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* s3tables: re-anchor legacy owners for federated STS sessions A web-identity role session was keyed on its bare OIDC subject until owners became issuer-scoped. Its sessions now carry the scoped aws:userid but no asserted issuers, so the legacy subject check never applied and the session lost the table buckets and namespaces it had created. Read the configured issuer set for such sessions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3api: keep token claims from asserting trusted issuers on STS sessions Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * iceberg: give the catalog's table handler the local accounts and issuer set Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3tables: test a federated session on a bucket its legacy subject owns Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * sts: drop a token-supplied aws:userid when a session has no parent user Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3api: take a session's aws:userid from its signed parent user Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3api: test that session claims keep only the server-asserted aws:userid Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3tables: match legacy subject patterns in table bucket policy principals A policy written before issuer scoping can name role sessions by a pattern over their bare OIDC subjects. Match such a pattern against the caller's subject claim once that subject resolves to the session's scoped principal under the single configured issuer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3tables: test a federated session against a legacy subject pattern principal Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
875 lines
29 KiB
Go
875 lines
29 KiB
Go
package s3tables
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import (
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"bytes"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"math"
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"net"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/iam/sts"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/policy_engine"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3_constants"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/util/wildcard"
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)
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// Permission represents a specific action permission
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type Permission string
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// IAM Policy structures for evaluation
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type PolicyDocument struct {
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Version string `json:"Version"`
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Statement []Statement `json:"Statement"`
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}
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// UnmarshalJSON handles both single statement object and array of statements
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// AWS allows {"Statement": {...}} or {"Statement": [{...}]}
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func (pd *PolicyDocument) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
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type Alias PolicyDocument
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aux := &struct {
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Statement json.RawMessage `json:"Statement"`
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*Alias
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}{
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Alias: (*Alias)(pd),
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}
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if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &aux); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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var statement interface{}
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if len(aux.Statement) > 0 {
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if err := json.Unmarshal(aux.Statement, &statement); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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// Handle Statement as either a single object or array
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raws := []json.RawMessage{aux.Statement}
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switch s := statement.(type) {
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case map[string]interface{}:
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// Single statement object - unmarshal to one Statement
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stmtData, err := json.Marshal(s)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal single statement: %w", err)
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}
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var stmt Statement
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if err := json.Unmarshal(stmtData, &stmt); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal single statement: %w", err)
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}
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pd.Statement = []Statement{stmt}
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case []interface{}:
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// Array of statements - normal handling
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stmtData, err := json.Marshal(s)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal statement array: %w", err)
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}
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if err := json.Unmarshal(stmtData, &pd.Statement); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal statement array: %w", err)
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}
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if err := json.Unmarshal(aux.Statement, &raws); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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case nil:
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// No statements
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pd.Statement = []Statement{}
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default:
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return fmt.Errorf("Statement must be an object or array, got %T", statement)
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}
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// The re-marshal above keeps only the last of a repeated key, so the
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// Condition keys are counted from the original bytes.
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for i := range pd.Statement {
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if i < len(raws) {
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pd.Statement[i].nullCondition, pd.Statement[i].splitCondition = conditionKeys(raws[i])
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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type Statement struct {
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Effect string `json:"Effect"` // "Allow" or "Deny"
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Principal interface{} `json:"Principal"` // Can be string, []string, or map
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Action interface{} `json:"Action"` // Can be string or []string
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Resource interface{} `json:"Resource"` // Can be string or []string
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Condition map[string]map[string]interface{} `json:"Condition,omitempty"`
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// nullCondition records a literal "Condition": null, which decodes the
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// same as no Condition.
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nullCondition bool
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// splitCondition records more than one Condition key, in any spelling.
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// Those objects decode into one map in which an operator they share keeps
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// only the last one's keys.
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splitCondition bool
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}
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// conditionKeys walks a statement object's keys, which a map would collapse,
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// and reports a null Condition and a Condition under more than one key.
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func conditionKeys(data []byte) (null, split bool) {
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dec := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(data))
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if tok, err := dec.Token(); err != nil || tok != json.Delim('{') {
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return false, false
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}
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conditions := 0
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for dec.More() {
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key, err := dec.Token()
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if err != nil {
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break
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}
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var raw json.RawMessage
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if err := dec.Decode(&raw); err != nil {
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break
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}
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if name, _ := key.(string); strings.EqualFold(name, "Condition") {
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conditions++
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null = null || string(raw) == "null"
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}
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}
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return null, conditions > 1
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}
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// SplitCondition reports a statement with more than one Condition key, which
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// the evaluator never grants on and always vetoes with.
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func (s *Statement) SplitCondition() bool {
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return s.splitCondition
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}
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type PolicyContext struct {
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Namespace string
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TableName string
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TableBucketName string
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IdentityActions []string
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RequestTags map[string]string
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ResourceTags map[string]string
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TableBucketTags map[string]string
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TagKeys []string
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SSEAlgorithm string
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KMSKeyArn string
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StorageClass string
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DefaultAllow bool
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// TrustedIssuers lists the OIDC issuers the deployment is configured to
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// trust, used to re-anchor owners/principals written before issuer-scoped
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// account IDs. A bare subject is only resolvable when exactly one issuer
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// is configured; more than one leaves it ambiguous, so it must not match.
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TrustedIssuers []string
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// IsLocalAccountID reports whether an account ID belongs to a configured
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// local identity. Such owner strings were never OIDC subjects and must not
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// be re-anchored; a nil predicate exempts nothing beyond the built-in
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// reserved, ARN, and scoped-id checks.
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IsLocalAccountID func(string) bool
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// Subject is the caller's OIDC subject, matched against subject patterns
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// written before issuer scoping once it is shown to hash to the principal.
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Subject string
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}
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// CheckPermissionWithContext checks permission with optional resource and condition context.
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func CheckPermissionWithContext(operation, principal, owner, resourcePolicy, resourceARN string, ctx *PolicyContext) bool {
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// Deny access if identities are empty
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if principal == "" || owner == "" {
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return false
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}
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// Admin always has permission.
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if principal == s3_constants.AccountAdminId && adminCaller(operation, ctx) {
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return true
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}
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glog.V(2).Infof("S3Tables: CheckPermission operation=%s principal=%s owner=%s", operation, principal, owner)
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return checkPermission(operation, principal, owner, resourcePolicy, resourceARN, ctx)
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}
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// CheckTableOrBucketPermission combines a table or namespace policy with its
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// table bucket's policy into one decision: a matching Deny on either policy
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// vetoes the request even when the other policy would allow it.
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func CheckTableOrBucketPermission(operation, principal, resourceOwner, resourcePolicy, resourceARN, bucketOwner, bucketPolicy, bucketARN string, ctx *PolicyContext) bool {
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if principal == "" {
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return false
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}
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if principal == s3_constants.AccountAdminId && adminCaller(operation, ctx) {
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return true
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}
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if matchesDenyStatement(operation, principal, resourcePolicy, resourceARN, ctx) ||
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matchesDenyStatement(operation, principal, bucketPolicy, bucketARN, ctx) {
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return false
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}
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// Each side fails closed when its owner is unknown, matching
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// CheckPermissionWithContext; an ownerless side contributes nothing.
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resourceOK := resourceOwner != "" &&
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checkPermission(operation, principal, resourceOwner, resourcePolicy, resourceARN, ctx)
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bucketOK := bucketOwner != "" &&
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checkPermission(operation, principal, bucketOwner, bucketPolicy, bucketARN, ctx)
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return resourceOK || bucketOK
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}
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// validatePolicyDocument rejects a policy the evaluator could not honor: one
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// that does not parse, whose actions and resources name the vector service,
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// whose conditions the evaluator cannot compare, or whose Allow carries a null
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// Condition. Any of them stored here would be a rule the writer believes is
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// enforced — vector requests authorize their s3tables action on a s3tables
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// ARN, an unusable condition is skipped on an Allow and vetoes everything on a
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// Deny, and a null Condition reads as none, so the Allow grants unconditionally.
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func validatePolicyDocument(raw string) error {
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var doc PolicyDocument
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if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(raw), &doc); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid policy document: %w", err)
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}
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for _, stmt := range doc.Statement {
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// A null Condition on a Deny only widens the veto, so it stays allowed.
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if stmt.Effect == "Allow" && stmt.nullCondition {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid policy document: an Allow statement's Condition must not be null")
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}
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if stmt.splitCondition {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid policy document: a statement's Condition must be under one key, spelled Condition")
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}
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for operator, keys := range stmt.Condition {
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if _, err := policy_engine.GetConditionEvaluator(operator); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid policy document: condition operator %q is not supported", operator)
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}
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// An operator with no keys holds for every request.
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if len(keys) == 0 {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid policy document: condition %s needs at least one key", operator)
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}
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for key, value := range keys {
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if !tableConditionKey(key) {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid policy document: condition key %q is not supported in a table policy", key)
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}
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if !ConditionValue(operator, value) {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid policy document: condition %s on %q needs values %s can read (a number for Numeric*, an RFC 3339 time for Date*, true or false for Bool and Null, an IP or CIDR for IpAddress)", operator, key, operator)
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}
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}
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}
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for _, action := range statementActions(stmt.Action) {
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if strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(action), "s3vectors:") {
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return fmt.Errorf("action %q is not enforceable in a resource policy", action)
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}
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}
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for _, resource := range statementActions(stmt.Resource) {
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if strings.EqualFold(arnService(resource), "s3vectors") {
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return fmt.Errorf("resource %q is not enforceable in a resource policy", resource)
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}
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// ConditionValue reports whether operator's evaluator can read v: a JSON
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// type it can compare, and a value it parses rather than skips. A null
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// value would panic it, an empty list never matches, and an unreadable
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// value is skipped — dropping a Deny or matching a negated Allow.
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func ConditionValue(operator string, v interface{}) bool {
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list, ok := v.([]interface{})
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if !ok {
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list = []interface{}{v}
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}
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base, qualified := strings.CutPrefix(operator, "ForAllValues:")
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if !qualified {
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base, _ = strings.CutPrefix(operator, "ForAnyValue:")
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}
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for _, item := range list {
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switch item.(type) {
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case string, float64, bool:
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default:
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return false
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}
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if !conditionValueReadable(base, item) {
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return false
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}
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}
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return len(list) > 0
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}
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// conditionValueReadable reports whether the evaluator for base parses item
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// the way it reads it. An operator without a case here is refused, so one
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// added to the policy engine cannot be accepted before it is checked.
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func conditionValueReadable(base string, item interface{}) bool {
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switch base {
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case "StringEquals", "StringNotEquals", "StringLike", "StringNotLike",
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"StringEqualsIgnoreCase", "StringNotEqualsIgnoreCase", "ArnEquals", "ArnLike":
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return true
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case "NumericEquals", "NumericNotEquals", "NumericLessThan", "NumericLessThanEquals",
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"NumericGreaterThan", "NumericGreaterThanEquals":
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switch v := item.(type) {
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case float64:
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return true
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case string:
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f, err := strconv.ParseFloat(v, 64)
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return err == nil && !math.IsNaN(f) && !math.IsInf(f, 0)
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}
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case "DateEquals", "DateNotEquals", "DateLessThan", "DateLessThanEquals",
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"DateGreaterThan", "DateGreaterThanEquals":
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if v, ok := item.(string); ok {
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_, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, v)
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return err == nil
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}
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case "Bool", "Null":
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switch v := item.(type) {
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case bool:
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return true
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case string:
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return strings.EqualFold(v, "true") || strings.EqualFold(v, "false")
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}
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case "IpAddress", "NotIpAddress":
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if v, ok := item.(string); ok {
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if _, _, err := net.ParseCIDR(v); err == nil {
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return true
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}
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return net.ParseIP(v) != nil
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// arnService returns the service field of an ARN in any partition, so a
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// resource naming s3vectors is caught for aws-cn, aws-us-gov, and friends —
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// not just the commercial partition.
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func arnService(resource string) string {
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parts := strings.SplitN(resource, ":", 4)
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if len(parts) == 4 && parts[0] == "arn" {
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return parts[2]
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}
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return ""
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}
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func statementActions(spec interface{}) []string {
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switch a := spec.(type) {
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case string:
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return []string{a}
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case []interface{}:
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var actions []string
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for _, item := range a {
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if str, ok := item.(string); ok {
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actions = append(actions, str)
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}
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}
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return actions
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}
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return nil
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}
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// deniedByPolicy reports whether another applicable resource policy vetoes the
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// request. The admin account is exempt, matching CheckPermissionWithContext.
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func deniedByPolicy(operation, principal, resourcePolicy, resourceARN string, ctx *PolicyContext) bool {
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return (principal != s3_constants.AccountAdminId || !adminCaller(operation, ctx)) &&
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matchesDenyStatement(operation, principal, resourcePolicy, resourceARN, ctx)
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}
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// adminCaller reports whether the admin principal bypass applies. Trusted
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// transports carry no action list, while an identified caller always has one
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// — possibly empty — and holds the bypass only when the identity administers
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// the operation's service: a principal that merely normalizes to the admin
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// id does not bypass policy denies.
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func adminCaller(operation string, ctx *PolicyContext) bool {
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return ctx == nil || ctx.IdentityActions == nil || hasAdminActionFor(operation, ctx.IdentityActions)
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}
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// matchesDenyStatement reports whether the JSON policy carries a statement
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// matching this request with Effect Deny. Malformed policies return false;
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// the caller's normal evaluation still denies them. A Deny whose condition
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// cannot be evaluated applies: it was written to protect the resource, and
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// dropping it would widen access.
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func matchesDenyStatement(operation, principal, resourcePolicy, resourceARN string, ctx *PolicyContext) bool {
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if resourcePolicy == "" {
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return false
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}
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fullAction := operation
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if !strings.Contains(operation, ":") {
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fullAction = "s3tables:" + operation
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}
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var policy PolicyDocument
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if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(resourcePolicy), &policy); err != nil {
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return false
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}
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for _, stmt := range policy.Statement {
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if stmt.Effect != "Deny" ||
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!matchesDenyCaller(stmt.Principal, principal, ctx) ||
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!matchesAction(stmt.Action, fullAction) ||
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(resourceARN != "" && !matchesResource(stmt.Resource, resourceARN)) {
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continue
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}
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matched, usable := matchesConditions(stmt.Condition, ctx)
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if !usable || stmt.splitCondition {
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glog.Warningf("S3Tables: policy on %q has a Deny condition that cannot be evaluated; denying %s for %s until the policy is replaced", resourceARN, fullAction, principal)
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return true
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}
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if matched {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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func checkPermission(operation, principal, owner, resourcePolicy, resourceARN string, ctx *PolicyContext) bool {
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// An explicit Deny in the resource policy vetoes owner and identity
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// grants as well as allows within the same document.
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if matchesDenyStatement(operation, principal, resourcePolicy, resourceARN, ctx) {
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return false
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}
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// Owner always has permission.
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if principal == owner || matchesLegacySubject(owner, principal, ctx) {
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return true
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}
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if hasIdentityPermission(operation, ctx) {
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return true
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}
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// If no policy is provided, use default allow if enabled
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if resourcePolicy == "" {
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if ctx != nil && ctx.DefaultAllow {
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return true
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}
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return false
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}
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// Normalize operation to full IAM-style action name (e.g., "s3tables:CreateTableBucket")
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// if not already prefixed
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fullAction := operation
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if !strings.Contains(operation, ":") {
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fullAction = "s3tables:" + operation
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}
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// Parse and evaluate policy
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var policy PolicyDocument
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if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(resourcePolicy), &policy); err != nil {
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return false
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}
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// Evaluate policy statements
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// Default is deny, so we need an explicit allow
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hasAllow := false
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for _, stmt := range policy.Statement {
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// Check if principal matches
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if !matchesCaller(stmt.Principal, principal, ctx) {
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continue
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}
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// Check if action matches (using normalized full action name)
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if !matchesAction(stmt.Action, fullAction) {
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continue
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}
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// Check if resource matches (if resourceARN specified and Resource field exists)
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if resourceARN != "" && !matchesResource(stmt.Resource, resourceARN) {
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continue
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}
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// A condition that cannot be evaluated never grants, nor does a null
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// or split one stored before validatePolicyDocument refused it.
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if stmt.Effect == "Allow" && (stmt.nullCondition || stmt.splitCondition) {
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continue
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}
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if matched, usable := matchesConditions(stmt.Condition, ctx); !usable || !matched {
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continue
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}
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// Statement matches - check effect
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switch stmt.Effect {
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case "Allow":
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hasAllow = true
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case "Deny":
|
|
// Explicit deny always wins
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if hasAllow {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If no statement matched, use default allow if enabled
|
|
if ctx != nil && ctx.DefaultAllow {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func hasIdentityPermission(operation string, ctx *PolicyContext) bool {
|
|
if ctx == nil || len(ctx.IdentityActions) == 0 {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
fullAction := operation
|
|
if !strings.Contains(operation, ":") {
|
|
fullAction = "s3tables:" + operation
|
|
}
|
|
if hasAdminActionFor(operation, ctx.IdentityActions) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
candidates := []string{operation, fullAction}
|
|
if ctx.TableBucketName != "" {
|
|
candidates = append(candidates, operation+":"+ctx.TableBucketName, fullAction+":"+ctx.TableBucketName)
|
|
}
|
|
for _, action := range ctx.IdentityActions {
|
|
for _, candidate := range candidates {
|
|
if action == candidate {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
if strings.ContainsAny(action, "*?") && wildcard.MatchesWildcard(action, candidate) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// hasAdminAction reports whether the action list grants blanket admin access.
|
|
// Legacy static identities may use broad markers or s3 wildcards; s3:* is treated
|
|
// as s3tables:* so shared admin policies still permit table access.
|
|
func hasAdminAction(actions []string) bool {
|
|
for _, action := range actions {
|
|
if action == "*" || action == s3_constants.ACTION_ADMIN || action == "s3:*" || action == "s3tables:*" {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// hasAdminActionFor reports whether the action list administers the
|
|
// operation's own service: the global admin markers always apply, while a
|
|
// service wildcard covers only that service — s3tables:* never reaches an
|
|
// s3vectors operation.
|
|
func hasAdminActionFor(operation string, actions []string) bool {
|
|
if !strings.Contains(operation, ":") {
|
|
operation = "s3tables:" + operation
|
|
}
|
|
serviceWildcard := operation[:strings.Index(operation, ":")] + ":*"
|
|
for _, action := range actions {
|
|
if action == "*" || action == s3_constants.ACTION_ADMIN || action == "s3:*" || action == serviceWildcard {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// matchesCaller matches a statement's Principal against the caller's scoped
|
|
// principal or, for policies written before issuer scoping, a bare subject
|
|
// that resolves to it under the deployment's single trusted issuer.
|
|
func matchesCaller(principalSpec interface{}, principal string, ctx *PolicyContext) bool {
|
|
return matchCaller(principalSpec, principal, ctx, false)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// matchesDenyCaller is matchesCaller for deny evaluation: an ARN-scoped
|
|
// statement also reaches a caller stored under the ARN's trailing name, so a
|
|
// deny cannot be ducked through normalization the way an allow must not grant
|
|
// through it.
|
|
func matchesDenyCaller(principalSpec interface{}, principal string, ctx *PolicyContext) bool {
|
|
return matchCaller(principalSpec, principal, ctx, true)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func matchCaller(principalSpec interface{}, principal string, ctx *PolicyContext, forDeny bool) bool {
|
|
if matchPrincipal(principalSpec, principal, forDeny) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
switch p := principalSpec.(type) {
|
|
case string:
|
|
return matchesLegacyPrincipal(p, principal, ctx)
|
|
case []interface{}:
|
|
for _, item := range p {
|
|
if str, ok := item.(string); ok && matchesLegacyPrincipal(str, principal, ctx) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
case map[string]interface{}:
|
|
if aws, ok := p["AWS"]; ok {
|
|
return matchCaller(aws, principal, ctx, forDeny)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// matchesLegacySubject reports whether a bare subject stored before issuer
|
|
// scoping belongs to the caller. Re-anchoring is only sound when exactly one
|
|
// OIDC issuer is configured: the stored subject is hashed under that issuer
|
|
// and compared to the caller's scoped principal. With multiple issuers a bare
|
|
// subject is ambiguous — matching it under the caller's own issuer would let
|
|
// a same-sub identity from any configured issuer claim it.
|
|
func matchesLegacySubject(legacy, principal string, ctx *PolicyContext) bool {
|
|
if ctx == nil || len(ctx.TrustedIssuers) != 1 {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
// The reserved accounts, ARN values, and already issuer-scoped ids are never
|
|
// OIDC subjects — or, for strings that could be either a legacy subject or a
|
|
// scoped id, resolving to scoped fails closed. A configured local account
|
|
// id is excluded the same way once the caller supplies the predicate. Any
|
|
// of them could otherwise be claimed by a token asserting that string as
|
|
// sub — including the admin account or a victim's scoped id.
|
|
if legacy == s3_constants.AccountAdminId || legacy == s3_constants.AccountAnonymousId ||
|
|
strings.HasPrefix(legacy, "arn:") || sts.IsParentUserID(legacy) ||
|
|
(ctx.IsLocalAccountID != nil && ctx.IsLocalAccountID(legacy)) {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
return sts.ComputeParentUser(legacy, ctx.TrustedIssuers[0]) == principal
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// matchesLegacyPrincipal is matchesLegacySubject for a policy principal, which
|
|
// may also be a subject pattern: it matches the caller's subject only when that
|
|
// subject itself resolves to the principal.
|
|
func matchesLegacyPrincipal(spec, principal string, ctx *PolicyContext) bool {
|
|
if matchesLegacySubject(spec, principal, ctx) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
return ctx != nil && strings.ContainsAny(spec, "*?") && !strings.HasPrefix(spec, "arn:") &&
|
|
wildcard.MatchesWildcard(spec, ctx.Subject) && matchesLegacySubject(ctx.Subject, principal, ctx)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// matchesPrincipal checks if the principal matches the statement's principal
|
|
func matchesPrincipal(principalSpec interface{}, principal string) bool {
|
|
return matchPrincipal(principalSpec, principal, false)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func matchPrincipal(principalSpec interface{}, principal string, forDeny bool) bool {
|
|
if principalSpec == nil {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch p := principalSpec.(type) {
|
|
case string:
|
|
return matchPrincipalString(p, principal, forDeny)
|
|
case []interface{}:
|
|
// Array of principals
|
|
for _, item := range p {
|
|
if str, ok := item.(string); ok && matchPrincipalString(str, principal, forDeny) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
case map[string]interface{}:
|
|
// AWS-style principal with service prefix, e.g., {"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::..."}
|
|
// For S3 Tables, we primarily care about the AWS key
|
|
if aws, ok := p["AWS"]; ok {
|
|
return matchPrincipal(aws, principal, forDeny)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// matchPrincipalString reports whether a single principal spec matches the
|
|
// caller. An ARN-scoped statement reaches a caller recorded under the ARN's
|
|
// trailing name only for denies: normalization drops the ARN's account and
|
|
// path, so an allow matched that way could grant a same-named caller the
|
|
// statement never verified, while a deny must still land so it cannot be
|
|
// ducked through the same collapse.
|
|
func matchPrincipalString(spec, principal string, forDeny bool) bool {
|
|
if spec == "*" || spec == principal {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
if wildcard.MatchesWildcard(spec, principal) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
return forDeny && strings.HasPrefix(spec, "arn:") && !strings.HasPrefix(principal, "arn:") &&
|
|
wildcard.MatchesWildcard(normalizePrincipalID(spec), principal)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// matchesAction checks if the action matches the statement's action
|
|
func matchesAction(actionSpec interface{}, action string) bool {
|
|
if actionSpec == nil {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch a := actionSpec.(type) {
|
|
case string:
|
|
// Direct match or wildcard
|
|
return matchesActionPattern(a, action)
|
|
case []interface{}:
|
|
// Array of actions
|
|
for _, item := range a {
|
|
if str, ok := item.(string); ok {
|
|
if matchesActionPattern(str, action) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// matchesActionPattern checks if an action matches a pattern (supports wildcards)
|
|
// This uses the policy_engine.MatchesWildcard function for full wildcard support,
|
|
// including middle wildcards (e.g., "s3tables:Get*Table") for complete IAM compatibility.
|
|
func matchesActionPattern(pattern, action string) bool {
|
|
if pattern == "*" {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Exact match
|
|
if pattern == action {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Wildcard match using policy engine's wildcard matcher
|
|
// Supports both * (any sequence) and ? (single character) anywhere in the pattern
|
|
return wildcard.MatchesWildcard(pattern, action)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// matchesConditions reports whether every condition holds for ctx, and
|
|
// whether the block can be evaluated at all: one unsupported operator, keyless
|
|
// operator or uncomparable value leaves it unusable, and the caller decides
|
|
// what that means for the statement's Effect. Every operator is checked
|
|
// before answering, so the verdict does not depend on map iteration order.
|
|
func matchesConditions(conditions map[string]map[string]interface{}, ctx *PolicyContext) (matched, usable bool) {
|
|
if len(conditions) == 0 {
|
|
return true, true
|
|
}
|
|
matched = true
|
|
for operator, conditionValues := range conditions {
|
|
ok, valid := matchesConditionOperator(operator, conditionValues, ctx)
|
|
if !valid {
|
|
return false, false
|
|
}
|
|
matched = matched && ok
|
|
}
|
|
return matched, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func matchesConditionOperator(operator string, conditionValues map[string]interface{}, ctx *PolicyContext) (matched, usable bool) {
|
|
evaluator, err := policy_engine.GetConditionEvaluator(operator)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, false
|
|
}
|
|
// With no keys the loop below would hold for every request; a stored
|
|
// keyless operator is unusable, so it never lets an Allow grant.
|
|
if len(conditionValues) == 0 {
|
|
return false, false
|
|
}
|
|
for _, value := range conditionValues {
|
|
if !ConditionValue(operator, value) {
|
|
return false, false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if ctx == nil {
|
|
return false, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for key, value := range conditionValues {
|
|
contextVals := getConditionContextValues(key, ctx)
|
|
if !evaluator.Evaluate(value, contextVals) {
|
|
return false, true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return true, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// tableConditionKey reports whether getConditionContextValues supplies key.
|
|
func tableConditionKey(key string) bool {
|
|
switch key {
|
|
case "s3tables:namespace", "s3tables:tableName", "s3tables:tableBucketName",
|
|
"s3tables:SSEAlgorithm", "s3tables:KMSKeyArn", "s3tables:StorageClass", "aws:TagKeys":
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
for _, prefix := range []string{"aws:RequestTag/", "aws:ResourceTag/", "s3tables:TableBucketTag/", "s3vectors:VectorBucketTag/"} {
|
|
if tagKey, ok := strings.CutPrefix(key, prefix); ok {
|
|
return tagKey != ""
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func getConditionContextValues(key string, ctx *PolicyContext) []string {
|
|
switch key {
|
|
case "s3tables:namespace":
|
|
return []string{ctx.Namespace}
|
|
case "s3tables:tableName":
|
|
return []string{ctx.TableName}
|
|
case "s3tables:tableBucketName":
|
|
return []string{ctx.TableBucketName}
|
|
case "s3tables:SSEAlgorithm":
|
|
return []string{ctx.SSEAlgorithm}
|
|
case "s3tables:KMSKeyArn":
|
|
return []string{ctx.KMSKeyArn}
|
|
case "s3tables:StorageClass":
|
|
return []string{ctx.StorageClass}
|
|
case "aws:TagKeys":
|
|
return ctx.TagKeys
|
|
}
|
|
if strings.HasPrefix(key, "aws:RequestTag/") {
|
|
tagKey := strings.TrimPrefix(key, "aws:RequestTag/")
|
|
if val, ok := ctx.RequestTags[tagKey]; ok {
|
|
return []string{val}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if strings.HasPrefix(key, "aws:ResourceTag/") {
|
|
tagKey := strings.TrimPrefix(key, "aws:ResourceTag/")
|
|
if val, ok := ctx.ResourceTags[tagKey]; ok {
|
|
return []string{val}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
tagKey, ok := strings.CutPrefix(key, "s3tables:TableBucketTag/")
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
tagKey, ok = strings.CutPrefix(key, "s3vectors:VectorBucketTag/")
|
|
}
|
|
if ok {
|
|
if val, found := ctx.TableBucketTags[tagKey]; found {
|
|
return []string{val}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// matchesResource checks if the resource ARN matches the statement's resource specification
|
|
// Returns true if resource matches or if Resource is not specified (implicit match)
|
|
func matchesResource(resourceSpec interface{}, resourceARN string) bool {
|
|
// If no Resource is specified, match all resources (implicit *)
|
|
if resourceSpec == nil {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch r := resourceSpec.(type) {
|
|
case string:
|
|
// Direct match or wildcard
|
|
return matchesResourcePattern(r, resourceARN)
|
|
case []interface{}:
|
|
// Array of resources - match if any matches
|
|
for _, item := range r {
|
|
if str, ok := item.(string); ok {
|
|
if matchesResourcePattern(str, resourceARN) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// matchesResourcePattern checks if a resource ARN matches a pattern (supports wildcards)
|
|
func matchesResourcePattern(pattern, resourceARN string) bool {
|
|
if pattern == "*" {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Exact match
|
|
if pattern == resourceARN {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Wildcard match using policy engine's wildcard matcher
|
|
return wildcard.MatchesWildcard(pattern, resourceARN)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AuthError represents an authorization error
|
|
type AuthError struct {
|
|
Operation string
|
|
Principal string
|
|
Message string
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (e *AuthError) Error() string {
|
|
return "unauthorized: " + e.Principal + " is not permitted to perform " + e.Operation + ": " + e.Message
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// NewAuthError creates a new authorization error
|
|
func NewAuthError(operation, principal, message string) *AuthError {
|
|
return &AuthError{
|
|
Operation: operation,
|
|
Principal: principal,
|
|
Message: message,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|