* admin: default to port 12535, keep 23646 as a best-effort compat listener The default admin HTTP port 23646 derives a worker gRPC port of 33646 (port + GrpcPortOffset), inside the Linux default ephemeral range (32768+). One of our own startup dials can claim 33646 before the admin binds it, killing startup. This is the same failure #10209 fixed for the test port allocator, still reachable via the mini default (#10838) and via standalone `weed admin` defaults. Move the default admin port to 12535 (gRPC 22535) everywhere, keeping the http+10000 convention so worker -admin derivation, the Rust worker and host:http.grpc addressing keep working: - weed admin -port, weed mini -admin.port - weed worker -admin, the plugin worker fallback, Rust worker and weed-lance-worker defaults - help text, README, helm values, docker compose, tests So old workers, bookmarks and scripts keep working, admin also serves the same handler and the worker gRPC server on the previous default (-port.legacy / -admin.port.legacy, default 23646, 0 disables). The legacy gRPC port binds best-effort: it lives in the ephemeral range, so a failed bind only warns instead of reintroducing the startup failure. weed mini reserves it early like the primary port and keeps it out of its own port relocation. grpc.Server tracks every listener handed to Serve, so the compat listener stops with the primary. Also warn when an explicitly configured admin port puts the derived gRPC port at or above the ephemeral floor, the other fix suggested in the issue. Supersedes the pinned-grpc approach in #11814: pinning -admin.port.grpc off the +10000 convention breaks external workers that derive the admin gRPC port from the HTTP address. ClickHouse/ClickHouse#115512 pins -admin.port on their side; this makes that pin unnecessary. Fixes #10838 * admin: let services win the legacy ports, close compat listener on failure Review findings on the compat listeners: - Do not put the legacy ports in mini's reservedPorts: an explicit -s3.port=23646 or -master.port.grpc=33646 must be honored, not rejected or stolen by the early reservation. Mini now checks the finalized port set and skips only the conflicting compat listener, so HTTP and gRPC compat degrade independently and the service keeps its port. - Also skip the legacy HTTP listener when a mini service owns the port: a wildcard-bound service can still leave loopback bindable, which would let the compat listener shadow it for loopback clients. - Close legacyServer's raw listener in the deferred cleanup: Serve may not have registered it yet when startAdminServer returns early. - Helm: add admin.legacyPort (default 23646) and expose the legacy http/grpc ports through the admin Service, container ports and NetworkPolicy so older workers resolved via the Service keep working. * helm: only pass -port.legacy when it differs from the binary default ct install deploys the released image with the new chart, and 4.48 does not know -port.legacy, so the admin pod crash-loops. Omitting the flag at the default value is behavior-identical on new binaries (their default is also 23646) and keeps older releases installable; legacyPort: 0 or a custom port still renders the flag.
SeaweedFS on Terraform
Experimental. This Terraform support is an early scaffold under active development. Interfaces (variables, outputs, module layout) may change without notice, and not every tier is implemented yet. Not recommended for production without your own review and testing.
Self-contained Terraform/OpenTofu modules to deploy SeaweedFS on cloud VMs
running the weed binary directly under systemd. No Helm and no Kubernetes
required.
What works today is verified end-to-end against a real weed cluster (see
"Test it locally" below).
Layout
terraform/
modules/
core/ cloud-agnostic renderer (ZERO cloud resources): turns an
address map + config into per-node weed argv, systemd units,
config files, disk-mount + secret-fetch scripts, and cloud-init.
Both the cloud wrappers and the local harnesses consume `nodes`.
security/ cloud-agnostic CA + per-component mTLS certs (distinct CNs) +
JWT signing keys (tls/random providers). Emits a `core_security`
object ready for the core, plus PEMs for secret-store delivery.
aws/ thin AWS wrapper: reserves stable ENIs (fixed private IPs)
first, feeds them to core, creates instances + protected EBS
data disks + SG; with enable_security it generates certs/JWT,
stores them in SSM SecureString, grants an instance role, and
renders a boot fetch-secrets.sh. Keyed for_each throughout.
examples/
aws-ha-distributed/ 3 masters + 3 volumes (1/AZ) + 2 filers + 1 S3,
secure-by-default (mTLS via SSM-delivered certs)
aws-all-in-one/ single `weed server` instance via core directly
test/
local/ render a cluster with core and run it as real weed processes
on 127.0.0.1 (no cloud, no docker), then assert it works
local-secure/ generate certs/JWT with the security module, run a real
mTLS cluster, and assert it forms + enforces JWT auth
Design in one paragraph
The chart is the structural reference, not a dependency. A cloud-agnostic
core renders everything portable; thin per-cloud wrappers provision infra.
Addressing is an input to the core (wrapper reserves static IPs first), so
the wrapper -> core dependency is one-way with no apply-time cycle. Stateful
tiers (master/volume/filer) are keyed for_each maps, never count, so a
middle node can be replaced without reindexing its peers or reattaching the
wrong disk. Flag names are verified against the real weed binary
(notably: volume uses -mserver for the master list; gRPC is -port.grpc,
auto = http+10000; minFreeSpacePercent is a string).
Test it locally
Requires tofu (or terraform), jq, curl, and a weed binary. Renders a
3-master + volume + filer + S3 cluster from the core module and runs it as real
processes, asserting quorum, volume registration, and filer/S3 round-trips:
cd terraform/test/local
WEED=/path/to/weed ./run_local_cluster.sh
# => 7 passed, 0 failed
The harness uses a high port range (29333/28080/28888/28333) so it does not
collide with a SeaweedFS cluster already running on the machine, and aborts if a
required port is taken. KEEP=1 ./run_local_cluster.sh leaves the cluster up.
mTLS end-to-end
cd terraform/test/local-secure
WEED=/path/to/weed ./run_local_secure.sh
# => generates a CA + component certs + JWT, renders security.toml, runs a real
# mTLS cluster, asserts master/volume/filer form over mutual TLS and that the
# filer enforces JWT signing (unsigned writes get 401). 5 passed.
Plan-level tests (no cloud)
cd terraform/modules/core && tofu test
# => 11 passed: peers list, -mserver vs -master, metrics gating,
# security.toml conditions, all-in-one inheritance, ...
Validate the cloud wrappers
cd terraform/examples/aws-ha-distributed && tofu init && tofu validate
apply needs AWS credentials, a VPC, subnets, and an AMI with weed installed
(bake with Packer, or install at boot).
Status
Implemented and verified:
- Tiers: master / volume / filer / s3 / all-in-one rendered by the core.
- Disk mount: cloud-init runs a
mount-disks.shthat auto-discovers (or takes explicit candidate devices),blkid-guardsmkfs, mounts, and persists to/etc/fstabby UUID. The AWS wrapper wires the protected EBS disk to/data. - mTLS + JWT: the
securitymodule generates the CA + per-component certs (distinct CNs) + JWT keys; the AWS wrapper stores them in SSM SecureString, grants an instance role, and the core renders a boot fetch script so secrets stay OUT of user_data. Proven end-to-end bytest/local-secure.
Not yet implemented:
- sftp / admin / worker tiers (core does not render them yet).
- GCP/Azure wrappers, the data-plane provider, and the K8s-native module.
- CA in Vault PKI (currently TF-generated, so the CA key lives in state). KMS
decrypt in the IAM policy is scoped by
ViaServicebut usesResource="*"; tighten to the SSM CMK in production.
Gotchas
- This
weedbuild starts an Iceberg REST catalog on:8181by default; sets3.iceberg_port = 0to disable, or a port to relocate it. - Disk auto-discovery assumes a single attached data disk per node. For multiple
data disks, pass explicit
devicescandidates indisk_mounts.
Security note
tofu output/state can contain secrets. Generate secrets outside Terraform
(cloud secret manager / Vault) and fetch them at boot; never commit secret
material.