Files
seaweedfs/weed/iam/sts/session_claims.go
T
Chris Lu a3638e479e fix(s3api/audit): surface OIDC identity claim in audit log for STS sessions (#11269)
* Add ResolveIdentityClaim helper for OIDC audit identity

ComputeParentUser derives a stable per-identity hash from (sub, iss) for
internal keying, but it is opaque and not human-readable. Audit logs for
STS-assumed OIDC sessions currently surface that opaque value (or the
random session id) as the requester, leaving no authoritative trace of the
federated user.

Add ResolveIdentityClaim next to ComputeParentUser to recover a
human-readable, server-asserted identity attribute from the STS request
context populated at federation time. It walks a priority list
(preferred_username, email, name, sub) so a federated session always
audits against a stable OIDC claim rather than a client-supplied role
session name.

For #11264

* Surface authoritative OIDC identity claim in S3 audit log

For STS-assumed sessions minted from an OIDC web identity, the audit log
requester field is the opaque session subject, which cannot be traced back
to the federated user who performed the operation. The OIDC identity claims
(preferred_username, email, sub) are already carried in the session request
context and reach the auth layer as identity.Claims, but they were never
surfaced to the audit log.

Add a requester_identity field to the S3 access audit log, populated from
the authoritative OIDC identity claim resolved via ResolveIdentityClaim.
The claim is propagated through the shared identity holder (the same
mechanism the requester name and principal ARN already use) so it survives
the request-context copy that hides auth-set values from the outer audit
middleware.

The existing requester field is left unchanged for backward compatibility;
requester_identity is empty for non-federated sessions, where requester
already carries the real username.

For #11264

* Gate OIDC audit identity on federation marker and harden resolver

Address review feedback (Devin Review, Greptile) on the initial
implementation:

- Non-federated STS sessions no longer gain a false requester_identity.
  ValidateJWTWithClaims merges the JWT registered sub claim (the opaque
  session id) into RequestContext for sessions without an explicit request
  context, so the previous ResolveIdentityClaim fallback to sub surfaced
  that session id as an authoritative identity. Resolution is now gated on
  SessionInfo.ParentUser, which is set only for OIDC-federated sessions in
  AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity. The claim is resolved from the original
  sessionInfo.RequestContext (not the local claims map, whose sub the bearer
  path overwrites with the session subject) so SigV4 and bearer sessions
  surface the same identity.

- ResolveIdentityClaim now trims whitespace and treats whitespace-only
  claims as absent, so a blank preferred_username no longer masks a usable
  email or sub.

The resolved claim is carried on Identity.IdentityClaim (and IAMIdentity for
the bearer path) rather than re-derived in recordIdentityInContext, making
the federation gate explicit at the auth boundary.

For #11264

* Resolve OIDC identity claim for external bearer tokens

The external OIDC bearer path (a raw OIDC JWT presented directly, not via
STS) populates Claims with preferred_username/email/name/sub from the
validated token but did not set IdentityClaim, so requester_identity stayed
blank for that authentication path. Resolve the claim there too — sub is the
real OIDC subject on this path (not an STS session id), so no federation
gate is needed.

Also drop an ineffectual ctx assignment flagged by ineffassign in the audit
test.

For #11264
2026-09-11 11:29:46 -07:00

249 lines
8.8 KiB
Go

package sts
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
)
// ComputeParentUser returns a stable per-identity hash derived from the OIDC
// (sub, iss) tuple. Only the (sub, iss) pair is guaranteed stable across token
// refreshes per OpenID Connect Core 1.0 §5.7, so any per-user state (audit
// logs, quotas) must key off this value rather than the access-key or session
// id. The hash is base64-rawurl-encoded SHA-256 over "openid:<sub>:<iss>" so
// it stays filesystem-safe and bounded in length for storage in audit paths.
func ComputeParentUser(sub, iss string) string {
if sub == "" || iss == "" {
return ""
}
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte("openid:" + sub + ":" + iss))
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(h[:])
}
// identityClaimPriority is the order in which ResolveIdentityClaim looks for a
// human-readable, authoritative identity attribute in an STS request context.
// The context is populated at federation time from the validated OIDC token
// (see AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity), so every entry here is server-asserted and
// not client-supplied. preferred_username/email/name are conventional OIDC
// user claims; sub is the always-present stable subject identifier and the
// final fallback so a federated session never audits as fully anonymous.
var identityClaimPriority = []string{"preferred_username", "email", "name", "sub"}
// ResolveIdentityClaim returns the most human-readable authoritative identity
// claim available in ctx, or "" when none is present. ctx is the STS request
// context (sessionInfo.RequestContext) populated from the validated OIDC token
// at federation time. Non-string values are skipped so a structured claim
// never leaks into an audit-facing field. Whitespace-only values are treated
// as absent so a blank preferred claim does not mask a usable email or sub.
func ResolveIdentityClaim(ctx map[string]interface{}) string {
if len(ctx) == 0 {
return ""
}
for _, key := range identityClaimPriority {
if v, ok := ctx[key].(string); ok {
if trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(v); trimmed != "" {
return trimmed
}
}
}
return ""
}
// defaultCredentialGenerator is a reusable instance for generating temporary credentials
// Reusing a single instance across all calls to ToSessionInfo() reduces allocation overhead
// since this method may be called frequently during signature verification
var defaultCredentialGenerator = NewCredentialGenerator()
// STSSessionClaims represents comprehensive session information embedded in JWT tokens
// This eliminates the need for separate session storage by embedding all session
// metadata directly in the token itself - enabling true stateless operation
type STSSessionClaims struct {
jwt.RegisteredClaims
// Session identification
SessionId string `json:"sid"` // session_id (abbreviated for smaller tokens)
SessionName string `json:"snam"` // session_name (abbreviated for smaller tokens)
TokenType string `json:"typ"` // token_type
// Role information
RoleArn string `json:"role"` // role_arn
AssumedRole string `json:"assumed"` // assumed_role_user
Principal string `json:"principal"` // principal_arn
// Authorization data
Policies []string `json:"pol,omitempty"` // policies (abbreviated)
// SessionPolicy contains inline session policy JSON (optional)
SessionPolicy string `json:"spol,omitempty"`
// Identity provider information
IdentityProvider string `json:"idp"` // identity_provider
ExternalUserId string `json:"ext_uid"` // external_user_id
ProviderIssuer string `json:"prov_iss"` // provider_issuer
// Request context (optional, for policy evaluation)
RequestContext map[string]interface{} `json:"req_ctx,omitempty"`
// Session metadata
AssumedAt time.Time `json:"assumed_at"` // when role was assumed
MaxDuration int64 `json:"max_dur,omitempty"` // maximum session duration in seconds
// ParentUser is a stable hash of (sub, iss) for tokens minted from an OIDC
// identity. It survives token rotation since only the (sub, iss) tuple is
// guaranteed stable per OpenID Connect Core 1.0. Empty for non-federated
// session types.
ParentUser string `json:"puid,omitempty"`
}
// NewSTSSessionClaims creates new STS session claims with all required information
func NewSTSSessionClaims(sessionId, issuer string, expiresAt time.Time) *STSSessionClaims {
now := time.Now()
return &STSSessionClaims{
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
Issuer: issuer,
Subject: sessionId,
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(expiresAt),
NotBefore: jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
// jti = sessionId. The session id is already a unique random
// identifier, so reusing it as the JWT id avoids a second secret
// while still giving the revocation layer a stable lookup key.
ID: sessionId,
},
SessionId: sessionId,
TokenType: TokenTypeSession,
AssumedAt: now,
}
}
// ToSessionInfo converts JWT claims back to SessionInfo structure
// This enables seamless integration with existing code expecting SessionInfo
func (c *STSSessionClaims) ToSessionInfo() *SessionInfo {
var expiresAt time.Time
if c.ExpiresAt != nil {
expiresAt = c.ExpiresAt.Time
}
// Generate temporary credentials from the session ID
// This is deterministic based on the session ID, so the same credentials are regenerated
credentials, err := defaultCredentialGenerator.GenerateTemporaryCredentials(c.SessionId, expiresAt)
if err != nil {
// Log the error with context - credential generation failure is important for debugging
errMsg := fmt.Errorf("generate temporary credentials for session %s: %w", c.SessionId, err)
glog.Warningf("Failed to generate credentials for STS session: %v", errMsg)
// Return session info without credentials - validation will catch this as invalid
credentials = nil
}
return &SessionInfo{
SessionId: c.SessionId,
SessionName: c.SessionName,
RoleArn: c.RoleArn,
AssumedRoleUser: c.AssumedRole,
Principal: c.Principal,
Policies: c.Policies,
SessionPolicy: c.SessionPolicy,
ExpiresAt: expiresAt,
IdentityProvider: c.IdentityProvider,
ExternalUserId: c.ExternalUserId,
ProviderIssuer: c.ProviderIssuer,
RequestContext: c.RequestContext,
ParentUser: c.ParentUser,
// Provide the Subject (sub) from registered claims
Subject: c.Subject,
Credentials: credentials,
}
}
// IsValid checks if the session claims are valid (not expired, etc.)
func (c *STSSessionClaims) IsValid() bool {
now := time.Now()
// Check expiration
if c.ExpiresAt != nil && c.ExpiresAt.Before(now) {
return false
}
// Check not-before
if c.NotBefore != nil && c.NotBefore.After(now) {
return false
}
// Ensure required fields are present
if c.SessionId == "" || c.RoleArn == "" || c.Principal == "" {
return false
}
return true
}
// GetSessionId returns the session identifier
func (c *STSSessionClaims) GetSessionId() string {
return c.SessionId
}
// GetExpiresAt returns the expiration time
func (c *STSSessionClaims) GetExpiresAt() time.Time {
if c.ExpiresAt != nil {
return c.ExpiresAt.Time
}
return time.Time{}
}
// WithRoleInfo sets role-related information in the claims
func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithRoleInfo(roleArn, assumedRole, principal string) *STSSessionClaims {
c.RoleArn = roleArn
c.AssumedRole = assumedRole
c.Principal = principal
return c
}
// WithPolicies sets the policies associated with this session
func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithPolicies(policies []string) *STSSessionClaims {
c.Policies = policies
return c
}
// WithSessionPolicy sets the inline session policy JSON for this session
func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithSessionPolicy(policy string) *STSSessionClaims {
c.SessionPolicy = policy
return c
}
// WithIdentityProvider sets identity provider information
func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithIdentityProvider(providerName, externalUserId, providerIssuer string) *STSSessionClaims {
c.IdentityProvider = providerName
c.ExternalUserId = externalUserId
c.ProviderIssuer = providerIssuer
return c
}
// WithRequestContext sets request context for policy evaluation
func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithRequestContext(ctx map[string]interface{}) *STSSessionClaims {
c.RequestContext = ctx
return c
}
// WithMaxDuration sets the maximum session duration
func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithMaxDuration(duration time.Duration) *STSSessionClaims {
c.MaxDuration = int64(duration.Seconds())
return c
}
// WithSessionName sets the session name
func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithSessionName(sessionName string) *STSSessionClaims {
c.SessionName = sessionName
return c
}
// WithParentUser sets the stable per-identity hash for the session. See
// ComputeParentUser for the derivation rule.
func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithParentUser(parentUser string) *STSSessionClaims {
c.ParentUser = parentUser
return c
}