Files
seaweedfs/weed/s3api/auth_signature_v2.go
T
Javier de la TorreandJavier de la Torre f40267db44 s3: answer InvalidBucketName to a denied request on a malformed bucket name (#11893)
* s3: answer InvalidBucketName to a denied request on a malformed bucket name

The store authorizes a request before it looks at the bucket, so a caller
denied on a bucket whose name breaks the S3 naming rules (upper case, an
underscore, too short, two adjacent periods, a non-ASCII letter) gets 403
AccessDenied, where AWS S3 answers 400 InvalidBucketName. Clients and
compatibility suites that check the error code read the 403 as a permission
problem.

Auth and AuthPostPolicy now turn an AccessDenied for a resolved identity into
InvalidBucketName when the bucket name fails VerifyS3BucketName or uses a
character outside a-z, 0-9, '.' and '-' (VerifyS3BucketName checks with
unicode.IsLower/IsNumber, which accept letters such as 'ü'). The answer depends
on the name alone, so it reveals nothing about which buckets exist. An
authentication failure, an allowed request and a denial on a well-formed name
answer as before.

Test: TestAuthDeniedInvalidBucketName drives iam.Auth with signed and anonymous
requests; on master every malformed name answers 403, with the change 400,
while the identity's own bucket stays allowed and a well-formed foreign name
stays 403. TestRefineDenialForBucketName covers the rule table.

* s3: refine POST-policy and deferred anonymous-read denials on a malformed bucket name

Two denial paths bypass the refinement in Auth and AuthPostPolicy:

- A browser POST upload carries its credentials in the form, so
  AuthPostPolicy delegates it to PostPolicyBucketHandler, which verifies the
  form and writes AccessDenied itself when the signer may not write the bucket
  or the per-key authorization denies the object. Both denials now go through
  refineDenialForBucketName with the verified identity.

  The coarse Write check used to run inside doesPolicySignatureV2Match and
  doesPolicySignatureV4Match before the signature was compared, so a form with
  a wrong signature was told whether the key may write the bucket. It now runs
  in doesPolicySignatureMatch after the signature verifies, as on the
  header-signed path; a form that fails verification answers
  SignatureDoesNotMatch (or MissingFields) and is never refined.

- Unsigned GET/HEAD object reads are deferred by AuthWithPublicRead to the
  object handlers, where writeAnonymousAwareNotFound masks a miss as
  AccessDenied. That denial is refined with the anonymous identity, so a
  missing malformed bucket answers InvalidBucketName when an anonymous
  identity is configured, as Auth does. A denial on an entry that was found
  is left alone: the bucket exists.

Test: TestPostPolicyDeniedInvalidBucketName drives AuthPostPolicy with signed
forms (Write denied, per-key policy deny, bad signature, well-formed name);
TestAnonymousReadDeniedInvalidBucketName drives AuthWithPublicRead with GET and
HEAD, with and without an anonymous identity. Both fail before this change.

* s3: refine a denied anonymous read of an existing key on a malformed bucket name

A deferred anonymous GET/HEAD refined only its masked miss to
InvalidBucketName, so in a bucket whose name breaks the S3 rules (one
VerifyS3BucketName still accepts, such as a non-ASCII name) a missing key
answered 400 and an existing private key 403, telling the caller which
keys exist. The entry check now refines its denial the same way, so both
answer alike. Without an anonymous identity no identity resolves and both
stay 403, as in Auth.

The deny-precedence case in TestAnonymousObjectACLConfiguredIdentity runs
on the fixture bucket "b", shorter than S3's three-character minimum, so
its denial now answers InvalidBucketName.

---------

Co-authored-by: Javier de la Torre <jatorre@lakehousebox.com>
2026-10-21 14:08:33 -07:00

387 lines
12 KiB
Go

/*
* The following code tries to reverse engineer the Amazon S3 APIs,
* and is mostly copied from minio implementation.
*/
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or
// implied. See the License for the specific language governing
// permissions and limitations under the License.
package s3api
import (
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha1"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/base64"
"net/http"
"sort"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3err"
)
// Whitelist resource list that will be used in query string for signature-V2 calculation.
// The list should be alphabetically sorted
var resourceList = []string{
"acl",
"delete",
"lifecycle",
"location",
"logging",
"notification",
"partNumber",
"policy",
"requestPayment",
"response-cache-control",
"response-content-disposition",
"response-content-encoding",
"response-content-language",
"response-content-type",
"response-expires",
"torrent",
"uploadId",
"uploads",
"versionId",
"versioning",
"versions",
"website",
}
// Verify if request has AWS Signature Version '2'.
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) isReqAuthenticatedV2(r *http.Request) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode) {
if isRequestSignatureV2(r) {
return iam.doesSignV2Match(r)
}
return iam.doesPresignV2SignatureMatch(r)
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) doesPolicySignatureV2Match(formValues http.Header) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode) {
accessKey := formValues.Get("AWSAccessKeyId")
if accessKey == "" {
return nil, s3err.ErrMissingFields
}
identity, cred, found := iam.lookupByAccessKey(accessKey)
if !found {
// Log detailed error information for InvalidAccessKeyId (V2 POST)
iam.m.RLock()
availableKeyCount := len(iam.accessKeyIdent)
iam.m.RUnlock()
glog.Warningf("InvalidAccessKeyId (V2 POST): attempted key '%s' not found. Available keys: %d, Auth enabled: %v",
accessKey, availableKeyCount, iam.isAuthEnabled)
return nil, s3err.ErrInvalidAccessKeyID
}
// Check service account expiration
if cred.isCredentialExpired() {
glog.V(2).Infof("Service account credential %s has expired (expiration: %d, now: %d)",
accessKey, cred.Expiration, time.Now().Unix())
return nil, s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
policy := formValues.Get("Policy")
if policy == "" {
return nil, s3err.ErrMissingFields
}
signature := formValues.Get("Signature")
if signature == "" {
return nil, s3err.ErrMissingFields
}
if !compareSignatureV2(signature, calculateSignatureV2(policy, cred.SecretKey)) {
return nil, s3err.ErrSignatureDoesNotMatch
}
return identity, s3err.ErrNone
}
// doesSignV2Match - Verify authorization header with calculated header in accordance with
// - http://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/dev/auth-request-sig-v2.html
//
// returns ErrNone if the signature matches.
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) doesSignV2Match(r *http.Request) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode) {
v2Auth := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
accessKey, errCode := validateV2AuthHeader(v2Auth)
if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
return nil, errCode
}
identity, cred, found := iam.lookupByAccessKey(accessKey)
if !found {
// Log detailed error information for InvalidAccessKeyId (V2 signed)
iam.m.RLock()
availableKeyCount := len(iam.accessKeyIdent)
iam.m.RUnlock()
glog.Warningf("InvalidAccessKeyId (V2 signed): attempted key '%s' not found. Available keys: %d, Auth enabled: %v",
accessKey, availableKeyCount, iam.isAuthEnabled)
return nil, s3err.ErrInvalidAccessKeyID
}
// Check service account expiration
if cred.isCredentialExpired() {
glog.V(2).Infof("Service account credential %s has expired (expiration: %d, now: %d)",
accessKey, cred.Expiration, time.Now().Unix())
return nil, s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
expectedAuth := signatureV2(cred, r.Method, r.URL.EscapedPath(), r.URL.Query().Encode(), r.Header)
// Extract signatures from both auth headers
v2Signature := ""
expectedV2Signature := ""
// Extract signature from request header
if idx := strings.LastIndex(v2Auth, ":"); idx != -1 {
v2Signature = v2Auth[idx+1:]
}
// Extract signature from expected auth header
// This should always succeed if signatureV2 is working correctly
if idx := strings.LastIndex(expectedAuth, ":"); idx != -1 {
expectedV2Signature = expectedAuth[idx+1:]
} else {
// This indicates a bug in signatureV2 function
return nil, s3err.ErrSignatureDoesNotMatch
}
if !compareSignatureV2(v2Signature, expectedV2Signature) {
return nil, s3err.ErrSignatureDoesNotMatch
}
return identity, s3err.ErrNone
}
// doesPresignV2SignatureMatch - Verify query headers with calculated header in accordance with
// - http://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/dev/auth-request-sig-v2.html
//
// returns ErrNone if the signature matches.
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) doesPresignV2SignatureMatch(r *http.Request) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode) {
query := r.URL.Query()
expires := query.Get("Expires")
if expires == "" {
return nil, s3err.ErrMissingFields
}
expireTimestamp, err := strconv.ParseInt(expires, 10, 64)
if err != nil {
return nil, s3err.ErrMalformedExpires
}
if time.Unix(expireTimestamp, 0).Before(time.Now().UTC()) {
return nil, s3err.ErrExpiredPresignRequest
}
accessKey := query.Get("AWSAccessKeyId")
if accessKey == "" {
glog.Warningf("InvalidAccessKeyId (V2 presigned): empty access key in request")
return nil, s3err.ErrInvalidAccessKeyID
}
signature := query.Get("Signature")
if signature == "" {
return nil, s3err.ErrMissingFields
}
identity, cred, found := iam.lookupByAccessKey(accessKey)
if !found {
// Log detailed error information for InvalidAccessKeyId (V2 presigned)
iam.m.RLock()
availableKeyCount := len(iam.accessKeyIdent)
iam.m.RUnlock()
glog.Warningf("InvalidAccessKeyId (V2 presigned): attempted key '%s' not found. Available keys: %d, Auth enabled: %v",
accessKey, availableKeyCount, iam.isAuthEnabled)
return nil, s3err.ErrInvalidAccessKeyID
}
// Check service account expiration
if cred.isCredentialExpired() {
glog.V(2).Infof("Service account credential %s has expired (expiration: %d, now: %d)",
accessKey, cred.Expiration, time.Now().Unix())
return nil, s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
expectedSignature := preSignatureV2(cred, r.Method, r.URL.EscapedPath(), r.URL.Query().Encode(), r.Header, expires)
if !compareSignatureV2(signature, expectedSignature) {
return nil, s3err.ErrSignatureDoesNotMatch
}
return identity, s3err.ErrNone
}
// validateV2AuthHeader validates AWS Signature Version '2' authentication header.
func validateV2AuthHeader(v2Auth string) (accessKey string, errCode s3err.ErrorCode) {
if v2Auth == "" {
return "", s3err.ErrAuthHeaderEmpty
}
// Signature V2 authorization header format:
// Authorization: AWS AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE:frJIUN8DYpKDtOLCwo//yllqDzg=
const signV2AlgorithmPrefix = signV2Algorithm + " "
if !strings.HasPrefix(v2Auth, signV2AlgorithmPrefix) {
return "", s3err.ErrSignatureVersionNotSupported
}
// Strip off the Algorithm prefix.
v2Auth = v2Auth[len(signV2Algorithm)+1:]
authFields := strings.Split(v2Auth, ":")
if len(authFields) != 2 {
return "", s3err.ErrMissingFields
}
// The first field is Access Key ID.
if authFields[0] == "" {
return "", s3err.ErrInvalidAccessKeyID
}
// The second field is signature.
if authFields[1] == "" {
return "", s3err.ErrMissingFields
}
return authFields[0], s3err.ErrNone
}
// signatureV2 - calculates signature version 2 for request.
func signatureV2(cred *Credential, method string, encodedResource string, encodedQuery string, headers http.Header) string {
stringToSign := getStringToSignV2(method, encodedResource, encodedQuery, headers, "")
signature := calculateSignatureV2(stringToSign, cred.SecretKey)
return signV2Algorithm + " " + cred.AccessKey + ":" + signature
}
// getStringToSignV2 - string to sign in accordance with
// - http://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/dev/auth-request-sig-v2.html
func getStringToSignV2(method string, encodedResource, encodedQuery string, headers http.Header, expires string) string {
canonicalHeaders := canonicalizedAmzHeadersV2(headers)
if len(canonicalHeaders) > 0 {
canonicalHeaders += "\n"
}
// From the Amazon docs:
//
// StringToSign = HTTP-Verb + "\n" +
// Content-MD5 + "\n" +
// Content-Type + "\n" +
// Date + "\n" +
// CanonicalizedAmzHeaders +
// CanonicalizedResource;
stringToSign := method + "\n"
stringToSign += headers.Get("Content-Md5") + "\n"
stringToSign += headers.Get("Content-Type") + "\n"
if expires != "" {
stringToSign += expires + "\n"
} else {
stringToSign += headers.Get("Date") + "\n"
if v := headers.Get("x-amz-date"); v != "" {
stringToSign = strings.Replace(stringToSign, headers.Get("Date")+"\n", "\n", -1)
}
}
stringToSign += canonicalHeaders
stringToSign += canonicalizedResourceV2(encodedResource, encodedQuery)
return stringToSign
}
// canonicalizedResourceV2 - canonicalize the resource string for signature V2.
func canonicalizedResourceV2(encodedResource, encodedQuery string) string {
queries := strings.Split(encodedQuery, "&")
keyval := make(map[string]string)
for _, query := range queries {
key := query
val := ""
index := strings.Index(query, "=")
if index != -1 {
key = query[:index]
val = query[index+1:]
}
keyval[key] = val
}
var canonicalQueries []string
for _, resource := range resourceList {
if val, ok := keyval[resource]; ok {
if val == "" {
canonicalQueries = append(canonicalQueries, resource)
continue
}
canonicalQueries = append(canonicalQueries, resource+"="+val)
}
}
// The queries will be already sorted as resourceList is sorted.
if len(canonicalQueries) == 0 {
return encodedResource
}
// If queries are present then the canonicalized resource is set to encodedResource + "?" + strings.Join(canonicalQueries, "&")
return encodedResource + "?" + strings.Join(canonicalQueries, "&")
}
// canonicalizedAmzHeadersV2 - canonicalize the x-amz-* headers for signature V2.
func canonicalizedAmzHeadersV2(headers http.Header) string {
var keys []string
keyval := make(map[string]string)
for key := range headers {
lkey := strings.ToLower(key)
if !strings.HasPrefix(lkey, "x-amz-") {
continue
}
keys = append(keys, lkey)
keyval[lkey] = strings.Join(headers[key], ",")
}
sort.Strings(keys)
var canonicalHeaders []string
for _, key := range keys {
canonicalHeaders = append(canonicalHeaders, key+":"+keyval[key])
}
return strings.Join(canonicalHeaders, "\n")
}
// calculateSignatureV2 - calculates signature version 2.
func calculateSignatureV2(stringToSign string, secret string) string {
hm := hmac.New(sha1.New, []byte(secret))
hm.Write([]byte(stringToSign))
return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(hm.Sum(nil))
}
// compareSignatureV2 returns true if and only if both signatures
// are equal. The signatures are expected to be base64 encoded strings
// according to the AWS S3 signature V2 spec.
func compareSignatureV2(sig1, sig2 string) bool {
// Decode signature string to binary byte-sequence representation is required
// as Base64 encoding of a value is not unique:
// For example "aGVsbG8=" and "aGVsbG8=\r" will result in the same byte slice.
signature1, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(sig1)
if err != nil {
return false
}
signature2, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(sig2)
if err != nil {
return false
}
return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(signature1, signature2) == 1
}
// Return signature-v2 for the presigned request.
func preSignatureV2(cred *Credential, method string, encodedResource string, encodedQuery string, headers http.Header, expires string) string {
stringToSign := getStringToSignV2(method, encodedResource, encodedQuery, headers, expires)
return calculateSignatureV2(stringToSign, cred.SecretKey)
}