Files
seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3api_object_anonymous_read.go
T
aa5b337716 fix(s3): honor object ACLs for anonymous GET and HEAD (#11605)
* fix(s3): honor object ACLs for anonymous reads

Signed-off-by: zhaoyuchen <43179751+zhao-yc@users.noreply.github.com>

* s3: drop unsigned session tokens on deferred anonymous reads

An unsigned GET/HEAD carrying X-Amz-Security-Token is anonymous, not a
session request; strip the token before authentication and authorization
so it cannot influence identity or policy evaluation.

Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: zhaoyuchen <43179751+zhao-yc@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chrislusf@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-06 09:52:37 +08:00

113 lines
5.1 KiB
Go

package s3api
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"path"
"strings"
"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/service/s3"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3_constants"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3err"
)
type anonymousObjectReadContextKey struct{}
// isAnonymousObjectRead identifies requests deferred by AuthWithPublicRead to
// the selected entry's authorization check. Clients cannot set this marker.
func isAnonymousObjectRead(r *http.Request) bool {
marked, _ := r.Context().Value(anonymousObjectReadContextKey{}).(bool)
return marked
}
// deferAnonymousObjectRead only grants entry-dependent authorization to raw
// GET/HEAD reads. Subresources, writes and requests carrying credentials keep
// their normal authentication path; no-auth development mode is unchanged.
func (s3a *S3ApiServer) deferAnonymousObjectRead(r *http.Request, action Action, bucket, object string) (*http.Request, bool) {
if s3a.iam == nil || !s3a.iam.isEnabled() || action != s3_constants.ACTION_READ ||
getRequestAuthType(r) != authTypeAnonymous || object == "" || object == "/" ||
(r.Method != http.MethodGet && r.Method != http.MethodHead) || isSOSAPIObject(strings.TrimPrefix(object, "/")) {
return r, false
}
resolved := ResolveS3Action(r, string(action), bucket, object)
if r.URL.Query().Has("uploads") || (resolved != s3_constants.S3_ACTION_GET_OBJECT && resolved != s3_constants.S3_ACTION_GET_OBJECT_VERSION) {
return r, false
}
// A session token without a signature names no session; drop it so it
// cannot influence identity or policy evaluation downstream.
r.Header.Del("X-Amz-Security-Token")
if q := r.URL.Query(); q.Has("X-Amz-Security-Token") {
q.Del("X-Amz-Security-Token")
r.URL.RawQuery = q.Encode()
}
// Reuse authentication's internal-header sanitization. A public ACL does
// not require an anonymous identity; a configured one still contributes
// its permissions and explicit identity-policy denies.
identity, _, _ := s3a.iam.authenticateRequestInternal(r)
ctx := recordIdentityInContext(r, identity)
return r.WithContext(context.WithValue(ctx, anonymousObjectReadContextKey{}, true)), true
}
// authorizeAnonymousObjectRead evaluates policies and ACLs against the same
// entry used for the response, including conditional and versioned reads.
// Explicit policy denies take precedence over every public-access grant.
func (s3a *S3ApiServer) authorizeAnonymousObjectRead(r *http.Request, bucket, object string, extended map[string][]byte) s3err.ErrorCode {
// A version's physical filer path is not another S3 key: accepting it would
// bypass GetObjectVersion policies on the logical key. Ordinary user keys
// containing ".versions" without internal version metadata are unaffected.
key := s3_constants.NormalizeObjectKey(object)
version := string(extended[s3_constants.ExtVersionIdKey])
if version != "" && strings.HasSuffix(path.Dir(key), s3_constants.VersionsFolder) && path.Base(key) == s3a.getVersionFileName(version) {
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
if string(extended[s3_constants.ExtDeleteMarkerKey]) == "true" {
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
// Loading config also synchronizes a cold bucket policy into the engine.
config, code := s3a.getBucketConfig(bucket)
if code != s3err.ErrNone {
return code
}
identity, _ := s3_constants.GetIdentityFromContext(r).(*Identity)
code, policyAllowed := s3a.checkPolicyWithEntry(r, bucket, object, string(s3_constants.ACTION_READ), buildPrincipalARN(identity, r), extended)
if code != s3err.ErrNone {
return code
}
if s3a.iam.isActionExplicitlyDeniedByApplicablePolicies(r, identity, s3_constants.ACTION_READ, bucket, object) {
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
if policyAllowed {
return s3err.ErrNone
}
if identity != nil && s3a.iam.VerifyActionPermission(r, identity, s3_constants.ACTION_READ, bucket, object) == s3err.ErrNone {
return s3err.ErrNone
}
// Match the upload/ACL path: legacy buckets without recorded ownership
// controls still accept ACLs. An enforced control explicitly disables them.
if config.Ownership == "" || s3_constants.EffectiveOwnership(config.Ownership) != s3_constants.OwnershipBucketOwnerEnforced {
if data, exists := extended[s3_constants.ExtAmzAclKey]; exists {
// An explicitly stored ACL replaces the legacy bucket-ACL fallback.
// Empty, malformed and non-public ACLs must not grant anonymous read.
var grants []*s3.Grant
if json.Unmarshal(data, &grants) == nil {
for _, grant := range grants {
if grant != nil && grant.Grantee != nil && grant.Grantee.Type != nil && *grant.Grantee.Type == "Group" &&
grant.Grantee.URI != nil && *grant.Grantee.URI == s3_constants.GranteeGroupAllUsers && grant.Permission != nil &&
(*grant.Permission == s3_constants.PermissionRead || *grant.Permission == s3_constants.PermissionFullControl) {
return s3err.ErrNone
}
}
}
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
}
// Preserve SeaweedFS's bucket-public-read behavior for legacy objects that
// have no stored object ACL; BucketOwnerEnforced ignores object grants.
if config.IsPublicRead {
return s3err.ErrNone
}
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}