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* iceberg: return 401 for invalid or expired Bearer tokens BUG-0001: when the OAuth JWT expired, Server.Auth fell through to the S3 SigV4 authenticator, which rejects the "Authorization: Bearer" scheme with NotImplemented — a 501. Iceberg clients (Java OAuth2Manager, pyiceberg) only refresh tokens on 401, so they retried the dead token forever: RisingWave sinks stalled and Doris catalog queries failed every token TTL (1h) until the client process was restarted. A request carrying a Bearer header is an Iceberg REST client: answer 401 (+ WWW-Authenticate: Bearer, RFC 6750) when the token fails, and only fall through to the S3 authenticator when no Bearer header is present. * iceberg: make OAuth token TTL configurable via ICEBERG_OAUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRY BUG-0001 follow-up: production evidence shows Iceberg Java 1.10.x clients (RisingWave connector node, Doris FE) never re-fetch tokens on 401 — the sink stalled again on token expiry even with the 501→401 fix, and no POST /v1/oauth/tokens appeared in server logs across dozens of retries. 401 is necessary but not sufficient for these clients. The TTL was hardcoded to 3600 with no knob. Read the expiry (seconds) from ICEBERG_OAUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRY, defaulting to 3600, so deployments can issue longer-lived tokens (e.g. 86400) to survive client restart cycles. * iceberg: support OAuth token exchange (RFC 8693) for client refresh Decompiling the Iceberg Java 1.10.1 client bundled with Doris FE showed the missing half of BUG-0001: OAuth2Manager refreshes via token-exchange (AuthConfig.exchangeEnabled defaults to true — the client_credentials re-fetch branch only runs with exchange disabled), so a server that only accepts client_credentials leaves Iceberg clients unable to ever refresh their token, regardless of 401 correctness. Accept grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange on POST /v1/oauth/tokens: verify the subject_token signature against the issuing credential, allow exchange within a recovery grace window (max(2*TTL, 1h), capped 24h) so clients holding tokens that expired while the grant was unsupported recover without a restart, and mint a fresh access token with the configured TTL. * iceberg: harden OAuth token exchange and Bearer matching per review - match the Bearer scheme case-insensitively (RFC 7235), like authenticateBearer already does - accept optional client authentication on the token-exchange grant (Basic or form credentials, bound to the subject token's client); expired subject tokens now require it. Iceberg Java's proactive refresh sends Bearer-only headers, so the grant cannot require it - reject subject tokens without an exp claim, and re-check the issuer on the verified claims - unauthenticated exchange cannot extend the lifetime past the subject token's own expiry (no chain-refresh from a leaked token) - return 400 invalid_grant per RFC 6749 §5.2 (was 401) - include issued_token_type on exchange responses (RFC 8693) - clamp ICEBERG_OAUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRY to 365d so Duration math cannot overflow into already-expired tokens * iceberg: give authenticated token exchanges a fresh full TTL The remaining-lifetime cap only guards unauthenticated (Bearer-only) exchanges; an authenticated client renewing a live token must get the full configured TTL, matching client_credentials. * iceberg: reject token exchange when no lifetime remains A Bearer-only exchange with under a second of subject lifetime would mint a token with expires_in: 0. Reject with invalid_grant instead. * iceberg: pin near-expiry test token to the next second boundary jwt/v5 serializes exp at one-second precision, so a 300 ms offset can round into the current second and route the test through the expired branch instead of the ttlSeconds<=0 guard. Mint the subject with the next whole-second expiry: live at exchange time, deterministically under a second of remaining lifetime. * iceberg: drop internal ticket reference from comments * iceberg: clamp oversized OAuth TTLs on 32-bit platforms strconv.Atoi on an int-sized value fails with ErrRange on 386, so an oversized ICEBERG_OAUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRY silently fell back to the default instead of clamping. Parse in 64-bit space and clamp, then narrow. * iceberg: make OAuth TTL narrowing explicit * iceberg: disable legacy OAuth in PyIceberg integration tests
398 lines
14 KiB
Go
398 lines
14 KiB
Go
package iceberg
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import (
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"os"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"time"
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jwt "github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
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)
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// OAuthTokenResponse is the response for POST /v1/oauth/tokens.
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type OAuthTokenResponse struct {
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AccessToken string `json:"access_token"`
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TokenType string `json:"token_type"`
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ExpiresIn int `json:"expires_in"`
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Scope string `json:"scope,omitempty"`
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// IssuedTokenType is set to the access-token URN on token-exchange
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// responses, where RFC 8693 requires it.
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IssuedTokenType string `json:"issued_token_type,omitempty"`
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}
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// OAuthErrorResponse is the error response for the OAuth endpoint.
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type OAuthErrorResponse struct {
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Error string `json:"error"`
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Description string `json:"error_description,omitempty"`
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}
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// IcebergClaims are JWT claims for Iceberg catalog OAuth tokens.
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type IcebergClaims struct {
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IdentityName string `json:"identity_name"`
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AccessKey string `json:"access_key"`
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jwt.RegisteredClaims
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}
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const defaultOauthTokenExpiry = 3600
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// maxOauthTokenExpiry bounds the configured TTL so seconds-to-Duration
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// conversions cannot overflow into already-expired tokens.
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const maxOauthTokenExpiry = 365 * 24 * 3600
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// accessTokenTokenType is the RFC 8693 token-type URN for access tokens,
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// required in issued_token_type on token-exchange responses.
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const accessTokenTokenType = "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token"
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// grant types accepted by POST /v1/oauth/tokens. Iceberg Java 1.10.x
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// refreshes tokens via token-exchange (exchangeEnabled defaults true), so a
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// server that only accepts client_credentials leaves those clients unable
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// to refresh.
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const (
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grantTypeClientCredentials = "client_credentials"
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grantTypeTokenExchange = "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange"
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)
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// oauthExpirySeconds returns the OAuth token TTL. Deployments whose
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// clients cannot refresh tokens on 401 can raise this to survive client
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// restart cycles instead of dying every hour.
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func oauthExpirySeconds() int {
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if v := os.Getenv("ICEBERG_OAUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRY"); v != "" {
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// Parse in 64-bit space: on 32-bit platforms Atoi overflows and
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// errors on oversized values, which would silently fall back to
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// the default instead of clamping.
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if n, err := strconv.ParseInt(v, 10, 64); err == nil && n > 0 {
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if n > maxOauthTokenExpiry {
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return maxOauthTokenExpiry
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}
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return int(n)
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}
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}
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return defaultOauthTokenExpiry
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}
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// tokenExchangeGrace is how long an expired subject token may still be
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// exchanged for a fresh access token. Signature verification is the real
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// gate; the grace exists so a client holding a token that expired while the
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// exchange grant was unsupported (or during a server outage) recovers
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// without a process restart.
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func tokenExchangeGrace() time.Duration {
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grace := 2 * oauthExpirySeconds()
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if grace < 3600 {
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grace = 3600
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}
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if grace > 86400 {
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grace = 86400
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}
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return time.Duration(grace) * time.Second
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}
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// handleOAuthTokens implements the OAuth2 client_credentials flow.
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// POST /v1/oauth/tokens
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func (s *Server) handleOAuthTokens(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
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writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_request", "Could not parse form body")
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return
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}
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// Reject credentials in query string to prevent leaking secrets into logs and caches.
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if r.URL.Query().Get("client_secret") != "" {
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writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_request", "client_secret must not be sent in the URL")
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return
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}
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grantType := r.PostFormValue("grant_type")
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switch grantType {
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case grantTypeClientCredentials:
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// handled below
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case grantTypeTokenExchange, "token_exchange":
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s.handleTokenExchange(w, r)
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return
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default:
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writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "unsupported_grant_type",
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fmt.Sprintf("Unsupported grant_type: %s", grantType))
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return
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}
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clientID := r.PostFormValue("client_id")
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clientSecret := r.PostFormValue("client_secret")
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// Also support HTTP Basic auth per OAuth2 spec
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if clientID == "" && clientSecret == "" {
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var ok bool
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clientID, clientSecret, ok = r.BasicAuth()
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if !ok {
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writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid_client", "Missing client credentials")
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return
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}
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}
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if clientID == "" || clientSecret == "" {
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writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid_client", "Missing client_id or client_secret")
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return
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}
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if s.credentialValidator == nil {
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writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "server_error", "Credential validation not configured")
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return
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}
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identityName, _, err := s.credentialValidator.ValidateS3Credential(clientID, clientSecret)
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if err != nil {
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glog.V(2).Infof("Iceberg OAuth: credential validation failed for client_id=%s: %v", clientID, err)
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writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid_client", "Invalid client credentials")
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return
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}
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// Generate a JWT signed with a key derived from the client secret.
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// Include the access key in claims so we can look up the exact credential for verification.
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tokenString, err := mintIcebergToken(identityName, clientID, clientSecret, oauthExpirySeconds())
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if err != nil {
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glog.Errorf("Iceberg OAuth: failed to sign token: %v", err)
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writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "server_error", "Failed to generate token")
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return
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}
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scope := r.PostFormValue("scope")
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resp := OAuthTokenResponse{
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AccessToken: tokenString,
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TokenType: "bearer",
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ExpiresIn: oauthExpirySeconds(),
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Scope: scope,
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}
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w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
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}
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// handleTokenExchange implements RFC 8693 token exchange for Iceberg REST
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// clients: a previously issued access token (subject_token) is exchanged for
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// a fresh one. Iceberg Java's OAuth2Manager refreshes via this grant
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// (exchangeEnabled defaults true), so supporting it lets those clients
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// self-heal before their token expires — no client restart needed.
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//
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// Client authentication (RFC 8693 §2.1) is accepted but not required:
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// Iceberg Java's refreshExpiredToken sends Basic credentials with the
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// exchange, while its proactive scheduled refresh sends only the Bearer
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// session headers. An expired subject_token is only exchangeable with valid
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// client credentials, and an unauthenticated exchange never extends the
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// token's lifetime beyond the subject_token's own expiry.
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func (s *Server) handleTokenExchange(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if s.credentialValidator == nil {
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writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "server_error", "Credential validation not configured")
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return
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}
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subjectToken := r.PostFormValue("subject_token")
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if subjectToken == "" {
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writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_request", "Missing subject_token")
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return
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}
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// Verify the subject token by signature (exp checked separately against
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// the recovery grace).
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unverified := &IcebergClaims{}
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parser := jwt.NewParser(jwt.WithoutClaimsValidation())
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if _, _, err := parser.ParseUnverified(subjectToken, unverified); err != nil {
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writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_grant", "Invalid subject_token")
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return
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}
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if unverified.AccessKey == "" || unverified.Issuer != "seaweedfs-iceberg" {
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writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_grant", "Invalid subject_token")
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return
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}
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identityName, _, secretKey, err := s.credentialValidator.GetCredentialByAccessKey(unverified.AccessKey)
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if err != nil {
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glog.V(2).Infof("Iceberg OAuth: token exchange failed to get credential for access key: %v", err)
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writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_grant", "Invalid subject_token")
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return
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}
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// Optional client authentication. When present, the client must
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// authenticate with the same credential that issued the subject_token.
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clientID, clientSecret, hasBasic := r.BasicAuth()
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if !hasBasic {
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clientID = r.PostFormValue("client_id")
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clientSecret = r.PostFormValue("client_secret")
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hasBasic = clientID != "" && clientSecret != ""
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}
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clientAuthenticated := false
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if hasBasic {
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if _, _, err := s.credentialValidator.ValidateS3Credential(clientID, clientSecret); err != nil {
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glog.V(2).Infof("Iceberg OAuth: token exchange client authentication failed for client_id=%s: %v", clientID, err)
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writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid_client", "Invalid client credentials")
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return
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}
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if clientID != unverified.AccessKey {
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writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_grant", "subject_token was issued to a different client")
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return
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}
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clientAuthenticated = true
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}
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signingKey := deriveSigningKey(unverified.AccessKey, secretKey)
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claims := &IcebergClaims{}
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parsed, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(subjectToken, claims, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
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if _, ok := token.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodHMAC); !ok {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected signing method: %v", token.Header["alg"])
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}
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return signingKey, nil
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}, jwt.WithoutClaimsValidation())
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if err != nil || !parsed.Valid {
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glog.V(2).Infof("Iceberg OAuth: token exchange signature verification failed: %v", err)
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writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_grant", "Invalid subject_token")
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return
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}
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if claims.Issuer != "seaweedfs-iceberg" {
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writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_grant", "Invalid subject_token")
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return
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}
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if claims.ExpiresAt == nil {
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// Tokens minted by this server always carry an expiry; a subject
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// token without one must not be exchangeable forever.
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writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_grant", "subject_token has no expiry")
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return
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}
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ttlSeconds := oauthExpirySeconds()
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if time.Now().After(claims.ExpiresAt.Time) {
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// Expired subject tokens are only exchangeable by an authenticated
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// client, within the recovery grace.
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if !clientAuthenticated {
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writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_grant",
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"subject_token is expired; client authentication is required to exchange it")
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return
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}
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if time.Since(claims.ExpiresAt.Time) > tokenExchangeGrace() {
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writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_grant", "subject_token expired beyond the exchange grace window")
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return
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}
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} else if remaining := int(time.Until(claims.ExpiresAt.Time).Seconds()); !clientAuthenticated && remaining < ttlSeconds {
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// Unauthenticated exchange (proactive refresh carrying only the
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// Bearer) must not extend the lifetime past the subject's expiry;
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// otherwise a leaked token could chain-refresh forever. An
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// authenticated client gets a fresh full TTL — it could mint one
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// via client_credentials anyway.
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ttlSeconds = remaining
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}
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if ttlSeconds <= 0 {
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// A subject token with under a second left would otherwise be
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// exchanged for a token that is born expired.
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writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_grant", "subject_token has no remaining lifetime")
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return
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}
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tokenString, err := mintIcebergToken(identityName, unverified.AccessKey, secretKey, ttlSeconds)
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if err != nil {
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glog.Errorf("Iceberg OAuth: failed to sign exchanged token: %v", err)
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writeOAuthError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "server_error", "Failed to generate token")
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return
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}
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resp := OAuthTokenResponse{
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AccessToken: tokenString,
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TokenType: "bearer",
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ExpiresIn: ttlSeconds,
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Scope: r.PostFormValue("scope"),
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IssuedTokenType: accessTokenTokenType,
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}
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w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
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}
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// mintIcebergToken issues a signed access token for the given identity and
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// credential, valid for ttlSeconds.
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func mintIcebergToken(identityName, accessKey, secret string, ttlSeconds int) (string, error) {
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signingKey := deriveSigningKey(accessKey, secret)
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now := time.Now()
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claims := IcebergClaims{
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IdentityName: identityName,
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AccessKey: accessKey,
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RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
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IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
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ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(now.Add(time.Duration(ttlSeconds) * time.Second)),
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Issuer: "seaweedfs-iceberg",
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},
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}
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token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)
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return token.SignedString(signingKey)
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}
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// authenticateBearer validates a Bearer token from the Authorization header.
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// Returns the identity name, identity object, and whether auth succeeded.
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func (s *Server) authenticateBearer(r *http.Request) (string, interface{}, bool) {
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auth := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
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if auth == "" {
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return "", nil, false
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}
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if !strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(auth), "bearer ") {
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return "", nil, false
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}
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tokenString := strings.TrimSpace(auth[7:])
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if tokenString == "" {
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return "", nil, false
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}
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if s.credentialValidator == nil {
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return "", nil, false
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}
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// Parse the token without verification first to get the access key,
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// then look up the exact credential to verify the signature.
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parser := jwt.NewParser(jwt.WithoutClaimsValidation())
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unverified := &IcebergClaims{}
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_, _, err := parser.ParseUnverified(tokenString, unverified)
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if err != nil {
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glog.V(2).Infof("Iceberg OAuth: failed to parse token: %v", err)
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return "", nil, false
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}
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if unverified.AccessKey == "" {
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return "", nil, false
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}
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// Look up the credential by access key to get the signing key for verification
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identityName, identity, secretKey, err := s.credentialValidator.GetCredentialByAccessKey(unverified.AccessKey)
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if err != nil {
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glog.V(2).Infof("Iceberg OAuth: failed to get credential for access key: %v", err)
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return "", nil, false
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}
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signingKey := deriveSigningKey(unverified.AccessKey, secretKey)
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claims := &IcebergClaims{}
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verified, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(tokenString, claims, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
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if _, ok := token.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodHMAC); !ok {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected signing method: %v", token.Header["alg"])
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}
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return signingKey, nil
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})
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if err != nil || !verified.Valid {
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glog.V(2).Infof("Iceberg OAuth: token verification failed: %v", err)
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return "", nil, false
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}
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return identityName, identity, true
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}
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// deriveSigningKey derives a signing key from the access key and secret using HMAC-SHA256.
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// Including the access key prevents cross-credential token forgery when two
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// credentials happen to share the same secret.
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func deriveSigningKey(accessKey, secret string) []byte {
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h := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte("seaweedfs-iceberg-oauth"))
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h.Write([]byte(accessKey))
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h.Write([]byte{0}) // null separator
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h.Write([]byte(secret))
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return h.Sum(nil)
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}
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func writeOAuthError(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, errCode, description string) {
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resp := OAuthErrorResponse{
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Error: errCode,
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Description: description,
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}
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writeJSON(w, status, resp)
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}
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