Files
seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3_constants/header.go
T
Chris Lu e6a0534e3b s3api: make ambiguous routed-PUT recovery atomic and stop transaction replay (#11787)
* filer_pb: map PRECONDITION_FAILED to a sentinel error

A conditional CreateEntry that the owner's path lock refuses comes back as
FilerError_PRECONDITION_FAILED; mapping it to ErrPreconditionFailed lets the
S3 gateway tell a rejected precondition apart from a transport failure and
report 412 instead of retrying the write.

* s3api: make the ambiguous-PUT recovery create conditional under the lock

createAfterAmbiguousRoute verified state and then issued an unconditional
create, so a write landing between the lookup and the create was still
clobbered by the stale re-commit (issue #11631). The recovery create now
carries a WriteCondition — IF_NOT_EXISTS for a proven-absent entry,
IF_ENTRY_EQUAL for a directory it may need to write onto — which the owner
filer evaluates under its per-path lock, making the check and the write
atomic. A refused precondition loops back to re-read the state instead of
overwriting whatever won the race.

* s3api: do not fail over a routed transaction past a possibly-sent request

withFilerClientFailover retried the callback on the next filer on any
transport error, so an ObjectTransaction whose response was lost could be
re-applied over a write that committed in between (issue #11631). A gRPC
error cannot distinguish "never sent" from "committed", but channel
readiness can: a non-replayable callback now runs only on a connection that
just reached READY, and failover continues only over channels that never
came up — the one failure mode that provably sent nothing.

* s3api: run ambiguous-route recovery for empty PUTs too

The recovery was gated on a nonempty chunk list, so a zero-byte PUT whose
routed transaction lost its response still fell back to an unconditional
create that could overwrite a newer write and delete its chunks. Chunk-count
mismatch on an empty upload list is enough to distinguish a superseding
entry from this PUT's — there is nothing to save by skipping the check.

* s3api: keep conditional recovery creates off the replay path

The conditional create in the ambiguous-PUT fallback rode the replayable
WithFilerClient failover, so a committed create whose response was lost
could be re-sent to another filer — where a delete in between would let
IF_NOT_EXISTS pass again and resurrect an entry pointing at reclaimed
chunks. Conditional creates now run through the non-replayable failover;
an ambiguous result falls through to confirmCreateLanded, which resolves
the committed entry rather than resending.

* s3api: do not mark a filer unhealthy for an answered request

A reply that reached the callback — including an application-level failure
like a refused write precondition — proves the filer is alive. Checking
received before the health bookkeeping keeps definitive application errors
from tripping the failure circuit or flagging a live routed owner as
unreachable.

* s3api: do not claim an empty stored entry as an ambiguous PUT's own

Two chunkless entries compare equal under sameFileChunks, so an older
empty object satisfies "the route landed" even though it predates this
write — recovery would return success while leaving the request's
Content-Type and metadata unapplied. A landed PUT stores the entry
exactly as built, so require mime/size/md5/content and the extended
attributes to match before claiming it; anything else stays uncertain
and the client retries.

* s3api: prove ambiguous empty PUTs by write id and pin recovery to the owner

- Conditional recovery creates are sent to the routed owner alone instead of failing over: the condition only serializes with routed writes under the owner's per-path lock, and another filer's forwarding is only as correct as its ring view. An unreachable owner now yields an uncertain result rather than a create under a different serialization boundary.
- A proven-absent path no longer satisfies an empty, chunkless PUT: the routed commit may have landed and been deleted, and there are no chunks to verify, so IF_NOT_EXISTS could resurrect a removed object. Recovery returns uncertain for the client to retry.
- Chunkless identity moves from metadata equality to a per-write id (x-seaweedfs-write-id) stamped into Extended: an identical older object can match mime/md5/content but not the id. Entries without this write's id are not claimed, and confirmCreateLanded can now positively confirm a committed empty object instead of always reporting failure.
2026-10-17 21:36:39 -07:00

513 lines
22 KiB
Go

/*
* MinIO Cloud Storage, (C) 2019 MinIO, Inc.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
package s3_constants
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"github.com/gorilla/mux"
)
// S3 XML namespace
const (
S3Namespace = "http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/"
)
// S3 object key limits
const (
MaxS3ObjectKeyLength = 1024
)
// Standard S3 HTTP request constants
const (
// S3 storage class
AmzStorageClass = "X-Amz-Storage-Class"
// S3 user-defined metadata
AmzUserMetaPrefix = "X-Amz-Meta-"
AmzUserMetaDirective = "X-Amz-Metadata-Directive"
AmzUserMetaMtime = "X-Amz-Meta-Mtime"
// S3 object tagging
AmzObjectTagging = "X-Amz-Tagging"
AmzObjectTaggingPrefix = "X-Amz-Tagging-"
AmzObjectTaggingDirective = "X-Amz-Tagging-Directive"
AmzTagCount = "x-amz-tagging-count"
// GetObjectAttributes headers
AmzObjectAttributes = "X-Amz-Object-Attributes"
AmzMaxParts = "X-Amz-Max-Parts"
AmzPartNumberMarker = "X-Amz-Part-Number-Marker"
AmzDeleteMarker = "X-Amz-Delete-Marker"
SeaweedFSUploadId = "X-Seaweedfs-Upload-Id"
SeaweedFSExtract = "X-Seaweedfs-Extract"
SeaweedFSExtractedCount = "X-Seaweedfs-Extracted-Count"
AmzMetaSnowballAutoExtract = "X-Amz-Meta-Snowball-Auto-Extract"
SeaweedFSMultipartPartsCount = "X-Seaweedfs-Multipart-Parts-Count"
SeaweedFSMultipartPartBoundaries = "X-Seaweedfs-Multipart-Part-Boundaries" // JSON: [{part:1,start:0,end:2,etag:"abc"},{part:2,start:2,end:3,etag:"def"}]
SeaweedFSExpiresS3 = "X-Seaweedfs-Expires-S3"
AmzMpPartsCount = "x-amz-mp-parts-count"
// S3 ACL headers
AmzCannedAcl = "X-Amz-Acl"
AmzAclFullControl = "X-Amz-Grant-Full-Control"
AmzAclRead = "X-Amz-Grant-Read"
AmzAclWrite = "X-Amz-Grant-Write"
AmzAclReadAcp = "X-Amz-Grant-Read-Acp"
AmzAclWriteAcp = "X-Amz-Grant-Write-Acp"
// S3 Object Lock headers
AmzBucketObjectLockEnabled = "X-Amz-Bucket-Object-Lock-Enabled"
AmzObjectLockMode = "X-Amz-Object-Lock-Mode"
AmzObjectLockRetainUntilDate = "X-Amz-Object-Lock-Retain-Until-Date"
AmzObjectLockLegalHold = "X-Amz-Object-Lock-Legal-Hold"
// S3 checksum headers
AmzChecksumAlgorithm = "X-Amz-Checksum-Algorithm"
AmzChecksumCRC32 = "X-Amz-Checksum-Crc32"
AmzChecksumCRC32C = "X-Amz-Checksum-Crc32c"
AmzChecksumCRC64NVME = "X-Amz-Checksum-Crc64nvme"
AmzChecksumSHA1 = "X-Amz-Checksum-Sha1"
AmzChecksumSHA256 = "X-Amz-Checksum-Sha256"
AmzTrailer = "X-Amz-Trailer"
AmzSdkChecksumAlgorithm = "X-Amz-Sdk-Checksum-Algorithm"
AmzChecksumType = "X-Amz-Checksum-Type"
AmzChecksumMode = "X-Amz-Checksum-Mode"
// S3 checksum type values (x-amz-checksum-type). A COMPOSITE checksum is a
// checksum-of-per-part-checksums ("base64-N"); a FULL_OBJECT checksum is the
// checksum of the whole object as if uploaded in a single request ("base64").
ChecksumTypeComposite = "COMPOSITE"
ChecksumTypeFullObject = "FULL_OBJECT"
// S3 conditional headers
IfMatch = "If-Match"
IfNoneMatch = "If-None-Match"
IfModifiedSince = "If-Modified-Since"
IfUnmodifiedSince = "If-Unmodified-Since"
// S3 conditional copy headers
AmzCopySourceIfMatch = "X-Amz-Copy-Source-If-Match"
AmzCopySourceIfNoneMatch = "X-Amz-Copy-Source-If-None-Match"
AmzCopySourceIfModifiedSince = "X-Amz-Copy-Source-If-Modified-Since"
AmzCopySourceIfUnmodifiedSince = "X-Amz-Copy-Source-If-Unmodified-Since"
// RenameObject
// AmzClientToken makes a rename idempotent. The AWS SDKs fill it in on every
// call, so it arrives on requests that were never written with it in mind.
AmzClientToken = "X-Amz-Client-Token"
AmzRenameSource = "X-Amz-Rename-Source"
AmzRenameSourceIfMatch = "X-Amz-Rename-Source-If-Match"
AmzRenameSourceIfNoneMatch = "X-Amz-Rename-Source-If-None-Match"
AmzRenameSourceIfModifiedSince = "X-Amz-Rename-Source-If-Modified-Since"
AmzRenameSourceIfUnmodifiedSince = "X-Amz-Rename-Source-If-Unmodified-Since"
// S3 Server-Side Encryption with Customer-provided Keys (SSE-C)
AmzServerSideEncryptionCustomerAlgorithm = "X-Amz-Server-Side-Encryption-Customer-Algorithm"
AmzServerSideEncryptionCustomerKey = "X-Amz-Server-Side-Encryption-Customer-Key"
AmzServerSideEncryptionCustomerKeyMD5 = "X-Amz-Server-Side-Encryption-Customer-Key-MD5"
AmzServerSideEncryptionContext = "X-Amz-Server-Side-Encryption-Context"
// S3 Server-Side Encryption with KMS (SSE-KMS)
AmzServerSideEncryption = "X-Amz-Server-Side-Encryption"
AmzServerSideEncryptionAwsKmsKeyId = "X-Amz-Server-Side-Encryption-Aws-Kms-Key-Id"
AmzServerSideEncryptionBucketKeyEnabled = "X-Amz-Server-Side-Encryption-Bucket-Key-Enabled"
// S3 SSE-C copy source headers
AmzCopySourceServerSideEncryptionCustomerAlgorithm = "X-Amz-Copy-Source-Server-Side-Encryption-Customer-Algorithm"
AmzCopySourceServerSideEncryptionCustomerKey = "X-Amz-Copy-Source-Server-Side-Encryption-Customer-Key"
AmzCopySourceServerSideEncryptionCustomerKeyMD5 = "X-Amz-Copy-Source-Server-Side-Encryption-Customer-Key-MD5"
)
// Metadata keys for internal storage
const (
// SSE-KMS metadata keys
AmzEncryptedDataKey = "x-amz-encrypted-data-key"
AmzEncryptionContextMeta = "x-amz-encryption-context"
// SeaweedFS internal metadata prefix (used to filter internal headers from client responses)
SeaweedFSInternalPrefix = "x-seaweedfs-"
// SeaweedFSPrefixObject marks a directory entry that also holds the object named by
// its path without a trailing slash. S3 keys are flat, so "a/b" and "a/b/c" are
// independent keys, and the filer stores the first one on the directory the second
// one lives under.
SeaweedFSPrefixObject = "x-seaweedfs-prefix-object"
// SeaweedFS internal metadata keys for encryption (prefixed to avoid automatic HTTP header conversion)
SeaweedFSSSEKMSKey = "x-seaweedfs-sse-kms-key" // Key for storing serialized SSE-KMS metadata
SeaweedFSSSES3Key = "x-seaweedfs-sse-s3-key" // Key for storing serialized SSE-S3 metadata
SeaweedFSSSEIV = "x-seaweedfs-sse-c-iv" // Key for storing SSE-C IV
// Multipart upload metadata keys for SSE-KMS (consistent with internal metadata key pattern)
SeaweedFSSSEKMSKeyID = "x-seaweedfs-sse-kms-key-id" // Key ID for multipart upload SSE-KMS inheritance
SeaweedFSSSEKMSEncryption = "x-seaweedfs-sse-kms-encryption" // Encryption type for multipart upload SSE-KMS inheritance
SeaweedFSSSEKMSBucketKeyEnabled = "x-seaweedfs-sse-kms-bucket-key-enabled" // Bucket key setting for multipart upload SSE-KMS inheritance
SeaweedFSSSEKMSEncryptionContext = "x-seaweedfs-sse-kms-encryption-context" // Encryption context for multipart upload SSE-KMS inheritance
SeaweedFSSSEKMSBaseIV = "x-seaweedfs-sse-kms-base-iv" // Base IV for multipart upload SSE-KMS (for IV offset calculation)
// SeaweedFSRenameToken records the x-amz-client-token of the rename that put an
// object at its key, together with the source that rename named. It rides on the
// object itself, so every gateway reads the same answer for a retry of that
// rename, and it is dropped whenever the key is written again.
SeaweedFSRenameToken = "x-seaweedfs-rename-token"
// SeaweedFSWriteId identifies the single write that stored an entry: putToFiler
// stamps a fresh id into Extended on every call. Recovery for an ambiguously
// committed write compares it to tell its own entry from an identical older
// object — chunk lists cannot, since an empty object carries none.
SeaweedFSWriteId = "x-seaweedfs-write-id"
// Multipart upload metadata keys for SSE-S3
SeaweedFSSSES3Encryption = "x-seaweedfs-sse-s3-encryption" // Encryption type for multipart upload SSE-S3 inheritance
SeaweedFSSSES3BaseIV = "x-seaweedfs-sse-s3-base-iv" // Base IV for multipart upload SSE-S3 (for IV offset calculation)
SeaweedFSSSES3KeyData = "x-seaweedfs-sse-s3-key-data" // Encrypted key data for multipart upload SSE-S3 inheritance
)
// SeaweedFS internal headers for filer communication
const (
SeaweedFSSSEKMSKeyHeader = "X-SeaweedFS-SSE-KMS-Key" // Header for passing SSE-KMS metadata to filer
SeaweedFSSSEIVHeader = "X-SeaweedFS-SSE-IV" // Header for passing SSE-C IV to filer (SSE-C only)
SeaweedFSSSEKMSBaseIVHeader = "X-SeaweedFS-SSE-KMS-Base-IV" // Header for passing base IV for multipart SSE-KMS
SeaweedFSSSES3BaseIVHeader = "X-SeaweedFS-SSE-S3-Base-IV" // Header for passing base IV for multipart SSE-S3
SeaweedFSSSES3KeyDataHeader = "X-SeaweedFS-SSE-S3-Key-Data" // Header for passing key data for multipart SSE-S3
// SeaweedFSPrincipalHeader and SeaweedFSSessionTokenHeader carry the
// server-derived principal ARN and session token from the auth layer to
// downstream authorization (IAM policy evaluation, S3Tables IAM checks).
// These headers are trusted: callers of AuthSignatureOnly /
// authenticateRequestInternal must scrub any client-supplied values at the
// very start of authentication to prevent privilege escalation via header
// injection. Prefer these constants over literals so that any future scrub
// or consumer cannot drift by typo.
SeaweedFSPrincipalHeader = "X-SeaweedFS-Principal"
SeaweedFSSessionTokenHeader = "X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token"
)
// Non-Standard S3 HTTP request constants
const (
AmzIdentityId = "s3-identity-id"
AmzAccountId = "s3-account-id"
AmzAuthType = "s3-auth-type"
)
func GetBucketAndObject(r *http.Request) (bucket, object string) {
vars := mux.Vars(r)
bucket = vars["bucket"]
object = NormalizeObjectKey(vars["object"])
return
}
// IsValidObjectKey rejects S3 object keys that — after normalization
// (backslash→slash, slash collapse) — contain a `.` or `..` path segment, or
// embed a NUL byte. Such keys are collapsed by filepath.Join inside the filer
// and would escape the bucket directory, so they must not reach the gRPC layer.
// Gorilla mux URL-decodes captured vars before this runs, so `%2e%2e` is
// already `..` here.
func IsValidObjectKey(object string) bool {
if object == "" {
return true
}
if strings.ContainsRune(object, '\x00') {
return false
}
object = strings.ReplaceAll(object, "\\", "/")
for _, seg := range strings.Split(object, "/") {
if seg == "." || seg == ".." {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// IsValidBucketName rejects bucket names captured from the URL path that are
// unsafe to use in filer path construction (`.`, `..`, contain `/` or `\`, or
// embed NUL). This is a path-safety check, not a full S3 naming-rule check.
func IsValidBucketName(bucket string) bool {
if bucket == "" {
return true
}
if bucket == "." || bucket == ".." {
return false
}
return !strings.ContainsAny(bucket, "/\\\x00")
}
// IsValidPathSegment reports whether value is safe to use as one filer path
// component. It intentionally does not enforce any application-specific
// format; callers can layer stricter checks on top.
func IsValidPathSegment(value string) bool {
if value == "" || value == "." || value == ".." {
return false
}
return !strings.ContainsAny(value, "/\\\x00")
}
// NormalizeObjectKey normalizes object keys by removing duplicate slashes and converting backslashes.
// This normalizes keys from various sources (URL path, form values, etc.) to a consistent format.
// It also converts Windows-style backslashes to forward slashes for cross-platform compatibility.
// Returns keys WITHOUT leading slash to match S3 API format (e.g., "foo/bar" not "/foo/bar").
// Preserves trailing slash if present (e.g., "foo/" stays "foo/").
func NormalizeObjectKey(object string) string {
// Preserve trailing slash if present
hasTrailingSlash := strings.HasSuffix(object, "/")
// Convert Windows-style backslashes to forward slashes
object = strings.ReplaceAll(object, "\\", "/")
object = removeDuplicateSlashes(object)
// Remove leading slash to match S3 API format
object = strings.TrimPrefix(object, "/")
// Restore trailing slash if it was present and result is not empty
if hasTrailingSlash && object != "" && !strings.HasSuffix(object, "/") {
object = object + "/"
}
return object
}
// removeDuplicateSlashes removes consecutive slashes from a path
func removeDuplicateSlashes(s string) string {
var result strings.Builder
result.Grow(len(s))
lastWasSlash := false
for _, r := range s {
if r == '/' {
if !lastWasSlash {
result.WriteRune(r)
}
lastWasSlash = true
} else {
result.WriteRune(r)
lastWasSlash = false
}
}
return result.String()
}
func GetPrefix(r *http.Request) string {
query := r.URL.Query()
prefix := query.Get("prefix")
prefix = removeDuplicateSlashes(prefix)
return prefix
}
var PassThroughHeaders = map[string]string{
"response-cache-control": "Cache-Control",
"response-content-disposition": "Content-Disposition",
"response-content-encoding": "Content-Encoding",
"response-content-language": "Content-Language",
"response-content-type": "Content-Type",
"response-expires": "Expires",
}
// IsSeaweedFSInternalHeader checks if a header key is a SeaweedFS internal header
// that should be filtered from client responses.
// Header names are case-insensitive in HTTP, so this function normalizes to lowercase.
func IsSeaweedFSInternalHeader(headerKey string) bool {
return strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(headerKey), SeaweedFSInternalPrefix)
}
// Context keys for storing authenticated identity information
type contextKey string
const (
contextKeyIdentityName contextKey = "s3-identity-name"
contextKeyIdentityObject contextKey = "s3-identity-object"
contextKeyIdentityHolder contextKey = "s3-identity-holder"
contextKeyPrincipalArn contextKey = "s3-principal-arn"
contextKeyIdentityClaim contextKey = "s3-identity-claim"
contextKeyIgnoredSessionToken contextKey = "s3-ignored-session-token"
contextKeyOriginalRequestPath contextKey = "s3-original-request-path"
)
// identityHolder is a mutable container for the authenticated identity name,
// stored by pointer in the request context. Authentication runs as an inner
// handler that records the identity with r.WithContext, which returns a request
// copy; that copy's new context values are invisible to outer middleware (e.g.
// the audit logger) holding an earlier copy of the request. A pointer to a
// holder installed before authentication is shared across all copies, so the
// name written by the inner handler is readable by the outer middleware.
type identityHolder struct {
name atomic.Pointer[string]
principalArn atomic.Pointer[string]
identityClaim atomic.Pointer[string]
}
// EnsureIdentityHolder attaches a mutable identity holder to the request context
// if one is not already present, returning the (possibly new) request. Install
// it before authentication so the authenticated requester remains recoverable
// from the original request, e.g. when emitting an audit entry for a handler
// that does not log the requester itself.
func EnsureIdentityHolder(r *http.Request) *http.Request {
if r == nil {
return nil
}
if h, ok := r.Context().Value(contextKeyIdentityHolder).(*identityHolder); ok && h != nil {
return r
}
return r.WithContext(context.WithValue(r.Context(), contextKeyIdentityHolder, &identityHolder{}))
}
// SetIdentityNameInContext stores the authenticated identity name in the request context
// This is the secure way to propagate identity - headers can be spoofed, context cannot
func SetIdentityNameInContext(ctx context.Context, identityName string) context.Context {
if identityName == "" {
return ctx
}
// Also record into the mutable holder (if installed) so the name survives the
// request-context copy and stays visible to outer middleware such as the
// audit logger.
if h, ok := ctx.Value(contextKeyIdentityHolder).(*identityHolder); ok && h != nil {
h.name.Store(&identityName)
}
return context.WithValue(ctx, contextKeyIdentityName, identityName)
}
// GetIdentityNameFromContext retrieves the authenticated identity name from the request context
// Returns empty string if no identity is set (unauthenticated request)
// This is the secure way to retrieve identity - never read from headers directly
func GetIdentityNameFromContext(r *http.Request) string {
// Prefer the per-request context value; fall back to the mutable holder for
// callers (e.g. the audit middleware) that hold a copy of the request taken
// before authentication set the identity.
if name, ok := r.Context().Value(contextKeyIdentityName).(string); ok && name != "" {
return name
}
if h, ok := r.Context().Value(contextKeyIdentityHolder).(*identityHolder); ok && h != nil {
if name := h.name.Load(); name != nil {
return *name
}
}
return ""
}
// SetPrincipalArnInContext stores the authenticated principal ARN in the request
// context. For an STS session the identity name is an opaque session subject, so
// the ARN is the only place the assumed role and session name survive to the
// audit log.
func SetPrincipalArnInContext(ctx context.Context, principalArn string) context.Context {
if principalArn == "" {
return ctx
}
if h, ok := ctx.Value(contextKeyIdentityHolder).(*identityHolder); ok && h != nil {
h.principalArn.Store(&principalArn)
}
return context.WithValue(ctx, contextKeyPrincipalArn, principalArn)
}
// GetPrincipalArnFromContext retrieves the authenticated principal ARN from the
// request context, or "" when the request is unauthenticated.
func GetPrincipalArnFromContext(r *http.Request) string {
if arn, ok := r.Context().Value(contextKeyPrincipalArn).(string); ok && arn != "" {
return arn
}
if h, ok := r.Context().Value(contextKeyIdentityHolder).(*identityHolder); ok && h != nil {
if arn := h.principalArn.Load(); arn != nil {
return *arn
}
}
return ""
}
// SetIdentityClaimInContext stores the authoritative OIDC identity claim (e.g.
// preferred_username, email, sub) for the audit log. For an STS-assumed OIDC
// session the requester name is an opaque session subject, so the claim is the
// only place a stable, human-readable federated identity survives to the audit
// log. Empty for non-federated sessions, where the requester name already
// carries the real username.
func SetIdentityClaimInContext(ctx context.Context, identityClaim string) context.Context {
if identityClaim == "" {
return ctx
}
if h, ok := ctx.Value(contextKeyIdentityHolder).(*identityHolder); ok && h != nil {
h.identityClaim.Store(&identityClaim)
}
return context.WithValue(ctx, contextKeyIdentityClaim, identityClaim)
}
// GetIdentityClaimFromContext retrieves the authoritative OIDC identity claim
// from the request context, or "" when the request is unauthenticated or not
// federated.
func GetIdentityClaimFromContext(r *http.Request) string {
if claim, ok := r.Context().Value(contextKeyIdentityClaim).(string); ok && claim != "" {
return claim
}
if h, ok := r.Context().Value(contextKeyIdentityHolder).(*identityHolder); ok && h != nil {
if claim := h.identityClaim.Load(); claim != nil {
return *claim
}
}
return ""
}
// SetOriginalRequestPathInContext records the path a client actually sent
// before an internal rewrite (e.g. the Iceberg catalog collapsing a doubled
// /v1 prefix). SigV4 verification must run against this path: the client
// signed the URI it requested, not the normalized path it was routed with.
func SetOriginalRequestPathInContext(ctx context.Context, path string) context.Context {
if path == "" {
return ctx
}
return context.WithValue(ctx, contextKeyOriginalRequestPath, path)
}
// GetOriginalRequestPathFromContext returns the pre-rewrite request path
// recorded by SetOriginalRequestPathInContext, or "" when unset.
func GetOriginalRequestPathFromContext(r *http.Request) string {
if path, ok := r.Context().Value(contextKeyOriginalRequestPath).(string); ok {
return path
}
return ""
}
// IgnoreSessionTokenInContext marks the request's session token as tolerated
// rather than authenticated: a statically configured access key signed the
// request, so the token (which credential vendors like Unity Catalog emit on
// static credentials too) must not steer authorization into the STS session
// path. A context value because headers can be spoofed; this cannot.
func IgnoreSessionTokenInContext(ctx context.Context) context.Context {
return context.WithValue(ctx, contextKeyIgnoredSessionToken, true)
}
// IsSessionTokenIgnored reports whether the request carries a session token
// that was tolerated for a statically configured access key.
func IsSessionTokenIgnored(ctx context.Context) bool {
ignored, _ := ctx.Value(contextKeyIgnoredSessionToken).(bool)
return ignored
}
// SetIdentityInContext stores the full authenticated identity object in the request context
// This is used to pass the full identity (including for JWT users) to handlers
func SetIdentityInContext(ctx context.Context, identity interface{}) context.Context {
if identity != nil {
return context.WithValue(ctx, contextKeyIdentityObject, identity)
}
return ctx
}
// GetIdentityFromContext retrieves the full identity object from the request context
// Returns nil if no identity is set (unauthenticated request)
func GetIdentityFromContext(r *http.Request) interface{} {
return r.Context().Value(contextKeyIdentityObject)
}