The last message in the map, and it reboots the charger

0108 was the one thing in the MQTT inventory nobody had wired: the device
power mode, whose single documented value restarts the charger. It is the
only way to reboot a charger that is on neither a CSMS nor the local
network — which is most of them — so the cloud transport sends it now,
and "reset" reaches it too, since that is what the OCPP path has always
called the same act.

Nothing waits for a confirmation: the device that would send it is the
device rebooting, so the command answers at once and says the charger
drops off the cloud for about a minute. The gate is unchanged and now
covers both spellings — an explicit confirm plus a password step-up,
audited either way. Modbus still refuses, because no register does this,
but its refusal now names both transports that can rather than only the
CSMS.

Both clients already had the reset button and its password prompt; they
were hidden in every mode that reads the device, which is why the cloud
never showed one. Modbus is now the only mode without it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

API Server/internal/api/integrations_ankersolix_mqtt_test.go

@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ func refuse(t *testing.T, action string, body ankerControlBody) *httptest.Respon
 // unknown.
 func TestAnkerMqttActionNamesTheTransportThatCan(t *testing.T) {
 	for _, tc := range []struct{ action, want string }{
-		{"reset", "CSMS"},
 		{"unlock", "CSMS"},
 		{"availability", "CSMS"},
 		{"config", "CSMS"},
@@ -43,6 +42,21 @@ func TestAnkerMqttActionNamesTheTransportThatCan(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// A reboot is a reboot under either name and over any transport: both go through
+// the confirmation and the password step-up, and nothing else does.
+func TestBothNamesForARebootAreGated(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, action := range []string{"reset", "restart", "unlock"} {
+		if !isDestructiveAction(action) {
+			t.Errorf("%s should need a confirmation and a password", action)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, action := range []string{"start", "stop", "limit", "boost", "settings", "status"} {
+		if isDestructiveAction(action) {
+			t.Errorf("%s should not demand a password", action)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 func TestAnkerMqttActionRejectsUnknownActions(t *testing.T) {
 	rec := refuse(t, "explode", ankerControlBody{})
 	if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "unknown control action") {