Charger control needs TLS, and the stack speaks plain HTTP, so the README said "terminate TLS in a reverse proxy" and left the operator to work out which four settings have to agree. This adds the proxy: a Caddy overlay that fronts the Web App BFF — which already carries /api/ and /ocpp/ — so browsers and chargers arrive at the same name and the certificate is issued on first boot. The four settings are derived from DV_DOMAIN, since one value getting typed right is better odds than four: OCPP_PUBLIC_URL, OCPP_REQUIRE_TLS back on, CORS, and TRUST_FORWARDED_PROTO on the Web App. That last one is the non-obvious one — without it the BFF overwrites Caddy's X-Forwarded-Proto with its own plaintext hop and the API Server rejects the charger it just told to connect over wss. The README's OCPP section was stale besides: it still sent chargers to the API Server port alone, from before the BFF carried that path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
DriverVault — Docker (multi-container stack)
Three containers — PocketBase, API Server, Web App — on one compose
network. This is the deployment to use unless you specifically want everything
in a single image; for that see ../Docker-AIO.
Browser ─► Web App BFF (:8090) ──/api/*──► API Server (:8080) ─► PocketBase (:8070)
Only the Web App port is meant to be public. The API Server and the PocketBase
admin UI are published for convenience and, in the prod file, bound to
127.0.0.1 by default.
| File | Use |
|---|---|
docker-compose.yml |
builds from source in this repo — for development and local testing |
docker-compose.prod.yml |
pulls prebuilt images from the registry — for deployment |
.env.example / .env.prod.example |
copy to .env for the matching compose file |
pocketbase/ |
the PocketBase image (official release binary on alpine) |
Run it
cd Docker
cp .env.example .env # then edit — PB_ADMIN_* have no safe defaults
docker compose up -d --build
Production, from the registry:
cp .env.prod.example .env # then edit
docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml pull
docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d
Then: web app on http://host:8090/, the API Server's superadmin panel on
http://host:8080/, PocketBase admin on http://host:8070/_/.
First boot
Both steps are idempotent, so restarts and upgrades are safe:
- PocketBase upserts its superuser from
PB_ADMIN_EMAIL/PB_ADMIN_PASSWORD. This is the only way to create the first superuser — the REST API cannot bootstrap it. The API Server then authenticates with the same credentials. - The API Server creates any missing collections and reconciles existing
ones, then creates the first app
superadminfromDRIVERVAULT_SUPERADMIN_EMAIL/_PASSWORDif no such user exists.
Leave
PB_BOOTSTRAPattrue, including across upgrades. A release can add collections or fields the server needs, and a stack that skipped the bootstrap never gets them. The API Server self-heals exactly one thing —app_settings, the collection holding the plugin settings, which it creates on demand because it cannot serve the plugin panel without it. Every other schema change still depends on this flag, so turn it off only for a database you know already matches the release you are running.
No manual setup-pocketbase.mjs step is needed here — the server runs the same
schema reconcile itself.
Volumes
| Volume | Holds |
|---|---|
pb_data |
the PocketBase SQLite database and uploaded files — everything that persists |
One volume, because the API Server keeps no state on disk. Plugin enable-state
and global config live in the database like the rest of the settings, so backing
up pb_data backs up the whole stack. It defaults to a Docker-managed named
volume; set PB_DATA to an absolute host path in the prod file for a bind mount
instead. PocketBase runs as root, so a root-owned host directory is fine.
One thing does not persist: the API Server panel's Settings → PocketBase and Settings → Web App screens apply immediately but only for the life of the container. Set
POCKETBASE_URL,PB_ADMIN_EMAIL/PB_ADMIN_PASSWORD,WEBAPP_URLandCORS_ALLOW_ORIGINSin.envto change them permanently — in this stack the compose environment wins over anything the panel writes.
Charger control (OCPP)
Chargers in own/proxy mode dial in to /ocpp/{serial}, authenticating with a
per-charger control token in an OCPP Basic-auth header. Two ports answer that
path: the API Server's own, and the Web App's, whose BFF proxies /ocpp/
through. The second one matters because it is the address the panel hands out —
the endpoint is derived from the host the panel itself was reached on, which is
the Web App, unless OCPP_PUBLIC_URL says otherwise.
A plaintext ws:// puts the control token on the wire in the clear, so
OCPP_REQUIRE_TLS defaults to true and non-TLS connections are rejected.
OCPP_REQUIRE_TLS=false is for a trusted network you own end to end.
With a public hostname and TLS
docker-compose.tls.yml adds Caddy in front of the stack: one hostname, a
certificate issued on first boot, and everything behind it spoken to over the
compose network. Browsers and chargers arrive at the same name.
# in .env
DV_DOMAIN=drivervault.example.com
DV_ACME_EMAIL=you@example.com
docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml -f docker-compose.tls.yml up -d
The overlay sets the rest for you: OCPP_PUBLIC_URL=wss://$DV_DOMAIN,
OCPP_REQUIRE_TLS=true, CORS_ALLOW_ORIGINS=https://$DV_DOMAIN, and
TRUST_FORWARDED_PROTO=true on the Web App so the BFF passes Caddy's
X-Forwarded-Proto to the API Server instead of overwriting it with its own
plaintext hop. Point the charger's OCPP backend at the endpoint the panel then
shows, with the control token as its authorization key.
Two things the overlay cannot arrange: DV_DOMAIN must resolve to the host from
the internet with ports 80 and 443 reaching it (Caddy needs :80 for the ACME
challenge), and the charger must be able to resolve that name too — behind NAT
that usually means hairpin NAT or a split-DNS entry pointing it at the LAN
address.
Using a proxy you already run instead? Terminate TLS there, forward to the Web
App port, and set the same four variables by hand — the X-Forwarded-Proto one
included, or chargers will be rejected as insecure.
Notes
docker-compose.ymlbuilds the API Server and Web App from../API Serverand../Web App, so run it from this directory with the repo checked out.- The Web App's Vue bundle is built with an empty
VITE_API_BASE, so the browser uses same-origin/apiand the BFF proxies it — no CORS in play. CORS_ALLOW_ORIGINStherefore only matters if a browser calls the API Server directly. Native mobile apps are not subject to CORS at all.