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* fix(s3api): re-encrypt UploadPartCopy bytes for the destination's SSE config (#8908) The remaining failure mode in #8908 was that Docker Registry's blob finalization (server-side Move via UploadPartCopy) silently corrupts SSE-S3 multipart objects. Reproduces with `aws s3api upload-part-copy` under bucket-default SSE-S3: the GET on the completed object returns deterministic wrong bytes (correct length, same wrong SHA-256 across runs). The metadata is mathematically self-consistent — every chunk's stored IV equals `calculateIVWithOffset(baseIV_dst, partLocalOffset)` — but the bytes on disk were encrypted with the SOURCE upload's key+baseIV. Root cause: - `copyChunksForRange` (and `createDestinationChunk`) constructs new chunks for UploadPartCopy without copying `SseType` / `SseMetadata`, so destination chunks are written with `SseType=NONE`. - At completion, `completedMultipartChunk` (PR #9224's NONE→SSE_S3 backfill, intended to recover from a different missing-metadata bug) sees those NONE chunks under an SSE-S3 multipart upload and backfills SSE-S3 metadata derived from the destination upload's baseIV. The chunk metadata is now internally consistent and the GET path applies decryption — but the bytes on disk are encrypted with the source upload's key, not the destination's. Decryption produces deterministic garbage. Docker Registry pulls then fail with "Digest did not match". Fix: when either the source object or the destination multipart upload has any SSE configured, take a slow-path UploadPartCopy that (1) opens a plaintext reader of the source range — decrypting the source's per-chunk SSE-S3 metadata if needed via a reused `buildMultipartSSES3Reader`, and (2) feeds that plaintext through `putToFiler`'s existing encryption pipeline by staging the destination upload entry's SSE-S3/SSE-KMS headers on a cloned request. Encryption then matches PutObjectPart's contract: every part starts a fresh CTR stream from counter 0 with `baseIV_dst`, and each internal chunk's metadata records `calculateIVWithOffset(baseIV_dst, chunk.partLocalOffset)`. The `non-SSE → non-SSE` case still takes the existing fast raw-byte copy path — bytes on disk are plaintext on both sides, so chunk-level metadata is irrelevant. Cross-encryption from SSE-KMS / SSE-C sources is left as TODO — the new path returns an explicit error rather than the previous silent corruption. SSE-S3 (the user-reported case) round-trips correctly. Tests: - test/s3/sse/s3_sse_uploadpartcopy_integration_test.go pins three UploadPartCopy shapes against bucket-default SSE-S3: * Docker-Registry-shape 32MB+tail (the user's exact 5-chunk / 2-part metadata layout) * single full-object UploadPartCopy * many small range copies Each round-trips SHA-256. - test/s3/sse/s3_sse_concurrent_repro_test.go covers the parallel multipart-upload shape from the user report (5 blobs in parallel, full GET and chunked range GET both hash-checked) — pre-existing coverage; added here as a regression sentinel. * test(s3-sse): rename UploadPartCopy regression test so CI matches it The CI workflow .github/workflows/s3-sse-tests.yml dispatches on the TEST_PATTERN ".*Multipart.*Integration" — i.e. the test name must contain both "Multipart" and "Integration" for CI to run it. The previous name TestSSES3UploadPartCopyIntegration had only "Integration"; "UploadPart" isn't "Multipart". Rename to TestSSES3MultipartUploadPartCopyIntegration so the regression test actually runs in CI rather than only locally. * fix(s3api): map unsupported UploadPartCopy SSE source to 501, not 500 (review feedback on #9280) openSourcePlaintextReader explicitly rejects SSE-KMS and SSE-C sources (SSE-S3 is the only one wired up in this slow path so far). Earlier the caller blanket-mapped that to ErrInternalError, which collapses "this shape isn't implemented yet" into the same 500 response a real server failure would produce. Clients can no longer tell whether they hit a feature gap or a bug. Introduce a sentinel errCopySourceSSEUnsupported and have copyObjectPartViaReencryption errors.Is-check it; on match, return ErrNotImplemented (501) instead of ErrInternalError (500). Other failures still map to 500. Found by coderabbitai review on PR #9280. * fix(s3api): UploadPartCopy must fail with NoSuchUpload when upload entry is missing (review feedback on #9280) CopyObjectPartHandler's earlier checkUploadId call only verifies that the uploadID's hash prefix matches dstObject; it does not prove the upload directory exists in the filer. The previous logic silently swallowed filer_pb.ErrNotFound from getEntry(uploadDir) and fell through with uploadEntry=nil, which then skipped the destination SSE check and could route a plain-source copy through the raw-byte fast path even though the destination's encryption state is unknown. Treat ErrNotFound as ErrNoSuchUpload so the client sees the right status, matching the AWS S3 contract for UploadPartCopy on a non-existent upload. Found by coderabbitai review on PR #9280. * feat(s3api): set SSE response headers on UploadPartCopy slow path (review feedback on #9280) PutObjectPartHandler writes x-amz-server-side-encryption (and the KMS key-id header for SSE-KMS) on every successful part response so clients can confirm the destination's encryption state. The new UploadPartCopy slow path was missing this — it returned only the ETag in the response body and no SSE response headers. Plumb putToFiler's SSEResponseMetadata back through copyObjectPartViaReencryption to the handler, then call setSSEResponseHeaders before writing the XML response, matching the PutObjectPart contract. Found by gemini-code-assist review on PR #9280. * fix(s3api): map transient filer errors on UploadPartCopy upload-entry fetch to 503 (review feedback on #9280) Earlier non-ErrNotFound errors from getEntry(uploadDir, uploadID) all returned 500 InternalError, which most SDKs treat as fatal — even though a transient filer outage (gRPC Unavailable, leader election in flight, deadline exceeded) is exactly the kind of failure SDK retry logic is supposed to recover from. Add an isTransientFilerError helper that recognises: - context.DeadlineExceeded / context.Canceled - gRPC codes.Unavailable, DeadlineExceeded, ResourceExhausted, Aborted When the upload-entry fetch fails for one of those reasons, return 503 ServiceUnavailable so the client retries; everything else still maps to 500. Log line now also carries dstObject (in addition to dstBucket and uploadID) to make incident triage easier. Found by gemini-code-assist review on PR #9280.
426 lines
16 KiB
Go
426 lines
16 KiB
Go
package s3api
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net/http"
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"sort"
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"strconv"
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"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
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"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/pb/filer_pb"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3_constants"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3err"
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)
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// errCopySourceSSEUnsupported is returned by openSourcePlaintextReader when
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// the source object's SSE type is not yet implemented in the UploadPartCopy
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// slow path. Callers map it to a 501 NotImplemented S3 response so clients
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// can distinguish "we will not handle this shape" from "the server failed".
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var errCopySourceSSEUnsupported = errors.New("UploadPartCopy source SSE type not yet supported")
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// isTransientFilerError reports whether an error talking to the filer is
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// retryable from the client's perspective (filer briefly unreachable, leader
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// election in flight, deadline exceeded, etc.). Such errors should map to a
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// 503 ServiceUnavailable response so SDK retry logic engages, rather than a
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// 500 InternalError which most clients treat as fatal.
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func isTransientFilerError(err error) bool {
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if err == nil {
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return false
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}
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if errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) || errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
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return true
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}
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if s, ok := status.FromError(err); ok {
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switch s.Code() {
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case codes.Unavailable, codes.DeadlineExceeded, codes.ResourceExhausted, codes.Aborted:
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// uploadEntryHasSSE reports whether the multipart upload entry was created
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// with any server-side encryption configured (SSE-S3 or SSE-KMS — explicit at
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// CreateMultipartUpload time or applied as bucket default). It is used to
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// decide whether UploadPartCopy must re-encrypt source bytes for the
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// destination, rather than copying them as raw bytes (the fast path).
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func uploadEntryHasSSE(uploadEntry *filer_pb.Entry) bool {
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if uploadEntry == nil || uploadEntry.Extended == nil {
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return false
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}
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if _, ok := uploadEntry.Extended[s3_constants.SeaweedFSSSEKMSKeyID]; ok {
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return true
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}
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if v, ok := uploadEntry.Extended[s3_constants.SeaweedFSSSES3Encryption]; ok && string(v) == s3_constants.SSEAlgorithmAES256 {
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return true
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}
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return false
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}
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// sourceEntryHasSSE reports whether the source object's chunks are SSE
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// ciphertext on disk and therefore cannot be raw-copied — they must be
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// decrypted on read.
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func sourceEntryHasSSE(srcEntry *filer_pb.Entry) bool {
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if srcEntry == nil {
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return false
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}
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for _, c := range srcEntry.GetChunks() {
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if c.GetSseType() != filer_pb.SSEType_NONE {
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return true
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}
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}
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if srcEntry.Extended != nil {
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if _, ok := srcEntry.Extended[s3_constants.SeaweedFSSSES3Key]; ok {
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return true
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}
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if _, ok := srcEntry.Extended[s3_constants.SeaweedFSSSEKMSKey]; ok {
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return true
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}
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if _, ok := srcEntry.Extended[s3_constants.AmzServerSideEncryptionCustomerAlgorithm]; ok {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// readCloserAdapter pairs an arbitrary io.Reader with an io.Closer so callers
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// can release the original underlying source even when the inner Reader (e.g.
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// cipher.StreamReader, io.LimitReader) does not implement io.Closer.
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type readCloserAdapter struct {
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io.Reader
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closer io.Closer
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}
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func (r *readCloserAdapter) Close() error {
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if r.closer == nil {
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return nil
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}
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return r.closer.Close()
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}
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// openSourcePlaintextReader returns a reader yielding the source object's
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// plaintext bytes for [startOffset, endOffset], applying any necessary SSE
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// decryption based on the source entry's metadata.
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//
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// Used by CopyObjectPartHandler when source or destination is SSE-encrypted:
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// the fast raw-chunk-copy path leaves destination chunks SseType=NONE and
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// completedMultipartChunk's NONE→SSE_S3 backfill (PR #9224) then writes
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// destination-baseIV-derived metadata onto bytes that were actually encrypted
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// with the source's key — producing deterministic byte corruption on GET (#8908).
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//
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// Returns errCopySourceSSEUnsupported when the source's SSE type is not yet
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// implemented in this slow path (SSE-KMS, SSE-C). Callers should map that
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// sentinel to a 501 NotImplemented S3 response rather than collapsing it to
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// 500 InternalError, so clients can distinguish "we will not handle this
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// shape" from "the server failed".
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func (s3a *S3ApiServer) openSourcePlaintextReader(
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ctx context.Context,
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srcEntry *filer_pb.Entry,
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startOffset, endOffset int64,
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) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
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if srcEntry == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("nil source entry")
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}
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if endOffset < startOffset {
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return io.NopCloser(io.LimitReader(emptyReader{}, 0)), nil
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}
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sliceLen := endOffset - startOffset + 1
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switch s3a.detectPrimarySSEType(srcEntry) {
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case s3_constants.SSETypeS3:
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return s3a.openSSES3SourcePlaintextReader(ctx, srcEntry, startOffset, sliceLen)
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case s3_constants.SSETypeKMS:
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: UploadPartCopy from SSE-KMS source", errCopySourceSSEUnsupported)
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case s3_constants.SSETypeC:
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: UploadPartCopy from SSE-C source", errCopySourceSSEUnsupported)
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default:
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// Unencrypted source: stream raw bytes and apply range.
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raw, err := s3a.getEncryptedStreamFromVolumes(ctx, srcEntry)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("open unencrypted source: %w", err)
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}
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return applyRange(raw, startOffset, sliceLen)
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}
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}
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// openSSES3SourcePlaintextReader builds a decrypted reader for an SSE-S3
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// source. It reuses buildMultipartSSES3Reader, which decrypts each chunk
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// independently using its per-chunk metadata — correct for both multipart-SSE
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// objects (multiple SSE-S3 chunks) and single-part SSE-S3 objects whose single
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// chunk also carries per-chunk metadata after PR #9211.
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//
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// For older single-part SSE-S3 objects whose chunks lack per-chunk metadata,
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// this falls back to the entry-level SSE-S3 key + the entry's stored IV,
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// matching the read path's single-part fallback.
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func (s3a *S3ApiServer) openSSES3SourcePlaintextReader(
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ctx context.Context,
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srcEntry *filer_pb.Entry,
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startOffset, sliceLen int64,
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) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
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chunks := srcEntry.GetChunks()
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hasPerChunkSSE := false
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for _, c := range chunks {
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if c.GetSseType() == filer_pb.SSEType_SSE_S3 && len(c.GetSseMetadata()) > 0 {
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hasPerChunkSSE = true
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break
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}
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}
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if hasPerChunkSSE {
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sortedChunks := make([]*filer_pb.FileChunk, len(chunks))
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copy(sortedChunks, chunks)
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sort.Slice(sortedChunks, func(i, j int) bool {
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return sortedChunks[i].GetOffset() < sortedChunks[j].GetOffset()
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})
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decReader, err := buildMultipartSSES3Reader(
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sortedChunks,
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GetSSES3KeyManager(),
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func(c *filer_pb.FileChunk) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
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return s3a.createEncryptedChunkReader(ctx, c)
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},
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)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("build SSE-S3 source reader: %w", err)
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}
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// buildMultipartSSES3Reader returns a *lazyMultipartChunkReader whose
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// Close() releases the live chunk body. Use it as the closer.
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var closer io.Closer
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if rc, ok := decReader.(io.Closer); ok {
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closer = rc
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}
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return applyRange(&readCloserAdapter{Reader: decReader, closer: closer}, startOffset, sliceLen)
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}
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// Legacy single-part fallback: entry-level SeaweedFSSSES3Key + entry IV.
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keyData, ok := srcEntry.Extended[s3_constants.SeaweedFSSSES3Key]
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if !ok || len(keyData) == 0 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("SSE-S3 source has no per-chunk metadata and no entry-level SSE-S3 key")
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}
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keyManager := GetSSES3KeyManager()
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sseS3Key, err := DeserializeSSES3Metadata(keyData, keyManager)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("deserialize entry-level SSE-S3 key: %w", err)
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}
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iv, err := GetSSES3IV(srcEntry, sseS3Key, keyManager)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("get SSE-S3 IV: %w", err)
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}
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encStream, err := s3a.getEncryptedStreamFromVolumes(ctx, srcEntry)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("open ciphertext source: %w", err)
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}
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dec, err := CreateSSES3DecryptedReader(encStream, sseS3Key, iv)
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if err != nil {
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encStream.Close()
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("create SSE-S3 decrypted reader: %w", err)
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}
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rc, ok := dec.(io.ReadCloser)
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if !ok {
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rc = &readCloserAdapter{Reader: dec, closer: encStream}
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}
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return applyRange(rc, startOffset, sliceLen)
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}
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// applyRange skips startOffset bytes from src and limits the result to
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// sliceLen bytes. The returned ReadCloser closes the underlying source.
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func applyRange(src io.ReadCloser, startOffset, sliceLen int64) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
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if startOffset > 0 {
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if _, err := io.CopyN(io.Discard, src, startOffset); err != nil {
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src.Close()
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("skip to range start %d: %w", startOffset, err)
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}
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}
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if sliceLen <= 0 {
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return &readCloserAdapter{Reader: io.LimitReader(src, 0), closer: src}, nil
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}
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return &readCloserAdapter{Reader: io.LimitReader(src, sliceLen), closer: src}, nil
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}
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// emptyReader yields no bytes. Used for empty-range UploadPartCopy.
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type emptyReader struct{}
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func (emptyReader) Read([]byte) (int, error) { return 0, io.EOF }
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// applyDestSSEHeadersToCopyRequest stages the destination's SSE setup on the
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// (cloned) request so that putToFiler's existing handleAllSSEEncryption picks
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// it up. The upload-entry markers (laid down at CreateMultipartUpload) bind
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// every part of the upload to the same key+baseIV, matching PutObjectPart.
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func (s3a *S3ApiServer) applyDestSSEHeadersToCopyRequest(
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r *http.Request, uploadEntry *filer_pb.Entry, uploadID string,
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) error {
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if uploadEntry == nil || uploadEntry.Extended == nil {
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return nil
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}
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if keyIDBytes, hasKMS := uploadEntry.Extended[s3_constants.SeaweedFSSSEKMSKeyID]; hasKMS {
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// Mirror the SSE-KMS branch of PutObjectPartHandler: stage
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// X-Amz-Server-Side-Encryption=aws:kms plus the key ID, encryption
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// context, bucket-key flag and base IV onto the request.
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keyID := string(keyIDBytes)
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bucketKeyEnabled := false
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if v, ok := uploadEntry.Extended[s3_constants.SeaweedFSSSEKMSBucketKeyEnabled]; ok && string(v) == "true" {
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bucketKeyEnabled = true
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}
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var encryptionContext map[string]string
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if cb, ok := uploadEntry.Extended[s3_constants.SeaweedFSSSEKMSEncryptionContext]; ok {
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if err := json.Unmarshal(cb, &encryptionContext); err != nil {
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glog.Errorf("UploadPartCopy: failed to parse SSE-KMS context for upload %s: %v", uploadID, err)
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encryptionContext = nil
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}
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}
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if len(encryptionContext) == 0 {
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// Bucket and object are populated on the cloned request; reuse
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// the same builder PutObjectPartHandler does.
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bucket, object := s3_constants.GetBucketAndObject(r)
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encryptionContext = BuildEncryptionContext(bucket, object, bucketKeyEnabled)
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}
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var baseIV []byte
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if ivBytes, ok := uploadEntry.Extended[s3_constants.SeaweedFSSSEKMSBaseIV]; ok {
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decoded, decErr := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(string(ivBytes))
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if decErr != nil || len(decoded) != s3_constants.AESBlockSize {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid SSE-KMS base IV on upload %s", uploadID)
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}
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baseIV = decoded
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} else {
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return fmt.Errorf("no SSE-KMS base IV on upload %s", uploadID)
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}
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r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzServerSideEncryption, "aws:kms")
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r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzServerSideEncryptionAwsKmsKeyId, keyID)
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if bucketKeyEnabled {
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r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzServerSideEncryptionBucketKeyEnabled, "true")
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}
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if len(encryptionContext) > 0 {
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if cj, err := json.Marshal(encryptionContext); err == nil {
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r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzServerSideEncryptionContext, base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(cj))
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}
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}
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r.Header.Set(s3_constants.SeaweedFSSSEKMSBaseIVHeader, base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(baseIV))
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return nil
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}
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// SSE-S3 path: reuse the existing PutObjectPart helper unchanged. It is
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// pure header manipulation on r and does not touch S3ApiServer state.
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return s3a.handleSSES3MultipartHeaders(r, uploadEntry, uploadID)
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}
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// fakeContentRequest builds a minimal request representing "PUT this body" for
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// the multipart-part write path used by UploadPartCopy. It clones the original
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// request's headers (so things like AmzAccountId carry over) and clears the
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// copy-only headers; SSE setup is added later by applyDestSSEHeadersToCopyRequest.
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func fakeContentRequest(orig *http.Request, body io.ReadCloser, contentLength int64) *http.Request {
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cloned := orig.Clone(orig.Context())
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cloned.Body = body
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cloned.ContentLength = contentLength
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if cloned.Header == nil {
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cloned.Header = http.Header{}
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} else {
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cloned.Header = cloned.Header.Clone()
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}
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cloned.Header.Set("Content-Length", strconv.FormatInt(contentLength, 10))
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cloned.Header.Del("X-Amz-Copy-Source")
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cloned.Header.Del("X-Amz-Copy-Source-Range")
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cloned.Header.Del("X-Amz-Metadata-Directive")
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cloned.Header.Del("X-Amz-Tagging-Directive")
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// Content-Md5 cannot be reproduced from the source plaintext without
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// streaming it once first; clear it so putToFiler doesn't validate.
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cloned.Header.Del("Content-Md5")
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return cloned
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}
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// copyObjectPartViaReencryption implements the slow path of UploadPartCopy when
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// either the source object is SSE-encrypted or the destination multipart upload
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// is configured for SSE encryption. It:
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//
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// 1. Opens a plaintext reader of the source range (decrypting if needed).
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// 2. Stages the destination's SSE-S3 / SSE-KMS multipart headers on a cloned
|
|
// request so handleAllSSEEncryption (called from putToFiler) routes the
|
|
// body through the matching multipart-encryption helper.
|
|
// 3. Calls putToFiler with the plaintext reader, which encrypts using the
|
|
// destination upload session's key+baseIV (consistent with PutObjectPart),
|
|
// auto-chunks, and writes the part entry with proper per-chunk SSE metadata.
|
|
//
|
|
// Without this path, copyChunksForRange's raw byte copy leaves destination
|
|
// chunks SseType=NONE; completedMultipartChunk then "backfills" SSE-S3 metadata
|
|
// with destination-baseIV-derived IVs, but the bytes on disk were encrypted
|
|
// with the source's key — yielding deterministic byte corruption on GET (#8908).
|
|
func (s3a *S3ApiServer) copyObjectPartViaReencryption(
|
|
r *http.Request,
|
|
srcEntry *filer_pb.Entry,
|
|
startOffset, endOffset int64,
|
|
dstBucket, uploadID string,
|
|
partID int,
|
|
uploadEntry *filer_pb.Entry,
|
|
) (etag string, sseMetadata SSEResponseMetadata, errCode s3err.ErrorCode) {
|
|
if endOffset < startOffset {
|
|
tag, code := s3a.writeEmptyCopyPart(dstBucket, uploadID, partID)
|
|
return tag, SSEResponseMetadata{}, code
|
|
}
|
|
sliceLen := endOffset - startOffset + 1
|
|
|
|
srcReader, err := s3a.openSourcePlaintextReader(r.Context(), srcEntry, startOffset, endOffset)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
glog.Errorf("UploadPartCopy: open source plaintext reader: %v", err)
|
|
// Distinguish "we will not handle this shape" (501) from "the server
|
|
// failed" (500). SSE-KMS / SSE-C source support in this slow path is
|
|
// staged work; the explicit error lets clients see it as a feature
|
|
// gap rather than a server fault.
|
|
if errors.Is(err, errCopySourceSSEUnsupported) {
|
|
return "", SSEResponseMetadata{}, s3err.ErrNotImplemented
|
|
}
|
|
return "", SSEResponseMetadata{}, s3err.ErrInternalError
|
|
}
|
|
defer srcReader.Close()
|
|
|
|
cloned := fakeContentRequest(r, srcReader, sliceLen)
|
|
if err := s3a.applyDestSSEHeadersToCopyRequest(cloned, uploadEntry, uploadID); err != nil {
|
|
glog.Errorf("UploadPartCopy: apply destination SSE headers: %v", err)
|
|
return "", SSEResponseMetadata{}, s3err.ErrInternalError
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Surface putToFiler's SSE response metadata to the caller so the handler
|
|
// can mirror PutObjectPart's behavior of writing
|
|
// x-amz-server-side-encryption / x-amz-server-side-encryption-aws-kms-key-id
|
|
// on the UploadPartCopy response. Without this, clients have no way to
|
|
// see that the destination was encrypted.
|
|
filePath := s3a.genPartUploadPath(dstBucket, uploadID, partID)
|
|
tag, code, putSSE := s3a.putToFiler(cloned, filePath, srcReader, dstBucket, "", partID, nil)
|
|
if code != s3err.ErrNone {
|
|
return "", SSEResponseMetadata{}, code
|
|
}
|
|
return tag, putSSE, s3err.ErrNone
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// writeEmptyCopyPart writes a 0-byte part entry for an empty UploadPartCopy
|
|
// range, mirroring the legacy fast path's handling of endOffset < startOffset.
|
|
func (s3a *S3ApiServer) writeEmptyCopyPart(dstBucket, uploadID string, partID int) (string, s3err.ErrorCode) {
|
|
uploadDir := s3a.genUploadsFolder(dstBucket) + "/" + uploadID
|
|
partName := fmt.Sprintf("%04d_%s.part", partID, "copy")
|
|
if exists, _ := s3a.exists(uploadDir, partName, false); exists {
|
|
if err := s3a.rm(uploadDir, partName, false, false); err != nil {
|
|
return "", s3err.ErrInternalError
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if err := s3a.mkFile(uploadDir, partName, nil, func(e *filer_pb.Entry) {
|
|
if e.Attributes == nil {
|
|
e.Attributes = &filer_pb.FuseAttributes{}
|
|
}
|
|
e.Attributes.FileSize = 0
|
|
}); err != nil {
|
|
return "", s3err.ErrInternalError
|
|
}
|
|
const emptyMD5Hex = "d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e"
|
|
return emptyMD5Hex, s3err.ErrNone
|
|
}
|