Files
seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3api_object_handlers_postpolicy.go
T
Javier de la TorreandJavier de la Torre f40267db44 s3: answer InvalidBucketName to a denied request on a malformed bucket name (#11893)
* s3: answer InvalidBucketName to a denied request on a malformed bucket name

The store authorizes a request before it looks at the bucket, so a caller
denied on a bucket whose name breaks the S3 naming rules (upper case, an
underscore, too short, two adjacent periods, a non-ASCII letter) gets 403
AccessDenied, where AWS S3 answers 400 InvalidBucketName. Clients and
compatibility suites that check the error code read the 403 as a permission
problem.

Auth and AuthPostPolicy now turn an AccessDenied for a resolved identity into
InvalidBucketName when the bucket name fails VerifyS3BucketName or uses a
character outside a-z, 0-9, '.' and '-' (VerifyS3BucketName checks with
unicode.IsLower/IsNumber, which accept letters such as 'ü'). The answer depends
on the name alone, so it reveals nothing about which buckets exist. An
authentication failure, an allowed request and a denial on a well-formed name
answer as before.

Test: TestAuthDeniedInvalidBucketName drives iam.Auth with signed and anonymous
requests; on master every malformed name answers 403, with the change 400,
while the identity's own bucket stays allowed and a well-formed foreign name
stays 403. TestRefineDenialForBucketName covers the rule table.

* s3: refine POST-policy and deferred anonymous-read denials on a malformed bucket name

Two denial paths bypass the refinement in Auth and AuthPostPolicy:

- A browser POST upload carries its credentials in the form, so
  AuthPostPolicy delegates it to PostPolicyBucketHandler, which verifies the
  form and writes AccessDenied itself when the signer may not write the bucket
  or the per-key authorization denies the object. Both denials now go through
  refineDenialForBucketName with the verified identity.

  The coarse Write check used to run inside doesPolicySignatureV2Match and
  doesPolicySignatureV4Match before the signature was compared, so a form with
  a wrong signature was told whether the key may write the bucket. It now runs
  in doesPolicySignatureMatch after the signature verifies, as on the
  header-signed path; a form that fails verification answers
  SignatureDoesNotMatch (or MissingFields) and is never refined.

- Unsigned GET/HEAD object reads are deferred by AuthWithPublicRead to the
  object handlers, where writeAnonymousAwareNotFound masks a miss as
  AccessDenied. That denial is refined with the anonymous identity, so a
  missing malformed bucket answers InvalidBucketName when an anonymous
  identity is configured, as Auth does. A denial on an entry that was found
  is left alone: the bucket exists.

Test: TestPostPolicyDeniedInvalidBucketName drives AuthPostPolicy with signed
forms (Write denied, per-key policy deny, bad signature, well-formed name);
TestAnonymousReadDeniedInvalidBucketName drives AuthWithPublicRead with GET and
HEAD, with and without an anonymous identity. Both fail before this change.

* s3: refine a denied anonymous read of an existing key on a malformed bucket name

A deferred anonymous GET/HEAD refined only its masked miss to
InvalidBucketName, so in a bucket whose name breaks the S3 rules (one
VerifyS3BucketName still accepts, such as a non-ASCII name) a missing key
answered 400 and an existing private key 403, telling the caller which
keys exist. The entry check now refines its denial the same way, so both
answer alike. Without an anonymous identity no identity resolves and both
stay 403, as in Auth.

The deny-precedence case in TestAnonymousObjectACLConfiguredIdentity runs
on the fixture bucket "b", shorter than S3's three-character minimum, so
its denial now answers InvalidBucketName.

---------

Co-authored-by: Javier de la Torre <jatorre@lakehousebox.com>
2026-10-21 14:08:33 -07:00

386 lines
12 KiB
Go

package s3api
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/base64"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"mime/multipart"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"github.com/dustin/go-humanize"
"github.com/gorilla/mux"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/pb/filer_pb"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/policy"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3_constants"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3err"
)
func (s3a *S3ApiServer) PostPolicyBucketHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/sigv4-HTTPPOSTConstructPolicy.html
// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/sigv4-post-example.html
bucket := mux.Vars(r)["bucket"]
glog.V(3).Infof("PostPolicyBucketHandler %s", bucket)
reader, err := r.MultipartReader()
if err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)
return
}
form, err := reader.ReadForm(int64(5 * humanize.MiByte))
if err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)
return
}
defer form.RemoveAll()
fileBody, fileName, fileContentType, fileSize, formValues, err := extractPostPolicyFormValues(form)
if err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)
return
}
if fileBody == nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrPOSTFileRequired)
return
}
defer fileBody.Close()
formValues.Set("Bucket", bucket)
if fileName != "" && strings.Contains(formValues.Get("Key"), "${filename}") {
formValues.Set("Key", strings.Replace(formValues.Get("Key"), "${filename}", fileName, -1))
}
rawObject := formValues.Get("Key")
if rawObject == "" || !s3_constants.IsValidObjectKey(rawObject) {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInvalidRequest)
return
}
object := s3_constants.NormalizeObjectKey(rawObject)
if err := s3a.validateTableBucketObjectPath(bucket, object); err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrAccessDenied)
return
}
successRedirect := formValues.Get("success_action_redirect")
successStatus := formValues.Get("success_action_status")
var redirectURL *url.URL
if successRedirect != "" {
redirectURL, err = url.Parse(successRedirect)
if err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)
return
}
}
// Verify policy signature.
identity, errCode := s3a.iam.doesPolicySignatureMatch(formValues)
if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, refineDenialForBucketName(r, identity, errCode))
return
}
if identity != nil {
r = r.WithContext(recordIdentityInContext(r, identity))
}
policyBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(formValues.Get("Policy"))
if err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)
return
}
// Handle policy if it is set.
if len(policyBytes) > 0 {
postPolicyForm, err := policy.ParsePostPolicyForm(string(policyBytes))
if err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrPostPolicyConditionInvalidFormat)
return
}
// Make sure formValues adhere to policy restrictions.
if err = policy.CheckPostPolicy(formValues, postPolicyForm); err != nil {
glog.V(3).Infof("PostPolicy check failed for bucket %s: %v", bucket, err)
s3err.WriteErrorResponseWithMessage(w, r, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, err.Error())
return
}
// Ensure that the object size is within expected range, also the file size
// should not exceed the maximum single Put size (5 GiB)
lengthRange := postPolicyForm.Conditions.ContentLengthRange
if lengthRange.Valid {
if fileSize < lengthRange.Min {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrEntityTooSmall)
return
}
if fileSize > lengthRange.Max {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrEntityTooLarge)
return
}
}
}
// Get ContentType from post formData
// Otherwise from formFile ContentType
contentType := formValues.Get("Content-Type")
if contentType == "" {
contentType = fileContentType
}
r.Header.Set("Content-Type", contentType)
// Forward validated POST form fields to the underlying PUT as headers.
applyPostPolicyFormHeaders(r, formValues)
// Authorize the object like the PUT path; the coarse Write check above does not consult the bucket policy.
if errCode := s3a.iam.AuthorizeObjectWrite(r, identity, bucket, object); errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, refineDenialForBucketName(r, identity, errCode))
return
}
versioningState, err := s3a.getVersioningState(bucket)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, filer_pb.ErrNotFound) {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrNoSuchBucket)
return
}
glog.Errorf("PostPolicyBucketHandler: versioning state for bucket %s: %v", bucket, err)
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInternalError)
return
}
objectLockEnabled, err := s3a.isObjectLockEnabled(bucket)
if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, filer_pb.ErrNotFound) {
glog.Errorf("PostPolicyBucketHandler: object lock state for bucket %s: %v", bucket, err)
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInternalError)
return
}
if err := s3a.validateObjectLockHeaders(r, bucket, object, objectLockEnabled); err != nil {
glog.V(2).Infof("PostPolicyBucketHandler: object lock header validation failed for %s/%s: %v", bucket, object, err)
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, mapValidationErrorToS3Error(err))
return
}
var etag string
var versionId string
var sseMetadata SSEResponseMetadata
switch versioningState {
case s3_constants.VersioningEnabled:
versionId, etag, errCode, sseMetadata = s3a.putVersionedObject(r, bucket, object, fileBody, contentType)
case s3_constants.VersioningSuspended:
etag, errCode, sseMetadata = s3a.putSuspendedVersioningObject(r, bucket, object, fileBody, contentType)
default:
filePath := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s", s3a.bucketDir(bucket), object)
// Use fileSize, not r.ContentLength: the multipart body inflates ContentLength.
ttlSec := s3a.lifecycleTTLForObjectWrite(bucket, object, fileSize)
etag, errCode, sseMetadata = s3a.putToFiler(r, filePath, fileBody, bucket, object, 1, ttlSec, nil, false, "")
}
if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, errCode)
return
}
if versionId != "" {
w.Header().Set("x-amz-version-id", versionId)
}
if successRedirect != "" {
// Replace raw query params..
redirectURL.RawQuery = getRedirectPostRawQuery(bucket, object, etag)
w.Header().Set("Location", redirectURL.String())
s3err.WriteEmptyResponse(w, r, http.StatusSeeOther)
return
}
setEtag(w, etag)
// Include SSE response headers (important for bucket-default encryption)
s3a.setSSEResponseHeaders(w, r, sseMetadata)
// Decide what http response to send depending on success_action_status parameter
switch successStatus {
case "201":
resp := PostResponse{
Bucket: bucket,
Key: object,
ETag: `"` + etag + `"`,
Location: w.Header().Get("Location"),
}
s3err.WriteXMLResponse(w, r, http.StatusCreated, resp)
s3err.PostLog(r, http.StatusCreated, s3err.ErrNone)
case "200":
s3err.WriteEmptyResponse(w, r, http.StatusOK)
case "204":
s3err.WriteEmptyResponse(w, r, http.StatusNoContent)
default:
s3err.WriteEmptyResponse(w, r, http.StatusNoContent)
}
}
// postPolicyReservedFormFields are multipart form fields that are part of the
// POST Object auth/policy mechanism (or handled explicitly elsewhere in the
// handler) and must not be forwarded to the upload as HTTP headers. Keys are
// already run through http.CanonicalHeaderKey before lookup.
var postPolicyReservedFormFields = map[string]struct{}{
// POST policy signature (V2)
"Policy": {},
"Signature": {},
"Awsaccesskeyid": {},
// POST policy signature (V4)
"X-Amz-Signature": {},
"X-Amz-Credential": {},
"X-Amz-Algorithm": {},
"X-Amz-Date": {},
"X-Amz-Security-Token": {},
// Target descriptors
"Key": {},
"File": {},
"Bucket": {},
// Success actions (handled elsewhere in the handler)
"Success_action_redirect": {},
"Success_action_status": {},
"Redirect": {},
// Content-Type is resolved separately above (from form or file part)
"Content-Type": {},
}
// applyPostPolicyFormHeaders forwards validated POST Object form fields to the
// request headers so they are applied to the resulting PUT. Reserved fields
// that are part of the POST policy mechanism itself (signature, key, etc.) are
// skipped. The acl form field is translated to the X-Amz-Acl header to match
// how AWS promotes the form value to the underlying PUT.
func applyPostPolicyFormHeaders(r *http.Request, formValues http.Header) {
for k := range formValues {
if _, reserved := postPolicyReservedFormFields[k]; reserved {
continue
}
switch {
case k == "Acl":
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzCannedAcl, formValues.Get(k))
case k == "Cache-Control",
k == "Expires",
k == "Content-Disposition",
k == "Content-Encoding",
k == "Content-Language":
r.Header.Set(k, formValues.Get(k))
case strings.HasPrefix(k, "X-Amz-"):
r.Header.Set(k, formValues.Get(k))
}
}
}
// Extract form fields and file data from a HTTP POST Policy
func extractPostPolicyFormValues(form *multipart.Form) (filePart io.ReadCloser, fileName, fileContentType string, fileSize int64, formValues http.Header, err error) {
// / HTML Form values
fileName = ""
fileContentType = ""
// Canonicalize the form values into http.Header.
formValues = make(http.Header)
for k, v := range form.Value {
formValues[http.CanonicalHeaderKey(k)] = v
}
// Validate form values.
if err = validateFormFieldSize(formValues); err != nil {
return nil, "", "", 0, nil, err
}
// this means that filename="" was not specified for file key and Go has
// an ugly way of handling this situation. Refer here
// https://golang.org/src/mime/multipart/formdata.go#L61
if len(form.File) == 0 {
var b = &bytes.Buffer{}
for _, v := range formValues["File"] {
b.WriteString(v)
}
fileSize = int64(b.Len())
filePart = io.NopCloser(b)
return filePart, fileName, fileContentType, fileSize, formValues, nil
}
// Iterator until we find a valid File field and break
for k, v := range form.File {
canonicalFormName := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(k)
if canonicalFormName == "File" {
if len(v) == 0 {
return nil, "", "", 0, nil, errors.New("Invalid arguments specified")
}
// Fetch fileHeader which has the uploaded file information
fileHeader := v[0]
// Set filename
fileName = fileHeader.Filename
// Set contentType
fileContentType = fileHeader.Header.Get("Content-Type")
// Open the uploaded part
filePart, err = fileHeader.Open()
if err != nil {
return nil, "", "", 0, nil, err
}
// Compute file size
fileSize, err = filePart.(io.Seeker).Seek(0, 2)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", "", 0, nil, err
}
// Reset Seek to the beginning
_, err = filePart.(io.Seeker).Seek(0, 0)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", "", 0, nil, err
}
// File found and ready for reading
break
}
}
return filePart, fileName, fileContentType, fileSize, formValues, nil
}
// Validate form field size for s3 specification requirement.
func validateFormFieldSize(formValues http.Header) error {
// Iterate over form values
for k := range formValues {
// Check if value's field exceeds S3 limit
if int64(len(formValues.Get(k))) > int64(1*humanize.MiByte) {
return errors.New("Data size larger than expected")
}
}
// Success.
return nil
}
func getRedirectPostRawQuery(bucket, key, etag string) string {
redirectValues := make(url.Values)
redirectValues.Set("bucket", bucket)
redirectValues.Set("key", key)
redirectValues.Set("etag", "\""+etag+"\"")
return redirectValues.Encode()
}
// Check to see if Policy is signed correctly, returning the signing identity.
// The identity's Write permission on the bucket is checked only once the
// signature verifies, as on the header-signed path, so a form that fails
// verification learns nothing about the key's permissions. A verified identity
// that may not write is returned with ErrAccessDenied.
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) doesPolicySignatureMatch(formValues http.Header) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode) {
var identity *Identity
var errCode s3err.ErrorCode
// For SignV2 - Signature field will be valid
if _, ok := formValues["Signature"]; ok {
identity, errCode = iam.doesPolicySignatureV2Match(formValues)
} else {
identity, errCode = iam.doesPolicySignatureV4Match(formValues)
}
if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
return nil, errCode
}
if !identity.CanDo(s3_constants.ACTION_WRITE, formValues.Get("bucket"), "") {
return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
return identity, s3err.ErrNone
}