Files
seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3api_object_handlers_postpolicy.go
T
Chris LuandDevin e442eda88e s3: authorize POST policy uploads through the shared object check (#12047)
* s3: authorize POST policy uploads through the shared object check

doesPolicySignatureMatch gated a verified POST Object signature on the
identity's legacy Write action, which cannot represent attached IAM
policies, STS session policies, or key-scoped grants. Users authorized
only by an attached policy (e.g. s3:PutObject on bucket/*) were denied
with AccessDenied even though the equivalent PUT succeeds.

The handler already runs AuthorizeObjectWrite against the real object
key after the form's x-amz-* fields are promoted to headers, so the
coarse check only shadowed the full evaluation. Signature verification
now just returns the identity; authorization stays in one place.

Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* test: POST Object authorizes attached-policy identities, still denies others

Cover the signature check and AuthorizeObjectWrite for an identity whose
only write grant comes from an attached IAM policy, plus the deny leg
for an identity whose attached policy omits s3:PutObject.

Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-24 15:09:34 -07:00

397 lines
13 KiB
Go

package s3api
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"mime/multipart"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"github.com/dustin/go-humanize"
"github.com/gorilla/mux"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/pb/filer_pb"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/policy"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3_constants"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3err"
)
func (s3a *S3ApiServer) PostPolicyBucketHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/sigv4-HTTPPOSTConstructPolicy.html
// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/sigv4-post-example.html
bucket := mux.Vars(r)["bucket"]
glog.V(3).Infof("PostPolicyBucketHandler %s", bucket)
reader, err := r.MultipartReader()
if err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)
return
}
form, err := reader.ReadForm(int64(5 * humanize.MiByte))
if err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)
return
}
defer form.RemoveAll()
fileBody, fileName, fileContentType, fileSize, formValues, err := extractPostPolicyFormValues(form)
if err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)
return
}
if fileBody == nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrPOSTFileRequired)
return
}
defer fileBody.Close()
formValues.Set("Bucket", bucket)
if fileName != "" && strings.Contains(formValues.Get("Key"), "${filename}") {
formValues.Set("Key", strings.Replace(formValues.Get("Key"), "${filename}", fileName, -1))
}
rawObject := formValues.Get("Key")
if rawObject == "" || !s3_constants.IsValidObjectKey(rawObject) {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInvalidRequest)
return
}
object := s3_constants.NormalizeObjectKey(rawObject)
if err := s3a.validateTableBucketObjectPath(bucket, object); err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrAccessDenied)
return
}
successRedirect := formValues.Get("success_action_redirect")
successStatus := formValues.Get("success_action_status")
var redirectURL *url.URL
if successRedirect != "" {
redirectURL, err = url.Parse(successRedirect)
if err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)
return
}
}
// Verify policy signature.
identity, errCode := s3a.iam.doesPolicySignatureMatch(r.Context(), formValues)
if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, refineDenialForBucketName(r, identity, errCode))
return
}
if identity != nil {
r = r.WithContext(recordIdentityInContext(r, identity))
}
policyBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(formValues.Get("Policy"))
if err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)
return
}
// Handle policy if it is set.
if len(policyBytes) > 0 {
postPolicyForm, err := policy.ParsePostPolicyForm(string(policyBytes))
if err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrPostPolicyConditionInvalidFormat)
return
}
// Make sure formValues adhere to policy restrictions.
if err = policy.CheckPostPolicy(formValues, postPolicyForm); err != nil {
glog.V(3).Infof("PostPolicy check failed for bucket %s: %v", bucket, err)
s3err.WriteErrorResponseWithMessage(w, r, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, err.Error())
return
}
// Ensure that the object size is within expected range, also the file size
// should not exceed the maximum single Put size (5 GiB)
lengthRange := postPolicyForm.Conditions.ContentLengthRange
if lengthRange.Valid {
if fileSize < lengthRange.Min {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrEntityTooSmall)
return
}
if fileSize > lengthRange.Max {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrEntityTooLarge)
return
}
}
}
// Get ContentType from post formData
// Otherwise from formFile ContentType
contentType := formValues.Get("Content-Type")
if contentType == "" {
contentType = fileContentType
}
r.Header.Set("Content-Type", contentType)
// Forward validated POST form fields to the underlying PUT as headers.
applyPostPolicyFormHeaders(r, formValues)
// Authorize the object like the PUT path.
if errCode := s3a.iam.AuthorizeObjectWrite(r, identity, bucket, object); errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, refineDenialForBucketName(r, identity, errCode))
return
}
// An acl or x-amz-grant-* form field rides onto the upload as ACL headers,
// which the PUT path only applies under s3:PutObjectAcl.
if postRequestsAcl(r) {
if errCode := s3a.iam.AuthorizeObjectAclWrite(r, identity, bucket, object); errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, refineDenialForBucketName(r, identity, errCode))
return
}
}
versioningState, err := s3a.getVersioningState(bucket)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, filer_pb.ErrNotFound) {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrNoSuchBucket)
return
}
glog.Errorf("PostPolicyBucketHandler: versioning state for bucket %s: %v", bucket, err)
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInternalError)
return
}
objectLockEnabled, err := s3a.isObjectLockEnabled(bucket)
if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, filer_pb.ErrNotFound) {
glog.Errorf("PostPolicyBucketHandler: object lock state for bucket %s: %v", bucket, err)
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInternalError)
return
}
if err := s3a.validateObjectLockHeaders(r, bucket, object, objectLockEnabled); err != nil {
glog.V(2).Infof("PostPolicyBucketHandler: object lock header validation failed for %s/%s: %v", bucket, object, err)
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, mapValidationErrorToS3Error(err))
return
}
var etag string
var versionId string
var sseMetadata SSEResponseMetadata
switch versioningState {
case s3_constants.VersioningEnabled:
versionId, etag, errCode, sseMetadata = s3a.putVersionedObject(r, bucket, object, fileBody, contentType)
case s3_constants.VersioningSuspended:
etag, errCode, sseMetadata = s3a.putSuspendedVersioningObject(r, bucket, object, fileBody, contentType)
default:
filePath := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s", s3a.bucketDir(bucket), object)
// Use fileSize, not r.ContentLength: the multipart body inflates ContentLength.
ttlSec := s3a.lifecycleTTLForObjectWrite(bucket, object, fileSize)
etag, errCode, sseMetadata = s3a.putToFiler(r, filePath, fileBody, bucket, object, 1, ttlSec, nil, false, "")
}
if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, errCode)
return
}
if versionId != "" {
w.Header().Set("x-amz-version-id", versionId)
}
if successRedirect != "" {
// Replace raw query params..
redirectURL.RawQuery = getRedirectPostRawQuery(bucket, object, etag)
w.Header().Set("Location", redirectURL.String())
s3err.WriteEmptyResponse(w, r, http.StatusSeeOther)
return
}
setEtag(w, etag)
// Include SSE response headers (important for bucket-default encryption)
s3a.setSSEResponseHeaders(w, r, sseMetadata)
// Decide what http response to send depending on success_action_status parameter
switch successStatus {
case "201":
resp := PostResponse{
Bucket: bucket,
Key: object,
ETag: `"` + etag + `"`,
Location: w.Header().Get("Location"),
}
s3err.WriteXMLResponse(w, r, http.StatusCreated, resp)
s3err.PostLog(r, http.StatusCreated, s3err.ErrNone)
case "200":
s3err.WriteEmptyResponse(w, r, http.StatusOK)
case "204":
s3err.WriteEmptyResponse(w, r, http.StatusNoContent)
default:
s3err.WriteEmptyResponse(w, r, http.StatusNoContent)
}
}
// postPolicyReservedFormFields are multipart form fields that are part of the
// POST Object auth/policy mechanism (or handled explicitly elsewhere in the
// handler) and must not be forwarded to the upload as HTTP headers. Keys are
// already run through http.CanonicalHeaderKey before lookup.
var postPolicyReservedFormFields = map[string]struct{}{
// POST policy signature (V2)
"Policy": {},
"Signature": {},
"Awsaccesskeyid": {},
// POST policy signature (V4)
"X-Amz-Signature": {},
"X-Amz-Credential": {},
"X-Amz-Algorithm": {},
"X-Amz-Date": {},
"X-Amz-Security-Token": {},
// Target descriptors
"Key": {},
"File": {},
"Bucket": {},
// Success actions (handled elsewhere in the handler)
"Success_action_redirect": {},
"Success_action_status": {},
"Redirect": {},
// Content-Type is resolved separately above (from form or file part)
"Content-Type": {},
}
// applyPostPolicyFormHeaders forwards validated POST Object form fields to the
// request headers so they are applied to the resulting PUT. Reserved fields
// that are part of the POST policy mechanism itself (signature, key, etc.) are
// skipped. The acl form field is translated to the X-Amz-Acl header to match
// how AWS promotes the form value to the underlying PUT.
func applyPostPolicyFormHeaders(r *http.Request, formValues http.Header) {
for k := range formValues {
if _, reserved := postPolicyReservedFormFields[k]; reserved {
continue
}
switch {
case k == "Acl":
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzCannedAcl, formValues.Get(k))
case k == "Cache-Control",
k == "Expires",
k == "Content-Disposition",
k == "Content-Encoding",
k == "Content-Language":
r.Header.Set(k, formValues.Get(k))
case strings.HasPrefix(k, "X-Amz-"):
r.Header.Set(k, formValues.Get(k))
}
}
}
// postRequestsAcl reports whether the request carries ACL headers, whether
// promoted from the POST form fields or supplied on the request itself.
func postRequestsAcl(r *http.Request) bool {
for _, header := range []string{s3_constants.AmzCannedAcl, s3_constants.AmzAclFullControl, s3_constants.AmzAclRead, s3_constants.AmzAclReadAcp, s3_constants.AmzAclWrite, s3_constants.AmzAclWriteAcp} {
if r.Header.Get(header) != "" {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// Extract form fields and file data from a HTTP POST Policy
func extractPostPolicyFormValues(form *multipart.Form) (filePart io.ReadCloser, fileName, fileContentType string, fileSize int64, formValues http.Header, err error) {
// / HTML Form values
fileName = ""
fileContentType = ""
// Canonicalize the form values into http.Header.
formValues = make(http.Header)
for k, v := range form.Value {
formValues[http.CanonicalHeaderKey(k)] = v
}
// Validate form values.
if err = validateFormFieldSize(formValues); err != nil {
return nil, "", "", 0, nil, err
}
// this means that filename="" was not specified for file key and Go has
// an ugly way of handling this situation. Refer here
// https://golang.org/src/mime/multipart/formdata.go#L61
if len(form.File) == 0 {
var b = &bytes.Buffer{}
for _, v := range formValues["File"] {
b.WriteString(v)
}
fileSize = int64(b.Len())
filePart = io.NopCloser(b)
return filePart, fileName, fileContentType, fileSize, formValues, nil
}
// Iterator until we find a valid File field and break
for k, v := range form.File {
canonicalFormName := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(k)
if canonicalFormName == "File" {
if len(v) == 0 {
return nil, "", "", 0, nil, errors.New("Invalid arguments specified")
}
// Fetch fileHeader which has the uploaded file information
fileHeader := v[0]
// Set filename
fileName = fileHeader.Filename
// Set contentType
fileContentType = fileHeader.Header.Get("Content-Type")
// Open the uploaded part
filePart, err = fileHeader.Open()
if err != nil {
return nil, "", "", 0, nil, err
}
// Compute file size
fileSize, err = filePart.(io.Seeker).Seek(0, 2)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", "", 0, nil, err
}
// Reset Seek to the beginning
_, err = filePart.(io.Seeker).Seek(0, 0)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", "", 0, nil, err
}
// File found and ready for reading
break
}
}
return filePart, fileName, fileContentType, fileSize, formValues, nil
}
// Validate form field size for s3 specification requirement.
func validateFormFieldSize(formValues http.Header) error {
// Iterate over form values
for k := range formValues {
// Check if value's field exceeds S3 limit
if int64(len(formValues.Get(k))) > int64(1*humanize.MiByte) {
return errors.New("Data size larger than expected")
}
}
// Success.
return nil
}
func getRedirectPostRawQuery(bucket, key, etag string) string {
redirectValues := make(url.Values)
redirectValues.Set("bucket", bucket)
redirectValues.Set("key", key)
redirectValues.Set("etag", "\""+etag+"\"")
return redirectValues.Encode()
}
// Check to see if Policy is signed correctly, returning the signing identity.
// The verified form's access key is recorded in ctx's identity holder.
// Write authorization happens later in the handler via AuthorizeObjectWrite,
// which evaluates the identity's attached IAM policies, session policies, and
// the bucket policy against the real object key; gating here on the legacy
// Actions projection would deny identities those mechanisms allow.
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) doesPolicySignatureMatch(ctx context.Context, formValues http.Header) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode) {
// For SignV2 - Signature field will be valid
if _, ok := formValues["Signature"]; ok {
return iam.doesPolicySignatureV2Match(ctx, formValues)
}
return iam.doesPolicySignatureV4Match(ctx, formValues)
}