mirror of
https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs.git
synced 2026-09-20 13:30:46 +02:00
* s3api: test that a session token must not reveal its credential * sts: derive secret access key with HMAC keyed on the signing key * s3api: stop accepting STS session tokens as bearer credentials * security: reject STS session tokens on filer and admin gRPC auth * test: sign s3/iam framework requests with the session credential * s3api: exercise the real auth pipeline in the end-to-end harness
371 lines
12 KiB
Go
371 lines
12 KiB
Go
package weed_server
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"context"
|
|
"errors"
|
|
"net/http"
|
|
"path"
|
|
"strconv"
|
|
"strings"
|
|
"sync/atomic"
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/filer"
|
|
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
|
|
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/pb/filer_pb"
|
|
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/security"
|
|
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/stats"
|
|
util_http "github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/util/http"
|
|
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/util/version"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
func (fs *FilerServer) filerHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
start := time.Now()
|
|
|
|
inFlightGauge := stats.FilerInFlightRequestsGauge.WithLabelValues(r.Method)
|
|
inFlightGauge.Inc()
|
|
defer inFlightGauge.Dec()
|
|
|
|
statusRecorder := stats.NewStatusResponseWriter(w)
|
|
w = statusRecorder
|
|
origin := r.Header.Get("Origin")
|
|
if origin != "" {
|
|
if fs.option.AllowedOrigins == nil || len(fs.option.AllowedOrigins) == 0 || fs.option.AllowedOrigins[0] == "*" {
|
|
origin = "*"
|
|
} else {
|
|
originFound := false
|
|
for _, allowedOrigin := range fs.option.AllowedOrigins {
|
|
if origin == allowedOrigin {
|
|
originFound = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if !originFound {
|
|
writeJsonError(w, r, http.StatusForbidden, errors.New("origin not allowed"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", origin)
|
|
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Expose-Headers", "*")
|
|
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "*")
|
|
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true")
|
|
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "PUT, POST, GET, DELETE, OPTIONS")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if r.Method == http.MethodOptions {
|
|
OptionsHandler(w, r, false)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
requestMethod := r.Method
|
|
defer func(method *string) {
|
|
stats.FilerRequestCounter.WithLabelValues(*method, strconv.Itoa(statusRecorder.Status)).Inc()
|
|
stats.FilerRequestHistogram.WithLabelValues(*method).Observe(time.Since(start).Seconds())
|
|
}(&requestMethod)
|
|
|
|
isReadHttpCall := r.Method == http.MethodGet || r.Method == http.MethodHead
|
|
if !fs.maybeCheckJwtAuthorization(r, !isReadHttpCall) {
|
|
writeJsonError(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, errors.New("wrong jwt"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// proxy to volume servers, after the gate: this is the one port operators
|
|
// expose, and the branch reaches any needle in the cluster by file id.
|
|
if r.URL.Path == "/" {
|
|
if fileId := r.URL.Query().Get(util_http.ProxyChunkIdParam); fileId != "" {
|
|
fs.proxyToVolumeServer(w, r, fileId)
|
|
stats.FilerHandlerCounter.WithLabelValues(stats.ChunkProxy).Inc()
|
|
// Name the deferred observation after the proxy rather than
|
|
// observing a second time, which would count the request twice.
|
|
requestMethod = stats.ChunkProxy
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
w.Header().Set("Server", "SeaweedFS "+version.VERSION)
|
|
|
|
switch r.Method {
|
|
case http.MethodGet, http.MethodHead:
|
|
fs.GetOrHeadHandler(w, r)
|
|
case http.MethodDelete:
|
|
if _, ok := r.URL.Query()["tagging"]; ok {
|
|
fs.DeleteTaggingHandler(w, r)
|
|
} else {
|
|
fs.DeleteHandler(w, r)
|
|
}
|
|
case http.MethodPost, http.MethodPut:
|
|
// wait until in flight data is less than the limit
|
|
contentLength := getContentLength(r)
|
|
fs.inFlightDataLimitCond.L.Lock()
|
|
inFlightDataSize := atomic.LoadInt64(&fs.inFlightDataSize)
|
|
inFlightUploads := atomic.LoadInt64(&fs.inFlightUploads)
|
|
|
|
// Wait if either data size limit or file count limit is exceeded
|
|
for (fs.option.ConcurrentUploadLimit != 0 && inFlightDataSize > fs.option.ConcurrentUploadLimit) || (fs.option.ConcurrentFileUploadLimit != 0 && inFlightUploads >= fs.option.ConcurrentFileUploadLimit) {
|
|
if fs.option.ConcurrentUploadLimit != 0 && inFlightDataSize > fs.option.ConcurrentUploadLimit {
|
|
glog.V(4).Infof("wait because inflight data %d > %d", inFlightDataSize, fs.option.ConcurrentUploadLimit)
|
|
}
|
|
if fs.option.ConcurrentFileUploadLimit != 0 && inFlightUploads >= fs.option.ConcurrentFileUploadLimit {
|
|
glog.V(4).Infof("wait because inflight uploads %d >= %d", inFlightUploads, fs.option.ConcurrentFileUploadLimit)
|
|
}
|
|
fs.inFlightDataLimitCond.Wait()
|
|
inFlightDataSize = atomic.LoadInt64(&fs.inFlightDataSize)
|
|
inFlightUploads = atomic.LoadInt64(&fs.inFlightUploads)
|
|
}
|
|
fs.inFlightDataLimitCond.L.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
// Increment counters
|
|
newUploads := atomic.AddInt64(&fs.inFlightUploads, 1)
|
|
newSize := atomic.AddInt64(&fs.inFlightDataSize, contentLength)
|
|
// Update metrics
|
|
stats.FilerInFlightUploadCountGauge.Set(float64(newUploads))
|
|
stats.FilerInFlightUploadBytesGauge.Set(float64(newSize))
|
|
defer func() {
|
|
// Decrement counters
|
|
newUploads := atomic.AddInt64(&fs.inFlightUploads, -1)
|
|
newSize := atomic.AddInt64(&fs.inFlightDataSize, -contentLength)
|
|
// Update metrics
|
|
stats.FilerInFlightUploadCountGauge.Set(float64(newUploads))
|
|
stats.FilerInFlightUploadBytesGauge.Set(float64(newSize))
|
|
fs.inFlightDataLimitCond.Signal()
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
if r.Method == http.MethodPut {
|
|
if _, ok := r.URL.Query()["tagging"]; ok {
|
|
fs.PutTaggingHandler(w, r)
|
|
} else {
|
|
fs.PostHandler(w, r, contentLength)
|
|
}
|
|
} else { // method == "POST"
|
|
fs.PostHandler(w, r, contentLength)
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
requestMethod = "INVALID"
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (fs *FilerServer) readonlyFilerHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
|
|
start := time.Now()
|
|
statusRecorder := stats.NewStatusResponseWriter(w)
|
|
w = statusRecorder
|
|
|
|
glog.V(4).Infof("Request: %s %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path)
|
|
|
|
origin := r.Header.Get("Origin")
|
|
if origin != "" {
|
|
if fs.option.AllowedOrigins == nil || len(fs.option.AllowedOrigins) == 0 || fs.option.AllowedOrigins[0] == "*" {
|
|
origin = "*"
|
|
} else {
|
|
originFound := false
|
|
for _, allowedOrigin := range fs.option.AllowedOrigins {
|
|
if origin == allowedOrigin {
|
|
originFound = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if !originFound {
|
|
writeJsonError(w, r, http.StatusForbidden, errors.New("origin not allowed"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", origin)
|
|
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "OPTIONS, GET, HEAD")
|
|
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true")
|
|
}
|
|
requestMethod := r.Method
|
|
defer func(method *string) {
|
|
stats.FilerRequestCounter.WithLabelValues(*method, strconv.Itoa(statusRecorder.Status)).Inc()
|
|
stats.FilerRequestHistogram.WithLabelValues(*method).Observe(time.Since(start).Seconds())
|
|
}(&requestMethod)
|
|
// We handle OPTIONS first because it never should be authenticated
|
|
if r.Method == http.MethodOptions {
|
|
OptionsHandler(w, r, true)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !fs.maybeCheckJwtAuthorization(r, false) {
|
|
writeJsonError(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, errors.New("wrong jwt"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
w.Header().Set("Server", "SeaweedFS "+version.VERSION)
|
|
|
|
switch r.Method {
|
|
case http.MethodGet, http.MethodHead:
|
|
fs.GetOrHeadHandler(w, r)
|
|
default:
|
|
requestMethod = "INVALID"
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func OptionsHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, isReadOnly bool) {
|
|
if isReadOnly {
|
|
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "GET, OPTIONS")
|
|
} else {
|
|
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "PUT, POST, GET, DELETE, OPTIONS")
|
|
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Expose-Headers", "*")
|
|
}
|
|
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "*")
|
|
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// maybeCheckJwtAuthorization returns true if access should be granted, false if it should be denied
|
|
func (fs *FilerServer) maybeCheckJwtAuthorization(r *http.Request, isWrite bool) bool {
|
|
return fs.checkJwtAuthorization(r, isWrite, jwtScopedRequestPaths(r))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// checkJwtAuthorization verifies the request carries a valid filer JWT for the
|
|
// requested access level and, for prefix-restricted tokens, that every path in
|
|
// scopedPaths falls within AllowedPrefixes.
|
|
func (fs *FilerServer) checkJwtAuthorization(r *http.Request, isWrite bool, scopedPaths []string) bool {
|
|
claims, ok := fs.authenticateFilerJwt(r, isWrite)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
return authorizeFilerJwtPaths(r, claims, scopedPaths)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// authenticateFilerJwt verifies the JWT signature and method claims. A nil claims
|
|
// with ok true means authentication is disabled for this access level. Splitting
|
|
// authentication from path authorization lets a handler load an indirect resource
|
|
// (the TUS session target) only after the caller's credential is verified.
|
|
func (fs *FilerServer) authenticateFilerJwt(r *http.Request, isWrite bool) (*security.SeaweedFilerClaims, bool) {
|
|
|
|
var signingKey security.SigningKey
|
|
if isWrite {
|
|
signingKey = fs.filerGuard.SigningKey()
|
|
} else {
|
|
signingKey = fs.filerGuard.ReadSigningKey()
|
|
}
|
|
if len(signingKey) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tokenStr := security.GetJwt(r)
|
|
if tokenStr == "" {
|
|
glog.V(1).Infof("missing jwt from %s", r.RemoteAddr)
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
token, err := security.DecodeJwt(signingKey, tokenStr, &security.SeaweedFilerClaims{})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
glog.V(1).Infof("jwt verification error from %s: %v", r.RemoteAddr, err)
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
if !token.Valid {
|
|
glog.V(1).Infof("jwt invalid from %s: %v", r.RemoteAddr, tokenStr)
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
claims, ok := token.Claims.(*security.SeaweedFilerClaims)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
glog.V(1).Infof("jwt claims not of type *SeaweedFilerClaims from %s", r.RemoteAddr)
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
if claims.SessionId != "" {
|
|
glog.V(1).Infof("jwt is an STS session token, not a filer credential, from %s", r.RemoteAddr)
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(claims.AllowedMethods) > 0 {
|
|
hasMethod := false
|
|
for _, method := range claims.AllowedMethods {
|
|
if method == r.Method {
|
|
hasMethod = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if !hasMethod {
|
|
glog.V(1).Infof("jwt method not allowed from %s: %v", r.RemoteAddr, r.Method)
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return claims, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// authorizeFilerJwtPaths checks the resource scope after authentication. A
|
|
// prefix-restricted token must name at least one resource path; an empty list
|
|
// fails closed, so a caller that cannot resolve its target never falls open.
|
|
func authorizeFilerJwtPaths(r *http.Request, claims *security.SeaweedFilerClaims, scopedPaths []string) bool {
|
|
if claims == nil || len(claims.AllowedPrefixes) == 0 {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
if len(scopedPaths) == 0 {
|
|
glog.V(1).Infof("jwt resource path missing from %s", r.RemoteAddr)
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
for _, p := range scopedPaths {
|
|
if !anyComponentPrefixMatches(claims.AllowedPrefixes, p) {
|
|
glog.V(1).Infof("jwt path not allowed from %s: %v", r.RemoteAddr, p)
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// jwtScopedRequestPaths returns every filer path a request touches that must be
|
|
// covered by the JWT AllowedPrefixes: the write target (r.URL.Path) plus any
|
|
// copy/move source named by the cp.from / mv.from query parameters.
|
|
func jwtScopedRequestPaths(r *http.Request) []string {
|
|
paths := []string{r.URL.Path}
|
|
if query := r.URL.Query(); query.Has("cp.from") || query.Has("mv.from") {
|
|
if from := query.Get("cp.from"); from != "" {
|
|
paths = append(paths, from)
|
|
}
|
|
if from := query.Get("mv.from"); from != "" {
|
|
paths = append(paths, from)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return paths
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// anyComponentPrefixMatches reports whether p is within any of the prefixes.
|
|
func anyComponentPrefixMatches(prefixes []string, p string) bool {
|
|
for _, prefix := range prefixes {
|
|
if pathHasComponentPrefix(p, prefix) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// pathHasComponentPrefix reports whether reqPath is contained within the
|
|
// directory subtree denoted by prefix, treating both as "/"-separated
|
|
// path components. Both inputs are normalised with path.Clean to neutralise
|
|
// "." and ".." segments and collapse duplicate slashes. A prefix of "/"
|
|
// matches any path.
|
|
func pathHasComponentPrefix(reqPath, prefix string) bool {
|
|
if prefix == "" {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
cleanedPath := path.Clean(reqPath)
|
|
if cleanedPath == "." {
|
|
cleanedPath = "/"
|
|
}
|
|
cleanedPrefix := path.Clean(prefix)
|
|
if cleanedPrefix == "." {
|
|
cleanedPrefix = "/"
|
|
}
|
|
if cleanedPrefix == "/" {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
if cleanedPath == cleanedPrefix {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
return strings.HasPrefix(cleanedPath, cleanedPrefix+"/")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (fs *FilerServer) filerHealthzHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
w.Header().Set("Server", "SeaweedFS "+version.VERSION)
|
|
if _, err := fs.filer.Store.FindEntry(context.Background(), filer.TopicsDir); err != nil && err != filer_pb.ErrNotFound {
|
|
glog.Warningf("filerHealthzHandler FindEntry: %+v", err)
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
|
|
} else {
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|