# DriverVault — Docker (multi-container stack)

Three containers — **PocketBase**, **API Server**, **Web App** — on one compose
network. This is the deployment to use unless you specifically want everything
in a single image; for that see [`../Docker-AIO`](../Docker-AIO).

```
Browser ─► Web App BFF (:8090) ──/api/*──► API Server (:8080) ─► PocketBase (:8070)
```

Only the Web App port is meant to be public. The API Server and the PocketBase
admin UI are published for convenience and, in the prod file, bound to
`127.0.0.1` by default.

| File | Use |
|---|---|
| `docker-compose.yml` | **builds from source** in this repo — for development and local testing |
| `docker-compose.prod.yml` | **pulls prebuilt images** from the registry — for deployment |
| `.env.example` / `.env.prod.example` | copy to `.env` for the matching compose file |
| `pocketbase/` | the PocketBase image (official release binary on alpine) |

## Run it

```bash
cd Docker
cp .env.example .env        # then edit — PB_ADMIN_* have no safe defaults
docker compose up -d --build
```

Production, from the registry:

```bash
cp .env.prod.example .env   # then edit
docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml pull
docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d
```

Then: web app on `http://host:8090/`, the API Server's superadmin panel on
`http://host:8080/`, PocketBase admin on `http://host:8070/_/`.

## First boot

Both steps are idempotent, so restarts and upgrades are safe:

1. **PocketBase** upserts its superuser from `PB_ADMIN_EMAIL` / `PB_ADMIN_PASSWORD`.
   This is the only way to create the first superuser — the REST API cannot
   bootstrap it. The API Server then authenticates with the same credentials.
2. **The API Server** creates any missing collections and reconciles existing
   ones, then creates the first app `superadmin` from
   `DRIVERVAULT_SUPERADMIN_EMAIL` / `_PASSWORD` if no such user exists.

> Leave `PB_BOOTSTRAP` at `true`, including across upgrades. A release can add
> collections or fields the server needs, and a stack that skipped the bootstrap
> never gets them. The API Server self-heals exactly one thing — `app_settings`,
> the collection holding the plugin settings, which it creates on demand because
> it cannot serve the plugin panel without it. Every other schema change still
> depends on this flag, so turn it off only for a database you know already
> matches the release you are running.

No manual `setup-pocketbase.mjs` step is needed here — the server runs the same
schema reconcile itself.

## Volumes

| Volume | Holds |
|---|---|
| `pb_data` | the PocketBase SQLite database and uploaded files — everything that persists |

One volume, because the API Server keeps no state on disk. Plugin enable-state
and global config live in the database like the rest of the settings, so backing
up `pb_data` backs up the whole stack. It defaults to a Docker-managed named
volume; set `PB_DATA` to an absolute host path in the prod file for a bind mount
instead. PocketBase runs as root, so a root-owned host directory is fine.

> One thing does **not** persist: the API Server panel's *Settings → PocketBase*
> and *Settings → Web App* screens apply immediately but only for the life of the
> container. Set `POCKETBASE_URL`, `PB_ADMIN_EMAIL` / `PB_ADMIN_PASSWORD`,
> `WEBAPP_URL` and `CORS_ALLOW_ORIGINS` in `.env` to change them permanently —
> in this stack the compose environment wins over anything the panel writes.

## Charger control (OCPP)

Chargers in own/proxy mode dial in to `/ocpp/{serial}`, authenticating with a
per-charger control token in an OCPP Basic-auth header. Two ports answer that
path: the API Server's own, and the Web App's, whose BFF proxies `/ocpp/`
through. The second one matters because it is the address the panel hands out —
the endpoint is derived from the host the panel itself was reached on, which is
the Web App, unless `OCPP_PUBLIC_URL` says otherwise.

A plaintext `ws://` puts the control token on the wire in the clear, so
`OCPP_REQUIRE_TLS` defaults to `true` and non-TLS connections are rejected.
`OCPP_REQUIRE_TLS=false` is for a trusted network you own end to end.

### With a public hostname and TLS

`docker-compose.tls.yml` adds Caddy in front of the stack: one hostname, a
certificate issued on first boot, and everything behind it spoken to over the
compose network. Browsers and chargers arrive at the same name.

```sh
# in .env
DV_DOMAIN=drivervault.example.com
DV_ACME_EMAIL=you@example.com

docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml -f docker-compose.tls.yml up -d
```

The overlay sets the rest for you: `OCPP_PUBLIC_URL=wss://$DV_DOMAIN`,
`OCPP_REQUIRE_TLS=true`, `CORS_ALLOW_ORIGINS=https://$DV_DOMAIN`, and
`TRUST_FORWARDED_PROTO=true` on the Web App so the BFF passes Caddy's
`X-Forwarded-Proto` to the API Server instead of overwriting it with its own
plaintext hop. Point the charger's OCPP backend at the endpoint the panel then
shows, with the control token as its authorization key.

Two things the overlay cannot arrange: `DV_DOMAIN` must resolve to the host from
the internet with ports 80 and 443 reaching it (Caddy needs `:80` for the ACME
challenge), and the charger must be able to resolve that name too — behind NAT
that usually means hairpin NAT or a split-DNS entry pointing it at the LAN
address.

Using a proxy you already run instead? Terminate TLS there, forward to the Web
App port, and set the same four variables by hand — the `X-Forwarded-Proto` one
included, or chargers will be rejected as insecure.

## Notes

- `docker-compose.yml` builds the API Server and Web App from `../API Server`
  and `../Web App`, so run it from this directory with the repo checked out.
- The Web App's Vue bundle is built with an empty `VITE_API_BASE`, so the
  browser uses same-origin `/api` and the BFF proxies it — no CORS in play.
- `CORS_ALLOW_ORIGINS` therefore only matters if a browser calls the API Server
  directly. Native mobile apps are not subject to CORS at all.