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* s3, iceberg: record the access key a request was signed with Several access keys can belong to one identity, but nothing downstream of authentication says which one signed a request: the audit log carries the identity name only, and every table credential the Iceberg catalog vends for that identity gets the same session name. When an identity is shared (one key per person or per service), the log cannot tell the holders apart. The verifier that matched a credential now records that credential's access key id in the request's identity holder (verifyV4Signature for header, presigned, streaming and STS requests; both SigV2 verifiers). Nothing re-reads the request for a key, so a second, unverified key elsewhere in the request (a junk X-Amz-Credential on a SigV2 request, a junk SigV4 header on a SigV2 presigned URL) is never recorded. - s3err.AccessLog gains access_key_id (omitempty): a static key's id, or an STS session's temporary key id. Every other field is unchanged. - The Iceberg and Lance catalogs install the holder before authenticating a SigV4 request; a Bearer token records the key it was minted from (the token is verified with a key derived from it); a Lance x-api-key records its key. - VendTableCredentials ends the session name with "-k" and the first 12 hex digits of SHA-256 of the key id (the table part gives way within the 64-character limit; the tag is never cut), and carries the key id in the session token (src_ak, SessionInfo.SourceAccessKeyId). Tests: auth_access_key_attribution_test.go and auth_access_key_shapes_test.go (two keys on one identity, the deny path, SigV2 and presigned SigV2 with a junk key elsewhere, streaming seed, STS session, failed signatures record nothing), s3api_iceberg_session_name_test.go, iceberg and lance Auth tests, sts source_access_key_test.go. * s3: record the access key of a verified POST-policy form and of a retargeted signature Two verified signatures left access_key_id empty in the audit log: - A browser POST upload is verified in PostPolicyBucketHandler from its form fields by doesPolicySignatureV2Match / doesPolicySignatureV4Match, which did not record the key. Both now take the request context and record the credential's key once its signature verifies; a form that fails verification records nothing. - verifyV4Signature refuses a signature that verified for one virtual-hosted bucket but was routed to another. The key was recorded only after that check, so the refusal carried none. It is now recorded as soon as a host candidate verifies. Test: TestPostPolicyUploadRecordsTheSigningKey (SigV4 and SigV2 forms, and a form with a wrong signature) and TestSignedVirtualHostRetargetRecordsTheSigningKey; both fail before this change. * s3: test VendTableCredentials end to end for the caller's access key TestVendTableCredentialsRecordsTheCallersKey mints sessions through VendTableCredentials with a configured STS service, the key recorded the way the catalog's authentication records it, then validates each session token: SourceAccessKeyId and the session name's key tag match the key, and a caller without a key gets an untagged session. It fails if the vendor stops passing either field. --------- Co-authored-by: Javier de la Torre <jatorre@lakehousebox.com> Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
388 lines
13 KiB
Go
388 lines
13 KiB
Go
package s3api
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"encoding/base64"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"mime/multipart"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"strings"
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"github.com/dustin/go-humanize"
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"github.com/gorilla/mux"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/pb/filer_pb"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/policy"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3_constants"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3err"
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)
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func (s3a *S3ApiServer) PostPolicyBucketHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/sigv4-HTTPPOSTConstructPolicy.html
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// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/sigv4-post-example.html
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bucket := mux.Vars(r)["bucket"]
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glog.V(3).Infof("PostPolicyBucketHandler %s", bucket)
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reader, err := r.MultipartReader()
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if err != nil {
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s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)
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return
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}
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form, err := reader.ReadForm(int64(5 * humanize.MiByte))
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if err != nil {
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s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)
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return
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}
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defer form.RemoveAll()
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fileBody, fileName, fileContentType, fileSize, formValues, err := extractPostPolicyFormValues(form)
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if err != nil {
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s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)
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return
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}
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if fileBody == nil {
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s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrPOSTFileRequired)
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return
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}
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defer fileBody.Close()
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formValues.Set("Bucket", bucket)
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if fileName != "" && strings.Contains(formValues.Get("Key"), "${filename}") {
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formValues.Set("Key", strings.Replace(formValues.Get("Key"), "${filename}", fileName, -1))
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}
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rawObject := formValues.Get("Key")
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if rawObject == "" || !s3_constants.IsValidObjectKey(rawObject) {
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s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInvalidRequest)
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return
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}
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object := s3_constants.NormalizeObjectKey(rawObject)
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if err := s3a.validateTableBucketObjectPath(bucket, object); err != nil {
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s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrAccessDenied)
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return
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}
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successRedirect := formValues.Get("success_action_redirect")
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successStatus := formValues.Get("success_action_status")
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var redirectURL *url.URL
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if successRedirect != "" {
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redirectURL, err = url.Parse(successRedirect)
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if err != nil {
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s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)
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return
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}
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}
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// Verify policy signature.
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identity, errCode := s3a.iam.doesPolicySignatureMatch(r.Context(), formValues)
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if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
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s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, refineDenialForBucketName(r, identity, errCode))
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return
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}
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if identity != nil {
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r = r.WithContext(recordIdentityInContext(r, identity))
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}
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policyBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(formValues.Get("Policy"))
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if err != nil {
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s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrMalformedPOSTRequest)
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return
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}
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// Handle policy if it is set.
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if len(policyBytes) > 0 {
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postPolicyForm, err := policy.ParsePostPolicyForm(string(policyBytes))
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if err != nil {
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s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrPostPolicyConditionInvalidFormat)
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return
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}
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// Make sure formValues adhere to policy restrictions.
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if err = policy.CheckPostPolicy(formValues, postPolicyForm); err != nil {
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glog.V(3).Infof("PostPolicy check failed for bucket %s: %v", bucket, err)
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s3err.WriteErrorResponseWithMessage(w, r, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, err.Error())
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return
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}
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// Ensure that the object size is within expected range, also the file size
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// should not exceed the maximum single Put size (5 GiB)
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lengthRange := postPolicyForm.Conditions.ContentLengthRange
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if lengthRange.Valid {
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if fileSize < lengthRange.Min {
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s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrEntityTooSmall)
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return
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}
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if fileSize > lengthRange.Max {
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s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrEntityTooLarge)
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return
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}
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}
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}
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// Get ContentType from post formData
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// Otherwise from formFile ContentType
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contentType := formValues.Get("Content-Type")
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if contentType == "" {
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contentType = fileContentType
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}
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r.Header.Set("Content-Type", contentType)
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// Forward validated POST form fields to the underlying PUT as headers.
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applyPostPolicyFormHeaders(r, formValues)
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// Authorize the object like the PUT path; the coarse Write check above does not consult the bucket policy.
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if errCode := s3a.iam.AuthorizeObjectWrite(r, identity, bucket, object); errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
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s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, refineDenialForBucketName(r, identity, errCode))
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return
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}
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versioningState, err := s3a.getVersioningState(bucket)
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if err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, filer_pb.ErrNotFound) {
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s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrNoSuchBucket)
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return
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}
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glog.Errorf("PostPolicyBucketHandler: versioning state for bucket %s: %v", bucket, err)
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s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInternalError)
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return
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}
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objectLockEnabled, err := s3a.isObjectLockEnabled(bucket)
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if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, filer_pb.ErrNotFound) {
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glog.Errorf("PostPolicyBucketHandler: object lock state for bucket %s: %v", bucket, err)
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s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInternalError)
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return
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}
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if err := s3a.validateObjectLockHeaders(r, bucket, object, objectLockEnabled); err != nil {
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glog.V(2).Infof("PostPolicyBucketHandler: object lock header validation failed for %s/%s: %v", bucket, object, err)
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s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, mapValidationErrorToS3Error(err))
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return
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}
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var etag string
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var versionId string
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var sseMetadata SSEResponseMetadata
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switch versioningState {
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case s3_constants.VersioningEnabled:
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versionId, etag, errCode, sseMetadata = s3a.putVersionedObject(r, bucket, object, fileBody, contentType)
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case s3_constants.VersioningSuspended:
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etag, errCode, sseMetadata = s3a.putSuspendedVersioningObject(r, bucket, object, fileBody, contentType)
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default:
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filePath := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s", s3a.bucketDir(bucket), object)
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// Use fileSize, not r.ContentLength: the multipart body inflates ContentLength.
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ttlSec := s3a.lifecycleTTLForObjectWrite(bucket, object, fileSize)
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etag, errCode, sseMetadata = s3a.putToFiler(r, filePath, fileBody, bucket, object, 1, ttlSec, nil, false, "")
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}
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if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
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s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, errCode)
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return
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}
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if versionId != "" {
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w.Header().Set("x-amz-version-id", versionId)
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}
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if successRedirect != "" {
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// Replace raw query params..
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redirectURL.RawQuery = getRedirectPostRawQuery(bucket, object, etag)
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w.Header().Set("Location", redirectURL.String())
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s3err.WriteEmptyResponse(w, r, http.StatusSeeOther)
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return
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}
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setEtag(w, etag)
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// Include SSE response headers (important for bucket-default encryption)
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s3a.setSSEResponseHeaders(w, r, sseMetadata)
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// Decide what http response to send depending on success_action_status parameter
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switch successStatus {
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case "201":
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resp := PostResponse{
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Bucket: bucket,
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Key: object,
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ETag: `"` + etag + `"`,
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Location: w.Header().Get("Location"),
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}
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s3err.WriteXMLResponse(w, r, http.StatusCreated, resp)
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s3err.PostLog(r, http.StatusCreated, s3err.ErrNone)
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case "200":
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s3err.WriteEmptyResponse(w, r, http.StatusOK)
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case "204":
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s3err.WriteEmptyResponse(w, r, http.StatusNoContent)
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default:
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s3err.WriteEmptyResponse(w, r, http.StatusNoContent)
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}
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}
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// postPolicyReservedFormFields are multipart form fields that are part of the
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// POST Object auth/policy mechanism (or handled explicitly elsewhere in the
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// handler) and must not be forwarded to the upload as HTTP headers. Keys are
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// already run through http.CanonicalHeaderKey before lookup.
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var postPolicyReservedFormFields = map[string]struct{}{
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// POST policy signature (V2)
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"Policy": {},
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"Signature": {},
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"Awsaccesskeyid": {},
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// POST policy signature (V4)
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"X-Amz-Signature": {},
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"X-Amz-Credential": {},
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"X-Amz-Algorithm": {},
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"X-Amz-Date": {},
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"X-Amz-Security-Token": {},
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// Target descriptors
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"Key": {},
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"File": {},
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"Bucket": {},
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// Success actions (handled elsewhere in the handler)
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"Success_action_redirect": {},
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"Success_action_status": {},
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"Redirect": {},
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// Content-Type is resolved separately above (from form or file part)
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"Content-Type": {},
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}
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// applyPostPolicyFormHeaders forwards validated POST Object form fields to the
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// request headers so they are applied to the resulting PUT. Reserved fields
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// that are part of the POST policy mechanism itself (signature, key, etc.) are
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// skipped. The acl form field is translated to the X-Amz-Acl header to match
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// how AWS promotes the form value to the underlying PUT.
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func applyPostPolicyFormHeaders(r *http.Request, formValues http.Header) {
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for k := range formValues {
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if _, reserved := postPolicyReservedFormFields[k]; reserved {
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continue
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}
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switch {
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case k == "Acl":
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r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzCannedAcl, formValues.Get(k))
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case k == "Cache-Control",
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k == "Expires",
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k == "Content-Disposition",
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k == "Content-Encoding",
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k == "Content-Language":
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r.Header.Set(k, formValues.Get(k))
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case strings.HasPrefix(k, "X-Amz-"):
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r.Header.Set(k, formValues.Get(k))
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}
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}
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}
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// Extract form fields and file data from a HTTP POST Policy
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func extractPostPolicyFormValues(form *multipart.Form) (filePart io.ReadCloser, fileName, fileContentType string, fileSize int64, formValues http.Header, err error) {
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// / HTML Form values
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fileName = ""
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fileContentType = ""
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// Canonicalize the form values into http.Header.
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formValues = make(http.Header)
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for k, v := range form.Value {
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formValues[http.CanonicalHeaderKey(k)] = v
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}
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// Validate form values.
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if err = validateFormFieldSize(formValues); err != nil {
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return nil, "", "", 0, nil, err
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}
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// this means that filename="" was not specified for file key and Go has
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// an ugly way of handling this situation. Refer here
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// https://golang.org/src/mime/multipart/formdata.go#L61
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if len(form.File) == 0 {
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var b = &bytes.Buffer{}
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for _, v := range formValues["File"] {
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b.WriteString(v)
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}
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fileSize = int64(b.Len())
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filePart = io.NopCloser(b)
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return filePart, fileName, fileContentType, fileSize, formValues, nil
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}
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// Iterator until we find a valid File field and break
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for k, v := range form.File {
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canonicalFormName := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(k)
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if canonicalFormName == "File" {
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if len(v) == 0 {
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return nil, "", "", 0, nil, errors.New("Invalid arguments specified")
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}
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// Fetch fileHeader which has the uploaded file information
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fileHeader := v[0]
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// Set filename
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fileName = fileHeader.Filename
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// Set contentType
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fileContentType = fileHeader.Header.Get("Content-Type")
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// Open the uploaded part
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filePart, err = fileHeader.Open()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, "", "", 0, nil, err
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}
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// Compute file size
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fileSize, err = filePart.(io.Seeker).Seek(0, 2)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, "", "", 0, nil, err
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}
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// Reset Seek to the beginning
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_, err = filePart.(io.Seeker).Seek(0, 0)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, "", "", 0, nil, err
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}
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// File found and ready for reading
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break
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}
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}
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return filePart, fileName, fileContentType, fileSize, formValues, nil
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}
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// Validate form field size for s3 specification requirement.
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func validateFormFieldSize(formValues http.Header) error {
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// Iterate over form values
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for k := range formValues {
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// Check if value's field exceeds S3 limit
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if int64(len(formValues.Get(k))) > int64(1*humanize.MiByte) {
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return errors.New("Data size larger than expected")
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}
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}
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// Success.
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return nil
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}
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func getRedirectPostRawQuery(bucket, key, etag string) string {
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redirectValues := make(url.Values)
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redirectValues.Set("bucket", bucket)
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redirectValues.Set("key", key)
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redirectValues.Set("etag", "\""+etag+"\"")
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return redirectValues.Encode()
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}
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// Check to see if Policy is signed correctly, returning the signing identity.
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// The verified form's access key is recorded in ctx's identity holder. The
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// identity's Write permission on the bucket is checked only once the signature
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// verifies, as on the header-signed path, so a form that fails verification
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// learns nothing about the key's permissions. A verified identity that may not
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// write is returned with ErrAccessDenied.
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func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) doesPolicySignatureMatch(ctx context.Context, formValues http.Header) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode) {
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var identity *Identity
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var errCode s3err.ErrorCode
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// For SignV2 - Signature field will be valid
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if _, ok := formValues["Signature"]; ok {
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identity, errCode = iam.doesPolicySignatureV2Match(ctx, formValues)
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} else {
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identity, errCode = iam.doesPolicySignatureV4Match(ctx, formValues)
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}
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if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
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return nil, errCode
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}
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if !identity.CanDo(s3_constants.ACTION_WRITE, formValues.Get("bucket"), "") {
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return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied
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}
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return identity, s3err.ErrNone
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}
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