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* Add ResolveIdentityClaim helper for OIDC audit identity ComputeParentUser derives a stable per-identity hash from (sub, iss) for internal keying, but it is opaque and not human-readable. Audit logs for STS-assumed OIDC sessions currently surface that opaque value (or the random session id) as the requester, leaving no authoritative trace of the federated user. Add ResolveIdentityClaim next to ComputeParentUser to recover a human-readable, server-asserted identity attribute from the STS request context populated at federation time. It walks a priority list (preferred_username, email, name, sub) so a federated session always audits against a stable OIDC claim rather than a client-supplied role session name. For #11264 * Surface authoritative OIDC identity claim in S3 audit log For STS-assumed sessions minted from an OIDC web identity, the audit log requester field is the opaque session subject, which cannot be traced back to the federated user who performed the operation. The OIDC identity claims (preferred_username, email, sub) are already carried in the session request context and reach the auth layer as identity.Claims, but they were never surfaced to the audit log. Add a requester_identity field to the S3 access audit log, populated from the authoritative OIDC identity claim resolved via ResolveIdentityClaim. The claim is propagated through the shared identity holder (the same mechanism the requester name and principal ARN already use) so it survives the request-context copy that hides auth-set values from the outer audit middleware. The existing requester field is left unchanged for backward compatibility; requester_identity is empty for non-federated sessions, where requester already carries the real username. For #11264 * Gate OIDC audit identity on federation marker and harden resolver Address review feedback (Devin Review, Greptile) on the initial implementation: - Non-federated STS sessions no longer gain a false requester_identity. ValidateJWTWithClaims merges the JWT registered sub claim (the opaque session id) into RequestContext for sessions without an explicit request context, so the previous ResolveIdentityClaim fallback to sub surfaced that session id as an authoritative identity. Resolution is now gated on SessionInfo.ParentUser, which is set only for OIDC-federated sessions in AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity. The claim is resolved from the original sessionInfo.RequestContext (not the local claims map, whose sub the bearer path overwrites with the session subject) so SigV4 and bearer sessions surface the same identity. - ResolveIdentityClaim now trims whitespace and treats whitespace-only claims as absent, so a blank preferred_username no longer masks a usable email or sub. The resolved claim is carried on Identity.IdentityClaim (and IAMIdentity for the bearer path) rather than re-derived in recordIdentityInContext, making the federation gate explicit at the auth boundary. For #11264 * Resolve OIDC identity claim for external bearer tokens The external OIDC bearer path (a raw OIDC JWT presented directly, not via STS) populates Claims with preferred_username/email/name/sub from the validated token but did not set IdentityClaim, so requester_identity stayed blank for that authentication path. Resolve the claim there too — sub is the real OIDC subject on this path (not an STS session id), so no federation gate is needed. Also drop an ineffectual ctx assignment flagged by ineffassign in the audit test. For #11264
249 lines
8.8 KiB
Go
249 lines
8.8 KiB
Go
package sts
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import (
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/base64"
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"fmt"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
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)
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// ComputeParentUser returns a stable per-identity hash derived from the OIDC
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// (sub, iss) tuple. Only the (sub, iss) pair is guaranteed stable across token
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// refreshes per OpenID Connect Core 1.0 §5.7, so any per-user state (audit
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// logs, quotas) must key off this value rather than the access-key or session
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// id. The hash is base64-rawurl-encoded SHA-256 over "openid:<sub>:<iss>" so
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// it stays filesystem-safe and bounded in length for storage in audit paths.
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func ComputeParentUser(sub, iss string) string {
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if sub == "" || iss == "" {
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return ""
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}
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h := sha256.Sum256([]byte("openid:" + sub + ":" + iss))
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return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(h[:])
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}
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// identityClaimPriority is the order in which ResolveIdentityClaim looks for a
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// human-readable, authoritative identity attribute in an STS request context.
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// The context is populated at federation time from the validated OIDC token
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// (see AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity), so every entry here is server-asserted and
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// not client-supplied. preferred_username/email/name are conventional OIDC
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// user claims; sub is the always-present stable subject identifier and the
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// final fallback so a federated session never audits as fully anonymous.
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var identityClaimPriority = []string{"preferred_username", "email", "name", "sub"}
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// ResolveIdentityClaim returns the most human-readable authoritative identity
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// claim available in ctx, or "" when none is present. ctx is the STS request
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// context (sessionInfo.RequestContext) populated from the validated OIDC token
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// at federation time. Non-string values are skipped so a structured claim
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// never leaks into an audit-facing field. Whitespace-only values are treated
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// as absent so a blank preferred claim does not mask a usable email or sub.
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func ResolveIdentityClaim(ctx map[string]interface{}) string {
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if len(ctx) == 0 {
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return ""
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}
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for _, key := range identityClaimPriority {
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if v, ok := ctx[key].(string); ok {
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if trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(v); trimmed != "" {
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return trimmed
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}
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}
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}
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return ""
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}
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// defaultCredentialGenerator is a reusable instance for generating temporary credentials
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// Reusing a single instance across all calls to ToSessionInfo() reduces allocation overhead
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// since this method may be called frequently during signature verification
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var defaultCredentialGenerator = NewCredentialGenerator()
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// STSSessionClaims represents comprehensive session information embedded in JWT tokens
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// This eliminates the need for separate session storage by embedding all session
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// metadata directly in the token itself - enabling true stateless operation
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type STSSessionClaims struct {
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jwt.RegisteredClaims
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// Session identification
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SessionId string `json:"sid"` // session_id (abbreviated for smaller tokens)
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SessionName string `json:"snam"` // session_name (abbreviated for smaller tokens)
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TokenType string `json:"typ"` // token_type
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// Role information
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RoleArn string `json:"role"` // role_arn
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AssumedRole string `json:"assumed"` // assumed_role_user
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Principal string `json:"principal"` // principal_arn
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// Authorization data
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Policies []string `json:"pol,omitempty"` // policies (abbreviated)
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// SessionPolicy contains inline session policy JSON (optional)
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SessionPolicy string `json:"spol,omitempty"`
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// Identity provider information
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IdentityProvider string `json:"idp"` // identity_provider
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ExternalUserId string `json:"ext_uid"` // external_user_id
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ProviderIssuer string `json:"prov_iss"` // provider_issuer
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// Request context (optional, for policy evaluation)
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RequestContext map[string]interface{} `json:"req_ctx,omitempty"`
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// Session metadata
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AssumedAt time.Time `json:"assumed_at"` // when role was assumed
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MaxDuration int64 `json:"max_dur,omitempty"` // maximum session duration in seconds
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// ParentUser is a stable hash of (sub, iss) for tokens minted from an OIDC
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// identity. It survives token rotation since only the (sub, iss) tuple is
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// guaranteed stable per OpenID Connect Core 1.0. Empty for non-federated
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// session types.
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ParentUser string `json:"puid,omitempty"`
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}
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// NewSTSSessionClaims creates new STS session claims with all required information
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func NewSTSSessionClaims(sessionId, issuer string, expiresAt time.Time) *STSSessionClaims {
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now := time.Now()
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return &STSSessionClaims{
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RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
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Issuer: issuer,
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Subject: sessionId,
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IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
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ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(expiresAt),
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NotBefore: jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
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// jti = sessionId. The session id is already a unique random
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// identifier, so reusing it as the JWT id avoids a second secret
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// while still giving the revocation layer a stable lookup key.
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ID: sessionId,
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},
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SessionId: sessionId,
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TokenType: TokenTypeSession,
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AssumedAt: now,
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}
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}
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// ToSessionInfo converts JWT claims back to SessionInfo structure
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// This enables seamless integration with existing code expecting SessionInfo
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func (c *STSSessionClaims) ToSessionInfo() *SessionInfo {
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var expiresAt time.Time
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if c.ExpiresAt != nil {
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expiresAt = c.ExpiresAt.Time
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}
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// Generate temporary credentials from the session ID
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// This is deterministic based on the session ID, so the same credentials are regenerated
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credentials, err := defaultCredentialGenerator.GenerateTemporaryCredentials(c.SessionId, expiresAt)
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if err != nil {
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// Log the error with context - credential generation failure is important for debugging
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errMsg := fmt.Errorf("generate temporary credentials for session %s: %w", c.SessionId, err)
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glog.Warningf("Failed to generate credentials for STS session: %v", errMsg)
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// Return session info without credentials - validation will catch this as invalid
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credentials = nil
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}
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return &SessionInfo{
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SessionId: c.SessionId,
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SessionName: c.SessionName,
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RoleArn: c.RoleArn,
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AssumedRoleUser: c.AssumedRole,
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Principal: c.Principal,
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Policies: c.Policies,
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SessionPolicy: c.SessionPolicy,
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ExpiresAt: expiresAt,
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IdentityProvider: c.IdentityProvider,
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ExternalUserId: c.ExternalUserId,
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ProviderIssuer: c.ProviderIssuer,
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RequestContext: c.RequestContext,
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ParentUser: c.ParentUser,
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// Provide the Subject (sub) from registered claims
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Subject: c.Subject,
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Credentials: credentials,
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}
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}
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// IsValid checks if the session claims are valid (not expired, etc.)
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func (c *STSSessionClaims) IsValid() bool {
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now := time.Now()
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// Check expiration
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if c.ExpiresAt != nil && c.ExpiresAt.Before(now) {
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return false
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}
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// Check not-before
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if c.NotBefore != nil && c.NotBefore.After(now) {
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return false
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}
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// Ensure required fields are present
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if c.SessionId == "" || c.RoleArn == "" || c.Principal == "" {
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return false
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}
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return true
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}
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// GetSessionId returns the session identifier
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func (c *STSSessionClaims) GetSessionId() string {
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return c.SessionId
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}
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// GetExpiresAt returns the expiration time
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func (c *STSSessionClaims) GetExpiresAt() time.Time {
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if c.ExpiresAt != nil {
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return c.ExpiresAt.Time
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}
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return time.Time{}
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}
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// WithRoleInfo sets role-related information in the claims
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func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithRoleInfo(roleArn, assumedRole, principal string) *STSSessionClaims {
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c.RoleArn = roleArn
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c.AssumedRole = assumedRole
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c.Principal = principal
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return c
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}
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// WithPolicies sets the policies associated with this session
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func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithPolicies(policies []string) *STSSessionClaims {
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c.Policies = policies
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return c
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}
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// WithSessionPolicy sets the inline session policy JSON for this session
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func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithSessionPolicy(policy string) *STSSessionClaims {
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c.SessionPolicy = policy
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return c
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}
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// WithIdentityProvider sets identity provider information
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func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithIdentityProvider(providerName, externalUserId, providerIssuer string) *STSSessionClaims {
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c.IdentityProvider = providerName
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c.ExternalUserId = externalUserId
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c.ProviderIssuer = providerIssuer
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return c
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}
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// WithRequestContext sets request context for policy evaluation
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func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithRequestContext(ctx map[string]interface{}) *STSSessionClaims {
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c.RequestContext = ctx
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return c
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}
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// WithMaxDuration sets the maximum session duration
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func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithMaxDuration(duration time.Duration) *STSSessionClaims {
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c.MaxDuration = int64(duration.Seconds())
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return c
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}
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// WithSessionName sets the session name
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func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithSessionName(sessionName string) *STSSessionClaims {
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c.SessionName = sessionName
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return c
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}
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// WithParentUser sets the stable per-identity hash for the session. See
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// ComputeParentUser for the derivation rule.
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func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithParentUser(parentUser string) *STSSessionClaims {
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c.ParentUser = parentUser
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return c
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}
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