mirror of
https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs.git
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* filer: require a read token for the root listing maybeCheckJwtAuthorization waved through every GET/HEAD on "/", so a filer with jwt.filer_signing.read.key set still served its root directory listing -- entry names, sizes and chunks[].file_id -- to a caller holding no token at all, and served the same listing to a token restricted by allowed_prefixes. The exemption was added for health checks before the filer had /healthz and /readyz. Both are registered on the default and read-only muxes ahead of the "/" handler and answer without a token, so drop it. Point the mTLS harness at /healthz, which is what it was probing for. * filer: keep the jwt query parameter out of a proxied chunk request The proxy stripped "jwt" from the forwarded query on reads only, on the grounds that a writer's own credential travels there. It does not: an uploader carries its AssignVolume token in the Authorization header, and the query parameter on this path holds a filer credential. Strip it for every method. A volume server has no business seeing a filer token, and because security.GetJwt reads the query before the header, relaying one would hide the writer's own token behind it. * filer: dispatch the chunk proxy after the JWT gate The ?proxyChunkId= branch returned before maybeCheckJwtAuthorization ran, so GET, PUT, POST and DELETE against any needle in the cluster were reachable on the filer's HTTP port with no filer credential, on a filer where every other request answered 401. An anonymous caller read a stored object, replaced its bytes, or deleted the needle, which the master's next vacuum makes permanent. #10434 stopped the filer from minting a volume write token for that caller, which closes the write half only where the volume server has a jwt.signing.key of its own -- not the shipped default, and not what scaffold/security.toml recommends for a filer deployment. The read half stayed open in every configuration, because the filer mints the read token itself. Move the dispatch below the gate. A file id carries no path, so a token restricted by allowed_prefixes cannot be scoped against one and is refused here; every consumer of this endpoint holds an unrestricted token. * filer: mint the volume credential for a proxied write too The proxy minted a volume token on reads and forwarded whatever the caller sent on writes. #10434 made it that way because the branch ran ahead of the JWT gate, so a token minted here would have been signed for an unauthenticated caller; the branch now runs behind the gate, and the credential the caller presents there is a filer one, which a volume server cannot validate and has no business seeing. Mint at the access level the request needs, and drop the caller's Authorization when there is no key to mint from. A proxied uploader then needs only the filer credential, instead of holding one for each hop with a single header to put them in. * mount, mq, filer.sync: send the filer credential for a proxied chunk Every in-tree consumer of ?proxyChunkId= reached the filer anonymously: mount and the broker put the AssignVolume token in the Authorization header, which is a volume credential, and filer.sync sent nothing at all. That was enough only while the branch ran ahead of the filer's JWT gate. Build the URL through one helper, and pick the credential from the URL it returns: a chunk proxied through a filer is a request to the filer, which authorizes it and attaches the volume credential itself, so the token there is a filer one at the access level the request needs. * filer: honor -exposeDirectoryData The flag was declared on all three commands that start a filer and read by none of them: FilerOption.ExposeDirectoryData was only ever assigned from filer.expose_directory_metadata in security.toml, so -exposeDirectoryData=false silently left the listing exposed. Only the TOML key had any effect. Plumb the flag through and let either switch turn the listing off. * filer: count a proxied chunk request once Moving the dispatch below the gate put it after the deferred request observation, so every proxied chunk now landed in FilerRequestHistogram twice, once under its HTTP method and once under chunkProxy. Name the deferred one after the proxy instead, the way the unsupported-method branch already does, which also gives the endpoint the status codes FilerRequestCounter records.
352 lines
12 KiB
Go
352 lines
12 KiB
Go
package weed_server
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"math"
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"mime"
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"net/http"
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"path/filepath"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/filer"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/pb/filer_pb"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/remote_storage"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3_constants"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/security"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/stats"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/util"
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"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
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"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
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)
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// Validates the preconditions. Returns true if GET/HEAD operation should not proceed.
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// Preconditions supported are:
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//
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// If-Modified-Since
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// If-Unmodified-Since
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// If-Match
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// If-None-Match
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func checkPreconditions(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, entry *filer.Entry) bool {
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etag := filer.ETagEntry(entry)
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/// When more than one conditional request header field is present in a
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/// request, the order in which the fields are evaluated becomes
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/// important. In practice, the fields defined in this document are
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/// consistently implemented in a single, logical order, since "lost
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/// update" preconditions have more strict requirements than cache
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/// validation, a validated cache is more efficient than a partial
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/// response, and entity tags are presumed to be more accurate than date
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/// validators. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7232#section-5
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if entry.Attr.Mtime.IsZero() {
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return false
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}
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w.Header().Set("Last-Modified", entry.Attr.Mtime.UTC().Format(http.TimeFormat))
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ifMatchETagHeader := r.Header.Get("If-Match")
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ifUnmodifiedSinceHeader := r.Header.Get("If-Unmodified-Since")
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if ifMatchETagHeader != "" {
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if util.CanonicalizeETag(etag) != util.CanonicalizeETag(ifMatchETagHeader) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusPreconditionFailed)
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return true
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}
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} else if ifUnmodifiedSinceHeader != "" {
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if t, parseError := time.Parse(http.TimeFormat, ifUnmodifiedSinceHeader); parseError == nil {
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if t.Before(entry.Attr.Mtime) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusPreconditionFailed)
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return true
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}
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}
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}
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ifNoneMatchETagHeader := r.Header.Get("If-None-Match")
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ifModifiedSinceHeader := r.Header.Get("If-Modified-Since")
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if ifNoneMatchETagHeader != "" {
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if util.CanonicalizeETag(etag) == util.CanonicalizeETag(ifNoneMatchETagHeader) {
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SetEtag(w, etag)
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotModified)
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return true
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}
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} else if ifModifiedSinceHeader != "" {
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if t, parseError := time.Parse(http.TimeFormat, ifModifiedSinceHeader); parseError == nil {
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if !t.Before(entry.Attr.Mtime) {
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SetEtag(w, etag)
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotModified)
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return true
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}
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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func (fs *FilerServer) GetOrHeadHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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ctx := r.Context()
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path := r.URL.Path
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isForDirectory := strings.HasSuffix(path, "/")
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if isForDirectory && len(path) > 1 {
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path = path[:len(path)-1]
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}
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entry, err := fs.filer.FindEntry(ctx, util.FullPath(path))
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if err != nil {
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if path == "/" {
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fs.listDirectoryHandler(w, r)
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return
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}
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if err == filer_pb.ErrNotFound {
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glog.V(2).InfofCtx(ctx, "Not found %s: %v", path, err)
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stats.FilerHandlerCounter.WithLabelValues(stats.ErrorReadNotFound).Inc()
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
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} else {
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glog.ErrorfCtx(ctx, "Internal %s: %v", path, err)
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stats.FilerHandlerCounter.WithLabelValues(stats.ErrorReadInternal).Inc()
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
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}
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return
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}
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query := r.URL.Query()
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if entry.IsDirectory() {
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if fs.option.DisableDirListing {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
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return
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}
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if query.Get("metadata") == "true" {
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writeJsonQuiet(w, r, http.StatusOK, entry)
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return
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}
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// listDirectoryHandler checks ExposeDirectoryData internally
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fs.listDirectoryHandler(w, r)
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return
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}
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if query.Get("metadata") == "true" {
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if query.Get("resolveManifest") == "true" {
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if entry.Chunks, _, err = filer.ResolveChunkManifest(
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ctx,
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fs.filer.MasterClient.GetLookupFileIdFunction(),
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entry.GetChunks(), 0, math.MaxInt64, fs.filer.MasterClient); err != nil {
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err = fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve chunk manifest, err: %s", err.Error())
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writeJsonError(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, err)
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return
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}
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}
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writeJsonQuiet(w, r, http.StatusOK, entry)
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return
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}
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if checkPreconditions(w, r, entry) {
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return
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}
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// Generate ETag for response
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etag := filer.ETagEntry(entry)
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w.Header().Set("Accept-Ranges", "bytes")
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// mime type
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mimeType := entry.Attr.Mime
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if mimeType == "" {
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if ext := filepath.Ext(entry.Name()); ext != "" {
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mimeType = mime.TypeByExtension(ext)
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}
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}
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if mimeType != "" {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", mimeType)
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} else {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream")
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}
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// print out the header from extended properties
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// Filter out xattr-* (filesystem extended attributes) and internal SeaweedFS headers
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for k, v := range entry.Extended {
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if !strings.HasPrefix(k, "xattr-") && !s3_constants.IsSeaweedFSInternalHeader(k) {
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w.Header().Set(k, string(v))
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}
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}
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//Seaweed custom header are not visible to Vue or javascript
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seaweedHeaders := []string{}
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for header := range w.Header() {
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if strings.HasPrefix(header, "Seaweed-") {
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seaweedHeaders = append(seaweedHeaders, header)
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}
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}
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seaweedHeaders = append(seaweedHeaders, "Content-Disposition")
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Expose-Headers", strings.Join(seaweedHeaders, ","))
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SetEtag(w, etag)
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filename := entry.Name()
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AdjustPassthroughHeaders(w, r, filename)
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// For range processing, use the original content size, not the encrypted size
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// entry.Size() returns max(chunk_sizes, file_size) where chunk_sizes include encryption overhead
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// For SSE objects, we need the original unencrypted size for proper range validation
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totalSize := int64(entry.FileSize)
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if r.Method == http.MethodHead {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.FormatInt(totalSize, 10))
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return
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}
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if entry.Remote != nil && entry.Remote.RemoteSize > 0 {
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// inline content is served locally without chunks
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hit := !entry.IsInRemoteOnly() || len(entry.Content) > 0
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stats.RecordRemoteCacheRead(stats.RemoteCacheSourceFiler, fs.filer.DetectBucket(entry.FullPath), hit)
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}
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ProcessRangeRequest(r, w, totalSize, mimeType, func(offset int64, size int64) (filer.DoStreamContent, error) {
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if offset+size <= int64(len(entry.Content)) {
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return func(writer io.Writer) error {
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_, err := writer.Write(entry.Content[offset : offset+size])
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if err != nil {
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stats.FilerHandlerCounter.WithLabelValues(stats.ErrorWriteEntry).Inc()
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glog.ErrorfCtx(ctx, "failed to write entry content: %v", err)
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}
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return err
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}, nil
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}
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chunks := entry.GetChunks()
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if entry.IsInRemoteOnly() {
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dir, name := entry.FullPath.DirAndName()
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// Bounded wait: a large download outlasts any client timeout, so
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// serve straight from the origin once the wait expires while the
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// detached cache keeps filling for later reads.
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cacheCtx, cancelCache := context.WithTimeout(ctx, remote_storage.CacheWaitTimeout(entry.Remote.RemoteSize))
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resp, err := fs.CacheRemoteObjectToLocalCluster(cacheCtx, &filer_pb.CacheRemoteObjectToLocalClusterRequest{
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Directory: dir,
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Name: name,
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})
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cancelCache()
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if err != nil {
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stats.FilerHandlerCounter.WithLabelValues(stats.ErrorReadCache).Inc()
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// Client disconnected: surface ctx error so caller stays silent.
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if ctxErr := ctx.Err(); ctxErr != nil {
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return nil, ctxErr
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}
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// Entry vanished mid-cache: forward the sentinel so caller maps to
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// 404, not the 503 retry-loop. The cache RPC returns it as a
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// canonical status, which errors.Is cannot see.
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if errors.Is(err, filer_pb.ErrNotFound) || status.Code(err) == codes.NotFound {
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return nil, filer_pb.ErrNotFound
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}
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// A multipart Range prepares every part before writing any, which
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// would hold one open origin connection per part and leak them
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// when a later prepare fails; keep those on the 503 retry path.
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if !strings.Contains(r.Header.Get("Range"), ",") {
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glog.V(1).InfofCtx(ctx, "stream %s from remote while caching: %v", entry.FullPath, err)
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if streamFn, remoteErr := fs.streamFromRemote(ctx, dir, name, offset, size); remoteErr == nil {
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return streamFn, nil
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} else {
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glog.WarningfCtx(ctx, "stream %s from remote: %v", entry.FullPath, remoteErr)
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}
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}
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// Origin unreadable: tag with sentinel so caller maps to 503 + Retry-After.
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glog.WarningfCtx(ctx, "CacheRemoteObjectToLocalCluster %s: %v", entry.FullPath, err)
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("cache %s: %w", entry.FullPath, ErrCacheNotReady)
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}
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chunks = resp.Entry.GetChunks()
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}
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// Use a detached context for streaming so client disconnects/cancellations don't abort volume server operations,
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// while preserving request-scoped values like tracing IDs.
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// Matches S3 API behavior. Request context (ctx) is used for metadata operations above.
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streamCtx, streamCancel := context.WithCancel(context.WithoutCancel(ctx))
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streamFn, err := filer.PrepareStreamContentWithPrefetch(streamCtx, fs.filer.MasterClient, fs.maybeGetVolumeReadJwtAuthorizationToken, chunks, offset, size, fs.option.DownloadMaxBytesPs, 4)
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if err != nil {
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streamCancel()
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stats.FilerHandlerCounter.WithLabelValues(stats.ErrorReadStream).Inc()
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glog.ErrorfCtx(ctx, "failed to prepare stream content %s: %v", r.URL, err)
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return nil, err
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}
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return func(writer io.Writer) error {
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defer streamCancel()
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err := streamFn(writer)
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if err != nil {
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stats.FilerHandlerCounter.WithLabelValues(stats.ErrorReadStream).Inc()
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glog.ErrorfCtx(ctx, "failed to stream content %s: %v", r.URL, err)
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}
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return err
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}, nil
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})
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}
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// streamFromRemote serves a byte range of a remote-only entry straight from the
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// mounted origin, so a first read is not blocked by the full local caching.
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func (fs *FilerServer) streamFromRemote(ctx context.Context, dir, name string, offset, size int64) (filer.DoStreamContent, error) {
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storageConf, remoteLocation, err := fs.resolveMountedRemote(ctx, dir, name)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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client, err := BuildGuardedRemoteStorageClient(ctx, storageConf, false)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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streamer, ok := client.(remote_storage.RemoteStorageStreamReader)
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if !ok {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("remote storage type %s does not support streaming reads", storageConf.Type)
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}
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reader, err := streamer.ReadFileAsStream(ctx, remoteLocation, offset, size)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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downloadThrottler := util.NewWriteThrottler(fs.option.DownloadMaxBytesPs)
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return func(writer io.Writer) error {
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defer reader.Close()
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var written int64
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buf := make([]byte, 128*1024)
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for {
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n, readErr := reader.Read(buf)
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if n > 0 {
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if _, writeErr := writer.Write(buf[:n]); writeErr != nil {
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return writeErr
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}
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written += int64(n)
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downloadThrottler.MaybeSlowdown(int64(n))
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}
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if readErr == io.EOF {
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if written != size {
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// the origin returned fewer bytes than the entry's RemoteSize
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return fmt.Errorf("origin stream %s: %w after %d of %d bytes", remoteLocation.Path, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF, written, size)
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}
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return nil
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}
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if readErr != nil {
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return readErr
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}
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}
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}, nil
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}
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func (fs *FilerServer) maybeGetVolumeReadJwtAuthorizationToken(fileId string) string {
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// Only ever sign with the read key. A volume server enforces read JWTs
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// solely when jwt.signing.read.key is set, so falling back to the write key
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// buys no access on a read -- it only hands out a token that would authorize
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// a write.
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return fs.maybeGetVolumeJwtAuthorizationToken(fileId, false)
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}
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// maybeGetVolumeJwtAuthorizationToken mints the volume credential for one file
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// id at the requested access level, empty when that key is unset -- which is
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// also when the volume server asks for nothing.
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func (fs *FilerServer) maybeGetVolumeJwtAuthorizationToken(fileId string, isWrite bool) string {
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key, expiresAfterSec := fs.volumeGuard.ReadSigningKey(), fs.volumeGuard.ReadExpiresAfterSec()
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if isWrite {
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key, expiresAfterSec = fs.volumeGuard.SigningKey(), fs.volumeGuard.ExpiresAfterSec()
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}
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if len(key) == 0 {
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return ""
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}
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// Claim the base fid: the volume server strips a _N delta suffix before
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// comparing, so a token claiming the suffixed form never matches.
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return string(security.GenJwtForVolumeServer(key, expiresAfterSec, baseFileId(fileId)))
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}
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