Files
seaweedfs/weed/iam/sts/session_claims.go
T
Chris Lu 9d6a699b94 feat(iam): opt-in session revocation via JTI blocklist (Phase 3d) (#9324)
* feat(iam): claim-based policy mode for AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity

When the caller passes the sentinel RoleArn arn:aws:iam:::role/sts-claim-based
(or omits it entirely) and the matched OIDC provider has policyClaim set,
mint a session whose effective policies come from that JWT claim instead
of from a server-side role mapping. Accepts string, comma-separated
string, or array shapes — MinIO-compatible behaviour for IDPs that
already attach policies to the user.

Trust-policy validation is skipped in claim-mode: the IDP is the sole
authority for both authentication and authorization, mirroring the
contract MinIO documents for its DummyRoleARN flow. Concrete-role mode
is unchanged and still requires the role definition + trust policy.

* fix(iam): trim policy-claim array elements + clean up stale comments

Three medium-priority cleanups gemini flagged on the claim-based path:

- extractClaimPolicies's array branch was leaving whitespace on each
  element while the string/comma-separated branch trimmed via
  splitPolicyClaimString. An IDP that emits ["readonly", " billing "]
  would create a "billing" policy lookup that didn't match the stored
  name. Trim every array element, drop empties.
- The "synthetic ARN keyed on the session name" comment was wrong —
  effectiveRoleArn here is the literal sentinel; it's the assumed-role
  ARN generated downstream that's session-keyed. Reword.
- The empty if/else block at the start of
  validateAssumeRoleWithWebIdentityRequest existed only to host a
  comment about deferred validation; the comment now lives in the
  function godoc and the empty branch is gone.

Addresses three gemini medium reviews on PR #9322.

* feat(iam): account-scoped OIDC providers

Add OIDCProviderRecord.AccountID enforcement: when a role lives in
account A, the OIDC provider validating the assume-role token must be
either global (AccountID="") or also live in account A. Cross-account
use is rejected at the IAM-manager layer before reaching the trust
policy validator.

OIDCProviderStore gains GetProviderByIssuerAndAccount; both the in-
memory and filer-backed stores implement it. Static-config-only
deployments are unaffected since they don't populate the store.

* fix(iam): account-scoped lookup for cross-account check

enforceProviderAccountScope was calling GetProviderByIssuer, which
returns the first match arbitrarily when multiple providers share an
issuer (one global + one per tenant is the canonical setup). On a
two-record collision the wrong record could come back first and
falsely reject a valid same-account or global-provider request.

Use GetProviderByIssuerAndAccount as the primary lookup so the
filter happens in the store. On miss, fall back to
GetProviderByIssuer purely to distinguish "issuer entirely unknown"
(let the STS layer reject) from "issuer registered in a different
account" (surface a precise cross-account error).

Addresses gemini high-priority review on PR #9323.

* feat(iam): opt-in session revocation via JTI blocklist

Add SessionRevocationStore (memory + filer implementations) and wire
it into the IAMManager.IsActionAllowed path so a revoked session is
rejected on the next signed request. Session JWTs now embed the
session id as the JTI claim, giving the blocklist a stable key
without requiring a second secret.

Operators who don't configure a store keep the existing fully-stateless
behaviour: every session stays valid until natural expiry. Operators
who do configure one accept one filer lookup per signed request in
exchange for being able to invalidate compromised tokens before
expiry. Revocation entries carry the original session expiry so the
blocklist self-trims via PurgeRevokedSessions.

* fix(iam): hash JTI filenames + paginate Purge with proper EOF handling

Three reviewer-flagged issues on the filer-backed revocation store:

1. Path traversal (security-medium): RevokeSession is exported and takes
   an arbitrary string. Using the JTI verbatim as a filename meant a
   caller could pass "../../etc/passwd" to write outside the basePath.
   SHA-1 hash the JTI to a fixed-width hex name; lookups still find the
   entry because Revoke and IsRevoked share the same hash function.

2. Purge swallowed errors. The inner `err` from stream.Recv() shadowed
   the outer err and the loop just broke on any failure, so a mid-stream
   gRPC error returned (count, nil) and the caller had no idea the
   purge was incomplete. Switch to errors.Is(io.EOF) for end-of-stream
   and propagate everything else.

3. Purge had a hardcoded 10000-entry cap. Stream-paginate via
   StartFromFileName so the operator-cron can clean a backlog larger
   than that without losing rows.
2026-05-05 13:25:22 -07:00

219 lines
7.4 KiB
Go

package sts
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
"time"
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
)
// ComputeParentUser returns a stable per-identity hash derived from the OIDC
// (sub, iss) tuple. Only the (sub, iss) pair is guaranteed stable across token
// refreshes per OpenID Connect Core 1.0 §5.7, so any per-user state (audit
// logs, quotas) must key off this value rather than the access-key or session
// id. The hash is base64-rawurl-encoded SHA-256 over "openid:<sub>:<iss>" so
// it stays filesystem-safe and bounded in length for storage in audit paths.
func ComputeParentUser(sub, iss string) string {
if sub == "" || iss == "" {
return ""
}
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte("openid:" + sub + ":" + iss))
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(h[:])
}
// defaultCredentialGenerator is a reusable instance for generating temporary credentials
// Reusing a single instance across all calls to ToSessionInfo() reduces allocation overhead
// since this method may be called frequently during signature verification
var defaultCredentialGenerator = NewCredentialGenerator()
// STSSessionClaims represents comprehensive session information embedded in JWT tokens
// This eliminates the need for separate session storage by embedding all session
// metadata directly in the token itself - enabling true stateless operation
type STSSessionClaims struct {
jwt.RegisteredClaims
// Session identification
SessionId string `json:"sid"` // session_id (abbreviated for smaller tokens)
SessionName string `json:"snam"` // session_name (abbreviated for smaller tokens)
TokenType string `json:"typ"` // token_type
// Role information
RoleArn string `json:"role"` // role_arn
AssumedRole string `json:"assumed"` // assumed_role_user
Principal string `json:"principal"` // principal_arn
// Authorization data
Policies []string `json:"pol,omitempty"` // policies (abbreviated)
// SessionPolicy contains inline session policy JSON (optional)
SessionPolicy string `json:"spol,omitempty"`
// Identity provider information
IdentityProvider string `json:"idp"` // identity_provider
ExternalUserId string `json:"ext_uid"` // external_user_id
ProviderIssuer string `json:"prov_iss"` // provider_issuer
// Request context (optional, for policy evaluation)
RequestContext map[string]interface{} `json:"req_ctx,omitempty"`
// Session metadata
AssumedAt time.Time `json:"assumed_at"` // when role was assumed
MaxDuration int64 `json:"max_dur,omitempty"` // maximum session duration in seconds
// ParentUser is a stable hash of (sub, iss) for tokens minted from an OIDC
// identity. It survives token rotation since only the (sub, iss) tuple is
// guaranteed stable per OpenID Connect Core 1.0. Empty for non-federated
// session types.
ParentUser string `json:"puid,omitempty"`
}
// NewSTSSessionClaims creates new STS session claims with all required information
func NewSTSSessionClaims(sessionId, issuer string, expiresAt time.Time) *STSSessionClaims {
now := time.Now()
return &STSSessionClaims{
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
Issuer: issuer,
Subject: sessionId,
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(expiresAt),
NotBefore: jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
// jti = sessionId. The session id is already a unique random
// identifier, so reusing it as the JWT id avoids a second secret
// while still giving the revocation layer a stable lookup key.
ID: sessionId,
},
SessionId: sessionId,
TokenType: TokenTypeSession,
AssumedAt: now,
}
}
// ToSessionInfo converts JWT claims back to SessionInfo structure
// This enables seamless integration with existing code expecting SessionInfo
func (c *STSSessionClaims) ToSessionInfo() *SessionInfo {
var expiresAt time.Time
if c.ExpiresAt != nil {
expiresAt = c.ExpiresAt.Time
}
// Generate temporary credentials from the session ID
// This is deterministic based on the session ID, so the same credentials are regenerated
credentials, err := defaultCredentialGenerator.GenerateTemporaryCredentials(c.SessionId, expiresAt)
if err != nil {
// Log the error with context - credential generation failure is important for debugging
errMsg := fmt.Errorf("generate temporary credentials for session %s: %w", c.SessionId, err)
glog.Warningf("Failed to generate credentials for STS session: %v", errMsg)
// Return session info without credentials - validation will catch this as invalid
credentials = nil
}
return &SessionInfo{
SessionId: c.SessionId,
SessionName: c.SessionName,
RoleArn: c.RoleArn,
AssumedRoleUser: c.AssumedRole,
Principal: c.Principal,
Policies: c.Policies,
SessionPolicy: c.SessionPolicy,
ExpiresAt: expiresAt,
IdentityProvider: c.IdentityProvider,
ExternalUserId: c.ExternalUserId,
ProviderIssuer: c.ProviderIssuer,
RequestContext: c.RequestContext,
ParentUser: c.ParentUser,
// Provide the Subject (sub) from registered claims
Subject: c.Subject,
Credentials: credentials,
}
}
// IsValid checks if the session claims are valid (not expired, etc.)
func (c *STSSessionClaims) IsValid() bool {
now := time.Now()
// Check expiration
if c.ExpiresAt != nil && c.ExpiresAt.Before(now) {
return false
}
// Check not-before
if c.NotBefore != nil && c.NotBefore.After(now) {
return false
}
// Ensure required fields are present
if c.SessionId == "" || c.RoleArn == "" || c.Principal == "" {
return false
}
return true
}
// GetSessionId returns the session identifier
func (c *STSSessionClaims) GetSessionId() string {
return c.SessionId
}
// GetExpiresAt returns the expiration time
func (c *STSSessionClaims) GetExpiresAt() time.Time {
if c.ExpiresAt != nil {
return c.ExpiresAt.Time
}
return time.Time{}
}
// WithRoleInfo sets role-related information in the claims
func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithRoleInfo(roleArn, assumedRole, principal string) *STSSessionClaims {
c.RoleArn = roleArn
c.AssumedRole = assumedRole
c.Principal = principal
return c
}
// WithPolicies sets the policies associated with this session
func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithPolicies(policies []string) *STSSessionClaims {
c.Policies = policies
return c
}
// WithSessionPolicy sets the inline session policy JSON for this session
func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithSessionPolicy(policy string) *STSSessionClaims {
c.SessionPolicy = policy
return c
}
// WithIdentityProvider sets identity provider information
func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithIdentityProvider(providerName, externalUserId, providerIssuer string) *STSSessionClaims {
c.IdentityProvider = providerName
c.ExternalUserId = externalUserId
c.ProviderIssuer = providerIssuer
return c
}
// WithRequestContext sets request context for policy evaluation
func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithRequestContext(ctx map[string]interface{}) *STSSessionClaims {
c.RequestContext = ctx
return c
}
// WithMaxDuration sets the maximum session duration
func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithMaxDuration(duration time.Duration) *STSSessionClaims {
c.MaxDuration = int64(duration.Seconds())
return c
}
// WithSessionName sets the session name
func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithSessionName(sessionName string) *STSSessionClaims {
c.SessionName = sessionName
return c
}
// WithParentUser sets the stable per-identity hash for the session. See
// ComputeParentUser for the derivation rule.
func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithParentUser(parentUser string) *STSSessionClaims {
c.ParentUser = parentUser
return c
}