Files
seaweedfs/seaweed-volume/src/security.rs
T
Chris Lu c0f33d599b rust volume: mirror Go volume server logic to gate the admin RPCs (#10748)
rust volume: gate the remaining admin RPCs behind check_grpc_admin_auth

The Go volume server gates 29 destructive VolumeServer RPCs on the
-whiteList admin check; the Rust port only gated 14. Add the gate to the
other 15 -- batch_delete, read_all_needles, fetch_and_write_needle, the
EC-shard generate/rebuild/copy/unmount/to-volume RPCs, both tier-move RPCs,
volume_copy, volume_tail_receiver, set_state, scrub_ec_volume and
volume_needle_status -- so a configured whitelist restricts them the same
way it already does on the Go side.

check_grpc_admin_auth also required peer info before checking whether any
control was configured, unlike Go's `if vs.guard == nil { return nil }`.
Short-circuit when no whitelist and no signing key are set, so in-process
callers keep working with security inactive and only the gate ordering
changes for configured servers.

tests/admin_auth_coverage.rs mirrors the Go coverage test: every handler
must either gate or be listed as intentionally open with a reason, so the
two implementations can't silently drift apart again.
2026-08-13 13:17:23 -07:00

546 lines
17 KiB
Rust

//! Security: JWT validation and IP whitelist checking.
//!
//! Matches Go's security/guard.go and security/jwt.go.
//! - Guard: combines whitelist IP checking with JWT token validation
//! - JWT: HS256 HMAC signing with file-id claims
pub mod tls;
use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::net::IpAddr;
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
use jsonwebtoken::{decode, encode, Algorithm, DecodingKey, EncodingKey, Header, Validation};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
// ============================================================================
// JWT Claims
// ============================================================================
/// Claims for volume server file access tokens.
/// Matches Go's `SeaweedFileIdClaims`.
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct FileIdClaims {
/// File ID this token grants access to (e.g., "3,01637037d6").
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub fid: Option<String>,
/// Expiration time (Unix timestamp).
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub exp: Option<u64>,
/// Not before (Unix timestamp).
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub nbf: Option<u64>,
}
/// Signing key wrapper (empty = security disabled).
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct SigningKey(pub Vec<u8>);
impl SigningKey {
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.0.is_empty()
}
pub fn from_string(s: &str) -> Self {
SigningKey(s.as_bytes().to_vec())
}
}
/// Generate a JWT token for file access.
pub fn gen_jwt(
signing_key: &SigningKey,
expires_after_sec: i64,
file_id: &str,
) -> Result<String, JwtError> {
if signing_key.is_empty() {
return Err(JwtError::NoSigningKey);
}
let now = SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
.unwrap_or_default()
.as_secs();
let claims = FileIdClaims {
fid: Some(file_id.to_string()),
exp: if expires_after_sec > 0 {
Some(now + expires_after_sec as u64)
} else {
None
},
nbf: None,
};
let token = encode(
&Header::new(Algorithm::HS256),
&claims,
&EncodingKey::from_secret(&signing_key.0),
)?;
Ok(token)
}
/// Decode and validate a JWT token.
pub fn decode_jwt(signing_key: &SigningKey, token: &str) -> Result<FileIdClaims, JwtError> {
if signing_key.is_empty() {
return Err(JwtError::NoSigningKey);
}
let mut validation = Validation::new(Algorithm::HS256);
// Match Go behavior: tokens without exp are accepted (Go's jwt-go does not require exp)
// But if exp IS present, it must be valid (not expired).
validation.required_spec_claims.clear();
validation.validate_exp = true;
// Go's jwt-go/v5 validates nbf when present
validation.validate_nbf = true;
validation.leeway = 0;
let data = decode::<FileIdClaims>(
token,
&DecodingKey::from_secret(&signing_key.0),
&validation,
)?;
Ok(data.claims)
}
// ============================================================================
// Guard
// ============================================================================
/// Security guard: IP whitelist + JWT token validation.
pub struct Guard {
whitelist_ips: HashSet<String>,
whitelist_cidrs: Vec<(IpAddr, u8)>, // (network, prefix_len)
pub signing_key: SigningKey,
pub expires_after_sec: i64,
pub read_signing_key: SigningKey,
pub read_expires_after_sec: i64,
/// Combined flag: true when whitelist is non-empty OR signing key is present.
/// Matches Go's `isWriteActive = !isEmptyWhiteList || len(SigningKey) != 0`.
is_write_active: bool,
}
impl Guard {
pub fn new(
whitelist: &[String],
signing_key: SigningKey,
expires_after_sec: i64,
read_signing_key: SigningKey,
read_expires_after_sec: i64,
) -> Self {
let mut guard = Guard {
whitelist_ips: HashSet::new(),
whitelist_cidrs: Vec::new(),
signing_key,
expires_after_sec,
read_signing_key,
read_expires_after_sec,
is_write_active: false,
};
guard.update_whitelist(whitelist);
guard
}
/// Update the IP whitelist.
pub fn update_whitelist(&mut self, entries: &[String]) {
self.whitelist_ips.clear();
self.whitelist_cidrs.clear();
for entry in entries {
let entry = entry.trim();
if entry.is_empty() {
continue;
}
if entry.contains('/') {
// CIDR range
if let Some((ip, prefix)) = parse_cidr(entry) {
self.whitelist_cidrs.push((ip, prefix));
} else {
tracing::error!("Parse CIDR {} in whitelist failed", entry);
}
} else {
// Exact IP/hostname
self.whitelist_ips.insert(entry.to_string());
}
}
// Match Go: isWriteActive = !isEmptyWhiteList || len(SigningKey) != 0
let is_empty_whitelist = self.whitelist_ips.is_empty() && self.whitelist_cidrs.is_empty();
self.is_write_active = !is_empty_whitelist || !self.signing_key.is_empty();
}
/// Refresh the JWT signing keys and their expirations in place so operators
/// can rotate keys via SIGHUP without restarting the process. Mirrors Go's
/// `Guard::UpdateSigningKeys`: it swaps the fields and recomputes
/// `is_write_active`.
pub fn update_signing_keys(
&mut self,
signing_key: SigningKey,
expires_after_sec: i64,
read_signing_key: SigningKey,
read_expires_after_sec: i64,
) {
self.signing_key = signing_key;
self.expires_after_sec = expires_after_sec;
self.read_signing_key = read_signing_key;
self.read_expires_after_sec = read_expires_after_sec;
let is_empty_whitelist = self.whitelist_ips.is_empty() && self.whitelist_cidrs.is_empty();
self.is_write_active = !is_empty_whitelist || !self.signing_key.is_empty();
}
/// Whether any write-side control is configured: a non-empty whitelist or a
/// signing key. Mirrors Go's non-nil `guard` -- when this is false, every
/// caller is allowed and admin RPCs need not carry peer info.
pub fn is_write_active(&self) -> bool {
self.is_write_active
}
/// Check if a remote IP is in the whitelist.
/// Returns true if write security is inactive (no whitelist and no signing key),
/// if the whitelist is empty, or if the IP matches.
pub fn check_whitelist(&self, remote_addr: &str) -> bool {
if !self.is_write_active {
return true;
}
if self.whitelist_ips.is_empty() && self.whitelist_cidrs.is_empty() {
return true;
}
let host = extract_host(remote_addr);
// Check exact match
if self.whitelist_ips.contains(&host) {
return true;
}
// Check CIDR ranges
if let Ok(ip) = host.parse::<IpAddr>() {
for &(ref network, prefix_len) in &self.whitelist_cidrs {
if ip_in_cidr(&ip, network, prefix_len) {
return true;
}
}
}
false
}
/// Check if a read signing key is configured.
pub fn has_read_signing_key(&self) -> bool {
!self.read_signing_key.is_empty()
}
/// Validate a request's JWT token.
/// `is_write` determines which signing key to use.
/// Returns Ok(()) if valid, or if security is disabled.
pub fn check_jwt(&self, token: Option<&str>, is_write: bool) -> Result<(), JwtError> {
let key = if is_write {
&self.signing_key
} else {
&self.read_signing_key
};
if key.is_empty() {
return Ok(()); // Security disabled for this operation type
}
let token = token.ok_or(JwtError::MissingToken)?;
decode_jwt(key, token)?;
Ok(())
}
/// Check JWT and validate the file ID claim matches.
pub fn check_jwt_for_file(
&self,
token: Option<&str>,
expected_fid: &str,
is_write: bool,
) -> Result<(), JwtError> {
let key = if is_write {
&self.signing_key
} else {
&self.read_signing_key
};
if key.is_empty() {
return Ok(());
}
let token = token.ok_or(JwtError::MissingToken)?;
let claims = decode_jwt(key, token)?;
match claims.fid {
None => {
return Err(JwtError::MissingFileIdClaim);
}
Some(ref fid) if fid != expected_fid => {
return Err(JwtError::FileIdMismatch {
expected: expected_fid.to_string(),
got: fid.to_string(),
});
}
_ => {}
}
Ok(())
}
}
// ============================================================================
// Helpers
// ============================================================================
/// Extract host from "host:port" or "[::1]:port" format.
fn extract_host(addr: &str) -> String {
// Handle IPv6 with brackets
if addr.starts_with('[') {
if let Some(end) = addr.find(']') {
return addr[1..end].to_string();
}
}
// Handle host:port
if let Some(pos) = addr.rfind(':') {
return addr[..pos].to_string();
}
addr.to_string()
}
/// Parse CIDR notation "192.168.1.0/24" into (IpAddr, prefix_len).
fn parse_cidr(cidr: &str) -> Option<(IpAddr, u8)> {
let parts: Vec<&str> = cidr.split('/').collect();
if parts.len() != 2 {
return None;
}
let ip: IpAddr = parts[0].parse().ok()?;
let prefix: u8 = parts[1].parse().ok()?;
Some((ip, prefix))
}
/// Check if an IP is within a CIDR range.
fn ip_in_cidr(ip: &IpAddr, network: &IpAddr, prefix_len: u8) -> bool {
match (ip, network) {
(IpAddr::V4(ip), IpAddr::V4(net)) => {
let ip_bits = u32::from(*ip);
let net_bits = u32::from(*net);
let mask = if prefix_len == 0 {
0
} else if prefix_len >= 32 {
u32::MAX
} else {
u32::MAX << (32 - prefix_len)
};
(ip_bits & mask) == (net_bits & mask)
}
(IpAddr::V6(ip), IpAddr::V6(net)) => {
let ip_bits = u128::from(*ip);
let net_bits = u128::from(*net);
let mask = if prefix_len == 0 {
0
} else if prefix_len >= 128 {
u128::MAX
} else {
u128::MAX << (128 - prefix_len)
};
(ip_bits & mask) == (net_bits & mask)
}
_ => false, // V4/V6 mismatch
}
}
// ============================================================================
// Errors
// ============================================================================
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum JwtError {
#[error("no signing key configured")]
NoSigningKey,
#[error("missing JWT token")]
MissingToken,
#[error("JWT error: {0}")]
Jwt(#[from] jsonwebtoken::errors::Error),
#[error("JWT token missing required fid claim")]
MissingFileIdClaim,
#[error("file ID mismatch: expected {expected}, got {got}")]
FileIdMismatch { expected: String, got: String },
}
// ============================================================================
// Tests
// ============================================================================
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_jwt_round_trip() {
let key = SigningKey::from_string("test-secret-key");
let token = gen_jwt(&key, 3600, "3,01637037d6").unwrap();
let claims = decode_jwt(&key, &token).unwrap();
assert_eq!(claims.fid, Some("3,01637037d6".to_string()));
}
#[test]
fn test_jwt_no_signing_key() {
let key = SigningKey(vec![]);
assert!(gen_jwt(&key, 3600, "1,abc").is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_jwt_invalid_token() {
let key = SigningKey::from_string("secret");
let result = decode_jwt(&key, "invalid.token.here");
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_jwt_wrong_key() {
let key1 = SigningKey::from_string("secret1");
let key2 = SigningKey::from_string("secret2");
let token = gen_jwt(&key1, 3600, "1,abc").unwrap();
assert!(decode_jwt(&key2, &token).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_guard_empty_whitelist() {
let guard = Guard::new(&[], SigningKey(vec![]), 0, SigningKey(vec![]), 0);
assert!(guard.check_whitelist("192.168.1.1:8080"));
}
#[test]
fn test_guard_whitelist_exact() {
let guard = Guard::new(
&["192.168.1.1".to_string(), "10.0.0.1".to_string()],
SigningKey(vec![]),
0,
SigningKey(vec![]),
0,
);
assert!(guard.check_whitelist("192.168.1.1:8080"));
assert!(guard.check_whitelist("10.0.0.1:1234"));
assert!(!guard.check_whitelist("172.16.0.1:8080"));
}
#[test]
fn test_guard_whitelist_cidr() {
let guard = Guard::new(
&["10.0.0.0/8".to_string()],
SigningKey(vec![]),
0,
SigningKey(vec![]),
0,
);
assert!(guard.check_whitelist("10.1.2.3:8080"));
assert!(guard.check_whitelist("10.255.255.255:80"));
assert!(!guard.check_whitelist("11.0.0.1:80"));
}
#[test]
fn test_guard_check_jwt_disabled() {
let guard = Guard::new(&[], SigningKey(vec![]), 0, SigningKey(vec![]), 0);
// No signing key = security disabled
assert!(guard.check_jwt(None, true).is_ok());
assert!(guard.check_jwt(None, false).is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn test_guard_check_jwt_enabled() {
let key = SigningKey::from_string("write-secret");
let read_key = SigningKey::from_string("read-secret");
let guard = Guard::new(&[], key.clone(), 3600, read_key.clone(), 3600);
// Missing token
assert!(guard.check_jwt(None, true).is_err());
// Valid write token
let token = gen_jwt(&key, 3600, "1,abc").unwrap();
assert!(guard.check_jwt(Some(&token), true).is_ok());
// Write token for read should fail (different key)
assert!(guard.check_jwt(Some(&token), false).is_err());
// Valid read token
let read_token = gen_jwt(&read_key, 3600, "1,abc").unwrap();
assert!(guard.check_jwt(Some(&read_token), false).is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn test_guard_check_jwt_file_id() {
let key = SigningKey::from_string("secret");
let guard = Guard::new(&[], key.clone(), 3600, SigningKey(vec![]), 0);
let token = gen_jwt(&key, 3600, "3,01637037d6").unwrap();
// Correct file ID
assert!(guard
.check_jwt_for_file(Some(&token), "3,01637037d6", true)
.is_ok());
// Wrong file ID
let err = guard.check_jwt_for_file(Some(&token), "4,deadbeef", true);
assert!(matches!(err, Err(JwtError::FileIdMismatch { .. })));
}
#[test]
fn test_update_signing_keys_rotates() {
let mut guard = Guard::new(
&[],
SigningKey::from_string("old-write"),
10,
SigningKey::from_string("old-read"),
60,
);
guard.update_signing_keys(
SigningKey::from_string("new-write"),
11,
SigningKey::from_string("new-read"),
61,
);
let token = gen_jwt(&guard.signing_key, 60, "3,01637037d6").unwrap();
// Validates with the rotated key, not the old one.
assert!(decode_jwt(&guard.signing_key, &token).is_ok());
assert!(decode_jwt(&SigningKey::from_string("old-write"), &token).is_err());
assert_eq!(guard.expires_after_sec, 11);
assert_eq!(guard.read_expires_after_sec, 61);
}
#[test]
fn test_update_signing_keys_toggles_write_active() {
let mut guard = Guard::new(&[], SigningKey(vec![]), 0, SigningKey(vec![]), 0);
assert!(guard.check_jwt(None, true).is_ok());
guard.update_signing_keys(SigningKey::from_string("write"), 10, SigningKey(vec![]), 0);
assert!(guard.is_write_active);
guard.update_signing_keys(SigningKey(vec![]), 0, SigningKey(vec![]), 0);
assert!(!guard.is_write_active);
}
#[test]
fn test_extract_host() {
assert_eq!(extract_host("192.168.1.1:8080"), "192.168.1.1");
assert_eq!(extract_host("[::1]:8080"), "::1");
assert_eq!(extract_host("localhost"), "localhost");
}
#[test]
fn test_ip_in_cidr() {
let net: IpAddr = "10.0.0.0".parse().unwrap();
let ip1: IpAddr = "10.1.2.3".parse().unwrap();
let ip2: IpAddr = "11.0.0.1".parse().unwrap();
assert!(ip_in_cidr(&ip1, &net, 8));
assert!(!ip_in_cidr(&ip2, &net, 8));
}
}