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* iam/oidc: reject reused jti claims with a bounded replay cache * iam/sts: pass jti replay settings through convertToOIDCConfig * iam/oidc: keep consumed jtis and stop the cleanup worker across re-init Re-initializing a provider reset the JTI store, so an already-used token could be presented again after a config refresh; the store is now allocated once and survives Initialize. The cleanup worker is stopped on every re-init (previously only when protection stayed enabled), is started only after the rest of Initialize has succeeded, and Shutdown no longer consumes a permanent sync.Once, so a re-initialized worker can be stopped again. * iam/oidc: enforce the jti replay cache bound for every token Tokens without a usable jti claim skipped the cache entirely and stayed reusable; they are now keyed by the token's own fingerprint so a repeat presentation is still a replay. Tokens without exp previously failed as expired on first use; their entry now gets a bounded retention. The replay test-and-set now runs before any capacity work so replayed tokens cannot each trigger a full-cache scan, the entry count is incremented as part of the insert so concurrent validations cannot overshoot the bound, and a guaranteed serialized sweep runs before a capacity rejection while opportunistic sweeps are rate limited and confined to one at a time. Raw token identifiers are no longer written to logs or errors, a stable fingerprint is logged instead. * iam/sts: shut down providers dropped by the managed-provider swap Each managed OIDC provider runs a background JTI cleanup worker, but SetIAMManagedOIDCProviders replaced the provider map without stopping the old providers, so every refresh leaked goroutines. Providers absent from the new map are now shut down; providers that stay keep running. * iam/integration: reuse providers across refreshes for unchanged records Every refresh rebuilt providers from their records, so a refreshed provider forgot the JTIs it had already consumed and an already-used token could be presented again. Records are now fingerprinted and an unchanged record reuses its provider, keeping the consumed-token cache; changed records are rebuilt, removed records are dropped, and the swap in STS releases the workers of whatever is no longer referenced. * iam/oidc: consume replay entries only on the single-use exchange path Bearer authentication validates the same token on every request, so consuming it in shared ValidateToken/Authenticate made every token single-use and rejected all but the first request. The replay check now runs only for the STS exchange via AuthenticateSingleUse; bearer paths validate without consuming. A token without exp also no longer gets a bounded replay entry that ages out while the token stays valid: its entry is kept until the capacity bound evicts it, so it can never become usable again. * iam/oidc: keep the mock provider on the mock path for single-use calls * iam/oidc: require exp on single-use tokens A cache slot frees only by expiry, so an expiry-less entry would hold it forever; a burst of distinct tokens could exhaust the bound permanently and block every later exchange. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3: give each web-identity test token a unique jti Subtests minted tokens with identical claims inside one second, so the exchange saw the same token fingerprint twice and the second call read as a replay. Each exchange now carries its own jti. * iam/oidc: carry the consumed-token replay store across provider rebuilds A record change rebuilds the managed provider with a fresh JTI store, so a token consumed before the rebuild could be presented again until it expired. The new provider adopts the replaced provider's replay store before it is published, and the replaced provider is shut down so only one cleanup worker sweeps the shared store. * iam/oidc: stop the cleanup worker of providers dropped from the store A refresh removed the provider object from the managed cache but left its JTI cleanup goroutine running for the life of the process. * iam/oidc: merge a provider's consumed replay entries into another's store MergeReplayStateFrom folds one provider's consumed-token entries into another's, skipping already-expired ones. Unlike AdoptReplayStateFrom it swaps no pointers, so it is safe on a provider still serving validators. * iam/integration: share one provider and replay store across identical issuer records Records for the same issuer URL with identical validation settings now reuse a single provider, so a token consumed through one account's record is rejected through the other's — previously each record owned a separate jti store and a spent token could be replayed cross-account. A superseded provider's consumed entries merge into the shared store so no rejection is lost, and a removed or rebuilt provider is only shut down once no remaining record references it. * iam/oidc: hand the superseded provider's live replay store to the shared one * iam/oidc: carry merged replay entries without charging the capacity bound * iam/oidc: key the jti-less replay fingerprint on the signed input Hashing the whole token lets ECDSA signature malleability (s -> N-s) mint a second cache key for identical claims, so a consumed token could be replayed for another exchange. Key the fallback on header.payload instead. * iam/oidc: publish the jti cache bound before the enabled flag Initialize stored jtiEnabled ahead of jtiMaxSize, so a provider flipped from disabled to enabled exposed enabled=true with a zero bound for a window; a single-use validation landing there would compute newCount > maxSize and reject with "JTI cache capacity exceeded". Store the bound first so the flag is the last thing published. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
290 lines
11 KiB
Go
290 lines
11 KiB
Go
package s3api
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/json"
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"encoding/xml"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"net/url"
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"strings"
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"sync/atomic"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/iam/integration"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/iam/oidc"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/iam/policy"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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)
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// AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity is the public, unauthenticated STS entry point, but
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// every existing test reaches the OIDC path either at the IAMManager service
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// layer or through the Authorization: Bearer shortcut. Nothing drove a real
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// signed OIDC token through HandleSTSRequest, which is what an AWS SDK actually
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// does - and that is the path carrying parameter parsing, the IAMManager
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// dispatch, and the XML response shape.
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func TestAssumeRoleWithWebIdentityOverHTTP(t *testing.T) {
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ctx := context.Background()
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key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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jwks := map[string]interface{}{
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"keys": []map[string]interface{}{{
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"kty": "RSA",
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"kid": "web-identity-test-key",
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"use": "sig",
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"alg": "RS256",
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"n": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(key.PublicKey.N.Bytes()),
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"e": "AQAB",
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}},
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}
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idp := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.URL.Path != "/jwks" {
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http.NotFound(w, r)
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return
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(jwks)
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}))
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defer idp.Close()
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provider := oidc.NewOIDCProvider("test-oidc")
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require.NoError(t, provider.Initialize(&oidc.OIDCConfig{
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Issuer: idp.URL,
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ClientID: "test-client",
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JWKSUri: idp.URL + "/jwks",
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}))
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manager := newTestSTSIntegrationManager(t)
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require.NoError(t, manager.RegisterIdentityProvider(provider))
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require.NoError(t, manager.CreatePolicy(ctx, "", "WebIdentityPolicy", &policy.PolicyDocument{
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Version: "2012-10-17",
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Statement: []policy.Statement{{
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Effect: "Allow",
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Action: []string{"s3:GetObject"},
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Resource: []string{"arn:aws:s3:::*/*"},
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}},
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}))
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trustPolicy := func(federatedProvider string) *policy.PolicyDocument {
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return &policy.PolicyDocument{
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Version: "2012-10-17",
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Statement: []policy.Statement{{
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Effect: "Allow",
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Principal: map[string]interface{}{"Federated": federatedProvider},
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Action: []string{"sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"},
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}},
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}
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}
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require.NoError(t, manager.CreateRole(ctx, "", "WebIdentityRole", &integration.RoleDefinition{
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RoleName: "WebIdentityRole",
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TrustPolicy: trustPolicy("test-oidc"),
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AttachedPolicies: []string{"WebIdentityPolicy"},
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}))
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require.NoError(t, manager.CreateRole(ctx, "", "WebIdentityDeniedRole", &integration.RoleDefinition{
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RoleName: "WebIdentityDeniedRole",
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TrustPolicy: trustPolicy("some-other-provider"),
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AttachedPolicies: []string{"WebIdentityPolicy"},
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}))
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iam := &IdentityAccessManagement{iamIntegration: NewS3IAMIntegration(manager, "")}
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handlers := NewSTSHandlers(manager.GetSTSService(), iam)
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var jtiCounter atomic.Int64
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signOIDCToken := func(t *testing.T, subject string) string {
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t.Helper()
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token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodRS256, jwt.MapClaims{
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"iss": idp.URL,
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"sub": subject,
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"aud": "test-client",
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"exp": time.Now().Add(time.Hour).Unix(),
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"iat": time.Now().Unix(),
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// a unique jti per token: the exchange consumes it, so two
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// subtests minting the same claims in one second would otherwise
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// collide on the token fingerprint and read as a replay
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"jti": fmt.Sprintf("%s-%d", subject, jtiCounter.Add(1)),
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})
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token.Header["kid"] = "web-identity-test-key"
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signed, err := token.SignedString(key)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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return signed
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}
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const trustedRoleArn = "arn:aws:iam::" + defaultAccountID + ":role/WebIdentityRole"
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// The SDK may put the parameters in the query string or the form body; both
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// reach HandleSTSRequest and must behave identically.
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for _, encoding := range []string{"query", "body"} {
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t.Run("succeeds with parameters in the "+encoding, func(t *testing.T) {
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form := url.Values{
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"Action": {"AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"},
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"Version": {"2011-06-15"},
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"RoleArn": {trustedRoleArn},
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"RoleSessionName": {"web-session"},
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"WebIdentityToken": {signOIDCToken(t, "oidc-user-1")},
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}
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var req *http.Request
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if encoding == "query" {
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req = httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "http://sts.seaweedfs.test/?"+form.Encode(), nil)
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} else {
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req = httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "http://sts.seaweedfs.test/", strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
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}
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handlers.HandleSTSRequest(rec, req)
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require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
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var resp AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityResponse
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require.NoError(t, xml.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &resp))
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assert.Equal(t, "oidc-user-1", resp.Result.SubjectFromWebIdentityToken)
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assert.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(resp.Result.Credentials.AccessKeyId, "ASIA"),
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"temporary credentials must use the ASIA prefix")
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require.NotEmpty(t, resp.Result.Credentials.SessionToken)
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assert.Nil(t, resp.Result.PackedPolicySize, "no inline session policy was sent")
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// The minted session must resolve to the assumed-role principal.
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// Unlike AssumeRole, this path does not embed the role's attached
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// policies in the token - they are resolved from the role at request
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// time - so assert the effective permission rather than the claim.
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info, err := manager.GetSTSService().ValidateSessionToken(ctx, resp.Result.Credentials.SessionToken)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.Contains(t, info.Principal, "assumed-role/WebIdentityRole/web-session")
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allowed, err := manager.IsActionAllowed(ctx, &integration.ActionRequest{
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Principal: info.Principal,
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Action: "s3:GetObject",
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Resource: "arn:aws:s3:::bucket/key",
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SessionToken: resp.Result.Credentials.SessionToken,
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})
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.True(t, allowed, "the role grants s3:GetObject")
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denied, err := manager.IsActionAllowed(ctx, &integration.ActionRequest{
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Principal: info.Principal,
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Action: "s3:PutObject",
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Resource: "arn:aws:s3:::bucket/key",
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SessionToken: resp.Result.Credentials.SessionToken,
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})
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.False(t, denied, "the role does not grant s3:PutObject")
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})
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}
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t.Run("inline session policy is reported in PackedPolicySize", func(t *testing.T) {
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sessionPolicy := `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::bucket/*"]}]}`
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form := url.Values{
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"Action": {"AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"},
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"Version": {"2011-06-15"},
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"RoleArn": {trustedRoleArn},
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"RoleSessionName": {"web-session-scoped"},
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"WebIdentityToken": {signOIDCToken(t, "oidc-user-2")},
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"Policy": {sessionPolicy},
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}
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "http://sts.seaweedfs.test/", strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handlers.HandleSTSRequest(rec, req)
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require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
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var resp AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityResponse
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require.NoError(t, xml.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &resp))
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require.NotNil(t, resp.Result.PackedPolicySize)
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assert.Greater(t, *resp.Result.PackedPolicySize, int64(0))
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info, err := manager.GetSTSService().ValidateSessionToken(ctx, resp.Result.Credentials.SessionToken)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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require.NotEmpty(t, info.SessionPolicy, "the inline policy must travel in the session token")
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// Carrying the policy is not the point - restricting the session is. The
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// role allows s3:GetObject on any bucket; the session policy narrows that
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// to one bucket, so the same action on another bucket must be refused.
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allowed, err := manager.IsActionAllowed(ctx, &integration.ActionRequest{
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Principal: info.Principal,
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Action: "s3:GetObject",
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Resource: "arn:aws:s3:::bucket/key",
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SessionToken: resp.Result.Credentials.SessionToken,
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})
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.True(t, allowed, "the session policy allows this bucket")
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denied, err := manager.IsActionAllowed(ctx, &integration.ActionRequest{
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Principal: info.Principal,
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Action: "s3:GetObject",
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Resource: "arn:aws:s3:::other-bucket/key",
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SessionToken: resp.Result.Credentials.SessionToken,
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})
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.False(t, denied, "the session policy must scope the session down to one bucket")
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})
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t.Run("role whose trust policy rejects the provider is denied", func(t *testing.T) {
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form := url.Values{
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"Action": {"AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"},
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"Version": {"2011-06-15"},
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"RoleArn": {"arn:aws:iam::" + defaultAccountID + ":role/WebIdentityDeniedRole"},
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"RoleSessionName": {"web-session"},
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"WebIdentityToken": {signOIDCToken(t, "oidc-user-1")},
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}
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "http://sts.seaweedfs.test/", strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handlers.HandleSTSRequest(rec, req)
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assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
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})
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// Both rejection paths matter and they are not the same code: one fails
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// signature verification against a key we do publish, the other never finds
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// a key to verify against. The claim set is otherwise identical to a token
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// signOIDCToken would mint, so neither can pass or fail for want of a claim.
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forgedTokenCases := []struct {
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name string
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kid string
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}{
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{name: "token signed by a key we do not publish is rejected", kid: "web-identity-test-key"},
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{name: "token naming an unknown key id is rejected", kid: "not-in-the-jwks"},
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}
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for _, tc := range forgedTokenCases {
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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otherKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodRS256, jwt.MapClaims{
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"iss": idp.URL,
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"sub": "forged-user",
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"aud": "test-client",
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"exp": time.Now().Add(time.Hour).Unix(),
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"iat": time.Now().Unix(),
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})
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token.Header["kid"] = tc.kid
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forged, err := token.SignedString(otherKey)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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form := url.Values{
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"Action": {"AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"},
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"Version": {"2011-06-15"},
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"RoleArn": {trustedRoleArn},
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"RoleSessionName": {"web-session"},
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"WebIdentityToken": {forged},
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}
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "http://sts.seaweedfs.test/", strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handlers.HandleSTSRequest(rec, req)
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assert.NotEqual(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code, "a forged token must not mint a session")
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})
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}
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}
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