Files
seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3tables/permissions.go
T
Chris LuandDevin 446e6f3444 s3tables: scope OIDC-derived account IDs to the token issuer (#11774)
* s3tables: scope OIDC-derived account IDs to the token issuer

Table ownership keyed off the bare sub claim, so two identity providers
issuing the same sub collided on one account - a caller could act on
tables owned by a different provider's user. OIDC bearer tokens now
carry the same issuer-namespaced (sub, iss) hash STS sessions already
expose as aws:userid, and getAccountID prefers it over the raw claims.

Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* s3tables: keep legacy owners working and scrub client-subject claims

- OIDC bearer tokens without a subject are rejected, and a token-supplied
  aws:userid claim is always overwritten with the verified (sub, iss)
  hash, so a forged claim can no longer stand in for the principal.
- Owners written before issuer scoping hold a bare subject; permission
  checks now re-anchor that subject under the caller's issuer, so the
  same (sub, iss) pair keeps its ownership while scoped owners remain
  issuer-isolated. The token issuer is asserted into claims alongside
  sub and carried through PolicyContext.

* s3tables: anchor legacy subjects to the configured issuer set

* s3: enumerate trusted issuers from registered providers too

* s3: fail closed when the OIDC provider store cannot be listed

trustedOIDCIssuers kept the registered issuers when ListOIDCProviders
failed, presenting a partial set as complete. A deployment trusting one
registered issuer A plus a stored issuer B would, on a listing error,
report only A — the single-issuer shape under which a legacy bare
subject re-anchors — letting a caller from A claim a stored subject
that belongs to B and gain owner access.

With no provider store the registered providers are provably complete,
so keep returning them; with a store, a failed listing means the real
set is unknown, so return none.

---------

Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-16 19:48:32 -07:00

466 lines
13 KiB
Go

package s3tables
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"strings"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/iam/sts"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/policy_engine"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3_constants"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/util/wildcard"
)
// Permission represents a specific action permission
type Permission string
// IAM Policy structures for evaluation
type PolicyDocument struct {
Version string `json:"Version"`
Statement []Statement `json:"Statement"`
}
// UnmarshalJSON handles both single statement object and array of statements
// AWS allows {"Statement": {...}} or {"Statement": [{...}]}
func (pd *PolicyDocument) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
type Alias PolicyDocument
aux := &struct {
Statement interface{} `json:"Statement"`
*Alias
}{
Alias: (*Alias)(pd),
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &aux); err != nil {
return err
}
// Handle Statement as either a single object or array
switch s := aux.Statement.(type) {
case map[string]interface{}:
// Single statement object - unmarshal to one Statement
stmtData, err := json.Marshal(s)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal single statement: %w", err)
}
var stmt Statement
if err := json.Unmarshal(stmtData, &stmt); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal single statement: %w", err)
}
pd.Statement = []Statement{stmt}
case []interface{}:
// Array of statements - normal handling
stmtData, err := json.Marshal(s)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal statement array: %w", err)
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(stmtData, &pd.Statement); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal statement array: %w", err)
}
case nil:
// No statements
pd.Statement = []Statement{}
default:
return fmt.Errorf("Statement must be an object or array, got %T", aux.Statement)
}
return nil
}
type Statement struct {
Effect string `json:"Effect"` // "Allow" or "Deny"
Principal interface{} `json:"Principal"` // Can be string, []string, or map
Action interface{} `json:"Action"` // Can be string or []string
Resource interface{} `json:"Resource"` // Can be string or []string
Condition map[string]map[string]interface{} `json:"Condition,omitempty"`
}
type PolicyContext struct {
Namespace string
TableName string
TableBucketName string
IdentityActions []string
RequestTags map[string]string
ResourceTags map[string]string
TableBucketTags map[string]string
TagKeys []string
SSEAlgorithm string
KMSKeyArn string
StorageClass string
DefaultAllow bool
// TrustedIssuers lists the OIDC issuers the deployment is configured to
// trust, used to re-anchor owners/principals written before issuer-scoped
// account IDs. A bare subject is only resolvable when exactly one issuer
// is configured; more than one leaves it ambiguous, so it must not match.
TrustedIssuers []string
}
// CheckPermissionWithContext checks permission with optional resource and condition context.
func CheckPermissionWithContext(operation, principal, owner, resourcePolicy, resourceARN string, ctx *PolicyContext) bool {
// Deny access if identities are empty
if principal == "" || owner == "" {
return false
}
// Admin always has permission.
if principal == s3_constants.AccountAdminId {
return true
}
glog.V(2).Infof("S3Tables: CheckPermission operation=%s principal=%s owner=%s", operation, principal, owner)
return checkPermission(operation, principal, owner, resourcePolicy, resourceARN, ctx)
}
func checkPermission(operation, principal, owner, resourcePolicy, resourceARN string, ctx *PolicyContext) bool {
// Owner always has permission.
if principal == owner || matchesLegacySubject(owner, principal, ctx) {
return true
}
if hasIdentityPermission(operation, ctx) {
return true
}
// If no policy is provided, use default allow if enabled
if resourcePolicy == "" {
if ctx != nil && ctx.DefaultAllow {
return true
}
return false
}
// Normalize operation to full IAM-style action name (e.g., "s3tables:CreateTableBucket")
// if not already prefixed
fullAction := operation
if !strings.Contains(operation, ":") {
fullAction = "s3tables:" + operation
}
// Parse and evaluate policy
var policy PolicyDocument
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(resourcePolicy), &policy); err != nil {
return false
}
// Evaluate policy statements
// Default is deny, so we need an explicit allow
hasAllow := false
for _, stmt := range policy.Statement {
// Check if principal matches
if !matchesCaller(stmt.Principal, principal, ctx) {
continue
}
// Check if action matches (using normalized full action name)
if !matchesAction(stmt.Action, fullAction) {
continue
}
// Check if resource matches (if resourceARN specified and Resource field exists)
if resourceARN != "" && !matchesResource(stmt.Resource, resourceARN) {
continue
}
if !matchesConditions(stmt.Condition, ctx) {
continue
}
// Statement matches - check effect
switch stmt.Effect {
case "Allow":
hasAllow = true
case "Deny":
// Explicit deny always wins
return false
}
}
if hasAllow {
return true
}
// If no statement matched, use default allow if enabled
if ctx != nil && ctx.DefaultAllow {
return true
}
return false
}
func hasIdentityPermission(operation string, ctx *PolicyContext) bool {
if ctx == nil || len(ctx.IdentityActions) == 0 {
return false
}
fullAction := operation
if !strings.Contains(operation, ":") {
fullAction = "s3tables:" + operation
}
if hasAdminAction(ctx.IdentityActions) {
return true
}
candidates := []string{operation, fullAction}
if ctx.TableBucketName != "" {
candidates = append(candidates, operation+":"+ctx.TableBucketName, fullAction+":"+ctx.TableBucketName)
}
for _, action := range ctx.IdentityActions {
for _, candidate := range candidates {
if action == candidate {
return true
}
if strings.ContainsAny(action, "*?") && wildcard.MatchesWildcard(action, candidate) {
return true
}
}
}
return false
}
// hasAdminAction reports whether the action list grants blanket admin access.
// Legacy static identities may use broad markers or s3 wildcards; s3:* is treated
// as s3tables:* so shared admin policies still permit table access.
func hasAdminAction(actions []string) bool {
for _, action := range actions {
if action == "*" || action == s3_constants.ACTION_ADMIN || action == "s3:*" || action == "s3tables:*" {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// matchesCaller matches a statement's Principal against the caller's scoped
// principal or, for policies written before issuer scoping, a bare subject
// that resolves to it under the deployment's single trusted issuer.
func matchesCaller(principalSpec interface{}, principal string, ctx *PolicyContext) bool {
if matchesPrincipal(principalSpec, principal) {
return true
}
legacy, ok := principalSpec.(string)
return ok && matchesLegacySubject(legacy, principal, ctx)
}
// matchesLegacySubject reports whether a bare subject stored before issuer
// scoping belongs to the caller. Re-anchoring is only sound when exactly one
// OIDC issuer is configured: the stored subject is hashed under that issuer
// and compared to the caller's scoped principal. With multiple issuers a bare
// subject is ambiguous — matching it under the caller's own issuer would let
// a same-sub identity from any configured issuer claim it.
func matchesLegacySubject(legacy, principal string, ctx *PolicyContext) bool {
if ctx == nil || len(ctx.TrustedIssuers) != 1 {
return false
}
return sts.ComputeParentUser(legacy, ctx.TrustedIssuers[0]) == principal
}
// matchesPrincipal checks if the principal matches the statement's principal
func matchesPrincipal(principalSpec interface{}, principal string) bool {
if principalSpec == nil {
return false
}
switch p := principalSpec.(type) {
case string:
// Direct string match or wildcard
if p == "*" || p == principal {
return true
}
// Support wildcard matching for principals (e.g., "arn:aws:iam::*:user/admin")
return wildcard.MatchesWildcard(p, principal)
case []interface{}:
// Array of principals
for _, item := range p {
if str, ok := item.(string); ok {
if str == "*" || str == principal {
return true
}
// Support wildcard matching
if wildcard.MatchesWildcard(str, principal) {
return true
}
}
}
case map[string]interface{}:
// AWS-style principal with service prefix, e.g., {"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::..."}
// For S3 Tables, we primarily care about the AWS key
if aws, ok := p["AWS"]; ok {
return matchesPrincipal(aws, principal)
}
}
return false
}
// matchesAction checks if the action matches the statement's action
func matchesAction(actionSpec interface{}, action string) bool {
if actionSpec == nil {
return false
}
switch a := actionSpec.(type) {
case string:
// Direct match or wildcard
return matchesActionPattern(a, action)
case []interface{}:
// Array of actions
for _, item := range a {
if str, ok := item.(string); ok {
if matchesActionPattern(str, action) {
return true
}
}
}
}
return false
}
// matchesActionPattern checks if an action matches a pattern (supports wildcards)
// This uses the policy_engine.MatchesWildcard function for full wildcard support,
// including middle wildcards (e.g., "s3tables:Get*Table") for complete IAM compatibility.
func matchesActionPattern(pattern, action string) bool {
if pattern == "*" {
return true
}
// Exact match
if pattern == action {
return true
}
// Wildcard match using policy engine's wildcard matcher
// Supports both * (any sequence) and ? (single character) anywhere in the pattern
return wildcard.MatchesWildcard(pattern, action)
}
func matchesConditions(conditions map[string]map[string]interface{}, ctx *PolicyContext) bool {
if len(conditions) == 0 {
return true
}
if ctx == nil {
return false
}
for operator, conditionValues := range conditions {
if !matchesConditionOperator(operator, conditionValues, ctx) {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func matchesConditionOperator(operator string, conditionValues map[string]interface{}, ctx *PolicyContext) bool {
evaluator, err := policy_engine.GetConditionEvaluator(operator)
if err != nil {
return false
}
for key, value := range conditionValues {
contextVals := getConditionContextValues(key, ctx)
if !evaluator.Evaluate(value, contextVals) {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func getConditionContextValues(key string, ctx *PolicyContext) []string {
switch key {
case "s3tables:namespace":
return []string{ctx.Namespace}
case "s3tables:tableName":
return []string{ctx.TableName}
case "s3tables:tableBucketName":
return []string{ctx.TableBucketName}
case "s3tables:SSEAlgorithm":
return []string{ctx.SSEAlgorithm}
case "s3tables:KMSKeyArn":
return []string{ctx.KMSKeyArn}
case "s3tables:StorageClass":
return []string{ctx.StorageClass}
case "aws:TagKeys":
return ctx.TagKeys
}
if strings.HasPrefix(key, "aws:RequestTag/") {
tagKey := strings.TrimPrefix(key, "aws:RequestTag/")
if val, ok := ctx.RequestTags[tagKey]; ok {
return []string{val}
}
}
if strings.HasPrefix(key, "aws:ResourceTag/") {
tagKey := strings.TrimPrefix(key, "aws:ResourceTag/")
if val, ok := ctx.ResourceTags[tagKey]; ok {
return []string{val}
}
}
if strings.HasPrefix(key, "s3tables:TableBucketTag/") {
tagKey := strings.TrimPrefix(key, "s3tables:TableBucketTag/")
if val, ok := ctx.TableBucketTags[tagKey]; ok {
return []string{val}
}
}
return nil
}
// matchesResource checks if the resource ARN matches the statement's resource specification
// Returns true if resource matches or if Resource is not specified (implicit match)
func matchesResource(resourceSpec interface{}, resourceARN string) bool {
// If no Resource is specified, match all resources (implicit *)
if resourceSpec == nil {
return true
}
switch r := resourceSpec.(type) {
case string:
// Direct match or wildcard
return matchesResourcePattern(r, resourceARN)
case []interface{}:
// Array of resources - match if any matches
for _, item := range r {
if str, ok := item.(string); ok {
if matchesResourcePattern(str, resourceARN) {
return true
}
}
}
}
return false
}
// matchesResourcePattern checks if a resource ARN matches a pattern (supports wildcards)
func matchesResourcePattern(pattern, resourceARN string) bool {
if pattern == "*" {
return true
}
// Exact match
if pattern == resourceARN {
return true
}
// Wildcard match using policy engine's wildcard matcher
return wildcard.MatchesWildcard(pattern, resourceARN)
}
// AuthError represents an authorization error
type AuthError struct {
Operation string
Principal string
Message string
}
func (e *AuthError) Error() string {
return "unauthorized: " + e.Principal + " is not permitted to perform " + e.Operation + ": " + e.Message
}
// NewAuthError creates a new authorization error
func NewAuthError(operation, principal, message string) *AuthError {
return &AuthError{
Operation: operation,
Principal: principal,
Message: message,
}
}