Files
seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3api_iceberg_credentials.go
T
74da88fc29 s3, iceberg: record the access key a request was signed with (#11901)
* s3, iceberg: record the access key a request was signed with

Several access keys can belong to one identity, but nothing downstream of
authentication says which one signed a request: the audit log carries the
identity name only, and every table credential the Iceberg catalog vends for
that identity gets the same session name. When an identity is shared (one key
per person or per service), the log cannot tell the holders apart.

The verifier that matched a credential now records that credential's access
key id in the request's identity holder (verifyV4Signature for header,
presigned, streaming and STS requests; both SigV2 verifiers). Nothing re-reads
the request for a key, so a second, unverified key elsewhere in the request
(a junk X-Amz-Credential on a SigV2 request, a junk SigV4 header on a SigV2
presigned URL) is never recorded.

- s3err.AccessLog gains access_key_id (omitempty): a static key's id, or an
  STS session's temporary key id. Every other field is unchanged.
- The Iceberg and Lance catalogs install the holder before authenticating a
  SigV4 request; a Bearer token records the key it was minted from (the token
  is verified with a key derived from it); a Lance x-api-key records its key.
- VendTableCredentials ends the session name with "-k" and the first 12 hex
  digits of SHA-256 of the key id (the table part gives way within the
  64-character limit; the tag is never cut), and carries the key id in the
  session token (src_ak, SessionInfo.SourceAccessKeyId).

Tests: auth_access_key_attribution_test.go and auth_access_key_shapes_test.go
(two keys on one identity, the deny path, SigV2 and presigned SigV2 with a
junk key elsewhere, streaming seed, STS session, failed signatures record
nothing), s3api_iceberg_session_name_test.go, iceberg and lance Auth tests,
sts source_access_key_test.go.

* s3: record the access key of a verified POST-policy form and of a retargeted signature

Two verified signatures left access_key_id empty in the audit log:

- A browser POST upload is verified in PostPolicyBucketHandler from its form
  fields by doesPolicySignatureV2Match / doesPolicySignatureV4Match, which did
  not record the key. Both now take the request context and record the
  credential's key once its signature verifies; a form that fails
  verification records nothing.
- verifyV4Signature refuses a signature that verified for one virtual-hosted
  bucket but was routed to another. The key was recorded only after that
  check, so the refusal carried none. It is now recorded as soon as a host
  candidate verifies.

Test: TestPostPolicyUploadRecordsTheSigningKey (SigV4 and SigV2 forms, and a
form with a wrong signature) and TestSignedVirtualHostRetargetRecordsTheSigningKey;
both fail before this change.

* s3: test VendTableCredentials end to end for the caller's access key

TestVendTableCredentialsRecordsTheCallersKey mints sessions through
VendTableCredentials with a configured STS service, the key recorded the way
the catalog's authentication records it, then validates each session token:
SourceAccessKeyId and the session name's key tag match the key, and a caller
without a key gets an untagged session. It fails if the vendor stops passing
either field.

---------

Co-authored-by: Javier de la Torre <jatorre@lakehousebox.com>
Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-21 20:33:08 -07:00

212 lines
7.3 KiB
Go

package s3api
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/iam/sts"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3_constants"
)
// icebergVendedCredentialsProvider names the origin recorded on sessions the
// catalog mints, so audit trails can tell them apart from ordinary logins.
const icebergVendedCredentialsProvider = "iceberg-catalog"
// SetIcebergCredentialRole configures the role the Iceberg catalog assumes when
// a client asks for vended credentials. Vending stays off until it is set.
func (s3a *S3ApiServer) SetIcebergCredentialRole(roleArn string, durationSeconds int64) {
s3a.icebergCredentialRole = strings.TrimSpace(roleArn)
s3a.icebergCredentialDuration = durationSeconds
}
// VendedCredentials are short-lived S3 credentials scoped to one table.
type VendedCredentials struct {
AccessKeyID string
SecretAccessKey string
SessionToken string
Expiration time.Time
}
// VendTableCredentials mints credentials that can read exactly one table's
// prefix, and write it too unless readOnly, for a caller the Iceberg catalog
// has already authenticated and authorized. Returns nil when no role is
// configured, which leaves the catalog telling the client to keep using its
// own credentials.
//
// The access key the caller authenticated with (from ctx) is recorded in the
// session: a short hash of it ends the session name, so the audit log's
// requester_arn tells apart the holders of several keys on one identity, and
// the key id itself is carried in the session token.
func (s3a *S3ApiServer) VendTableCredentials(ctx context.Context, principal, bucket, prefix string, readOnly bool) (*VendedCredentials, error) {
if s3a.icebergCredentialRole == "" {
return nil, nil
}
if principal == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no principal to vend credentials for")
}
if bucket == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no bucket to scope credentials to")
}
stsService := s3a.stsService()
if stsService == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("STS is not configured")
}
policy, err := tablePrefixSessionPolicy(bucket, prefix, readOnly)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
accessKey := s3_constants.AccessKeyIdFromContext(ctx)
request := &sts.AssumeRoleForPrincipalRequest{
RoleArn: s3a.icebergCredentialRole,
Principal: principal,
RoleSessionName: icebergSessionName(principal, bucket, prefix, accessKey),
ProviderName: icebergVendedCredentialsProvider,
Policy: &policy,
SourceAccessKeyId: accessKey,
}
if s3a.icebergCredentialDuration > 0 {
duration := s3a.icebergCredentialDuration
request.DurationSeconds = &duration
}
resp, err := stsService.AssumeRoleForPrincipal(ctx, request)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if resp == nil || resp.Credentials == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("STS returned no credentials")
}
return &VendedCredentials{
AccessKeyID: resp.Credentials.AccessKeyId,
SecretAccessKey: resp.Credentials.SecretAccessKey,
SessionToken: resp.Credentials.SessionToken,
Expiration: resp.Credentials.Expiration,
}, nil
}
func (s3a *S3ApiServer) stsService() *sts.STSService {
if s3a.iam == nil || s3a.iam.iamIntegration == nil {
return nil
}
provider, ok := s3a.iam.iamIntegration.(IAMManagerProvider)
if !ok {
return nil
}
manager := provider.GetIAMManager()
if manager == nil {
return nil
}
return manager.GetSTSService()
}
// tablePrefixSessionPolicy narrows a session to one table's files plus the
// bucket listing that clients need to resolve them. A read-only session drops
// the write verbs: the catalog vends no more authority than the caller holds.
func tablePrefixSessionPolicy(bucket, prefix string, readOnly bool) (string, error) {
prefix = strings.Trim(prefix, "/")
// A resource pattern is matched with wildcards, so a location carrying one
// would widen the session to sibling tables. Refuse rather than escape it:
// nothing SeaweedFS generates contains these.
if strings.ContainsAny(bucket, "*?") || strings.ContainsAny(prefix, "*?") {
return "", fmt.Errorf("refusing to scope credentials to a location with wildcards: s3://%s/%s", bucket, prefix)
}
// Without a prefix there is nothing to scope to, and the session would carry
// read and write over every table in the bucket. A table registered at the
// bucket root is the only way to get here.
if prefix == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("refusing to scope credentials to a whole bucket: s3://%s", bucket)
}
objectActions := []string{"s3:GetObject", "s3:PutObject", "s3:DeleteObject", "s3:AbortMultipartUpload", "s3:ListMultipartUploadParts"}
if readOnly {
objectActions = []string{"s3:GetObject"}
}
policy := map[string]interface{}{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": []map[string]interface{}{
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": objectActions,
"Resource": []string{fmt.Sprintf("arn:aws:s3:::%s/%s/*", bucket, prefix)},
},
{
// Listing is granted on the bucket, so without the condition the
// session could enumerate every other table's object names.
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": []string{"s3:ListBucket"},
"Resource": []string{fmt.Sprintf("arn:aws:s3:::%s", bucket)},
"Condition": map[string]interface{}{
"StringLike": map[string]interface{}{
"s3:prefix": []string{prefix, prefix + "/*"},
},
},
},
{
// GetBucketLocation carries no prefix to condition on, so it sits
// in its own statement rather than being denied by one.
// ListBucketMultipartUploads is deliberately absent: Iceberg
// writers complete and abort by upload id, and granting it either
// leaks in-flight keys bucket-wide or breaks on the same missing
// prefix.
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": []string{"s3:GetBucketLocation"},
"Resource": []string{fmt.Sprintf("arn:aws:s3:::%s", bucket)},
},
},
}
encoded, err := json.Marshal(policy)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("build session policy: %w", err)
}
return string(encoded), nil
}
// icebergSessionKeyTagLength is the hex length of the access key hash that ends
// a vended session's name: 48 bits, so two keys of one identity collide with
// odds of about 2^-48.
const icebergSessionKeyTagLength = 12
// icebergSessionKeyTag is "-k" and the first icebergSessionKeyTagLength hex
// digits of the SHA-256 of the access key id, or "" without a key.
func icebergSessionKeyTag(accessKey string) string {
if accessKey == "" {
return ""
}
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(accessKey))
return "-k" + hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])[:icebergSessionKeyTagLength]
}
// icebergSessionName builds a session name that identifies the caller, the
// table and the caller's access key in audit logs, within the 64-character AWS
// limit. The key tag is never cut: the table part gives way to it.
func icebergSessionName(principal, bucket, prefix, accessKey string) string {
name := fmt.Sprintf("iceberg-%s-%s", principal, strings.ReplaceAll(strings.Trim(prefix, "/"), "/", "-"))
if strings.Trim(prefix, "/") == "" {
name = fmt.Sprintf("iceberg-%s-%s", principal, bucket)
}
name = strings.Map(func(r rune) rune {
switch {
case r >= 'a' && r <= 'z', r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z', r >= '0' && r <= '9', r == '-', r == '_':
return r
default:
return '-'
}
}, name)
tag := icebergSessionKeyTag(accessKey)
if limit := 64 - len(tag); len(name) > limit {
name = name[:limit]
}
return name + tag
}