Files
seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3api_object_handlers_postpolicy.go
T
Chris LuandClaude Opus 5.5 4cba4eb7bf s3: ignore unsigned object headers on POST Object (#12585)
* s3: ignore unsigned object headers on POST Object

The POST policy signs form fields only, but the upload read tagging,
user metadata, storage class, object lock and the stored content
headers from the request headers as well. Drop them before the form
fields are applied.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* s3: test POST Object request headers against signed form fields

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-12 09:28:33 -08:00

458 lines
15 KiB
Go

package s3api
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"mime/multipart"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"slices"
"strings"
"github.com/dustin/go-humanize"
"github.com/gorilla/mux"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/pb/filer_pb"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/policy"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3_constants"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3err"
"golang.org/x/net/http/httpguts"
)
func (s3a *S3ApiServer) PostPolicyBucketHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/sigv4-HTTPPOSTConstructPolicy.html
// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/sigv4-post-example.html
bucket := mux.Vars(r)["bucket"]
glog.V(3).Infof("PostPolicyBucketHandler %s", bucket)
reader, err := r.MultipartReader()
if err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)
return
}
form, err := reader.ReadForm(int64(5 * humanize.MiByte))
if err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)
return
}
defer form.RemoveAll()
fileBody, fileName, fileContentType, fileSize, formValues, err := extractPostPolicyFormValues(form)
if err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)
return
}
if fileBody == nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrPOSTFileRequired)
return
}
defer fileBody.Close()
formValues.Set("Bucket", bucket)
if fileName != "" && strings.Contains(formValues.Get("Key"), "${filename}") {
formValues.Set("Key", strings.Replace(formValues.Get("Key"), "${filename}", fileName, -1))
}
rawObject := formValues.Get("Key")
if rawObject == "" || !s3_constants.IsValidObjectKey(rawObject) {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInvalidRequest)
return
}
object := s3_constants.NormalizeObjectKey(rawObject)
if err := s3a.validateTableBucketObjectPath(bucket, object); err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrAccessDenied)
return
}
successRedirect := formValues.Get("success_action_redirect")
successStatus := formValues.Get("success_action_status")
var redirectURL *url.URL
if successRedirect != "" {
redirectURL, err = url.Parse(successRedirect)
if err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)
return
}
}
// Verify policy signature. With auth off there are no keys to check it against, as on the other handlers.
var identity *Identity
errCode := s3err.ErrNone
if s3a.iam.isEnabled() {
identity, errCode = s3a.iam.doesPolicySignatureMatch(r.Context(), formValues)
if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, refineDenialForBucketName(r, identity, errCode))
return
}
if identity != nil {
r = r.WithContext(recordIdentityInContext(r, identity))
if identity.Account != nil {
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAccountId, identity.Account.Id)
}
}
}
policyBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(formValues.Get("Policy"))
if err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)
return
}
// Handle policy if it is set.
if len(policyBytes) > 0 {
postPolicyForm, err := policy.ParsePostPolicyForm(string(policyBytes))
if err != nil {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrPostPolicyConditionInvalidFormat)
return
}
// Make sure formValues adhere to policy restrictions.
if err = policy.CheckPostPolicy(formValues, postPolicyForm); err != nil {
glog.V(3).Infof("PostPolicy check failed for bucket %s: %v", bucket, err)
s3err.WriteErrorResponseWithMessage(w, r, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, err.Error())
return
}
// Ensure that the object size is within expected range, also the file size
// should not exceed the maximum single Put size (5 GiB)
lengthRange := postPolicyForm.Conditions.ContentLengthRange
if lengthRange.Valid {
if fileSize < lengthRange.Min {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrEntityTooSmall)
return
}
if fileSize > lengthRange.Max {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrEntityTooLarge)
return
}
}
}
// Get ContentType from post formData
// Otherwise from formFile ContentType
contentType := formValues.Get("Content-Type")
if contentType == "" {
contentType = fileContentType
}
r.Header.Set("Content-Type", contentType)
// acl and x-amz-acl both set the canned ACL; differing values are ambiguous.
_, hasAcl := formValues["Acl"]
_, hasAmzAcl := formValues[s3_constants.AmzCannedAcl]
if hasAcl && hasAmzAcl && formValues.Get("Acl") != formValues.Get(s3_constants.AmzCannedAcl) {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInvalidRequest)
return
}
// Forward validated POST form fields to the underlying PUT as headers.
applyPostPolicyFormHeaders(r, formValues)
if !validHeaderValues(r.Header) {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)
return
}
// Authorize the object like the PUT path, with policies seeing the ACL as PutObject presents it.
policyReq, errCode := putObjectACLPolicyRequest(objectKeyPolicyRequest(r, http.MethodPut, bucket, object, ""), s3_constants.ACTION_WRITE, bucket, object)
if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, errCode)
return
}
if errCode := s3a.iam.AuthorizeObjectWrite(policyReq, identity, bucket, object); errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, refineDenialForBucketName(r, identity, errCode))
return
}
// An acl or x-amz-grant-* form field rides onto the upload as ACL headers,
// which the PUT path only applies under s3:PutObjectAcl.
if postRequestsAcl(r) {
if errCode := s3a.iam.AuthorizeObjectAclWrite(policyReq, identity, bucket, object); errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, refineDenialForBucketName(r, identity, errCode))
return
}
}
versioningState, err := s3a.getVersioningState(bucket)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, filer_pb.ErrNotFound) {
// Auto-create bucket if it doesn't exist (requires Admin permission)
if !s3a.handleAutoCreateBucket(w, r, bucket, "PostPolicyBucketHandler") {
return
}
// Re-fetch versioning state to handle race conditions where
// another process might have created the bucket with versioning enabled.
versioningState, err = s3a.getVersioningState(bucket)
}
if err != nil {
glog.Errorf("PostPolicyBucketHandler: versioning state for bucket %s: %v", bucket, err)
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInternalError)
return
}
}
// The bucket load above brings its policy into the engine.
if !s3a.iam.isEnabled() && postRequestsAcl(r) {
if errCode := s3a.checkPutObjectACLPolicy(policyReq, bucket, object); errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, errCode)
return
}
}
r, errCode = s3a.preparePostObjectACL(r, bucket)
if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, errCode)
return
}
objectLockEnabled, err := s3a.isObjectLockEnabled(bucket)
if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, filer_pb.ErrNotFound) {
glog.Errorf("PostPolicyBucketHandler: object lock state for bucket %s: %v", bucket, err)
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInternalError)
return
}
if err := s3a.validateObjectLockHeaders(r, bucket, object, objectLockEnabled); err != nil {
glog.V(2).Infof("PostPolicyBucketHandler: object lock header validation failed for %s/%s: %v", bucket, object, err)
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, mapValidationErrorToS3Error(err))
return
}
var etag string
var versionId string
var sseMetadata SSEResponseMetadata
switch versioningState {
case s3_constants.VersioningEnabled:
versionId, etag, errCode, sseMetadata = s3a.putVersionedObject(r, bucket, object, fileBody, contentType)
case s3_constants.VersioningSuspended:
etag, errCode, sseMetadata = s3a.putSuspendedVersioningObject(r, bucket, object, fileBody, contentType)
default:
filePath := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s", s3a.bucketDir(bucket), object)
// Use fileSize, not r.ContentLength: the multipart body inflates ContentLength.
ttlSec := s3a.lifecycleTTLForObjectWrite(bucket, object, fileSize)
etag, errCode, sseMetadata = s3a.putToFiler(r, filePath, fileBody, bucket, object, 1, ttlSec, nil, false, "")
}
if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, errCode)
return
}
if versionId != "" {
w.Header().Set("x-amz-version-id", versionId)
}
if successRedirect != "" {
// Replace raw query params..
redirectURL.RawQuery = getRedirectPostRawQuery(bucket, object, etag)
w.Header().Set("Location", redirectURL.String())
s3err.WriteEmptyResponse(w, r, http.StatusSeeOther)
return
}
setEtag(w, etag)
// Include SSE response headers (important for bucket-default encryption)
s3a.setSSEResponseHeaders(w, r, sseMetadata)
// Decide what http response to send depending on success_action_status parameter
switch successStatus {
case "201":
resp := PostResponse{
Bucket: bucket,
Key: object,
ETag: `"` + etag + `"`,
Location: w.Header().Get("Location"),
}
s3err.WriteXMLResponse(w, r, http.StatusCreated, resp)
s3err.PostLog(r, http.StatusCreated, s3err.ErrNone)
case "200":
s3err.WriteEmptyResponse(w, r, http.StatusOK)
case "204":
s3err.WriteEmptyResponse(w, r, http.StatusNoContent)
default:
s3err.WriteEmptyResponse(w, r, http.StatusNoContent)
}
}
// postPolicyReservedFormFields are multipart form fields that are part of the
// POST Object auth/policy mechanism (or handled explicitly elsewhere in the
// handler) and must not be forwarded to the upload as HTTP headers. Keys are
// already run through http.CanonicalHeaderKey before lookup.
var postPolicyReservedFormFields = map[string]struct{}{
// POST policy signature (V2)
"Policy": {},
"Signature": {},
"Awsaccesskeyid": {},
// POST policy signature (V4)
"X-Amz-Signature": {},
"X-Amz-Credential": {},
"X-Amz-Algorithm": {},
"X-Amz-Date": {},
"X-Amz-Security-Token": {},
// Target descriptors
"Key": {},
"File": {},
"Bucket": {},
// Success actions (handled elsewhere in the handler)
"Success_action_redirect": {},
"Success_action_status": {},
"Redirect": {},
// Content-Type is resolved separately above (from form or file part)
"Content-Type": {},
}
// applyPostPolicyFormHeaders forwards validated POST Object form fields to the
// request headers so they are applied to the resulting PUT. Reserved fields
// that are part of the POST policy mechanism itself (signature, key, etc.) are
// skipped. The acl form field is translated to the X-Amz-Acl header to match
// how AWS promotes the form value to the underlying PUT.
func applyPostPolicyFormHeaders(r *http.Request, formValues http.Header) {
// The policy signs form fields only, so object settings come from the form.
for k := range r.Header {
if ck := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(k); strings.HasPrefix(ck, "X-Amz-") || slices.Contains(postObjectHeaders, ck) || ck == "Response-Content-Disposition" {
delete(r.Header, k)
}
}
for k := range formValues {
if _, reserved := postPolicyReservedFormFields[k]; reserved {
continue
}
switch {
case k == "Acl":
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzCannedAcl, formValues.Get(k))
case slices.Contains(postObjectHeaders, k), strings.HasPrefix(k, "X-Amz-"):
r.Header.Set(k, formValues.Get(k))
}
}
}
// postObjectHeaders are the standard headers the upload stores on the object.
var postObjectHeaders = []string{"Cache-Control", "Expires", "Content-Disposition", "Content-Encoding", "Content-Language"}
// validHeaderValues rejects form values carrying control characters, which a
// real PUT could not send and which would corrupt the volume upload framing.
func validHeaderValues(h http.Header) bool {
for _, values := range h {
for _, v := range values {
if !httpguts.ValidHeaderFieldValue(v) {
return false
}
}
}
return true
}
var postAclHeaders = []string{s3_constants.AmzCannedAcl, s3_constants.AmzAclFullControl, s3_constants.AmzAclRead, s3_constants.AmzAclReadAcp, s3_constants.AmzAclWrite, s3_constants.AmzAclWriteAcp}
// postRequestsAcl reports whether the POST form fields promoted an ACL.
func postRequestsAcl(r *http.Request) bool {
for _, header := range postAclHeaders {
if r.Header.Get(header) != "" {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// Extract form fields and file data from a HTTP POST Policy
func extractPostPolicyFormValues(form *multipart.Form) (filePart io.ReadCloser, fileName, fileContentType string, fileSize int64, formValues http.Header, err error) {
// / HTML Form values
fileName = ""
fileContentType = ""
// Canonicalize the form values into http.Header.
formValues = make(http.Header)
for k, v := range form.Value {
formValues[http.CanonicalHeaderKey(k)] = v
}
// Validate form values.
if err = validateFormFieldSize(formValues); err != nil {
return nil, "", "", 0, nil, err
}
// this means that filename="" was not specified for file key and Go has
// an ugly way of handling this situation. Refer here
// https://golang.org/src/mime/multipart/formdata.go#L61
if len(form.File) == 0 {
var b = &bytes.Buffer{}
for _, v := range formValues["File"] {
b.WriteString(v)
}
fileSize = int64(b.Len())
filePart = io.NopCloser(b)
return filePart, fileName, fileContentType, fileSize, formValues, nil
}
// Iterator until we find a valid File field and break
for k, v := range form.File {
canonicalFormName := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(k)
if canonicalFormName == "File" {
if len(v) == 0 {
return nil, "", "", 0, nil, errors.New("Invalid arguments specified")
}
// Fetch fileHeader which has the uploaded file information
fileHeader := v[0]
// Set filename
fileName = fileHeader.Filename
// Set contentType
fileContentType = fileHeader.Header.Get("Content-Type")
// Open the uploaded part
filePart, err = fileHeader.Open()
if err != nil {
return nil, "", "", 0, nil, err
}
// Compute file size
fileSize, err = filePart.(io.Seeker).Seek(0, 2)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", "", 0, nil, err
}
// Reset Seek to the beginning
_, err = filePart.(io.Seeker).Seek(0, 0)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", "", 0, nil, err
}
// File found and ready for reading
break
}
}
return filePart, fileName, fileContentType, fileSize, formValues, nil
}
// Validate form field size for s3 specification requirement.
func validateFormFieldSize(formValues http.Header) error {
// Iterate over form values
for k := range formValues {
// Check if value's field exceeds S3 limit
if int64(len(formValues.Get(k))) > int64(1*humanize.MiByte) {
return errors.New("Data size larger than expected")
}
}
// Success.
return nil
}
func getRedirectPostRawQuery(bucket, key, etag string) string {
redirectValues := make(url.Values)
redirectValues.Set("bucket", bucket)
redirectValues.Set("key", key)
redirectValues.Set("etag", "\""+etag+"\"")
return redirectValues.Encode()
}
// Check to see if Policy is signed correctly, returning the signing identity.
// The verified form's access key is recorded in ctx's identity holder.
// Write authorization happens later in the handler via AuthorizeObjectWrite,
// which evaluates the identity's attached IAM policies, session policies, and
// the bucket policy against the real object key; gating here on the legacy
// Actions projection would deny identities those mechanisms allow.
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) doesPolicySignatureMatch(ctx context.Context, formValues http.Header) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode) {
// For SignV2 - Signature field will be valid
if _, ok := formValues["Signature"]; ok {
return iam.doesPolicySignatureV2Match(ctx, formValues)
}
return iam.doesPolicySignatureV4Match(ctx, formValues)
}