Phase 7: E2EE support

Implements PLAN.md Phase 7: the server half of end-to-end encryption.
Devices upload identity, one-time and fallback keys; other devices query
and claim them, across servers too, and every one-time key is handed out
exactly once. Cross-signing, signature uploads, device list tracking and
server-side key backup complete the set.

internal/keyserver is the component. Keys are stored in canonical JSON
so that re-uploading the same key is a byte comparison, and signatures
uploaded later are kept apart from the key they sign and merged in on
read, so a key's own JSON stays what its owner uploaded. Device keys must
be for the caller's own device; cross-signing keys must be the
uploader's, carry the right usage and, for self- and user-signing keys,
be signed by the master key. Signatures are verified against the key as
stored. Replacing a master key asks for the password; a first upload or
an upload of the keys already stored does not, as the spec allows. A
signature of another user's master key is shown only to the user who
made it and never federated.

Every write that changes what /keys/query answers moves the device list
stream in the same transaction, one position per device, and wakes the
syncs of everyone sharing a room. The stream is the sixth field of a sync
token; older tokens still parse. The syncapi works out device_lists
changed and left from the stream and from membership moves in the
window, skipping invites and knocks, and reports
device_one_time_keys_count and device_unused_fallback_key_types, the
latter as [] when empty. GET /keys/changes uses the same logic.

Over federation: /user/keys/query, /user/keys/claim and
/user/devices/{userId}, and m.device_list_update and m.signing_key_update
both ways. Remote keys are not cached; an update about a remote user
sharing a room moves them in the stream so local clients re-query.
Device display names are not sent to other servers. With federation off,
remote users are reported in failures at once.

Deleting a device deletes its keys, through a new userapi
DeviceObserver. Key backup keeps the better copy of each session by the
spec's rule, never reuses a deleted version's number, and answers writes
to a stale version with M_WRONG_ROOM_KEYS_VERSION.

Storage is migration 0008 for sqlite and postgres, with a PocketBase
stub. The Complement target sets gain the key, device list, fallback,
cross-signing and backup tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
tajniak81andClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-10-17 10:34:08 +02:00
1 parent 92836f8dcd
commit fc49f56339
45 files changed
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@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ import (
"github.com/dariuszjaniak/warp/server/internal/config"
"github.com/dariuszjaniak/warp/server/internal/federation"
"github.com/dariuszjaniak/warp/server/internal/httputil"
"github.com/dariuszjaniak/warp/server/internal/keyserver"
"github.com/dariuszjaniak/warp/server/internal/mediaapi"
"github.com/dariuszjaniak/warp/server/internal/ratelimit"
"github.com/dariuszjaniak/warp/server/internal/roomserver"
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ type ClientAPI struct {
users *userapi.API
rooms *roomserver.API
sync *syncapi.API
keys *keyserver.API
media *mediaapi.API
legacyMedia bool
settings *settings.Service
@@ -92,6 +94,11 @@ type Options struct {
// pretending there is a stream to read.
Sync *syncapi.API
// Keys is the keyserver. Without it the end-to-end encryption
// endpoints answer M_UNRECOGNIZED, which is how a client learns it
// cannot encrypt here.
Keys *keyserver.API
// Media is the media repository. Without it the media endpoints
// answer M_UNRECOGNIZED.
Media *mediaapi.API
@@ -153,6 +160,7 @@ func New(opts Options) (*ClientAPI, error) {
users: opts.Users,
rooms: opts.Rooms,
sync: opts.Sync,
keys: opts.Keys,
media: opts.Media,
legacyMedia: opts.LegacyMediaDownloads,
settings: opts.Settings,
@@ -247,6 +255,7 @@ func (c *ClientAPI) RegisterRoutes(r *httputil.Router) {
c.registerRoomRoutes(r)
c.registerSyncRoutes(r)
c.registerKeyRoutes(r)
c.registerMediaRoutes(r)
}