read bucket was served to anonymous callers without any policy evaluation. Evaluate the policy with the directory entry, matching the recheck the file path performs. |
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11791fad6a |
filer: resolve the collection a bucket delete drops (#11439)
* filer: resolve the collection a bucket delete drops A bucket delete dropped the collection named after the bucket, which assumes bucket name is collection name. With a collection rule the write path honors, deleting the bucket either orphaned its collection or, when a bucket was named after a shared collection, removed volumes other buckets still write to. Resolve the collection through the same rule chain the write path uses and drop it only when no other bucket resolves there too. A listing failure keeps the collection, the safe side of an unknown. * filer: prove collection exclusivity across all paths before dropping it The sibling-bucket scan missed every non-bucket writer: a broad rule like '/' or '/buckets/', a rule under a surviving bucket, or a rule on an unrelated path can route into the same collection. Check every storage rule's prefix instead, and mirror the grouped gateway's explicit <group>_<bucket> collection, which otherwise resolves a rule-named collection the bucket never wrote to. * s3: let the filer own the collection decision on bucket delete Both entry points deleted a name-derived collection around the filer's own resolved delete, bypassing its exclusivity check and wiping sibling data. The filer now resolves the collection a bucket actually used, including the grouped form. * filer: keep a collection the default write route also uses Rule-less writes outside buckets land in the filer's default collection, so a bucket resolving there shares it with them. |
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01bb3b3053 |
s3api: add Snowflake s3compat API integration tests (#11394)
* s3api: add Snowflake s3compat API integration tests Run the upstream snowflakedb/snowflake-s3compat-api-test-suite against a local SeaweedFS server in CI. test/s3/snowflake/run.sh starts weed server with S3 (-s3.autoCreateBucket=false so missing-bucket PUTs return NoSuchBucket), prepares the fixtures the suite needs (versioned bucket, deny-all-policy bucket, >1000-object prefix), clones the suite, patches it to path-style addressing, and runs mvn -Dtest=S3CompatApiTest. The suite also exposed that GetBucketLocation returned 404 NoSuchBucket for a malformed bucket name; validate the name first and return 400 InvalidBucketName like AWS. * test: harden snowflake s3compat runner per review - Pin the upstream suite to a tested commit (SUITE_REV) instead of the moving default branch - Bind the test server to loopback only - Require the AccessDenied error code when verifying the denied bucket - Fix README so go install runs in a subshell - checkout with persist-credentials: false - Make the concurrency group unique per PR, and widen path filters to the storage/operation/wdclient/cluster/pb packages the S3 stack uses * test: advertise loopback ip for snowflake test server -ip.bind 127.0.0.1 alone left the volume server advertising the host's primary address, so chunk uploads were refused. Also set -ip 127.0.0.1 and disable the Iceberg/Lance listeners so the harness is loopback-only and does not collide with other local services. |
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93d4a6aefd |
s3: drain request body before error response (#11334)
* s3: drain request body before error response * s3: keep oversized request bodies drainable |
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f35e2ccf21 |
s3: warn when a lifecycle change leaves fast-path-stamped objects on their old TTL (#11184)
* s3: warn when a lifecycle change leaves fast-path-stamped objects on their old TTL The per-write TTL fast path (opt-in via s3.bucket.lifecycle.fastpath) stamps a volume TTL at PutObject time that can't be taken back. When an operator lengthens or removes an Expiration.Days rule (or deletes the bucket lifecycle) on a fast-path-enabled bucket, objects already written keep their baked-in TTL and won't be rescued by the change — unlike the default worker-driven path, which re-evaluates the current rules each pass. This is the data-loss direction described in #11183. Surface it: Put/DeleteBucketLifecycle now emit a glog warning and set X-Seaweed-Lifecycle-Fastpath-Warning on the response when the change removes, disables, lengthens, or re-scopes a fast-path-eligible rule. Shortening a rule does not warn (old objects simply expire later, not data loss). Tag-only and overflow-day rules are never on the fast path and never warn. Addresses the warning half of option 2 in #11183. * s3: address review — emit warning after mutation succeeds, fix ID-rename false positive Two issues raised by CodeRabbit, Greptile, and Devin reviews: 1. Failed mutations retained the warning header. The warning was set on the ResponseWriter before storeBucketLifecycleConfiguration / clearStoredBucketLifecycleConfiguration was called; if that failed, the error response carried a warning for a change that was never applied. Now the reason is computed before the mutation but the log and header are emitted only after it succeeds. 2. Rule renames produced false "removed" warnings. fastpathRuleKey used Rule.ID as the sole identity when present, so renaming a rule (same prefix/size/days, different ID) treated the old rule as removed. Replaced with two-pass matching: first by ID, then by fast-path predicates (prefix + size). An ID-only rename with unchanged predicates and days no longer warns. Greedy matching ensures each new rule is consumed by at most one old rule. Added regression tests: ID-only rename (no warn), rename + lengthen (warn), rename + shorten (no warn). |
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ba5b14b457 |
master, filer, s3api: bound the collection deletes that strand a caller (#11026)
* master: bound each volume server DeleteCollection, and finish the fan-out A collection delete fanned out to every volume server holding it with context.Background(), so a server that accepted the connection and then went quiet held the whole delete open with nothing to end it. Each RPC is bounded now, on the same budget allocateVolumeTimeout gives the other master-to-volume-server admin RPC. The volume server runs the delete to completion regardless of the request context, so giving up costs the confirmation and not the deletion. The walk itself is the caller's, not a per-server one: - It outlives the caller. A cancelled request must not abandon a destructive fan-out part-done, with volumes left behind and no request still running to come back for them. - It no longer stops at the first server that refuses, which left the collection on every server after it in the list. The first failure is still what is reported, and the collection stays in the topology so a later delete comes back for the rest. - It sends one RPC per server rather than one per replica. ListVolumeServers reports a node once for every replica it holds, while DeleteCollection removes the whole collection from the server it reaches, so a collection with thousands of volumes repeated the same whole-collection delete thousands of times over. Both passes run too. Returning after a failed normal pass left the collection's EC shards in place with nothing left to retry them. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EnB1fbryyKc2LetRZxQPTP * master: delete the EC shards behind /col/delete too The HTTP handler carried its own copy of the volume-server walk and only ever ran the normal pass, so a collection deleted through it kept its EC shards. It shares the gRPC path now, which also gets it the bounded RPCs and the one-per-server fan-out. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EnB1fbryyKc2LetRZxQPTP * filer: bound the collection delete a bucket delete leaves behind Deleting a bucket entry deletes its collection afterwards, deliberately detached from the request so a client that hangs up cannot strand the bucket's volumes. Detached meant unbounded, though: with the master down or mid-election the wait for a leader has nothing to end it, so the handler parks, and the client retrying behind it parks another. It keeps outliving the request and now carries a deadline of its own. The budget bounds the wait, not the work: the master keeps deleting on its own fan-out once asked, so giving up costs the confirmation. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EnB1fbryyKc2LetRZxQPTP * s3api: bound the collection RPCs a bucket creation and deletion issue Neither carried a deadline, so a transient failure anywhere down the chain held the S3 request open until the client gave up on it. Both budgets are taken outside the filer failover walk, so one budget covers the whole walk rather than granting each filer a fresh one. The walk itself stops when that budget is spent, and stops without blaming anyone: the caller's own expiry is not evidence against the filer that was answering, and the next filer has no time left to answer in either. Recorded as a filer failure, a slow master upstream would flag every filer in the walk, and the three failures that open the circuit take unrelated object reads down with them. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EnB1fbryyKc2LetRZxQPTP * s3api: a failed collection listing no longer fails a bucket creation PutBucket lists collections to notice a leftover one it is about to reuse. The result feeds a warning and nothing else -- s3a.exists is what decides whether the bucket already exists -- yet a transient failure of that listing returned 500 and refused the creation. It is advisory now, so a failure is logged and the creation continues, exactly as it does when the listing returns false. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EnB1fbryyKc2LetRZxQPTP |
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7bb0a1c127 |
s3: replay a delete whose reply the transport dropped (#11022)
* s3: stop retrying a delete the filer refused for a non-empty folder The filer looked and the children are there, so the answer will not change. retryFilerOp spent six attempts and up to 3.1s of backoff on it before the caller could act on the condition it was already holding. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XqaJrwgXQ5GSUpyzRbe5nD * s3: thread the request context through the unversioned delete path doDeleteEntry issued every DeleteEntry on context.Background(), so an S3 client that hung up left the gateway working on its behalf, out of reach of both cancellation and the per-request retry allowance that DeleteMultipleObjectsHandler installs. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XqaJrwgXQ5GSUpyzRbe5nD * s3: treat a cancelled filer RPC as terminal, not transient isRetryableFilerErr matched context.Canceled and DeadlineExceeded by sentinel, which only holds while the error is still local. Once it has crossed gRPC it is a status, so an abandoned request was retried six times on behalf of a caller that had already gone. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XqaJrwgXQ5GSUpyzRbe5nD * s3: replay a delete whose reply the transport dropped A delete is idempotent at the filer, which answers an entry that is already gone with an empty resp.Error, so a reply lost in transit can be reissued rather than surfaced. Surfaced, it becomes a 500 on the bucket delete, which boto3 resends and is then answered NoSuchBucket, or a per-key InternalError inside the 200 of a multi-object delete, which no SDK retries at all. The replay runs through retryFilerOp, so it draws on the allowance the request already installs rather than paying a backoff per key, and stops for a caller that has gone. rm and rmObject re-enter WithFilerClient per attempt, so each one walks the failover list again on a connection the failed attempt had invalidated; the multi-object loop holds one client for the batch, so there the replay reuses it. Classification stays structural. The filer reports its own refusals in resp.Error, which carries no status and has the deleted path - and, for a recursive delete, the children it stopped on - formatted into it, so no key name can steer the decision either way. rm and rmObject now take the caller's context. Cleanup and rollback paths pass context.Background() deliberately: they have to run whether or not the caller is still waiting. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XqaJrwgXQ5GSUpyzRbe5nD * s3: share one retry allowance across multipart completion cleanup The unused-entry loop deletes once per entry, and each delete now retries, so a filer that stays unavailable held the response for 3.1s per entry after the object was already committed. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XqaJrwgXQ5GSUpyzRbe5nD |
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d850f36513 |
s3: distinguish a failed bucket lookup from a missing bucket on HEAD (#11000)
HeadBucket treated any lookup error as ErrNoSuchBucket, so a transient filer failure answered 404 instead of 500 and clients stopped retrying. Split the two cases the way the bucket policy handlers already do. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjDWtZsCoZY6x4pdDmGWxU |
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df93d01c06 |
admin: add bucket lifecycle rule editing (#10860)
* admin: add bucket lifecycle rule editing * address greptile's comments * more small fixes * coderabbit's comments * more comment fixes * more fixes * more * maybe last * last ? * 14850 * 14851 * filer: stamp the content MD5 on every SaveInsideFiler write An entry's ETag falls back to Attributes.Md5, so conditional writers key IF_ETAG_MATCH off it. SaveInsideFiler carried the looked-up attributes forward without refreshing the hash, leaving it describing whatever the previous writer stored: a later conditional write matched the stale hash and overwrote content that had already changed. * s3api: give the bucket lifecycle constants and the write route key one definition each The extended-attribute keys, the XML size cap and the object-write ring key prefix were each spelled out in two places, so the admin dashboard's copies could drift from the gateway's. Move them to the packages both sides already import and alias them where the short local name reads better. * admin: patch the bucket entry's lifecycle keys instead of rewriting the entry The save read the bucket entry, edited its extended map and wrote the whole entry back, guarded by IF_UNMODIFIED_SINCE. Nothing that writes a bucket entry advances its mtime - not the S3 gateway's patchBucketEntry, not SetBucketOwner, not SetBucketQuota - so the guard never fired and the stale snapshot reverted whatever else had changed since the lookup. Send the PATCH_EXTENDED mutation the S3 gateway already uses for these keys: the filer re-reads and merges under the bucket path lock, so only the two lifecycle keys move. That removes the reason for the mtime snapshot, the verification retry loop and the compensating restore of the cleared day-TTL rules, which the migration now logs instead. * s3api: run the delete-lifecycle day-TTL migration through the shared helper DeleteBucketLifecycleHandler kept its own copy of the read-strip-write sequence the put handler now shares, including a missing return that let a ToText failure persist a truncated filer.conf and write a second response. It also wrote the whole file back unconditionally, reverting any concurrent edit; the shared helper writes conditionally. * admin: answer 404 when a lifecycle request names a bucket that does not exist Every SetBucketLifecycle failure came back as 500, including the lookup miss for an unknown bucket, so a client or monitor read a caller error as a server fault and retried it. * s3api: emit lifecycle XML a client would recognize Two changes to what MarshalCanonical writes, both visible through GetBucketLifecycleConfiguration, which replays the stored bytes verbatim: stamp the S3 namespace on the root, and put a size range under <And>. A <Filter> carries one predicate, so two size bounds side by side is a shape AWS does not document. Parsing still accepts either. * admin: fix the lifecycle editor's handling of stored status, deletes and empty saves Four things the editor got wrong: A stored <Status> the S3 API never validated, say 'enabled', left both radio buttons unchecked, so reading the form threw on a null querySelector result and Save did nothing. Collapse anything but an exact 'Enabled' to 'Disabled', which is what the engine already does with it. Deleting a rule re-rendered an open edit form from the snapshot taken when editing began, discarding what had been typed; every other transition folds the form in first. The Transition warning only matched a bare <Transition>, missing the form with attributes, self-closed or namespace-prefixed. Saving an emptied rule list clears the configuration through a path with no prompt, next to a Delete-all-rules button that asks. Also collapses the three divergent copies of formatBytes on this page to one. * filer: stop the day-TTL migration from deleting an operator's path rule The migration removed every rule under the bucket's path that carried a day TTL in the bucket's collection. The add path it is retiring used AddLocationConf, which merged its TTL onto whatever already sat at the prefix, so a rule can hold operator settings the lifecycle path never wrote - a disk type, WORM retention, a read-only flag, a placement pin. Deleting the whole rule to retire its TTL took those with it, leaving objects under that prefix on defaults nobody asked for. Delete only rules shaped like ones the add path created from scratch; anything else keeps its settings and loses just the TTL. --------- Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chrislusf@users.noreply.github.com> |
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f66d6ffc4a |
s3: option to disable bucket auto-creation on upload (#10759)
* s3: add option to disable bucket auto-creation on upload * command: expose -autoCreateBucket in s3, filer, server, and mini * s3: apply the bucket auto-create policy to directory marker uploads * s3: validate the bucket name before the auto-create disabled check * s3: cover the disabled auto-create gate at all three upload entry points |
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f09bc14165 |
s3: report the effective ownership when a bucket has none stored (#10591)
* s3: report the effective ownership when a bucket has none stored GetBucketOwnershipControls read Seaweed-X-Amz-Ownership straight out of the bucket entry, so a bucket that never had one written reported an empty ObjectOwnership. The object write path defaults the same missing attribute to BucketOwnerEnforced, so the API contradicted the behavior it describes. Resolve the stored value through one helper both readers share, and let PutBucketOwnershipControls persist unconditionally so setting the default value still gives DeleteBucketOwnershipControls something to remove. * test: cover the bucket ownership controls round trip Pins the behaviors the ownership default fix depends on: a bucket that never had ownership controls written reports BucketOwnerEnforced, and putting that same value on such a bucket still persists it, so the delete that follows has something to remove. The put-then-delete case gets its own bucket -- run after an ObjectWriter put, it would pass against an implementation that skips only the initial write. The acl workflow already runs this package against a live weed mini, so it needs no wiring. |
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98e49d2d42 |
s3: read bucket owner and crtime from the entry-free bucket config
The owner index read the raw filer entry off BucketConfig, which no longer carries one. Cache Crtime alongside IdentityId, and pass the owner id rather than the entry through the ListBuckets visibility checks so the scan and granted-bucket paths share one implementation. |
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17af32f3ff |
s3: paginate ListBuckets and serve it from a bucket owner index (#10214)
* s3: paginate ListBuckets with max-buckets, continuation-token, and prefix ListBuckets buffered every bucket entry into one slice and one XML body, which falls over with very large bucket counts. Page through the filer listing instead, cap each response at 10000 buckets like AWS, and honor max-buckets, prefix, and an opaque keyset continuation-token. * s3: maintain a bucket owner index under /buckets/.system/owners Map each bucket owner to its buckets as zero-length entries at /buckets/.system/owners/<owner>/<bucket>, with Crtime mirroring the bucket's creation time. The bucket handlers write the index synchronously, the /buckets metadata subscription reconciles changes made elsewhere (weed shell, other gateways, direct filer operations), and a startup backfill indexes pre-existing buckets before writing a ready marker. Owner names are path-escaped so no identity name can escape the index directory. * s3: serve ListBuckets from the bucket owner index Once the owner index is ready, non-admin identities list their owned buckets straight from it, merged with any buckets their legacy actions name explicitly, so ListBuckets costs O(own buckets) instead of a scan of the global /buckets directory. Admins, identities with a bare List grant or wildcard action patterns, and policy-authorized identities whose grants cannot be enumerated keep the paged scan; policy-routed identities get their owned buckets, matching AWS ListBuckets returning only the caller's buckets. * s3: keep dot-prefixed names under /buckets out of bucket surfaces Dot-prefixed entries (.system) can never be valid bucket names, so refuse to resolve them as buckets and skip them in the shell bucket listing, matching what ListBuckets and the admin UI already do. * test: cover ListBuckets pagination and the owner index end to end * s3: fail closed on a nil identity when routing ListBuckets * s3: decide the IAM authorization mechanism in one place VerifyActionPermission and the ListBuckets owner-index routing each re-derived the session-token / attached-policy / legacy-actions split; extract the decision so the two cannot drift. * s3: heal the owner index on concurrent bucket recreation too The mkdir-lost-the-race path answers BucketAlreadyOwnedByYou just like the up-front existence check, so give it the same index repair. * s3: drop owner-index records for buckets deleted during backfill A bucket removed between the backfill reading its page and writing the index record became a permanent phantom in its owner's listing: the delete's own cleanup ran before the record existed. After indexing each page, re-list the same name range and remove records whose bucket is gone; deletes landing after the re-list find the record and remove it themselves. * s3: add ContinuationToken and Prefix to the ListBuckets schema Keep AmazonS3.xsd aligned with the generated ListAllMyBucketsResult so a regeneration does not drop the pagination fields. |
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c4f0b12a9a |
s3: lazy, bounded, entry-free per-bucket caches (#10213)
* s3: stop warming every bucket's config at startup Listing all buckets in BucketRegistry.init() made S3 gateway startup O(buckets) and pinned every bucket's metadata and config resident, which does not scale past a few hundred thousand buckets. Both caches already have lazy miss paths, so load on first access instead and let the metadata subscription refresh only entries already resident; cold buckets cost one filer round-trip on their first request. * s3: bound the per-bucket caches with LRU eviction The bucket config cache, bucket registry, and their negative caches were plain maps that only ever grew: the config cache TTL made Get miss but never evicted the entry, and the not-found sets grew on every probe of a nonexistent bucket name. Cap all four at 65536 entries with LRU eviction so a gateway keeps its hot working set and evicted buckets reload from the filer on next access. * s3: cache parsed bucket config instead of the full filer entry Each cached BucketConfig retained the whole bucket entry (extended attribute map plus raw content bytes) alongside the fields parsed from it, roughly doubling per-bucket cache cost and keeping data the read path never looks at. Parse everything up front in newBucketConfigFromEntry - now also the creator identity, tags, encryption config, and stored lifecycle XML - and drop the entry. updateBucketConfig now reads the entry fresh from the filer and diffs the mapped extended attributes against it, so the patch is computed against current state instead of a cached copy; the config clone helpers that existed for that path go away. * s3: dedup cold bucket-registry loads per bucket The registry's notFound lock doubled as the load serializer, holding one global mutex across the filer round-trip so first-touch requests for different buckets queued behind each other; the cache fill also happened after the lock was released, so two concurrent misses for the same bucket could both reach the filer. Replace it with a singleflight per bucket that fills the cache inside the flight: different buckets load concurrently, the same bucket loads once. |
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e64c821139 |
s3: give account-less identities a distinct owner instead of admin (#9962)
* s3: stop collapsing account-less identities into the admin account Identities configured without an account block all defaulted to the shared admin account, so distinct users got the same owner id and ownership checks could not tell them apart. checkAccessByOwnership also treated that id as an admin bypass, so any account-less caller passed ownership for any bucket. Give such identities a distinct account id from their name, and decide the ownership admin bypass by Admin capability rather than by the account id. isUserAdmin is now nil-safe. * s3: use the context identity in isUserAdmin before re-authenticating The Auth middleware already verifies and stores the identity in the request context. Read it there first so the ownership/admin checks don't re-run signature verification, which is redundant and fails once the request body has been consumed. * s3: nil-guard the context identity in isUserAdmin A non-nil interface wrapping a typed-nil *Identity passes the type assertion; guard against it before calling isAdmin(). * s3: trim verbose comments |
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8d59069a0a |
s3: return BucketAlreadyOwnedByYou when recreating your own bucket (#9822)
* s3: return BucketAlreadyOwnedByYou when recreating your own bucket PutBucket returned BucketAlreadyExists for every existing bucket, even when the caller already owns it, so idempotent re-creation (e.g. a container that creates its bucket on startup) couldn't tell "someone else took the name" from "it's already mine". Recreating a bucket you own now returns BucketAlreadyOwnedByYou, unless the request conflicts with the existing bucket: a different Object Lock setting, or an ACL on the request or the existing bucket. To detect the latter, a requested non-default canned/grant ACL is now persisted on creation instead of being dropped. * s3: fail PutBucket when the existing bucket's config can't be read When a bucket already exists, an unreadable config left the recreate defaulting to BucketAlreadyOwnedByYou, masking the backend error and possibly accepting a conflicting recreate (Object Lock / ACL unknown). Surface the read error instead. * s3: return the stored bucket ACL from GetBucketAcl GetBucketAcl always returned the owner's default full-control grant and ignored any stored ACL, so a bucket created with a canned ACL or one set via PutBucketAcl never read back correctly. Decode the stored grants instead, sharing one grants-to-XML helper with the object ACL handler. The shared helper also emits each grantee's real xsi:type (e.g. Group for public-read) instead of a hardcoded CanonicalUser, so group grants read back correctly for both bucket and object ACLs. * s3: resolve the right already-exists error on the concurrent-create race When two requests create the same bucket at once, the loser's mkdir fails and the handler fell back to a flat BucketAlreadyExists, bypassing the same-owner idempotency check. Route both the pre-check and the race fallback through one existingBucketError helper so a same-owner recreate still gets BucketAlreadyOwnedByYou. * s3: record the bucket owner's account id at creation setBucketOwner only stored the creating identity name, so the canonical account id wasn't available later. Persist it under ExtAmzOwnerKey too, the same field PutBucketAcl writes, so the bucket owner can be reported independently of whoever reads it. * s3: report the bucket owner from GetBucketAcl, not the caller GetBucketAcl built the ACL Owner from the caller's account header, so an admin or cross-account read returned the wrong owner. Use the owner persisted on the bucket, falling back to the caller only when none is recorded. |
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bbbc3925ec | fix: validate s3 ownership controls rule (#9684) | ||
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ee1d8f9e8c |
refactor(s3api): drop filer.conf TTL routing from PUT lifecycle (#9379)
PutBucketLifecycleConfiguration used to install /buckets/<bucket>/<prefix> day-TTL entries in filer.conf so the volume server's RocksDB compaction filter would expire matching writes. With 9377 the s3api server now stamps volume TTL per-write via LifecycleTTLResolver off the stored XML, which covers the same prefix-only Expiration.Days subset and additionally handles size filters and AWS overlapping-rule precedence. Maintaining both paths means a rule change has to mutate two stores in lockstep, and the filer.conf path can't represent everything the resolver does. Drop the add path. Keep a one-way cleanup loop so an upgrade still wipes day-TTL entries written by older builds — otherwise a stale entry would silently double-stamp writes (volume server expires under the old rule) or contradict the new XML after a rule change. Also removes resolveLifecycleDefaultsFromFilerConf (no longer needed) and the versioning-fast-path guard (the resolver itself returns nil for versioned/object-lock buckets, covered by TestNewLifecycleTTLResolver_NilOnVersionedBucket). Tests covering the deleted helpers are deleted with them; the GET fallback that synthesizes lifecycle rules from existing filer.conf TTLs is unchanged so users who historically configured TTL via filer.conf directly still see a rule. |
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8b87ceb0d1 |
refactor(s3api): strip back-stamp from PutBucketLifecycleConfiguration (Phase 4) (#9367)
* refactor(s3api): strip back-stamp from PutBucketLifecycleConfiguration The handler used to walk every existing entry under the rule's prefix and stamp entry.Attributes.TtlSec + the SeaweedFSExpiresS3 flag so that the filer's compaction filter would expire them. With the event-driven lifecycle worker live, that retroactive walk is redundant — the worker drives expiration off the meta-log and a one-time bootstrap scan, so a PUT lifecycle stays O(rules) instead of O(objects). New writes still inherit TTL from the filer.conf location entry above; that volume-routing path is unchanged here and will move to an explicit operator command later (Phase 11). Drops updateEntriesTTL + processDirectoryTTL + processTTLBatch + updateEntryTTL from filer_util.go. * fix(s3api): clear stale lifecycle TTL entries on PUT PutBucketLifecycleConfiguration only ever appended/updated filer.conf entries — it never cleared ones the operator removed, renamed-prefix on, disabled, retagged with a tag filter, or bucket-versioned out of the fast path. The stale day-TTL kept routing new writes (and would expire old ones if any landed under the prefix) after the policy was updated. Treat PUT as a full replacement: walk this bucket's existing day-TTL entries, clear them, then add fresh entries from the new rule set. * test(command): bump mini default plugin job-type count to 7 The s3_lifecycle plugin handler registered in #9362 is the seventh default; the test still asserted six. * fix(s3api): delete stale lifecycle PathConf instead of blanking Ttl Just clearing pathConf.Ttl leaves the rule's Collection, Replication, and VolumeGrowthCount in place, so new writes still match the stale prefix and inherit outdated routing/placement. Use fc.DeleteLocationConf so the lifecycle-owned PathConf goes away entirely. Same fix in DeleteBucketLifecycleHandler, which had the same bug. |
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b7928637a0 |
refactor(s3api): move Lifecycle XML structs to leaf package lifecycle_xml (#9360)
* refactor(s3api): move Lifecycle XML structs to leaf package lifecycle_xml The structs S3 PutBucketLifecycleConfiguration parses and the canonical conversion to s3lifecycle.Rule lived in package s3api, which transitively imports weed/server (which imports weed/shell). Any caller outside weed/s3api — the shell, the future lifecycle worker — that wanted to parse a bucket's lifecycle XML hit an import cycle. Moves: weed/s3api/s3api_policy.go -> lifecycle_xml/types.go weed/s3api/s3api_lifecycle_canonical.go -> lifecycle_xml/canonical.go s3api_lifecycle_canonical_test.go -> lifecycle_xml/canonical_test.go s3api_policy_test.go -> lifecycle_xml/round_trip_test.go Renames the public RuleStatus type (was unexported ruleStatus) and adds small accessor methods (Set/Val/AndSet/TagSet) for fields the s3api handler needs to read across the package boundary. Adds NewPrefix and NewExpirationDays constructors so the GET handler can build response rules without poking at unexported fields. Adds a Tag struct local to the package so it has zero internal seaweed deps. Adds a one-shot ParseCanonical(xml []byte) helper for non-server callers. s3api_policy.go was misnamed — its content is lifecycle XML, not S3 bucket policy. The new package name reflects the actual scope. * test(s3api/lifecycle_xml): exercise public API in tests - canonical_test.go's parseLifecycle helper went through xml.Unmarshal directly; route it through the package's exported Parse so tests validate the public entrypoint. - round_trip_test.go asserted internal flags (rule.Filter.tagSet, rule.Filter.andSet, Transition.set, NoncurrentVersionTransition.set); switch to TagSet(), AndSet(), Set() — exercises the public contract that downstream callers (s3api handler, future shell command) rely on. |
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35e3fe89bc |
feat(s3/lifecycle): filer-backed cursor Persister + drop BlockerStore (#9358)
* feat(s3/lifecycle): filer-backed cursor Persister FilerPersister persists per-shard cursor maps as JSON to /etc/s3/lifecycle/cursors/shard-NN.json via filer.SaveInsideFiler. One file per shard keeps Save atomic — the filer writes the entry in a single mutation, so a crash mid-write doesn't leak partial state. Pipeline.Run loads on start; the periodic checkpoint and graceful-shutdown save go through this implementation. A small FilerStore interface wraps the SeaweedFilerClient surface the persister needs, so tests inject an in-memory fake instead of mocking the full gRPC client. * refactor(s3/lifecycle): drop BlockerStore — durable cursor IS the block A frozen cursor doesn't advance, so the durable cursor (FilerPersister) encodes the blocked state on its own. On worker restart the reader re-encounters the poison event at MinTsNs, the dispatcher walks the same retry budget to BLOCKED, and the cursor freezes at the same EventTs. Other in-flight events between freeze tsNs and prior cursor positions self-resolve via NOOP_RESOLVED (STALE_IDENTITY) since the underlying objects were already deleted on the prior pass. Removed: - BlockerStore interface + InMemoryBlockerStore + BlockerRecord - Dispatcher.Blockers + Dispatcher.ReplayBlockers - the BlockerStore.Put call in handleBlocked - Pipeline.Blockers field + the ReplayBlockers call on startup Added a TestDispatchRestartReFreezesNaturally that pins the self-recovery property: a fresh Dispatcher with a fresh Cursor, fed the same poison event, reaches the same frozen state at the same EventTs without any durable blocker store. Operator visibility: a cursor whose MinTsNs hasn't advanced is the signal — surfaced via the durable cursor file. * refactor(filer): SaveInsideFiler accepts ctx ReadInsideFiler already takes ctx; SaveInsideFiler used context.Background() internally and silently dropped the caller's ctx. Symmetric API now; cancellation/deadlines propagate through LookupEntry / CreateEntry / UpdateEntry. Mechanical update of all callers — most pass context.Background() since the existing call sites have no ctx in scope. * fix(s3/lifecycle): deterministic order in cursor save Iterating Go maps yields random order, so json.Encode produced a different byte sequence on each save even when the state hadn't changed. Sort entries by (Bucket, ActionKind, RuleHash) before encoding so the on-disk file diffs cleanly. New test pins byte-identical output across two saves of the same map. * fix(s3/lifecycle): log reason when freezing cursor in handleBlocked handleBlocked dropped the reason via _ = reason with a comment claiming the caller logged it; none of the three callers do. A frozen cursor is the only surface where the operator finds out something stuck, so the reason has to land somewhere. glog.Warningf with shard, key, eventTs, and the original reason — same shape the rest of the package uses. |
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7aaa431bb4 |
s3api: prune bucket-scoped IAM actions on DeleteBucket (#9054)
* s3api: prune bucket-scoped IAM actions on DeleteBucket DeleteBucket removed the bucket directory and collection but left behind any identity actions configured via s3.configure that were scoped to that bucket (e.g. Read:bucket, Write:bucket/prefix), leaving stale auth metadata that users expected to be cleaned up along with the bucket. After a successful delete, strip actions whose resource is exactly the bucket or a prefix under it, save via the credential manager, and let the existing filer metadata subscription fan the reload out to every S3 server. Wildcarded resources and global actions are preserved since they may cover other buckets; static identities are left untouched. Fixes #5310 * s3api: address review feedback on bucket IAM prune - Apply per-identity updates via credentialManager.UpdateUser instead of a full LoadConfiguration/SaveConfiguration round-trip, so the prune no longer clobbers concurrent IAM edits made by s3.configure or the IAM API during a DeleteBucket. - Use a 30s bounded background context for the post-delete cleanup so it survives client disconnect — the bucket is already gone by then and this is best-effort bookkeeping. - Skip static identities via IsStaticIdentity, since the credential store never persists them and UpdateUser would return NotFound. |
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995dfc4d5d |
chore: remove ~50k lines of unreachable dead code (#8913)
* chore: remove unreachable dead code across the codebase Remove ~50,000 lines of unreachable code identified by static analysis. Major removals: - weed/filer/redis_lua: entire unused Redis Lua filer store implementation - weed/wdclient/net2, resource_pool: unused connection/resource pool packages - weed/plugin/worker/lifecycle: unused lifecycle plugin worker - weed/s3api: unused S3 policy templates, presigned URL IAM, streaming copy, multipart IAM, key rotation, and various SSE helper functions - weed/mq/kafka: unused partition mapping, compression, schema, and protocol functions - weed/mq/offset: unused SQL storage and migration code - weed/worker: unused registry, task, and monitoring functions - weed/query: unused SQL engine, parquet scanner, and type functions - weed/shell: unused EC proportional rebalance functions - weed/storage/erasure_coding/distribution: unused distribution analysis functions - Individual unreachable functions removed from 150+ files across admin, credential, filer, iam, kms, mount, mq, operation, pb, s3api, server, shell, storage, topology, and util packages * fix(s3): reset shared memory store in IAM test to prevent flaky failure TestLoadIAMManagerFromConfig_EmptyConfigWithFallbackKey was flaky because the MemoryStore credential backend is a singleton registered via init(). Earlier tests that create anonymous identities pollute the shared store, causing LookupAnonymous() to unexpectedly return true. Fix by calling Reset() on the memory store before the test runs. * style: run gofmt on changed files * fix: restore KMS functions used by integration tests * fix(plugin): prevent panic on send to closed worker session channel The Plugin.sendToWorker method could panic with "send on closed channel" when a worker disconnected while a message was being sent. The race was between streamSession.close() closing the outgoing channel and sendToWorker writing to it concurrently. Add a done channel to streamSession that is closed before the outgoing channel, and check it in sendToWorker's select to safely detect closed sessions without panicking. |
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e8a6fcaafb |
s3api: skip TTL fast-path for versioned buckets (#8823)
* s3api: skip TTL fast-path for versioned buckets (#8757) PutBucketLifecycleConfiguration was translating Expiration.Days into filer.conf TTL entries for all buckets. For versioned buckets this is wrong: 1. TTL volumes expire as a unit, destroying all data — including noncurrent versions that should be preserved. 2. Filer-backend TTL (RocksDB compaction filter, Redis key expiry) removes entries without triggering chunk deletion, leaving orphaned volume data with 0 deleted bytes. 3. On AWS S3, Expiration.Days on a versioned bucket creates a delete marker — it does not hard-delete data. TTL has no such nuance. Fix: skip the TTL fast-path when the bucket has versioning enabled or suspended. All lifecycle rules are evaluated at scan time by the lifecycle worker instead. Also fix the lifecycle worker to evaluate Expiration rules against the latest version in .versions/ directories, which was previously skipped entirely — only NoncurrentVersionExpiration was handled. * lifecycle worker: handle SeaweedList error in versions dir cleanup Do not assume the directory is empty when the list call fails — log the error and skip the directory to avoid incorrect deletion. * address review feedback - Fetch version file for tag-based rules instead of reading tags from the .versions directory entry where they are not cached. - Handle getBucketVersioningStatus error by failing closed (treat as versioned) to avoid creating TTL entries on transient failures. - Capture and assert deleteExpiredObjects return values in test. - Improve test documentation. |
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297cdef1a3 |
s3api: accept all supported lifecycle rule types (#8813)
* s3api: accept NoncurrentVersionExpiration, AbortIncompleteMultipartUpload, Expiration.Date Update PutBucketLifecycleConfigurationHandler to accept all newly-supported lifecycle rule types. Only Transition and NoncurrentVersionTransition are still rejected (require storage class tier infrastructure). Changes: - Remove ErrNotImplemented for Expiration.Date (handled by worker at scan time) - Only reject rules with Transition.set or NoncurrentVersionTransition.set - Extract prefix from Filter.And when present - Add comment explaining that non-Expiration.Days rules are evaluated by the lifecycle worker from stored lifecycle XML, not via filer.conf TTL The lifecycle XML is already stored verbatim in bucket metadata, so new rule types are preserved on Get even without explicit handler support. Filer.conf TTL entries are only created for Expiration.Days (fast path). * s3api: skip TTL fast path for rules with tag or size filters Rules with tag or size constraints (Filter.Tag, Filter.And with tags or size bounds, Filter.ObjectSizeGreaterThan/LessThan) must not be lowered to filer.conf TTL entries, because TTL applies unconditionally to all objects under the prefix. These rules are evaluated at scan time by the lifecycle worker which checks each object's tags and size. Only simple Expiration.Days rules with prefix-only filters use the TTL fast path (RocksDB compaction filter). --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <copilot@github.com> |
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e3f052cd84 |
s3api: preserve lifecycle config responses for Terraform (#8805)
* s3api: preserve lifecycle configs for terraform * s3api: bound lifecycle config request bodies * s3api: make bucket config updates copy-on-write * s3api: tighten string slice cloning |
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ab85f46529 |
fix(s3api): clear negative cache in autoCreateBucket when bucket exists
When autoCreateBucket finds the bucket already exists, remove it from the negative cache so subsequent requests don't unnecessarily trigger another auto-create attempt. |
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5208c7c727 |
fix(s3api): improve PutBucketHandler comment for orphaned collection recovery
Clarify the comment and log message for the case where a collection exists but the bucket directory is missing, explaining the root cause (partial deletion) more precisely. |
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12b360f499 |
fix(s3api): delete bucket directory before collection to prevent inconsistent state
Reorder DeleteBucketHandler to remove the bucket directory first, then delete the collection. If collection deletion fails, the bucket is still effectively deleted and can be recreated. Previously, if directory deletion succeeded but collection deletion failed, the bucket was left in an unrecoverable state. |
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d1a631123f |
fix(s3api): allow bucket recreation when orphaned collection exists (#8605)
* fix(s3api): allow bucket recreation when orphaned collection exists (#8601) When a bucket is deleted, its filer directory is removed but the underlying collection/volumes may not be fully cleaned up yet. If the bucket is immediately recreated, PutBucketHandler was returning ErrBucketAlreadyExists due to the orphaned collection, blocking bucket recreation and causing subsequent uploads to fail with InternalError. Allow bucket creation to proceed when a collection exists without a corresponding bucket directory, since this is a transient orphaned state from a previous deletion. * fix(s3api): handle concurrent bucket creation race in mkdir On mkdir failure, re-check whether the bucket directory now exists and return BucketAlreadyExists instead of InternalError when another request created the bucket concurrently. |
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0a5c5ed4ce |
Persist S3 bucket counter metrics across idle periods (#8595)
* Stop deleting counter metrics during bucket TTL cleanup Counter metrics (traffic bytes, request counts, object counts) are monotonically increasing by design. Deleting them after 10 minutes of bucket inactivity causes them to vanish from /metrics output and reset to zero when traffic resumes, breaking Prometheus rate()/increase() queries and making historical traffic reporting impossible. Only delete gauges and histograms in the TTL cleanup loop, as these represent current state and are safely re-populated on next activity. Fixes https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/issues/8521 * Clean up all bucket metrics on bucket deletion Add DeleteBucketMetrics() to delete all metrics (including counters) for a bucket when it is explicitly deleted. This prevents unbounded label cardinality from accumulating for buckets that no longer exist. Called from DeleteBucketHandler after successful bucket deletion. * Reduce mutex scope in bucket metrics TTL sweep Collect expired bucket names under the lock, then release before calling DeletePartialMatch on Prometheus metrics. This prevents RecordBucketActiveTime from blocking during the expensive cleanup. |
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f9311a3422 |
s3api: fix static IAM policy enforcement after reload (#8532)
* s3api: honor attached IAM policies over legacy actions * s3api: hydrate IAM policy docs during config reload * s3api: use policy-aware auth when listing buckets * credential: propagate context through filer_etc policy reads * credential: make legacy policy deletes durable * s3api: exercise managed policy runtime loader * s3api: allow static IAM users without session tokens * iam: deny unmatched attached policies under default allow * iam: load embedded policy files from filer store * s3api: require session tokens for IAM presigning * s3api: sync runtime policies into zero-config IAM * credential: respect context in policy file loads * credential: serialize legacy policy deletes * iam: align filer policy store naming * s3api: use authenticated principals for presigning * iam: deep copy policy conditions * s3api: require request creation in policy tests * filer: keep ReadInsideFiler as the context-aware API * iam: harden filer policy store writes * credential: strengthen legacy policy serialization test * credential: forward runtime policy loaders through wrapper * s3api: harden runtime policy merging * iam: require typed already-exists errors |
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2f837c4780 |
Fix error on deleting non-empty bucket (#8376)
* Move check for non-empty bucket deletion out of `WithFilerClient` call * Added proper checking if a bucket has "user" objects |
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951eeefb76 |
fix(s3): lifecycle TTL rules inherit replication and volumeGrowthCount from filer config (#8321)
* fix(s3): lifecycle TTL rules inherit replication from parent path and filer config PutBucketLifecycleConfiguration wrote filer.conf entries with empty replication, so effective replication could differ from operator default. Now we resolve replication from parent path rule (MatchStorageRule) then filer global config; only Replication is set on the rule (no DataCenter/Rack/DataNode for S3). * add volumeGrowthCount * review --------- Co-authored-by: Dmitiy Gushchin <dag@fivegen.ru> |
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e6ee293c17 |
Add table operations test (#8241)
* Add Trino blog operations test * Update test/s3tables/catalog_trino/trino_blog_operations_test.go Co-authored-by: gemini-code-assist[bot] <176961590+gemini-code-assist[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * feat: add table bucket path helpers and filer operations - Add table object root and table location mapping directories - Implement ensureDirectory, upsertFile, deleteEntryIfExists helpers - Support table location bucket mapping for S3 access * feat: manage table bucket object roots on creation/deletion - Create .objects directory for table buckets on creation - Clean up table object bucket paths on deletion - Enable S3 operations on table bucket object roots * feat: add table location mapping for Iceberg REST - Track table location bucket mappings when tables are created/updated/deleted - Enable location-based routing for S3 operations on table data * feat: route S3 operations to table bucket object roots - Route table-s3 bucket names to mapped table paths - Route table buckets to object root directories - Support table location bucket mapping lookup * feat: emit table-s3 locations from Iceberg REST - Generate unique table-s3 bucket names with UUID suffix - Store table metadata under table bucket paths - Return table-s3 locations for Trino compatibility * fix: handle missing directories in S3 list operations - Propagate ErrNotFound from ListEntries for non-existent directories - Treat missing directories as empty results for list operations - Fixes Trino non-empty location checks on table creation * test: improve Trino CSV parsing for single-value results - Sanitize Trino output to skip jline warnings - Handle single-value CSV results without header rows - Strip quotes from numeric values in tests * refactor: use bucket path helpers throughout S3 API - Replace direct bucket path operations with helper functions - Leverage centralized table bucket routing logic - Improve maintainability with consistent path resolution * fix: add table bucket cache and improve filer error handling - Cache table bucket lookups to reduce filer overhead on repeated checks - Use filer_pb.CreateEntry and filer_pb.UpdateEntry helpers to check resp.Error - Fix delete order in handler_bucket_get_list_delete: delete table object before directory - Make location mapping errors best-effort: log and continue, don't fail API - Update table location mappings to delete stale prior bucket mappings on update - Add 1-second sleep before timestamp time travel query to ensure timestamps are in past - Fix CSV parsing: examine all lines, not skip first; handle single-value rows * fix: properly handle stale metadata location mapping cleanup - Capture oldMetadataLocation before mutation in handleUpdateTable - Update updateTableLocationMapping to accept both old and new locations - Use passed-in oldMetadataLocation to detect location changes - Delete stale mapping only when location actually changes - Pass empty string for oldLocation in handleCreateTable (new tables have no prior mapping) - Improve logging to show old -> new location transitions * refactor: cleanup imports and cache design - Remove unused 'sync' import from bucket_paths.go - Use filer_pb.UpdateEntry helper in setExtendedAttribute and deleteExtendedAttribute for consistent error handling - Add dedicated tableBucketCache map[string]bool to BucketRegistry instead of mixing concerns with metadataCache - Improve cache separation: table buckets cache is now separate from bucket metadata cache * fix: improve cache invalidation and add transient error handling Cache invalidation (critical fix): - Add tableLocationCache to BucketRegistry for location mapping lookups - Clear tableBucketCache and tableLocationCache in RemoveBucketMetadata - Prevents stale cache entries when buckets are deleted/recreated Transient error handling: - Only cache table bucket lookups when conclusive (found or ErrNotFound) - Skip caching on transient errors (network, permission, etc) - Prevents marking real table buckets as non-table due to transient failures Performance optimization: - Cache tableLocationDir results to avoid repeated filer RPCs on hot paths - tableLocationDir now checks cache before making expensive filer lookups - Cache stores empty string for 'not found' to avoid redundant lookups Code clarity: - Add comment to deleteDirectory explaining DeleteEntry response lacks Error field * go fmt * fix: mirror transient error handling in tableLocationDir and optimize bucketDir Transient error handling: - tableLocationDir now only caches definitive results - Mirrors isTableBucket behavior to prevent treating transient errors as permanent misses - Improves reliability on flaky systems or during recovery Performance optimization: - bucketDir avoids redundant isTableBucket call via bucketRoot - Directly use s3a.option.BucketsPath for regular buckets - Saves one cache lookup for every non-table bucket operation * fix: revert bucketDir optimization to preserve bucketRoot logic The optimization to directly use BucketsPath bypassed bucketRoot's logic and caused issues with S3 list operations on delimiter+prefix cases. Revert to using path.Join(s3a.bucketRoot(bucket), bucket) which properly handles all bucket types and ensures consistent path resolution across the codebase. The slight performance cost of an extra cache lookup is worth the correctness and consistency benefits. * feat: move table buckets under /buckets Add a table-bucket marker attribute, reuse bucket metadata cache for table bucket detection, and update list/validation/UI/test paths to treat table buckets as /buckets entries. * Fix S3 Tables code review issues - handler_bucket_create.go: Fix bucket existence check to properly validate entryResp.Entry before setting s3BucketExists flag (nil Entry should not indicate existing bucket) - bucket_paths.go: Add clarifying comment to bucketRoot() explaining unified buckets root path for all bucket types - file_browser_data.go: Optimize by extracting table bucket check early to avoid redundant WithFilerClient call * Fix list prefix delimiter handling * Handle list errors conservatively * Fix Trino FOR TIMESTAMP query - use past timestamp Iceberg requires the timestamp to be strictly in the past. Use current_timestamp - interval '1' second instead of current_timestamp. --------- Co-authored-by: gemini-code-assist[bot] <176961590+gemini-code-assist[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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000e2bd4a9 | logging and debugging | ||
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1274cf038c |
s3: enforce authentication and JSON error format for Iceberg REST Catalog (#8192)
* s3: enforce authentication and JSON error format for Iceberg REST Catalog * s3/iceberg: align error exception types with OpenAPI spec examples * s3api: refactor AuthenticateRequest to return identity object * s3/iceberg: propagate full identity object to request context * s3/iceberg: differentiate NotAuthorizedException and ForbiddenException * s3/iceberg: reject requests if authenticator is nil to prevent auth bypass * s3/iceberg: refactor Auth middleware to build context incrementally and use switch for error mapping * s3api: update misleading comment for authRequestWithAuthType * s3api: return ErrAccessDenied if IAM is not configured to prevent auth bypass * s3/iceberg: optimize context update in Auth middleware * s3api: export CanDo for external authorization use * s3/iceberg: enforce identity-based authorization in all API handlers * s3api: fix compilation errors by updating internal CanDo references * s3/iceberg: robust identity validation and consistent action usage in handlers * s3api: complete CanDo rename across tests and policy engine integration * s3api: fix integration tests by allowing admin access when auth is disabled and explicit gRPC ports * duckdb * create test bucket |
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ee3813787e |
feat(s3api): Implement S3 Policy Variables (#8039)
* feat: Add AWS IAM Policy Variables support to S3 API
Implements policy variables for dynamic access control in bucket policies.
Supported variables:
- aws:username - Extracted from principal ARN
- aws:userid - User identifier (same as username in SeaweedFS)
- aws:principaltype - IAMUser, IAMRole, or AssumedRole
- jwt:* - Any JWT claim (e.g., jwt:preferred_username, jwt:sub)
Key changes:
- Added PolicyVariableRegex to detect ${...} patterns
- Extended CompiledStatement with DynamicResourcePatterns, DynamicPrincipalPatterns, DynamicActionPatterns
- Added Claims field to PolicyEvaluationArgs for JWT claim access
- Implemented SubstituteVariables() for variable replacement from context and JWT claims
- Implemented extractPrincipalVariables() for ARN parsing
- Updated EvaluateConditions() to support variable substitution
- Comprehensive unit and integration tests
Resolves #8037
* feat: Add LDAP and PrincipalAccount variable support
Completes future enhancements for policy variables:
- Added ldap:* variable support for LDAP claims
- ldap:username - LDAP username from claims
- ldap:dn - LDAP distinguished name from claims
- ldap:* - Any LDAP claim
- Added aws:PrincipalAccount extraction from ARN
- Extracts account ID from principal ARN
- Available as ${aws:PrincipalAccount} in policies
Updated SubstituteVariables() to check LDAP claims
Updated extractPrincipalVariables() to extract account ID
Added comprehensive tests for new variables
* feat(s3api): implement IAM policy variables core logic and optimization
* feat(s3api): integrate policy variables with S3 authentication and handlers
* test(s3api): add integration tests for policy variables
* cleanup: remove unused policy conversion files
* Add S3 policy variables integration tests and path support
- Add comprehensive integration tests for policy variables
- Test username isolation, JWT claims, LDAP claims
- Add support for IAM paths in principal ARN parsing
- Add tests for principals with paths
* Fix IAM Role principal variable extraction
IAM Roles should not have aws:userid or aws:PrincipalAccount
according to AWS behavior. Only IAM Users and Assumed Roles
should have these variables.
Fixes TestExtractPrincipalVariables test failures.
* Security fixes and bug fixes for S3 policy variables
SECURITY FIXES:
- Prevent X-SeaweedFS-Principal header spoofing by clearing internal
headers at start of authentication (auth_credentials.go)
- Restrict policy variable substitution to safe allowlist to prevent
client header injection (iam/policy/policy_engine.go)
- Add core policy validation before storing bucket policies
BUG FIXES:
- Remove unused sid variable in evaluateStatement
- Fix LDAP claim lookup to check both prefixed and unprefixed keys
- Add ValidatePolicy call in PutBucketPolicyHandler
These fixes prevent privilege escalation via header injection and
ensure only validated identity claims are used in policy evaluation.
* Additional security fixes and code cleanup
SECURITY FIXES:
- Fixed X-Forwarded-For spoofing by only trusting proxy headers from
private/localhost IPs (s3_iam_middleware.go)
- Changed context key from "sourceIP" to "aws:SourceIp" for proper
policy variable substitution
CODE IMPROVEMENTS:
- Kept aws:PrincipalAccount for IAM Roles to support condition evaluations
- Removed redundant STS principaltype override
- Removed unused service variable
- Cleaned up commented-out debug logging statements
- Updated tests to reflect new IAM Role behavior
These changes prevent IP spoofing attacks and ensure policy variables
work correctly with the safe allowlist.
* Add security documentation for ParseJWTToken
Added comprehensive security comments explaining that ParseJWTToken
is safe despite parsing without verification because:
- It's only used for routing to the correct verification method
- All code paths perform cryptographic verification before trusting claims
- OIDC tokens: validated via validateExternalOIDCToken
- STS tokens: validated via ValidateSessionToken
Enhanced function documentation with clear security warnings about
proper usage to prevent future misuse.
* Fix IP condition evaluation to use aws:SourceIp key
Fixed evaluateIPCondition in IAM policy engine to use "aws:SourceIp"
instead of "sourceIP" to match the updated extractRequestContext.
This fixes the failing IP-restricted role test where IP-based policy
conditions were not being evaluated correctly.
Updated all test cases to use the correct "aws:SourceIp" key.
* Address code review feedback: optimize and clarify
PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT:
- Optimized expandPolicyVariables to use regexp.ReplaceAllStringFunc
for single-pass variable substitution instead of iterating through
all safe variables. This improves performance from O(n*m) to O(m)
where n is the number of safe variables and m is the pattern length.
CODE CLARITY:
- Added detailed comment explaining LDAP claim fallback mechanism
(checks both prefixed and unprefixed keys for compatibility)
- Enhanced TODO comment for trusted proxy configuration with rationale
and recommendations for supporting cloud load balancers, CDNs, and
complex network topologies
All tests passing.
* Address Copilot code review feedback
BUG FIXES:
- Fixed type switch for int/int32/int64 - separated into individual cases
since interface type switches only match the first type in multi-type cases
- Fixed grammatically incorrect error message in types.go
CODE QUALITY:
- Removed duplicate Resource/NotResource validation (already in ValidateStatement)
- Added comprehensive comment explaining isEnabled() logic and security implications
- Improved trusted proxy NOTE comment to be more concise while noting limitations
All tests passing.
* Fix test failures after extractSourceIP security changes
Updated tests to work with the security fix that only trusts
X-Forwarded-For/X-Real-IP headers from private IP addresses:
- Set RemoteAddr to 127.0.0.1 in tests to simulate trusted proxy
- Changed context key from "sourceIP" to "aws:SourceIp"
- Added test case for untrusted proxy (public RemoteAddr)
- Removed invalid ValidateStatement call (validation happens in ValidatePolicy)
All tests now passing.
* Address remaining Gemini code review feedback
CODE SAFETY:
- Deep clone Action field in CompileStatement to prevent potential data races
if the original policy document is modified after compilation
TEST CLEANUP:
- Remove debug logging (fmt.Fprintf) from engine_notresource_test.go
- Remove unused imports in engine_notresource_test.go
All tests passing.
* Fix insecure JWT parsing in IAM auth flow
SECURITY FIX:
- Renamed ParseJWTToken to ParseUnverifiedJWTToken with explicit security warnings.
- Refactored AuthenticateJWT to use the trusted SessionInfo returned by ValidateSessionToken
instead of relying on unverified claims from the initial parse.
- Refactored ValidatePresignedURLWithIAM to reuse the robust AuthenticateJWT logic, removing
duplicated and insecure manual token parsing.
This ensures all identity information (Role, Principal, Subject) used for authorization
decisions is derived solely from cryptographically verified tokens.
* Security: Fix insecure JWT claim extraction in policy engine
- Refactored EvaluatePolicy to accept trusted claims from verified Identity instead of parsing unverified tokens
- Updated AuthenticateJWT to populate Claims in IAMIdentity from verified sources (SessionInfo/ExternalIdentity)
- Updated s3api_server and handlers to pass claims correctly
- Improved isPrivateIP to support IPv6 loopback, link-local, and ULA
- Fixed flaky distributed_session_consistency test with retry logic
* fix(iam): populate Subject in STSSessionInfo to ensure correct identity propagation
This fixes the TestS3IAMAuthentication/valid_jwt_token_authentication failure by ensuring the session subject (sub) is correctly mapped to the internal SessionInfo struct, allowing bucket ownership validation to succeed.
* Optimized isPrivateIP
* Create s3-policy-tests.yml
* fix tests
* fix tests
* tests(s3/iam): simplify policy to resource-based \ (step 1)
* tests(s3/iam): add explicit Deny NotResource for isolation (step 2)
* fixes
* policy: skip resource matching for STS trust policies to allow AssumeRole evaluation
* refactor: remove debug logging and hoist policy variables for performance
* test: fix TestS3IAMBucketPolicyIntegration cleanup to handle per-subtest object lifecycle
* test: fix bucket name generation to comply with S3 63-char limit
* test: skip TestS3IAMPolicyEnforcement until role setup is implemented
* test: use weed mini for simpler test server deployment
Replace 'weed server' with 'weed mini' for IAM tests to avoid port binding issues
and simplify the all-in-one server deployment. This improves test reliability
and execution time.
* security: prevent allocation overflow in policy evaluation
Add maxPoliciesForEvaluation constant to cap the number of policies evaluated
in a single request. This prevents potential integer overflow when allocating
slices for policy lists that may be influenced by untrusted input.
Changes:
- Add const maxPoliciesForEvaluation = 1024 to set an upper bound
- Validate len(policies) < maxPoliciesForEvaluation before appending bucket policy
- Use append() instead of make([]string, len+1) to avoid arithmetic overflow
- Apply fix to both IsActionAllowed policy evaluation paths
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2b529e310d |
s3: Add SOSAPI support for Veeam integration (#7899)
* s3api: Add SOSAPI core implementation and tests Implement Smart Object Storage API (SOSAPI) support for Veeam integration. - Add s3api_sosapi.go with XML structures and handlers for system.xml and capacity.xml - Implement virtual object detection and dynamic XML generation - Add capacity retrieval via gRPC (to be optimized in follow-up) - Include comprehensive unit tests covering detection, XML generation, and edge cases This enables Veeam Backup & Replication to discover SeaweedFS capabilities and capacity. * s3api: Integrate SOSAPI handlers into GetObject and HeadObject Add early interception for SOSAPI virtual objects in GetObjectHandler and HeadObjectHandler. - Check for SOSAPI objects (.system-*/system.xml, .system-*/capacity.xml) before normal processing - Delegate to handleSOSAPIGetObject and handleSOSAPIHeadObject when detected - Ensures virtual objects are served without hitting storage layer * s3api: Allow anonymous access to SOSAPI virtual objects Enable discovery of SOSAPI capabilities without requiring credentials. - Modify AuthWithPublicRead to bypass auth for SOSAPI objects if bucket exists - Supports Veeam's initial discovery phase before full IAM setup - Validates bucket existence to prevent information disclosure * s3api: Fix SOSAPI capacity retrieval to use proper master connection Fix gRPC error by connecting directly to master servers instead of through filer. - Use pb.WithOneOfGrpcMasterClients with s3a.option.Masters - Matches pattern used in bucket_size_metrics.go - Resolves "unknown service master_pb.Seaweed" error - Gracefully handles missing master configuration * Merge origin/master and implement robust SOSAPI capacity logic - Resolved merge conflict in s3api_sosapi.go - Replaced global Statistics RPC with VolumeList (topology) for accurate bucket-specific 'Used' calculation - Added bucket quota support (report quota as Capacity if set) - Implemented cluster-wide capacity calculation from topology when no quota - Added unit tests for topology capacity and usage calculations * s3api: Remove anonymous access to SOSAPI virtual objects Reverts the implicit public access for system.xml and capacity.xml. Requests to these objects now require standard S3 authentication, unless the bucket has a public-read policy. * s3api: Refactor SOSAPI handlers to use http.ServeContent - Consolidate handleSOSAPIGetObject and handleSOSAPIHeadObject into serveSOSAPI - Use http.ServeContent for standard Range, HEAD, and ETag handling - Remove manual range request handler and reduce code duplication * s3api: Unify SOSAPI request handling - Replaced handleSOSAPIGetObject and handleSOSAPIHeadObject with single HandleSOSAPI function - Updated call sites in s3api_object_handlers.go - Simplifies logic and ensures consistent handling for both GET and HEAD requests via http.ServeContent * s3api: Restore distinct SOSAPI GET/HEAD handlers - Reverted unified handler to enforce distinct behavior for GET and HEAD - GET: Supports Range requests via http.ServeContent - HEAD: Explicitly ignores Range requests (matches MinIO behavior) and writes headers only * s3api: Refactor SOSAPI handlers to eliminate duplication - Extracted shared content generation logic into generateSOSAPIContent helper - handleSOSAPIGetObject: Uses http.ServeContent (supports Range requests) - handleSOSAPIHeadObject: Manually sets headers (no Range, no body) - Maintains distinct behavior while following DRY principle * s3api: Remove low-value SOSAPI tests Removed tests that validate standard library behavior or trivial constant checks: - TestSOSAPIConstants (string prefix/suffix checks) - TestSystemInfoXMLRootElement (redundant with TestGenerateSystemXML) - TestSOSAPIXMLContentType (tests httptest, not our code) - TestHTTPTimeFormat (tests standard library) - TestCapacityInfoXMLStruct (tests Go's XML marshaling) Kept tests that validate actual business logic and edge cases. * s3api: Use consistent S3-compliant error responses in SOSAPI Replaced http.Error() with s3err.WriteErrorResponse() for internal errors to ensure all SOSAPI errors return S3-compliant XML instead of plain text. * s3api: Return error when no masters configured for SOSAPI capacity Changed getCapacityInfo to return an error instead of silently returning zero capacity when no master servers are configured. This helps surface configuration issues rather than masking them. * s3api: Use collection name with FilerGroup prefix for SOSAPI capacity Fixed collectBucketUsageFromTopology to use s3a.getCollectionName(bucket) instead of raw bucket name. This ensures collection comparisons match actual volume collection names when FilerGroup prefix is configured. * s3api: Apply PR review feedback for SOSAPI - Renamed `bucket` parameter to `collectionName` in collectBucketUsageFromTopology for clarity - Changed error checks from `==` to `errors.Is()` for better wrapped error handling - Added `errors` import * s3api: Avoid variable shadowing in SOSAPI capacity retrieval Refactored `getCapacityInfo` to use distinct variable names for errors to improve code clarity and avoid unintentional shadowing of the return parameter. |
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e8baeb3616 |
s3api: Allow anonymous access to SOSAPI virtual objects
Enable discovery of SOSAPI capabilities without requiring credentials. - Modify AuthWithPublicRead to bypass auth for SOSAPI objects if bucket exists - Supports Veeam's initial discovery phase before full IAM setup - Validates bucket existence to prevent information disclosure |
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a77b145590 |
fix: ListBuckets returns empty for users with bucket-specific permissions (#7799)
* fix: ListBuckets returns empty for users with bucket-specific permissions (#7796) The ListBucketsHandler was using sequential AND logic where ownership check happened before permission check. If a user had 'List:bucketname' permission but didn't own the bucket (different AmzIdentityId or missing owner metadata), the bucket was filtered out before the permission check could run. Changed to OR logic: a bucket is now visible if the user owns it OR has explicit permission to list it. This allows users with bucket-specific permissions like 'List:geoserver' to see buckets they have access to, even if they don't own them. Changes: - Modified ListBucketsHandler to check both ownership and permission, including bucket if either check passes - Renamed isBucketVisibleToIdentity to isBucketOwnedByIdentity for clarity - Added comprehensive tests in TestListBucketsIssue7796 Fixes #7796 * address review comments: optimize permission check and add integration test - Skip permission check if user is already the owner (performance optimization) - Add integration test that simulates the complete handler filtering logic to verify the combination of ownership OR permission check works correctly * add visibility assertions to each sub-test for self-contained verification Each sub-test now verifies the final outcome using isOwner || canList logic, making tests more robust and independently verifiable. |
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f77e6ed2d4 |
fix: admin UI bucket delete now properly deletes collection and checks Object Lock (#7734)
* fix: admin UI bucket delete now properly deletes collection and checks Object Lock Fixes #7711 The admin UI's DeleteS3Bucket function was missing two critical behaviors: 1. It did not delete the collection from the master (unlike s3.bucket.delete shell command), leaving orphaned volume data that caused fs.verify errors. 2. It did not check for Object Lock protections before deletion, potentially allowing deletion of buckets with locked objects. Changes: - Add shared Object Lock checking utilities to object_lock_utils.go: - EntryHasActiveLock: standalone function to check if an entry has active lock - HasObjectsWithActiveLocks: shared function to scan bucket for locked objects - Refactor S3 API entryHasActiveLock to use shared EntryHasActiveLock function - Update admin UI DeleteS3Bucket to: - Check Object Lock using shared HasObjectsWithActiveLocks utility - Delete the collection before deleting filer entries (matching s3.bucket.delete) * refactor: S3 API uses shared Object Lock utilities Removes 114 lines of duplicated code from s3api_bucket_handlers.go by having hasObjectsWithActiveLocks delegate to the shared HasObjectsWithActiveLocks function in object_lock_utils.go. Now both S3 API and Admin UI use the same shared utilities: - EntryHasActiveLock - HasObjectsWithActiveLocks - recursivelyCheckLocksWithClient - checkVersionsForLocksWithClient * feat: s3.bucket.delete shell command now checks Object Lock Add Object Lock protection to the s3.bucket.delete shell command. If the bucket has Object Lock enabled and contains objects with active retention or legal hold, deletion is prevented. Also refactors Object Lock checking utilities into a new s3_objectlock package to avoid import cycles between shell, s3api, and admin packages. All three components now share the same logic: - S3 API (DeleteBucketHandler) - Admin UI (DeleteS3Bucket) - Shell command (s3.bucket.delete) * refactor: unified Object Lock checking and consistent deletion parameters 1. Add CheckBucketForLockedObjects() - a unified function that combines: - Bucket entry lookup - Object Lock enabled check - Scan for locked objects 2. All three components now use this single function: - S3 API (via s3api.CheckBucketForLockedObjects) - Admin UI (via s3api.CheckBucketForLockedObjects) - Shell command (via s3_objectlock.CheckBucketForLockedObjects) 3. Aligned deletion parameters across all components: - isDeleteData: false (collection already deleted separately) - isRecursive: true - ignoreRecursiveError: true * fix: properly handle non-EOF errors in Recv() loops The Recv() loops in recursivelyCheckLocksWithClient and checkVersionsForLocksWithClient were breaking on any error, which could hide real stream errors and incorrectly report 'no locks found'. Now: - io.EOF: break loop (normal end of stream) - any other error: return it so caller knows the stream failed * fix: address PR review comments 1. Add path traversal protection - validate entry names before building subdirectory paths. Skip entries with empty names, '.', '..', or containing path separators. 2. Use exact match for .versions folder instead of HasSuffix() to avoid mismatching unrelated directories like 'foo.versions'. 3. Replace path.Join with simple string concatenation since we now validate entry names. * refactor: extract paginateEntries helper to reduce duplication The recursivelyCheckLocksWithClient and checkVersionsForLocksWithClient functions shared significant structural similarity. Extracted a generic paginateEntries helper that: - Handles pagination logic (lastFileName tracking, Limit) - Handles stream receiving with proper EOF vs error handling - Validates entry names (path traversal protection) - Calls a processEntry callback for business logic This centralizes pagination logic and makes the code more maintainable. * feat: add context propagation for timeout and cancellation support All Object Lock checking functions now accept context.Context parameter: - paginateEntries(ctx, client, dir, processEntry) - recursivelyCheckLocksWithClient(ctx, client, dir, hasLocks, currentTime) - checkVersionsForLocksWithClient(ctx, client, versionsDir, hasLocks, currentTime) - HasObjectsWithActiveLocks(ctx, client, bucketPath) - CheckBucketForLockedObjects(ctx, client, bucketsPath, bucketName) This enables: - Timeout support for large bucket scans - Cancellation propagation from HTTP requests - The S3 API handler now uses r.Context() for proper request lifecycle * fix: address PR review comments 1. Add DefaultBucketsPath constant in admin_server.go instead of hardcoding "/buckets" in multiple places. 2. Add defensive normalization in EntryHasActiveLock: - TrimSpace to handle whitespace around values - ToUpper for case-insensitive comparison of legal hold and retention mode values - TrimSpace on retention date before parsing * fix: use ctx variable consistently instead of context.Background() In both DeleteS3Bucket and command_s3_bucket_delete, use the ctx variable defined at the start of the function for all gRPC calls instead of creating new context.Background() instances. |
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d6d893c8c3 |
s3: add s3:ExistingObjectTag condition support for bucket policies (#7677)
* s3: add s3:ExistingObjectTag condition support in policy engine
Add support for s3:ExistingObjectTag/<tag-key> condition keys in bucket
policies, allowing access control based on object tags.
Changes:
- Add ObjectEntry field to PolicyEvaluationArgs (entry.Extended metadata)
- Update EvaluateConditions to handle s3:ExistingObjectTag/<key> format
- Extract tag value from entry metadata using X-Amz-Tagging-<key> prefix
This enables policies like:
{
"Condition": {
"StringEquals": {
"s3:ExistingObjectTag/status": ["public"]
}
}
}
Fixes: https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/issues/7447
* s3: update EvaluatePolicy to accept object entry for tag conditions
Update BucketPolicyEngine.EvaluatePolicy to accept objectEntry parameter
(entry.Extended metadata) for evaluating tag-based policy conditions.
Changes:
- Add objectEntry parameter to EvaluatePolicy method
- Update callers in auth_credentials.go and s3api_bucket_handlers.go
- Pass nil for objectEntry in auth layer (entry fetched later in handlers)
For tag-based conditions to work, handlers should call EvaluatePolicy
with the object's entry.Extended after fetching the entry from filer.
* s3: add tests for s3:ExistingObjectTag policy conditions
Add comprehensive tests for object tag-based policy conditions:
- TestExistingObjectTagCondition: Basic tag matching scenarios
- Matching/non-matching tag values
- Missing tags, no tags, empty tags
- Multiple tags with one matching
- TestExistingObjectTagConditionMultipleTags: Multiple tag conditions
- Both tags match
- Only one tag matches
- TestExistingObjectTagDenyPolicy: Deny policies with tag conditions
- Default allow without tag
- Deny when specific tag present
* s3: document s3:ExistingObjectTag support and feature status
Update policy engine documentation:
- Add s3:ExistingObjectTag/<tag-key> to supported condition keys
- Add 'Object Tag-Based Access Control' section with examples
- Add 'Feature Status' section with implemented and planned features
Planned features for future implementation:
- s3:RequestObjectTag/<key>
- s3:RequestObjectTagKeys
- s3:x-amz-server-side-encryption
- Cross-account access
* Implement tag-based policy re-check in handlers
- Add checkPolicyWithEntry helper to S3ApiServer for handlers to re-check
policy after fetching object entry (for s3:ExistingObjectTag conditions)
- Add HasPolicyForBucket method to policy engine for efficient check
- Integrate policy re-check in GetObjectHandler after entry is fetched
- Integrate policy re-check in HeadObjectHandler after entry is fetched
- Update auth_credentials.go comments to explain two-phase evaluation
- Update documentation with supported operations for tag-based conditions
This implements 'Approach 1' where handlers re-check the policy with
the object entry after fetching it, allowing tag-based conditions to
be properly evaluated.
* Add integration tests for s3:ExistingObjectTag conditions
- Add TestCheckPolicyWithEntry: tests checkPolicyWithEntry helper with various
tag scenarios (matching tags, non-matching tags, empty entry, nil entry)
- Add TestCheckPolicyWithEntryNoPolicyForBucket: tests early return when no policy
- Add TestCheckPolicyWithEntryNilPolicyEngine: tests nil engine handling
- Add TestCheckPolicyWithEntryDenyPolicy: tests deny policies with tag conditions
- Add TestHasPolicyForBucket: tests HasPolicyForBucket method
These tests cover the Phase 2 policy evaluation with object entry metadata,
ensuring tag-based conditions are properly evaluated.
* Address code review nitpicks
- Remove unused extractObjectTags placeholder function (engine.go)
- Add clarifying comment about s3:ExistingObjectTag/<key> evaluation
- Consolidate duplicate tag-based examples in README
- Factor out tagsToEntry helper to package level in tests
* Address code review feedback
- Fix unsafe type assertions in GetObjectHandler and HeadObjectHandler
when getting identity from context (properly handle type assertion failure)
- Extract getConditionContextValue helper to eliminate duplicated logic
between EvaluateConditions and EvaluateConditionsLegacy
- Ensure consistent handling of missing condition keys (always return
empty slice)
* Fix GetObjectHandler to match HeadObjectHandler pattern
Add safety check for nil objectEntryForSSE before tag-based policy
evaluation, ensuring tag-based conditions are always evaluated rather
than silently skipped if entry is unexpectedly nil.
Addresses review comment from Copilot.
* Fix HeadObject action name in docs for consistency
Change 'HeadObject' to 's3:HeadObject' to match other action names.
* Extract recheckPolicyWithObjectEntry helper to reduce duplication
Move the repeated identity extraction and policy re-check logic from
GetObjectHandler and HeadObjectHandler into a shared helper method.
* Add validation for empty tag key in s3:ExistingObjectTag condition
Prevent potential issues with malformed policies containing
s3:ExistingObjectTag/ (empty tag key after slash).
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f5c0bcafa3 |
s3: fix ListBuckets not showing buckets created by authenticated users (#7648)
* s3: fix ListBuckets not showing buckets created by authenticated users Fixes #7647 ## Problem Users with proper Admin permissions could create buckets but couldn't list them. The issue occurred because ListBucketsHandler was not wrapped with the Auth middleware, so the authenticated identity was never set in the request context. ## Root Cause - PutBucketHandler uses iam.Auth() middleware which sets identity in context - ListBucketsHandler did NOT use iam.Auth() middleware - Without the middleware, GetIdentityNameFromContext() returned empty string - Bucket ownership checks failed because no identity was present ## Changes 1. Wrap ListBucketsHandler with iam.Auth() middleware (s3api_server.go) 2. Update ListBucketsHandler to get identity from context (s3api_bucket_handlers.go) 3. Add lookupByIdentityName() helper method (auth_credentials.go) 4. Add comprehensive test TestListBucketsIssue7647 (s3api_bucket_handlers_test.go) ## Testing - All existing tests pass (1348 tests in s3api package) - New test TestListBucketsIssue7647 validates the fix - Verified admin users can see their created buckets - Verified admin users can see all buckets - Verified backward compatibility maintained * s3: fix ListBuckets for JWT/Keycloak authentication The previous fix broke JWT/Keycloak authentication because JWT identities are created on-the-fly and not stored in the iam.identities list. The lookupByIdentityName() would return nil for JWT users. Solution: Store the full Identity object in the request context, not just the name. This allows ListBucketsHandler to retrieve the complete identity for all authentication types (SigV2, SigV4, JWT, Anonymous). Changes: - Add SetIdentityInContext/GetIdentityFromContext in s3_constants/header.go - Update Auth middleware to store full identity in context - Update ListBucketsHandler to retrieve identity from context first, with fallback to lookup for backward compatibility * s3: optimize lookupByIdentityName to O(1) using map Address code review feedback: Use a map for O(1) lookups instead of O(N) linear scan through identities list. Changes: - Add nameToIdentity map to IdentityAccessManagement struct - Populate map in loadS3ApiConfiguration (consistent with accessKeyIdent pattern) - Update lookupByIdentityName to use map lookup instead of loop This improves performance when many identities are configured and aligns with the existing pattern used for accessKeyIdent lookups. * s3: address code review feedback on nameToIdentity and logging Address two code review points: 1. Wire nameToIdentity into env-var fallback path - The AWS env-var fallback in NewIdentityAccessManagementWithStore now populates nameToIdentity map along with accessKeyIdent - Keeps all identity lookup maps in sync - Avoids potential issues if handlers rely on lookupByIdentityName 2. Improve access key lookup logging - Reduce log verbosity: V(1) -> V(2) for failed lookups - Truncate access keys in logs (show first 4 chars + ***) - Include key length for debugging - Prevents credential exposure in production logs - Reduces log noise from misconfigured clients * fmt * s3: refactor truncation logic and improve error handling Address additional code review feedback: 1. DRY principle: Extract key truncation logic into local function - Define truncate() helper at function start - Reuse throughout lookupByAccessKey - Eliminates code duplication 2. Enhanced security: Mask very short access keys - Keys <= 4 chars now show as '***' instead of full key - Prevents any credential exposure even for short keys - Consistent masking across all log statements 3. Improved robustness: Add warning log for type assertion failure - Log unexpected type when identity context object is wrong type - Helps debug potential middleware or context issues - Better production diagnostics 4. Documentation: Add comment about future optimization opportunity - Note potential for lightweight identity view in context - Suggests credential-free view for better data minimization - Documents design decision for future maintainers |
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55f0fbf364 |
s3: optimize DELETE by skipping lock check for buckets without Object Lock (#7642)
This optimization avoids an expensive filer gRPC call for every DELETE operation on buckets that don't have Object Lock enabled. Before this change, enforceObjectLockProtections() would always call getObjectEntry() to fetch object metadata to check for retention/legal hold, even for buckets that never had Object Lock configured. Changes: 1. Add early return in enforceObjectLockProtections() if bucket has no Object Lock config or bucket doesn't exist 2. Add isObjectLockEnabled() helper function to check if a bucket has Object Lock configured 3. Fix validateObjectLockHeaders() to check ObjectLockConfig instead of just versioningEnabled - this ensures object-lock headers are properly rejected on buckets without Object Lock enabled, which aligns with AWS S3 semantics 4. Make bucket creation with Object Lock atomic - set Object Lock config in the same CreateEntry call as bucket creation, preventing race conditions where bucket exists without Object Lock enabled 5. Properly handle Object Lock setup failures during bucket creation - if StoreObjectLockConfigurationInExtended fails, roll back the bucket creation and return an error instead of leaving a bucket without the requested Object Lock configuration This significantly improves DELETE latency for non-Object-Lock buckets, which is the common case (lockCheck time reduced from 1-10ms to ~1µs). |