Files
seaweedfs/weed/s3api/lance/handlers_oauth.go
T
ad89f003a5 s3: end a catalog-vended session with the access key it was vended for (#11945)
* s3: end a catalog-vended session with the access key it was vended for

A table credential the Iceberg catalog vends is a self-contained STS session:
it stays valid until it expires (an hour by default) even after the access key
that loaded the table is deleted or deactivated, or its identity is removed
or disabled. An operator revoking a leaked key cannot cut off the table
credentials that key already obtained.

Sessions are stateless JWTs, so there is no revocation list to consult. This
change follows the same pattern as role sessions, which are already refused
once their role's ID no longer matches (checkSessionRoleBinding): a vended
session carries the access key it was vended for (src_ak, recorded by the
previous change), and validateSTSSessionToken checks it against the identity
table held in memory. A session of provider iceberg-catalog that carries a
source key is refused (InvalidAccessKeyId, as for an unknown key) once its
identity is gone or disabled, or the key is no longer one of that identity's
active, unexpired credentials.

Scope:
- Only catalog-vended sessions are checked; web-identity, AssumeRole and
  every other STS session are validated as before.
- The vendor binds a session to the caller's key only when the caller is a
  stored identity holding that key. A caller that signed with another STS
  session's key, an OIDC user, or a request that recorded no key gets an
  unbound session, as today; binding it would refuse every request made with
  it. A session minted before this change carries no key and is unbound.
- The check is one map lookup under the read lock and a scan of one
  identity's keys (about 11 ns, 0 allocations, with 1,000 identities).

Tests (s3api_iceberg_vended_session_test.go) mint real sessions through the
catalog vendor and validate them the way a data-path request is validated:
deactivating, expiring or deleting key A ends A's session while the session
vended through key B on the same identity keeps working; disabling or
deleting the identity ends it; callers that are not a stored identity holding
the key get unbound sessions that keep working; other STS sessions are not
checked. The first two tests and the third fail without this change.

* s3: keep the vended-session key binding when the key dies before vend

vendedSessionKeyLive gated the binding, so a key revoked between the
request's authentication and the vend skipped it and minted an unbound
session that stayed usable until it expired. Every catalog auth path
pairs the identity name in context with the key that authenticated, so
a stored-identity principal always means the request signed with that
identity's own key. Bind whenever the principal is a stored identity: a
session bound to a now-dead key is refused on its first request, which
is what the binding is for.

* s3: gate the vended-session key binding on the authenticated caller type

lookupByIdentityName(principal) named only that some identity exists, not
that the request signed with a stored key: an STS session or OIDC principal
that collides with an identity name got a session bound to its temporary
key, which vendedSessionKeyLive then refused on every request. Verifiers
now record the verified key as a stored credential, and the vendor binds
only when that marker is present — keeping the binding even when the key
was revoked between authentication and the vend.

* s3: enforce the vended key binding under a dedicated claim

Sessions minted before the binding existed carry the caller's key in the
audit-only SourceAccessKeyId — including temporary STS keys that can never
resolve in the identity table. Enforcing on that field would end live table
credentials at upgrade; the binding now travels under BoundAccessKeyId,
leaving legacy sessions unbound as before.

Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* s3: bind vended sessions to a credential fingerprint

The key id alone cannot identify a credential: an operator can delete a
key and re-create it under the same id with a different secret, reviving
sessions minted for the original. Verifiers now record a fingerprint of
the secret at authentication; the session dies unless it still matches.

Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* s3: keep recording the caller's key on every catalog session

SourceAccessKeyId was unconditional audit metadata before the binding
existed; gating it on the stored-credential marker dropped the record
for callers that authenticated another way. With the binding under its
own claim there is no ambiguity left, so the field records the caller's
key again regardless of how it authenticated.

* s3: key the vended-session credential fingerprint with the signing key

The bound-credential fingerprint travels inside the vended session
token. As a plain SHA-256 of the secret it gave any token holder an
offline guessing oracle for weak secrets, and CodeQL flags it twice.

Store the verified secret in the request marker instead and HMAC it
with the STS signing key at vend and at validation. The claim can no
longer be mined, and the per-request auth path stops hashing secrets.

---------

Co-authored-by: Javier de la Torre <jatorre@lakehousebox.com>
Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chrislusf@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-23 03:58:06 -07:00

255 lines
8.4 KiB
Go

package lance
import (
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha256"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
jwt "github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
)
// OAuthTokenResponse is the response for POST /oauth/token.
type OAuthTokenResponse struct {
AccessToken string `json:"access_token"`
TokenType string `json:"token_type"`
ExpiresIn int `json:"expires_in"`
Scope string `json:"scope,omitempty"`
}
// OAuthErrorResponse is the error response for the OAuth endpoint.
type OAuthErrorResponse struct {
Error string `json:"error"`
Description string `json:"error_description,omitempty"`
}
// LanceClaims are JWT claims for Lance catalog OAuth tokens.
type LanceClaims struct {
IdentityName string `json:"identity_name"`
AccessKey string `json:"access_key"`
jwt.RegisteredClaims
}
const defaultOauthTokenExpiry = 3600
// maxOauthTokenExpiry bounds the configured TTL so seconds-to-Duration
// conversions cannot overflow into already-expired tokens.
const maxOauthTokenExpiry = 365 * 24 * 3600
const grantTypeClientCredentials = "client_credentials"
// oauthExpirySeconds returns the OAuth token TTL. Lance clients hold a static
// Authorization header and cannot refresh on 401, so deployments can raise
// this to survive beyond the default hour.
func oauthExpirySeconds() int {
if v := os.Getenv("LANCE_OAUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRY"); v != "" {
if n, err := strconv.ParseInt(v, 10, 64); err == nil && n > 0 {
if n > maxOauthTokenExpiry {
return maxOauthTokenExpiry
}
return int(n)
}
}
return defaultOauthTokenExpiry
}
// handleOAuthTokens implements the OAuth2 client_credentials flow.
// POST /oauth/token
func (s *Server) handleOAuthTokens(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxRequestBody)
if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_request", "Could not parse form body")
return
}
// Reject credentials in query string to prevent leaking secrets into logs and caches.
if r.URL.Query().Get("client_secret") != "" {
writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_request", "client_secret must not be sent in the URL")
return
}
if grantType := r.PostFormValue("grant_type"); grantType != grantTypeClientCredentials {
writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "unsupported_grant_type",
fmt.Sprintf("Unsupported grant_type: %s", grantType))
return
}
clientID := r.PostFormValue("client_id")
clientSecret := r.PostFormValue("client_secret")
// Also support HTTP Basic auth per OAuth2 spec
if clientID == "" && clientSecret == "" {
var ok bool
clientID, clientSecret, ok = r.BasicAuth()
if !ok {
writeInvalidClient(w, "Missing client credentials")
return
}
}
if clientID == "" || clientSecret == "" {
writeInvalidClient(w, "Missing client_id or client_secret")
return
}
if s.credentialValidator == nil {
writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "server_error", "Credential validation not configured")
return
}
identityName, _, err := s.credentialValidator.ValidateS3Credential(clientID, clientSecret)
if err != nil {
glog.V(2).Infof("Lance OAuth: credential validation failed for client_id=%s: %v", clientID, err)
writeInvalidClient(w, "Invalid client credentials")
return
}
tokenString, err := mintToken(identityName, clientID, clientSecret, oauthExpirySeconds())
if err != nil {
glog.Errorf("Lance OAuth: failed to sign token: %v", err)
writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "server_error", "Failed to generate token")
return
}
resp := OAuthTokenResponse{
AccessToken: tokenString,
TokenType: "bearer",
ExpiresIn: oauthExpirySeconds(),
Scope: r.PostFormValue("scope"),
}
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
}
// mintToken issues a signed access token for the given identity and
// credential, valid for ttlSeconds.
func mintToken(identityName, accessKey, secret string, ttlSeconds int) (string, error) {
signingKey := deriveSigningKey(accessKey, secret)
now := time.Now()
claims := LanceClaims{
IdentityName: identityName,
AccessKey: accessKey,
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(now.Add(time.Duration(ttlSeconds) * time.Second)),
Issuer: "seaweedfs-lance",
},
}
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)
return token.SignedString(signingKey)
}
// authenticateBearer validates a Bearer token from the Authorization header.
// Returns the identity name, identity object, and whether auth succeeded.
func (s *Server) authenticateBearer(r *http.Request) (string, interface{}, bool) {
identityName, identity, _, _, ok := s.authenticateBearerKey(r)
return identityName, identity, ok
}
// authenticateBearerKey is authenticateBearer that also returns the access key
// the token was minted from (its verified access_key claim).
func (s *Server) authenticateBearerKey(r *http.Request) (string, interface{}, string, string, bool) {
auth := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
if auth == "" {
return "", nil, "", "", false
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(auth), "bearer ") {
return "", nil, "", "", false
}
tokenString := strings.TrimSpace(auth[7:])
if tokenString == "" {
return "", nil, "", "", false
}
if s.credentialValidator == nil {
return "", nil, "", "", false
}
// Parse the token without verification first to get the access key,
// then look up the exact credential to verify the signature.
parser := jwt.NewParser(jwt.WithoutClaimsValidation())
unverified := &LanceClaims{}
_, _, err := parser.ParseUnverified(tokenString, unverified)
if err != nil {
glog.V(2).Infof("Lance OAuth: failed to parse token: %v", err)
return "", nil, "", "", false
}
if unverified.AccessKey == "" {
return "", nil, "", "", false
}
identityName, identity, secretKey, err := s.credentialValidator.GetCredentialByAccessKey(unverified.AccessKey)
if err != nil {
glog.V(2).Infof("Lance OAuth: failed to get credential for access key: %v", err)
return "", nil, "", "", false
}
signingKey := deriveSigningKey(unverified.AccessKey, secretKey)
claims := &LanceClaims{}
verified, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(tokenString, claims, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
if _, ok := token.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodHMAC); !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected signing method: %v", token.Header["alg"])
}
return signingKey, nil
})
if err != nil || !verified.Valid {
glog.V(2).Infof("Lance OAuth: token verification failed: %v", err)
return "", nil, "", "", false
}
// The token's signing key is derived from this access key, so a verified
// token was minted from it.
return identityName, identity, unverified.AccessKey, secretKey, true
}
// authenticateApiKey validates an x-api-key header carrying an S3 credential
// as "access_key:secret_key". Unlike a Bearer token it does not expire, which
// suits clients that hold static headers.
func (s *Server) authenticateApiKey(apiKey string) (string, interface{}, bool) {
if s.credentialValidator == nil {
return "", nil, false
}
accessKey, secretKey, ok := strings.Cut(apiKey, ":")
if !ok || accessKey == "" || secretKey == "" {
return "", nil, false
}
identityName, identity, err := s.credentialValidator.ValidateS3Credential(accessKey, secretKey)
if err != nil {
glog.V(2).Infof("Lance x-api-key: credential validation failed: %v", err)
return "", nil, false
}
return identityName, identity, true
}
// deriveSigningKey derives a signing key from the access key and secret using HMAC-SHA256.
// Including the access key prevents cross-credential token forgery when two
// credentials happen to share the same secret.
func deriveSigningKey(accessKey, secret string) []byte {
h := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte("seaweedfs-lance-oauth"))
h.Write([]byte(accessKey))
h.Write([]byte{0}) // null separator
h.Write([]byte(secret))
return h.Sum(nil)
}
// writeInvalidClient answers 401 with the Basic challenge RFC 6749 §5.2
// requires, so a client knows which scheme to retry with.
func writeInvalidClient(w http.ResponseWriter, description string) {
w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", `Basic realm="lance"`)
writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid_client", description)
}
func writeOAuthError(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, errCode, description string) {
resp := OAuthErrorResponse{
Error: errCode,
Description: description,
}
writeJSON(w, status, resp)
}