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* s3: validate indirect filer path inputs * s3: avoid query parsing on common request path * filer: scope copy/move source against JWT AllowedPrefixes maybeCheckJwtAuthorization only checked r.URL.Path, but copy and move read their source from the cp.from / mv.from query params. A prefix-restricted token could copy or move data out of a subtree it cannot otherwise reach. Check every path the request touches, reusing pathHasComponentPrefix so `..` in the source is collapsed before the prefix match. * s3: confine iceberg CreateTable location to the catalog bucket CreateTable derived the metadata bucket and path from the client-supplied req.Location / req.Name and wrote there directly, so a caller scoped to one table bucket could place metadata in another bucket (and path.Join collapsed any `..`). Require the parsed bucket to equal the request's catalog bucket and reject traversal segments in the table path. * webdav: clean client path before subFolder confinement wrappedFs concatenated subFolder + name before the underlying FileSystem ran path.Clean, so `..` in the request path or COPY/MOVE Destination resolved across the FilerRootPath confinement boundary. Clean the name as a rooted path first so traversal segments collapse below subFolder. Only the non-default -filer.path (non-empty subFolder) setup was affected. * filer: enforce read-only rule on real write path with destination header The x-seaweedfs-destination header overrides the path used for storage-rule matching while the entry is written at r.URL.Path, letting a caller select a writable rule for a read-only target. When the header is present, also check the read-only/quota rule against the actual write path.
344 lines
11 KiB
Go
344 lines
11 KiB
Go
package weed_server
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"net/http"
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"path"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"sync/atomic"
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"time"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/filer"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/pb/filer_pb"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/security"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/stats"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/util/version"
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)
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func (fs *FilerServer) filerHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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start := time.Now()
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inFlightGauge := stats.FilerInFlightRequestsGauge.WithLabelValues(r.Method)
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inFlightGauge.Inc()
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defer inFlightGauge.Dec()
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statusRecorder := stats.NewStatusResponseWriter(w)
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w = statusRecorder
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origin := r.Header.Get("Origin")
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if origin != "" {
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if fs.option.AllowedOrigins == nil || len(fs.option.AllowedOrigins) == 0 || fs.option.AllowedOrigins[0] == "*" {
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origin = "*"
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} else {
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originFound := false
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for _, allowedOrigin := range fs.option.AllowedOrigins {
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if origin == allowedOrigin {
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originFound = true
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}
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}
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if !originFound {
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writeJsonError(w, r, http.StatusForbidden, errors.New("origin not allowed"))
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return
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}
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}
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", origin)
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Expose-Headers", "*")
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "*")
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true")
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "PUT, POST, GET, DELETE, OPTIONS")
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}
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if r.Method == http.MethodOptions {
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OptionsHandler(w, r, false)
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return
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}
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// proxy to volume servers
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var fileId string
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if strings.HasPrefix(r.RequestURI, "/?proxyChunkId=") {
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fileId = r.RequestURI[len("/?proxyChunkId="):]
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}
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if fileId != "" {
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fs.proxyToVolumeServer(w, r, fileId)
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stats.FilerHandlerCounter.WithLabelValues(stats.ChunkProxy).Inc()
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stats.FilerRequestHistogram.WithLabelValues(stats.ChunkProxy).Observe(time.Since(start).Seconds())
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return
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}
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requestMethod := r.Method
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defer func(method *string) {
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stats.FilerRequestCounter.WithLabelValues(*method, strconv.Itoa(statusRecorder.Status)).Inc()
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stats.FilerRequestHistogram.WithLabelValues(*method).Observe(time.Since(start).Seconds())
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}(&requestMethod)
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isReadHttpCall := r.Method == http.MethodGet || r.Method == http.MethodHead
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if !fs.maybeCheckJwtAuthorization(r, !isReadHttpCall) {
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writeJsonError(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, errors.New("wrong jwt"))
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return
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}
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w.Header().Set("Server", "SeaweedFS "+version.VERSION)
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switch r.Method {
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case http.MethodGet, http.MethodHead:
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fs.GetOrHeadHandler(w, r)
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case http.MethodDelete:
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if _, ok := r.URL.Query()["tagging"]; ok {
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fs.DeleteTaggingHandler(w, r)
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} else {
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fs.DeleteHandler(w, r)
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}
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case http.MethodPost, http.MethodPut:
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// wait until in flight data is less than the limit
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contentLength := getContentLength(r)
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fs.inFlightDataLimitCond.L.Lock()
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inFlightDataSize := atomic.LoadInt64(&fs.inFlightDataSize)
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inFlightUploads := atomic.LoadInt64(&fs.inFlightUploads)
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// Wait if either data size limit or file count limit is exceeded
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for (fs.option.ConcurrentUploadLimit != 0 && inFlightDataSize > fs.option.ConcurrentUploadLimit) || (fs.option.ConcurrentFileUploadLimit != 0 && inFlightUploads >= fs.option.ConcurrentFileUploadLimit) {
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if fs.option.ConcurrentUploadLimit != 0 && inFlightDataSize > fs.option.ConcurrentUploadLimit {
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glog.V(4).Infof("wait because inflight data %d > %d", inFlightDataSize, fs.option.ConcurrentUploadLimit)
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}
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if fs.option.ConcurrentFileUploadLimit != 0 && inFlightUploads >= fs.option.ConcurrentFileUploadLimit {
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glog.V(4).Infof("wait because inflight uploads %d >= %d", inFlightUploads, fs.option.ConcurrentFileUploadLimit)
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}
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fs.inFlightDataLimitCond.Wait()
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inFlightDataSize = atomic.LoadInt64(&fs.inFlightDataSize)
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inFlightUploads = atomic.LoadInt64(&fs.inFlightUploads)
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}
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fs.inFlightDataLimitCond.L.Unlock()
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// Increment counters
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newUploads := atomic.AddInt64(&fs.inFlightUploads, 1)
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newSize := atomic.AddInt64(&fs.inFlightDataSize, contentLength)
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// Update metrics
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stats.FilerInFlightUploadCountGauge.Set(float64(newUploads))
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stats.FilerInFlightUploadBytesGauge.Set(float64(newSize))
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defer func() {
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// Decrement counters
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newUploads := atomic.AddInt64(&fs.inFlightUploads, -1)
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newSize := atomic.AddInt64(&fs.inFlightDataSize, -contentLength)
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// Update metrics
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stats.FilerInFlightUploadCountGauge.Set(float64(newUploads))
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stats.FilerInFlightUploadBytesGauge.Set(float64(newSize))
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fs.inFlightDataLimitCond.Signal()
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}()
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if r.Method == http.MethodPut {
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if _, ok := r.URL.Query()["tagging"]; ok {
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fs.PutTaggingHandler(w, r)
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} else {
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fs.PostHandler(w, r, contentLength)
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}
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} else { // method == "POST"
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fs.PostHandler(w, r, contentLength)
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}
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default:
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requestMethod = "INVALID"
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
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}
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}
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func (fs *FilerServer) readonlyFilerHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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start := time.Now()
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statusRecorder := stats.NewStatusResponseWriter(w)
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w = statusRecorder
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glog.V(4).Infof("Request: %s %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path)
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origin := r.Header.Get("Origin")
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if origin != "" {
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if fs.option.AllowedOrigins == nil || len(fs.option.AllowedOrigins) == 0 || fs.option.AllowedOrigins[0] == "*" {
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origin = "*"
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} else {
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originFound := false
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for _, allowedOrigin := range fs.option.AllowedOrigins {
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if origin == allowedOrigin {
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originFound = true
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}
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}
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if !originFound {
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writeJsonError(w, r, http.StatusForbidden, errors.New("origin not allowed"))
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return
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}
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}
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", origin)
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "OPTIONS, GET, HEAD")
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true")
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}
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requestMethod := r.Method
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defer func(method *string) {
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stats.FilerRequestCounter.WithLabelValues(*method, strconv.Itoa(statusRecorder.Status)).Inc()
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stats.FilerRequestHistogram.WithLabelValues(*method).Observe(time.Since(start).Seconds())
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}(&requestMethod)
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// We handle OPTIONS first because it never should be authenticated
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if r.Method == http.MethodOptions {
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OptionsHandler(w, r, true)
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return
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}
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if !fs.maybeCheckJwtAuthorization(r, false) {
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writeJsonError(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, errors.New("wrong jwt"))
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return
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}
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w.Header().Set("Server", "SeaweedFS "+version.VERSION)
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switch r.Method {
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case http.MethodGet, http.MethodHead:
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fs.GetOrHeadHandler(w, r)
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default:
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requestMethod = "INVALID"
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
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}
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}
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func OptionsHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, isReadOnly bool) {
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if isReadOnly {
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "GET, OPTIONS")
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} else {
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "PUT, POST, GET, DELETE, OPTIONS")
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Expose-Headers", "*")
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}
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "*")
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true")
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}
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// maybeCheckJwtAuthorization returns true if access should be granted, false if it should be denied
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func (fs *FilerServer) maybeCheckJwtAuthorization(r *http.Request, isWrite bool) bool {
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if !isWrite && r.URL.Path == "/" {
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return true
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}
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var signingKey security.SigningKey
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if isWrite {
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signingKey = fs.filerGuard.SigningKey()
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if len(signingKey) == 0 {
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return true
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}
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} else {
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signingKey = fs.filerGuard.ReadSigningKey()
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if len(signingKey) == 0 {
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return true
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}
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}
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tokenStr := security.GetJwt(r)
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if tokenStr == "" {
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glog.V(1).Infof("missing jwt from %s", r.RemoteAddr)
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return false
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}
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token, err := security.DecodeJwt(signingKey, tokenStr, &security.SeaweedFilerClaims{})
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if err != nil {
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glog.V(1).Infof("jwt verification error from %s: %v", r.RemoteAddr, err)
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return false
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}
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if !token.Valid {
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glog.V(1).Infof("jwt invalid from %s: %v", r.RemoteAddr, tokenStr)
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return false
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}
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claims, ok := token.Claims.(*security.SeaweedFilerClaims)
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if !ok {
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glog.V(1).Infof("jwt claims not of type *SeaweedFilerClaims from %s", r.RemoteAddr)
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return false
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}
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if len(claims.AllowedPrefixes) > 0 {
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// Copy and move name their source via a query parameter, not r.URL.Path.
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// Scope every path the request reads or relocates, or a prefix-restricted
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// token could reach data outside its allowed subtree.
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for _, p := range jwtScopedRequestPaths(r) {
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if !anyComponentPrefixMatches(claims.AllowedPrefixes, p) {
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glog.V(1).Infof("jwt path not allowed from %s: %v", r.RemoteAddr, p)
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return false
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}
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}
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}
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if len(claims.AllowedMethods) > 0 {
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hasMethod := false
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for _, method := range claims.AllowedMethods {
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if method == r.Method {
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hasMethod = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !hasMethod {
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glog.V(1).Infof("jwt method not allowed from %s: %v", r.RemoteAddr, r.Method)
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return false
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}
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}
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return true
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}
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// jwtScopedRequestPaths returns every filer path a request touches that must be
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// covered by the JWT AllowedPrefixes: the write target (r.URL.Path) plus any
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// copy/move source named by the cp.from / mv.from query parameters.
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func jwtScopedRequestPaths(r *http.Request) []string {
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paths := []string{r.URL.Path}
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if query := r.URL.Query(); query.Has("cp.from") || query.Has("mv.from") {
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if from := query.Get("cp.from"); from != "" {
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paths = append(paths, from)
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}
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if from := query.Get("mv.from"); from != "" {
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paths = append(paths, from)
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}
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}
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return paths
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}
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// anyComponentPrefixMatches reports whether p is within any of the prefixes.
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func anyComponentPrefixMatches(prefixes []string, p string) bool {
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for _, prefix := range prefixes {
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if pathHasComponentPrefix(p, prefix) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// pathHasComponentPrefix reports whether reqPath is contained within the
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// directory subtree denoted by prefix, treating both as "/"-separated
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// path components. Both inputs are normalised with path.Clean to neutralise
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// "." and ".." segments and collapse duplicate slashes. A prefix of "/"
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// matches any path.
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func pathHasComponentPrefix(reqPath, prefix string) bool {
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if prefix == "" {
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return false
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}
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cleanedPath := path.Clean(reqPath)
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if cleanedPath == "." {
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cleanedPath = "/"
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}
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cleanedPrefix := path.Clean(prefix)
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if cleanedPrefix == "." {
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cleanedPrefix = "/"
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}
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if cleanedPrefix == "/" {
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return true
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}
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if cleanedPath == cleanedPrefix {
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return true
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}
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return strings.HasPrefix(cleanedPath, cleanedPrefix+"/")
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}
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func (fs *FilerServer) filerHealthzHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Server", "SeaweedFS "+version.VERSION)
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if _, err := fs.filer.Store.FindEntry(context.Background(), filer.TopicsDir); err != nil && err != filer_pb.ErrNotFound {
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glog.Warningf("filerHealthzHandler FindEntry: %+v", err)
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
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} else {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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}
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}
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