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Implements PLAN.md Phase 5: the Server-Server API. Warp joins rooms on other servers and lets their users join its rooms, invites across servers with the invitee's server countersigning, rejects remote invites (locally if the inviter is unreachable), and exchanges events, typing, receipts and to-device messages with other homeservers — all behind the runtime switch, which now starts and stops real outbound traffic. The protocol lives in internal/federation with no knowledge of rooms: X-Matrix signing (fuzzed parser), the spec's discovery algorithm keeping the dial address and the TLS name apart, a signed client that refuses every request while the switch is off or the policy denies the destination, and a key ring that caches other servers' keys for at most a week, with optional notaries. The roomserver takes events from elsewhere through the spec's intake: signatures and hashes (a hash mismatch keeps the redacted form), the rules against the event's own auth events, against the state before it — with /get_missing_events for small gaps and /state_ids for wide ones — and against the current state, where a failure is a soft failure. Events held without their state are outliers: a column on roomserver_events, because the current state of a room joined over federation is almost all outliers, and excluded from every timeline query. Forks are resolved at the room's head. Membership across servers is make_join/send_join, make_leave/send_leave and countersigned invites, in both directions; m.room.server_acl is enforced on everything another server sends. History before a remote join is backfilled when /messages pages past it, stored at negative stream positions. internal/federationapi is the running component: the inbound endpoints, and an outbound queue that persists what it owes each destination, sends it in transactions of 50 PDUs and 100 EDUs, backs off from ten seconds to six hours, survives restarts, and drops events persisted while federation is off rather than delivering a backlog in one burst. Its Module is what the switch starts and stops. Also: a TLS listener for port 8448, trusted key servers, key validity and an outbound CA bundle in the config; per-destination health and backoff reset in the admin API; remote profiles, aliases and directories in the Client-Server API; a Complement federation profile. See docs/federation.md, including its known gaps (no partial-state joins, no key rotation). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
202 lines
8.5 KiB
Plaintext
202 lines
8.5 KiB
Plaintext
# Warp homeserver configuration.
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#
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# Copy to warp.yaml and edit. Every field below is optional except
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# global.server_name; the values shown are the defaults.
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#
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# Any field can also be set from the environment, which wins over this
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# file. The variable name is on the right of each line below, e.g.
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# WARP_SERVER_NAME=warp.example WARP_FEDERATION_ENABLED=true warp serve
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# List values are comma-separated; a single "-" clears a list.
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version: 1
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global:
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# The Matrix server name. It appears in every user, room and event ID
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# and CANNOT be changed after the first event is written. WARP_SERVER_NAME
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server_name: warp.example
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# ed25519 signing key, created by `warp generate-keys`. WARP_PRIVATE_KEY
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private_key: ./keys/signing.key
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well_known:
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# Advertised to clients as m.homeserver.base_url.
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# Defaults to https://<server_name>. WARP_WELL_KNOWN_CLIENT_BASE_URL
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client_base_url: ""
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# Optional identity server. WARP_WELL_KNOWN_IDENTITY_SERVER_BASE_URL
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identity_server_base_url: ""
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# Advertised to other homeservers as m.server, e.g. "warp.example:8448".
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# Only served while federation is enabled; empty means other servers
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# fall back to SRV/A resolution. WARP_WELL_KNOWN_SERVER_ADDRESS
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server_address: ""
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listen:
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address: ":8008" # WARP_LISTEN_ADDRESS
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read_header_timeout: 10s # WARP_READ_HEADER_TIMEOUT
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read_timeout: 60s # WARP_READ_TIMEOUT
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write_timeout: 120s # WARP_WRITE_TIMEOUT
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idle_timeout: 120s # WARP_IDLE_TIMEOUT
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max_header_bytes: 1048576 # WARP_MAX_HEADER_BYTES
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shutdown_timeout: 30s # WARP_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT
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# A second listener serving the same API over TLS, for other servers.
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# 8448 is the port they try when nothing delegates them elsewhere. Leave
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# it empty behind a reverse proxy that terminates TLS, and point
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# global.well_known.server_address at the proxy instead.
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# WARP_LISTEN_FEDERATION_ADDRESS
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federation_address: ""
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tls_cert_file: "" # WARP_TLS_CERT_FILE (PEM chain)
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tls_key_file: "" # WARP_TLS_KEY_FILE
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database:
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# sqlite (dev, single user), postgres (production) or pocketbase
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# (appliance; not implemented yet). WARP_DB_DRIVER
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driver: sqlite
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# sqlite: file:warp.db?_pragma=journal_mode(WAL)
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# postgres: postgres://warp:secret@localhost/warp?sslmode=disable
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# WARP_DB_CONNECTION_STRING
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connection_string: "file:warp.db?_pragma=journal_mode(WAL)&_pragma=busy_timeout(10000)&_pragma=foreign_keys(1)"
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max_open_conns: 10 # WARP_DB_MAX_OPEN_CONNS (ignored by sqlite:
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max_idle_conns: 5 # WARP_DB_MAX_IDLE_CONNS one writer only)
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conn_max_lifetime: 1h # WARP_DB_CONN_MAX_LIFETIME
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# Apply pending migrations on startup. Set false to gate schema changes
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# behind an explicit `warp migrate`. WARP_DB_AUTO_MIGRATE
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auto_migrate: true
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client_api:
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# The Matrix spec expects a homeserver to allow any origin. Narrow this
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# if only your own web client talks to it. WARP_CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS
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cors_allowed_origins: ["*"]
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# Take the client address from X-Forwarded-For instead of the socket.
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# Turn this on ONLY behind a reverse proxy that overwrites the header:
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# anyone can send it, and the rate limiter keys on the result.
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# WARP_TRUST_X_FORWARDED_FOR
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trust_x_forwarded_for: false
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# Expire access tokens after this long. 0 (the default) issues tokens
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# that never expire, which is what clients without refresh-token
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# support need. With a lifetime set, clients that ask for
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# refresh_token on login get one. WARP_ACCESS_TOKEN_LIFETIME
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access_token_lifetime: 0s
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# How long a refresh token may be exchanged for a new access token.
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# 0 means no expiry. WARP_REFRESH_TOKEN_LIFETIME
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refresh_token_lifetime: 0s
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# Per-endpoint rate limiting. Each bucket allows `burst` requests back
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# to back and returns one slot every `interval`, per client address.
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# Login and registration get their own, tighter, buckets because they
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# are the two endpoints worth brute-forcing.
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#
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# Only `enabled` has an environment override (the three buckets share a
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# type, so per-bucket variables would collide): set
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# WARP_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED=false to turn the whole thing off, which is
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# what a test harness such as Complement wants.
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rate_limit:
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enabled: true # WARP_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED
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default:
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burst: 30
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interval: 100ms
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login:
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burst: 10
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interval: 1s
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register:
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burst: 5
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interval: 2s
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# Creating a room writes a dozen events and joining one writes a
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# membership event that everybody in the room then sees, so both are
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# deliberately slower than a read.
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room_create:
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burst: 10
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interval: 1s
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join:
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burst: 10
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interval: 1s
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# /sync and the chatty writes behind it: typing, receipts, to-device
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# messages and presence. The loosest bucket of the lot on purpose — a
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# client lives in /sync, and a long poll that is refused leaves it
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# reconnecting in a loop, which is the one case where rate limiting
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# makes the load worse rather than better.
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sync:
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burst: 100
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interval: 20ms
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sync:
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# Presence — who is online, and the status message they set. Off by
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# default: it is the noisiest thing in Matrix, because every user's
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# state change is published to everybody they share a room with, and a
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# private homeserver gains little from it. With it off, the presence
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# endpoints answer M_FORBIDDEN and a sync's presence section is empty.
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# WARP_SYNC_PRESENCE
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presence: false
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# How long a typing notification lasts without being renewed, and the
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# cap on what a client may ask for. A notification that outlived its
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# sender's session would leave a room claiming somebody was typing.
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# WARP_SYNC_TYPING_TIMEOUT
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typing_timeout: 30s
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# The cap on a /sync's ?timeout=, whatever the client asks for. Holding
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# a connection open longer buys nothing — a blocked sync is woken the
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# moment anything happens — so this only decides how often an idle
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# client re-establishes its request.
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# WARP_SYNC_LONG_POLL_TIMEOUT
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long_poll_timeout: 30s
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federation:
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# Off by default: a new install is a private homeserver until you say
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# otherwise. WARP_FEDERATION_ENABLED
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enabled: false
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# Non-empty = federate ONLY with these servers.
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# WARP_FEDERATION_ALLOWLIST
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allowlist: []
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# Always blocked, even if listed above. WARP_FEDERATION_DENYLIST
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denylist: []
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# Let the admin API flip `enabled` without a restart. When true, the
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# stored setting overrides the value above on boot.
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# WARP_FEDERATION_ALLOW_RUNTIME_TOGGLE
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allow_runtime_toggle: true
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# Notaries asked for another server's signing key when that server
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# cannot be reached directly, e.g. [matrix.org]. Empty: keys are only
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# fetched from their own server. WARP_FEDERATION_TRUSTED_KEY_SERVERS
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trusted_key_servers: []
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# How long other servers may cache this server's key. At most 168h.
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# WARP_FEDERATION_KEY_VALIDITY_PERIOD
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key_validity_period: 24h
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# Extra CA certificates (PEM) trusted for outbound federation, for a
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# private federation with an internal CA. WARP_FEDERATION_TLS_CA_FILE
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tls_ca_file: ""
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registration:
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# Off by default. Make the first account with
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# `warp create-account --username you --admin`, then turn registration
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# on from the admin API if you want others to sign up.
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enabled: false # WARP_REGISTRATION_ENABLED
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allow_runtime_toggle: true # WARP_REGISTRATION_ALLOW_RUNTIME_TOGGLE
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# Non-empty = registration also requires one of these tokens, as the
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# m.login.registration_token stage of the sign-up flow. Per-token use
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# counts and expiry arrive with admin token management in Phase 9.
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# WARP_REGISTRATION_TOKENS
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tokens: []
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logging:
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level: info # debug, info, warn, error WARP_LOG_LEVEL
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format: text # text or json WARP_LOG_FORMAT
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add_source: false # WARP_LOG_ADD_SOURCE
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metrics:
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enabled: true # WARP_METRICS_ENABLED
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path: /metrics # WARP_METRICS_PATH
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