Files
Warp/server/internal/userapi/password_test.go
T
tajniak81andClaude Opus 5 6004bb01de
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Phase 1: accounts and sessions
Implements PLAN.md Phase 1. A client can now register, log in, manage its
devices and set its profile; an operator can create accounts and flip the
runtime switches. There are still no rooms and no real /sync.

userapi: accounts, argon2id passwords in PHC format, devices, access and
refresh tokens stored as SHA-256 hashes, account data and the admin flag.
Its storage interface is storage.UserStore, implemented once in sqlstore
with `?` placeholders; the postgres driver supplies a rebind function and
unique-violation recognition rather than keeping a second copy of thirty
statements. Timestamps in these tables are int64 milliseconds, the unit the
Client-Server API uses on the wire.

Client-Server API: register (user-interactive auth with m.login.dummy and
optional registration tokens), register/available, token validity, login
with m.login.password, logout, logout/all, refresh, account/whoami,
capabilities, devices/* with password-gated deletion, profile/*, global and
per-room account data.

GET /sync is a deliberate placeholder: it answers a valid token with an
empty but well-formed response and refuses a revoked one. Phase 1 has no
rooms, so that is the whole truth, and it is what makes session revocation
observable. Phase 4 replaces it with the syncapi.

Auth middleware resolves a bearer token (header or the legacy query
parameter) to a device and user, answering an expired token with the soft
logout the spec asks for. Rate limiting is a token bucket per endpoint class
keyed on the client address, returning M_LIMIT_EXCEEDED with retry_after_ms.

adminapi v1 under /_warp/admin/v1: admin-only auth via a normal Matrix
token, GET/PUT /federation and /registration driving internal/settings and
reporting a config-pinned switch as a 409, GET/POST /users, GET /stats.

warp create-account [--admin] creates the first account straight in the
database, so a new install with registration off has a way in.

Complement is wired up for the federation=off profile: an image meeting its
contract, an entrypoint that configures Warp entirely from WARP_*
variables, and a runner that builds, clones and executes the target set
(TestRegistration, TestLogin, TestDeviceManagement). It has not been run
yet -- there is no container runtime on the development machine -- so the
three tests' assertions were read from the Complement sources and pinned as
httptest tests instead, and CI gained a job that runs the real thing.

Also fixes a .gitignore bug from Phase 0: the unanchored `warp` pattern,
meant for the built binary, also matched the directory server/cmd/warp and
silently excluded the entire command package from the repository. The
binary patterns are now anchored to the repository root, and cmd/warp is
committed for the first time.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 18:18:37 +02:00

161 lines
5.0 KiB
Go

package userapi
import (
"errors"
"strings"
"testing"
"golang.org/x/crypto/argon2"
)
func TestHashAndVerifyPassword(t *testing.T) {
const password = "correct horse battery staple"
hash, err := HashPassword(password)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("HashPassword: %v", err)
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(hash, "$argon2id$v=") {
t.Fatalf("hash %q is not in the PHC format", hash)
}
ok, err := VerifyPassword(hash, password)
if err != nil || !ok {
t.Fatalf("VerifyPassword of the right password = %v, %v", ok, err)
}
ok, err = VerifyPassword(hash, password+"!")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("VerifyPassword: %v", err)
}
if ok {
t.Error("the wrong password verified")
}
}
// TestHashIsSalted is what makes a stolen table worth attacking one row at a
// time rather than all at once.
func TestHashIsSalted(t *testing.T) {
first, err := HashPassword("same password")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
second, err := HashPassword("same password")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if first == second {
t.Error("two hashes of the same password are identical, so the salt is not random")
}
}
// TestHashRecordsItsParameters is what lets the cost be raised later without
// invalidating every existing password.
func TestHashRecordsItsParameters(t *testing.T) {
hash, err := HashPassword("x")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
params, salt, key, err := decodeHash(hash)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decodeHash of our own output: %v", err)
}
if params.memory != argonMemoryKiB || params.time != argonTime || params.lanes != argonLanes {
t.Errorf("recorded parameters = %+v, want the current constants", params)
}
if len(salt) != argonSaltLen || len(key) != argonKeyLen {
t.Errorf("salt is %d bytes and key %d bytes", len(salt), len(key))
}
}
// TestVerifyAgainstAnOlderCost proves the point of recording them: a hash
// made with weaker parameters still verifies.
func TestVerifyAgainstAnOlderCost(t *testing.T) {
const password = "from an older release"
// A hash as a previous, cheaper, configuration would have written it.
salt := []byte("0123456789abcdef")
key := argon2.IDKey([]byte(password), salt, 1, 8*1024, 1, 32)
hash := "$argon2id$v=19$m=8192,t=1,p=1$" + b64.EncodeToString(salt) + "$" + b64.EncodeToString(key)
ok, err := VerifyPassword(hash, password)
if err != nil || !ok {
t.Fatalf("VerifyPassword against older parameters = %v, %v", ok, err)
}
}
// TestVerifyRejectsMalformedHashes keeps a corrupt row from looking like a
// wrong password for ever.
func TestVerifyRejectsMalformedHashes(t *testing.T) {
good, err := HashPassword("x")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
parts := strings.Split(good, "$")
for name, hash := range map[string]string{
"empty": "",
"not a hash": "hunter2",
"too few fields": "$argon2id$v=19$m=19456,t=2,p=1$" + parts[4],
"wrong algorithm": "$argon2i$v=19$" + strings.Join(parts[3:], "$"),
"unknown version": "$argon2id$v=16$" + strings.Join(parts[3:], "$"),
"unparseable params": "$argon2id$v=19$m=lots,t=2,p=1$" + parts[4] + "$" + parts[5],
"zero memory": "$argon2id$v=19$m=0,t=2,p=1$" + parts[4] + "$" + parts[5],
"bad base64 salt": "$argon2id$v=19$m=19456,t=2,p=1$not!base64$" + parts[5],
"empty key": "$argon2id$v=19$m=19456,t=2,p=1$" + parts[4] + "$",
} {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
ok, err := VerifyPassword(hash, "x")
if ok {
t.Fatal("a malformed hash verified")
}
if !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidPasswordHash) {
t.Errorf("error = %v, want ErrInvalidPasswordHash", err)
}
})
}
}
func TestPasswordLengthIsBounded(t *testing.T) {
long := strings.Repeat("x", MaxPasswordLength+1)
if _, err := HashPassword(long); !errors.Is(err, ErrPasswordTooLong) {
t.Errorf("HashPassword of an overlong password = %v, want ErrPasswordTooLong", err)
}
hash, err := HashPassword(strings.Repeat("x", MaxPasswordLength))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("a password at the limit must be accepted: %v", err)
}
if _, err := VerifyPassword(hash, long); !errors.Is(err, ErrPasswordTooLong) {
t.Errorf("VerifyPassword of an overlong password = %v, want ErrPasswordTooLong", err)
}
}
// TestNonASCIIPasswords: the hash takes bytes, so there is nothing to
// normalise, but a client sending one must not be refused.
func TestNonASCIIPasswords(t *testing.T) {
const password = "übers3kr1t 🔐"
hash, err := HashPassword(password)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if ok, err := VerifyPassword(hash, password); err != nil || !ok {
t.Errorf("VerifyPassword = %v, %v", ok, err)
}
}
// TestDummyPasswordHashIsUsable: the dummy hash exists so that a login for
// an account that does not exist costs the same as one that does. If it ever
// stopped being a valid hash, that work would vanish and the timing would
// leak which user names are real.
func TestDummyPasswordHashIsUsable(t *testing.T) {
ok, err := VerifyPassword(dummyPasswordHash, "anything")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("the dummy hash is not verifiable: %v", err)
}
if ok {
t.Error("the dummy hash matched a password")
}
}