Files
seaweedfs/.github/actions/sign-image/action.yml
T
Chris Lu 0d3aebbcbe ci: pin the actions the signing jobs newly run by commit
These run with registry credentials and the OIDC token that signs under
the repository's identity, so a retargeted tag upstream must not be able
to reach them.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A5zMqzaUg1Snur4Yg8xJGa
2026-09-03 10:25:02 -07:00

40 lines
1.3 KiB
YAML

name: Sign container images
description: >
Keyless cosign signature on each image, then a verification pass against the
identity the signature should carry, so a misconfigured job fails here and not
on someone's cluster. That identity is the calling workflow's own,
https://github.com/<owner>/<repo>/.github/workflows/<file>@<ref>.
The calling job needs `id-token: write` and a registry login for every image.
inputs:
images:
description: Image references by digest (name@sha256:...), whitespace separated.
required: true
runs:
using: composite
steps:
- name: Install cosign
uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@6f9f17788090df1f26f669e9d70d6ae9567deba6 # v4.1.2
- name: Sign
shell: bash
env:
IMAGES: ${{ inputs.images }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# The .sig tag layout: the OCI-referrer bundle cosign 3 writes by default
# is not read by the Kyverno and policy-controller releases in use today.
cosign sign --yes --recursive --new-bundle-format=false $IMAGES
- name: Verify
shell: bash
env:
IMAGES: ${{ inputs.images }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
cosign verify \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
--certificate-identity "https://github.com/$GITHUB_WORKFLOW_REF" \
$IMAGES