Files
Chris Lu a3638e479e fix(s3api/audit): surface OIDC identity claim in audit log for STS sessions (#11269)
* Add ResolveIdentityClaim helper for OIDC audit identity

ComputeParentUser derives a stable per-identity hash from (sub, iss) for
internal keying, but it is opaque and not human-readable. Audit logs for
STS-assumed OIDC sessions currently surface that opaque value (or the
random session id) as the requester, leaving no authoritative trace of the
federated user.

Add ResolveIdentityClaim next to ComputeParentUser to recover a
human-readable, server-asserted identity attribute from the STS request
context populated at federation time. It walks a priority list
(preferred_username, email, name, sub) so a federated session always
audits against a stable OIDC claim rather than a client-supplied role
session name.

For #11264

* Surface authoritative OIDC identity claim in S3 audit log

For STS-assumed sessions minted from an OIDC web identity, the audit log
requester field is the opaque session subject, which cannot be traced back
to the federated user who performed the operation. The OIDC identity claims
(preferred_username, email, sub) are already carried in the session request
context and reach the auth layer as identity.Claims, but they were never
surfaced to the audit log.

Add a requester_identity field to the S3 access audit log, populated from
the authoritative OIDC identity claim resolved via ResolveIdentityClaim.
The claim is propagated through the shared identity holder (the same
mechanism the requester name and principal ARN already use) so it survives
the request-context copy that hides auth-set values from the outer audit
middleware.

The existing requester field is left unchanged for backward compatibility;
requester_identity is empty for non-federated sessions, where requester
already carries the real username.

For #11264

* Gate OIDC audit identity on federation marker and harden resolver

Address review feedback (Devin Review, Greptile) on the initial
implementation:

- Non-federated STS sessions no longer gain a false requester_identity.
  ValidateJWTWithClaims merges the JWT registered sub claim (the opaque
  session id) into RequestContext for sessions without an explicit request
  context, so the previous ResolveIdentityClaim fallback to sub surfaced
  that session id as an authoritative identity. Resolution is now gated on
  SessionInfo.ParentUser, which is set only for OIDC-federated sessions in
  AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity. The claim is resolved from the original
  sessionInfo.RequestContext (not the local claims map, whose sub the bearer
  path overwrites with the session subject) so SigV4 and bearer sessions
  surface the same identity.

- ResolveIdentityClaim now trims whitespace and treats whitespace-only
  claims as absent, so a blank preferred_username no longer masks a usable
  email or sub.

The resolved claim is carried on Identity.IdentityClaim (and IAMIdentity for
the bearer path) rather than re-derived in recordIdentityInContext, making
the federation gate explicit at the auth boundary.

For #11264

* Resolve OIDC identity claim for external bearer tokens

The external OIDC bearer path (a raw OIDC JWT presented directly, not via
STS) populates Claims with preferred_username/email/name/sub from the
validated token but did not set IdentityClaim, so requester_identity stayed
blank for that authentication path. Resolve the claim there too — sub is the
real OIDC subject on this path (not an STS session id), so no federation
gate is needed.

Also drop an ineffectual ctx assignment flagged by ineffassign in the audit
test.

For #11264
2026-09-11 11:29:46 -07:00

261 lines
8.8 KiB
Go

package s3err
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"os"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/fluent/fluent-logger-golang/fluent"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3_constants"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/util/request_id"
)
type AccessLogExtend struct {
AccessLog
AccessLogHTTP
}
type AccessLog struct {
Bucket string `msg:"bucket" json:"bucket"` // awsexamplebucket1
Time int64 `msg:"time" json:"time"` // [06/Feb/2019:00:00:38 +0000]
RemoteIP string `msg:"remote_ip" json:"remote_ip,omitempty"` // 192.0.2.3
Requester string `msg:"requester" json:"requester,omitempty"` // IAM user id
RequesterArn string `msg:"requester_arn" json:"requester_arn,omitempty"` // arn:aws:sts::0:assumed-role/Role/session
RequesterIdentity string `msg:"requester_identity" json:"requester_identity,omitempty"` // authoritative OIDC identity claim (preferred_username/email/sub)
RequestID string `msg:"request_id" json:"request_id,omitempty"` // 3E57427F33A59F07
Operation string `msg:"operation" json:"operation,omitempty"` // REST.HTTP_method.resource_type REST.PUT.OBJECT
Key string `msg:"key" json:"key,omitempty"` // /photos/2019/08/puppy.jpg
ErrorCode string `msg:"error_code" json:"error_code,omitempty"`
HostId string `msg:"host_id" json:"host_id,omitempty"`
HostHeader string `msg:"host_header" json:"host_header,omitempty"` // s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com
UserAgent string `msg:"user_agent" json:"user_agent,omitempty"`
HTTPStatus int `msg:"status" json:"status,omitempty"`
SignatureVersion string `msg:"signature_version" json:"signature_version,omitempty"`
}
type AccessLogHTTP struct {
RequestURI string `json:"request_uri,omitempty"` // "GET /awsexamplebucket1/photos/2019/08/puppy.jpg?x-foo=bar HTTP/1.1"
BytesSent string `json:"bytes_sent,omitempty"`
ObjectSize string `json:"object_size,omitempty"`
TotalTime int `json:"total_time,omitempty"`
TurnAroundTime int `json:"turn_around_time,omitempty"`
Referer string `json:"Referer,omitempty"`
VersionId string `json:"version_id,omitempty"`
CipherSuite string `json:"cipher_suite,omitempty"`
AuthenticationType string `json:"auth_type,omitempty"`
TLSVersion string `json:"TLS_version,omitempty"`
}
const tag = "s3.access"
var (
Logger *fluent.Fluent
hostname = os.Getenv("HOSTNAME")
environment = os.Getenv("ENVIRONMENT")
)
func InitAuditLog(config string) {
configContent, readErr := os.ReadFile(config)
if readErr != nil {
glog.Errorf("fail to read fluent config %s : %v", config, readErr)
return
}
fluentConfig := &fluent.Config{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(configContent, fluentConfig); err != nil {
glog.Errorf("fail to parse fluent config %s : %v", string(configContent), err)
return
}
if len(fluentConfig.TagPrefix) == 0 && len(environment) > 0 {
fluentConfig.TagPrefix = environment
}
fluentConfig.Async = true
fluentConfig.AsyncResultCallback = func(data []byte, err error) {
if err != nil {
glog.Warning("Error while posting log: ", err)
}
}
var err error
Logger, err = fluent.New(*fluentConfig)
if err != nil {
glog.Errorf("fail to load fluent config: %v", err)
}
}
// getRemoteIP returns the client IP for the audit log, honoring forwarding
// headers set by reverse proxies. Preference order: X-Forwarded-For (first
// non-empty entry), X-Real-IP, then r.RemoteAddr. Headers are trusted as-is;
// operators who expose the S3 endpoint directly to untrusted networks should
// strip these headers at the proxy boundary so clients cannot spoof them.
func getRemoteIP(r *http.Request) string {
if forwardedFor := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); forwardedFor != "" {
for _, entry := range strings.Split(forwardedFor, ",") {
if ip := strings.TrimSpace(entry); ip != "" {
return ip
}
}
}
if realIP := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP")); realIP != "" {
return realIP
}
if host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr); err == nil {
return host
}
return r.RemoteAddr
}
func getREST(httpMetod string, resourceType string) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("REST.%s.%s", httpMetod, resourceType)
}
func getResourceType(object string, query_key string, method string) (string, bool) {
if object == "/" {
switch query_key {
case "delete":
return "BATCH.DELETE.OBJECT", true
case "tagging":
return getREST(method, "OBJECTTAGGING"), true
case "lifecycle":
return getREST(method, "LIFECYCLECONFIGURATION"), true
case "acl":
return getREST(method, "ACCESSCONTROLPOLICY"), true
case "policy":
return getREST(method, "BUCKETPOLICY"), true
default:
return getREST(method, "BUCKET"), false
}
} else {
switch query_key {
case "tagging":
return getREST(method, "OBJECTTAGGING"), true
default:
return getREST(method, "OBJECT"), false
}
}
}
func getOperation(object string, r *http.Request) string {
queries := r.URL.Query()
var operation string
var queryFound bool
for key, _ := range queries {
operation, queryFound = getResourceType(object, key, r.Method)
if queryFound {
return operation
}
}
if len(queries) == 0 {
operation, _ = getResourceType(object, "", r.Method)
}
return operation
}
func GetAccessLog(r *http.Request, HTTPStatusCode int, s3errCode ErrorCode) *AccessLog {
bucket, key := s3_constants.GetBucketAndObject(r)
var errorCode string
if s3errCode != ErrNone {
errorCode = GetAPIError(s3errCode).Code
}
remoteIP := getRemoteIP(r)
hostHeader := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Host")
if len(hostHeader) == 0 {
hostHeader = r.Host
}
return &AccessLog{
HostHeader: hostHeader,
RequestID: request_id.GetFromRequest(r),
RemoteIP: remoteIP,
Requester: s3_constants.GetIdentityNameFromContext(r), // Get from context, not header (secure)
RequesterArn: s3_constants.GetPrincipalArnFromContext(r),
RequesterIdentity: s3_constants.GetIdentityClaimFromContext(r),
SignatureVersion: r.Header.Get(s3_constants.AmzAuthType),
UserAgent: r.Header.Get("user-agent"),
HostId: hostname,
Bucket: bucket,
HTTPStatus: HTTPStatusCode,
Time: time.Now().Unix(),
Key: key,
Operation: getOperation(key, r),
ErrorCode: errorCode,
}
}
func PostLog(r *http.Request, HTTPStatusCode int, errorCode ErrorCode) {
if r == nil {
return
}
// Mark before the Logger nil-check so the middleware fallback in track()
// still sees that audit was handled by the caller in deployments that
// haven't configured fluent — keeps the flag behavior consistent and
// makes wiring testable without standing up a fluent server.
markAuditLogged(r)
if Logger == nil {
return
}
if err := Logger.Post(tag, *GetAccessLog(r, HTTPStatusCode, errorCode)); err != nil {
glog.Warning("Error while posting log: ", err)
}
}
func PostAccessLog(log AccessLog) {
if Logger == nil || len(log.Key) == 0 {
return
}
if err := Logger.Post(tag, log); err != nil {
glog.Warning("Error while posting log: ", err)
}
}
// auditLogCtxKey identifies the per-request flag used to detect whether an
// audit entry has already been emitted, so middleware can supply a fallback
// log for handlers that don't call PostLog themselves without double-logging
// the ones that do.
type auditLogCtxKey struct{}
// EnsureAuditTracking attaches an audit-tracking flag to the request context
// if one is not already present. Safe to call when no fluent logger is
// configured; the flag is harmless in that case.
func EnsureAuditTracking(r *http.Request) *http.Request {
if r == nil {
return nil
}
if v, ok := r.Context().Value(auditLogCtxKey{}).(*atomic.Bool); ok && v != nil {
return r
}
flag := new(atomic.Bool)
return r.WithContext(context.WithValue(r.Context(), auditLogCtxKey{}, flag))
}
// MarkAuditLogged signals that an audit entry has already been emitted for r.
// Callers that emit logs via paths other than PostLog (e.g. PostAccessLog in
// batch delete) should invoke this so the middleware fallback skips r.
func MarkAuditLogged(r *http.Request) {
markAuditLogged(r)
}
func markAuditLogged(r *http.Request) {
if r == nil {
return
}
if v, ok := r.Context().Value(auditLogCtxKey{}).(*atomic.Bool); ok && v != nil {
v.Store(true)
}
}
// AuditAlreadyLogged reports whether PostLog (or MarkAuditLogged) has run for r.
func AuditAlreadyLogged(r *http.Request) bool {
if r == nil {
return false
}
if v, ok := r.Context().Value(auditLogCtxKey{}).(*atomic.Bool); ok && v != nil {
return v.Load()
}
return false
}