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* Add ResolveIdentityClaim helper for OIDC audit identity ComputeParentUser derives a stable per-identity hash from (sub, iss) for internal keying, but it is opaque and not human-readable. Audit logs for STS-assumed OIDC sessions currently surface that opaque value (or the random session id) as the requester, leaving no authoritative trace of the federated user. Add ResolveIdentityClaim next to ComputeParentUser to recover a human-readable, server-asserted identity attribute from the STS request context populated at federation time. It walks a priority list (preferred_username, email, name, sub) so a federated session always audits against a stable OIDC claim rather than a client-supplied role session name. For #11264 * Surface authoritative OIDC identity claim in S3 audit log For STS-assumed sessions minted from an OIDC web identity, the audit log requester field is the opaque session subject, which cannot be traced back to the federated user who performed the operation. The OIDC identity claims (preferred_username, email, sub) are already carried in the session request context and reach the auth layer as identity.Claims, but they were never surfaced to the audit log. Add a requester_identity field to the S3 access audit log, populated from the authoritative OIDC identity claim resolved via ResolveIdentityClaim. The claim is propagated through the shared identity holder (the same mechanism the requester name and principal ARN already use) so it survives the request-context copy that hides auth-set values from the outer audit middleware. The existing requester field is left unchanged for backward compatibility; requester_identity is empty for non-federated sessions, where requester already carries the real username. For #11264 * Gate OIDC audit identity on federation marker and harden resolver Address review feedback (Devin Review, Greptile) on the initial implementation: - Non-federated STS sessions no longer gain a false requester_identity. ValidateJWTWithClaims merges the JWT registered sub claim (the opaque session id) into RequestContext for sessions without an explicit request context, so the previous ResolveIdentityClaim fallback to sub surfaced that session id as an authoritative identity. Resolution is now gated on SessionInfo.ParentUser, which is set only for OIDC-federated sessions in AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity. The claim is resolved from the original sessionInfo.RequestContext (not the local claims map, whose sub the bearer path overwrites with the session subject) so SigV4 and bearer sessions surface the same identity. - ResolveIdentityClaim now trims whitespace and treats whitespace-only claims as absent, so a blank preferred_username no longer masks a usable email or sub. The resolved claim is carried on Identity.IdentityClaim (and IAMIdentity for the bearer path) rather than re-derived in recordIdentityInContext, making the federation gate explicit at the auth boundary. For #11264 * Resolve OIDC identity claim for external bearer tokens The external OIDC bearer path (a raw OIDC JWT presented directly, not via STS) populates Claims with preferred_username/email/name/sub from the validated token but did not set IdentityClaim, so requester_identity stayed blank for that authentication path. Resolve the claim there too — sub is the real OIDC subject on this path (not an STS session id), so no federation gate is needed. Also drop an ineffectual ctx assignment flagged by ineffassign in the audit test. For #11264
261 lines
8.8 KiB
Go
261 lines
8.8 KiB
Go
package s3err
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"os"
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"strings"
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"sync/atomic"
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"time"
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"github.com/fluent/fluent-logger-golang/fluent"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3_constants"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/util/request_id"
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)
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type AccessLogExtend struct {
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AccessLog
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AccessLogHTTP
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}
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type AccessLog struct {
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Bucket string `msg:"bucket" json:"bucket"` // awsexamplebucket1
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Time int64 `msg:"time" json:"time"` // [06/Feb/2019:00:00:38 +0000]
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RemoteIP string `msg:"remote_ip" json:"remote_ip,omitempty"` // 192.0.2.3
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Requester string `msg:"requester" json:"requester,omitempty"` // IAM user id
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RequesterArn string `msg:"requester_arn" json:"requester_arn,omitempty"` // arn:aws:sts::0:assumed-role/Role/session
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RequesterIdentity string `msg:"requester_identity" json:"requester_identity,omitempty"` // authoritative OIDC identity claim (preferred_username/email/sub)
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RequestID string `msg:"request_id" json:"request_id,omitempty"` // 3E57427F33A59F07
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Operation string `msg:"operation" json:"operation,omitempty"` // REST.HTTP_method.resource_type REST.PUT.OBJECT
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Key string `msg:"key" json:"key,omitempty"` // /photos/2019/08/puppy.jpg
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ErrorCode string `msg:"error_code" json:"error_code,omitempty"`
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HostId string `msg:"host_id" json:"host_id,omitempty"`
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HostHeader string `msg:"host_header" json:"host_header,omitempty"` // s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com
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UserAgent string `msg:"user_agent" json:"user_agent,omitempty"`
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HTTPStatus int `msg:"status" json:"status,omitempty"`
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SignatureVersion string `msg:"signature_version" json:"signature_version,omitempty"`
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}
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type AccessLogHTTP struct {
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RequestURI string `json:"request_uri,omitempty"` // "GET /awsexamplebucket1/photos/2019/08/puppy.jpg?x-foo=bar HTTP/1.1"
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BytesSent string `json:"bytes_sent,omitempty"`
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ObjectSize string `json:"object_size,omitempty"`
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TotalTime int `json:"total_time,omitempty"`
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TurnAroundTime int `json:"turn_around_time,omitempty"`
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Referer string `json:"Referer,omitempty"`
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VersionId string `json:"version_id,omitempty"`
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CipherSuite string `json:"cipher_suite,omitempty"`
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AuthenticationType string `json:"auth_type,omitempty"`
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TLSVersion string `json:"TLS_version,omitempty"`
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}
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const tag = "s3.access"
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var (
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Logger *fluent.Fluent
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hostname = os.Getenv("HOSTNAME")
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environment = os.Getenv("ENVIRONMENT")
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)
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func InitAuditLog(config string) {
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configContent, readErr := os.ReadFile(config)
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if readErr != nil {
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glog.Errorf("fail to read fluent config %s : %v", config, readErr)
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return
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}
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fluentConfig := &fluent.Config{}
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if err := json.Unmarshal(configContent, fluentConfig); err != nil {
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glog.Errorf("fail to parse fluent config %s : %v", string(configContent), err)
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return
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}
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if len(fluentConfig.TagPrefix) == 0 && len(environment) > 0 {
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fluentConfig.TagPrefix = environment
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}
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fluentConfig.Async = true
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fluentConfig.AsyncResultCallback = func(data []byte, err error) {
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if err != nil {
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glog.Warning("Error while posting log: ", err)
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}
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}
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var err error
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Logger, err = fluent.New(*fluentConfig)
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if err != nil {
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glog.Errorf("fail to load fluent config: %v", err)
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}
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}
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// getRemoteIP returns the client IP for the audit log, honoring forwarding
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// headers set by reverse proxies. Preference order: X-Forwarded-For (first
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// non-empty entry), X-Real-IP, then r.RemoteAddr. Headers are trusted as-is;
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// operators who expose the S3 endpoint directly to untrusted networks should
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// strip these headers at the proxy boundary so clients cannot spoof them.
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func getRemoteIP(r *http.Request) string {
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if forwardedFor := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); forwardedFor != "" {
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for _, entry := range strings.Split(forwardedFor, ",") {
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if ip := strings.TrimSpace(entry); ip != "" {
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return ip
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}
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}
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}
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if realIP := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP")); realIP != "" {
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return realIP
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}
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if host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr); err == nil {
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return host
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}
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return r.RemoteAddr
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}
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func getREST(httpMetod string, resourceType string) string {
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return fmt.Sprintf("REST.%s.%s", httpMetod, resourceType)
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}
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func getResourceType(object string, query_key string, method string) (string, bool) {
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if object == "/" {
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switch query_key {
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case "delete":
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return "BATCH.DELETE.OBJECT", true
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case "tagging":
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return getREST(method, "OBJECTTAGGING"), true
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case "lifecycle":
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return getREST(method, "LIFECYCLECONFIGURATION"), true
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case "acl":
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return getREST(method, "ACCESSCONTROLPOLICY"), true
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case "policy":
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return getREST(method, "BUCKETPOLICY"), true
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default:
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return getREST(method, "BUCKET"), false
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}
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} else {
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switch query_key {
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case "tagging":
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return getREST(method, "OBJECTTAGGING"), true
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default:
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return getREST(method, "OBJECT"), false
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}
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}
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}
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func getOperation(object string, r *http.Request) string {
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queries := r.URL.Query()
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var operation string
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var queryFound bool
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for key, _ := range queries {
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operation, queryFound = getResourceType(object, key, r.Method)
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if queryFound {
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return operation
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}
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}
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if len(queries) == 0 {
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operation, _ = getResourceType(object, "", r.Method)
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}
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return operation
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}
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func GetAccessLog(r *http.Request, HTTPStatusCode int, s3errCode ErrorCode) *AccessLog {
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bucket, key := s3_constants.GetBucketAndObject(r)
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var errorCode string
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if s3errCode != ErrNone {
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errorCode = GetAPIError(s3errCode).Code
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}
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remoteIP := getRemoteIP(r)
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hostHeader := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Host")
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if len(hostHeader) == 0 {
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hostHeader = r.Host
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}
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return &AccessLog{
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HostHeader: hostHeader,
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RequestID: request_id.GetFromRequest(r),
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RemoteIP: remoteIP,
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Requester: s3_constants.GetIdentityNameFromContext(r), // Get from context, not header (secure)
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RequesterArn: s3_constants.GetPrincipalArnFromContext(r),
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RequesterIdentity: s3_constants.GetIdentityClaimFromContext(r),
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SignatureVersion: r.Header.Get(s3_constants.AmzAuthType),
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UserAgent: r.Header.Get("user-agent"),
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HostId: hostname,
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Bucket: bucket,
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HTTPStatus: HTTPStatusCode,
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Time: time.Now().Unix(),
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Key: key,
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Operation: getOperation(key, r),
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ErrorCode: errorCode,
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}
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}
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func PostLog(r *http.Request, HTTPStatusCode int, errorCode ErrorCode) {
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if r == nil {
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return
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}
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// Mark before the Logger nil-check so the middleware fallback in track()
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// still sees that audit was handled by the caller in deployments that
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// haven't configured fluent — keeps the flag behavior consistent and
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// makes wiring testable without standing up a fluent server.
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markAuditLogged(r)
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if Logger == nil {
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return
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}
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if err := Logger.Post(tag, *GetAccessLog(r, HTTPStatusCode, errorCode)); err != nil {
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glog.Warning("Error while posting log: ", err)
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}
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}
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func PostAccessLog(log AccessLog) {
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if Logger == nil || len(log.Key) == 0 {
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return
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}
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if err := Logger.Post(tag, log); err != nil {
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glog.Warning("Error while posting log: ", err)
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}
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}
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// auditLogCtxKey identifies the per-request flag used to detect whether an
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// audit entry has already been emitted, so middleware can supply a fallback
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// log for handlers that don't call PostLog themselves without double-logging
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// the ones that do.
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type auditLogCtxKey struct{}
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// EnsureAuditTracking attaches an audit-tracking flag to the request context
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// if one is not already present. Safe to call when no fluent logger is
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// configured; the flag is harmless in that case.
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func EnsureAuditTracking(r *http.Request) *http.Request {
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if r == nil {
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return nil
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}
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if v, ok := r.Context().Value(auditLogCtxKey{}).(*atomic.Bool); ok && v != nil {
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return r
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}
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flag := new(atomic.Bool)
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return r.WithContext(context.WithValue(r.Context(), auditLogCtxKey{}, flag))
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}
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// MarkAuditLogged signals that an audit entry has already been emitted for r.
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// Callers that emit logs via paths other than PostLog (e.g. PostAccessLog in
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// batch delete) should invoke this so the middleware fallback skips r.
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func MarkAuditLogged(r *http.Request) {
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markAuditLogged(r)
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}
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func markAuditLogged(r *http.Request) {
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if r == nil {
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return
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}
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if v, ok := r.Context().Value(auditLogCtxKey{}).(*atomic.Bool); ok && v != nil {
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v.Store(true)
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}
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}
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// AuditAlreadyLogged reports whether PostLog (or MarkAuditLogged) has run for r.
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func AuditAlreadyLogged(r *http.Request) bool {
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if r == nil {
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return false
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}
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if v, ok := r.Context().Value(auditLogCtxKey{}).(*atomic.Bool); ok && v != nil {
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return v.Load()
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}
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return false
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}
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