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Implements PLAN.md Phase 3: the roomserver, the room half of storage, the Client-Server room endpoints and the admin room endpoints. A client can now create a room, invite, join, leave, kick, ban, send messages and state, redact, name a room with an alias and find one in the public directory. Nothing talks to another server; every operation that would need to is refused with a message that says so rather than a bare M_FORBIDDEN. roomserver: one input pipeline every event goes through, whatever sent it — validate, authorise, resolve, persist, emit. The rules are not reimplemented here; internal/matrix is pure library code and this is what connects it to a database and to a room's history. The Client-Server handlers do no authorisation of their own, deliberately: whether Alice may kick Bob is a question about the room's power levels, and the one place that is answered correctly is the authorisation rules inside the pipeline. A mutex per room serialises writers. Two events racing into one room would each read the same forward extremities, both become one, and fork the room for no reason — which would then need state resolution to put back together. State resolution is wired in anyway for the multi-extremity case. It is unreachable from outside in this phase, and the alternative is a pipeline that authorises against one arbitrary branch of a fork without saying so. Room versions 3 to 12 all work and are each tested end to end. Version 12 earns that coverage: its room ID is the create event's own ID, its create event carries no room_id, and the create event is excluded from every other event's auth_events — so the state auth.Check is given is the event's auth_events plus the create event, which that version identifies by room ID rather than citing. createRoom sends the spec's events in the spec's order, each authorised against what the ones before it produced. A failure part-way leaves an incomplete room, which is the lesser evil: the alternative is holding every event of a new room in memory and writing them in one transaction, making the pipeline that authorises them a special case. The one failure a second client can cause at any time, an alias clash, takes the room row back out. Redactions stay two decisions, as the spec keeps them. The rules let almost any redaction into the room; whether it applies to its target is a separate test, run inside the same transaction as the redaction itself so that a client holding an event ID can always read the stripped event. storage: events keyed by event ID rather than by a surrogate, since an event ID appears in prev_events, auth_events, state snapshots and client requests alike. Stream ordering comes from a counter row bumped inside the write transaction, because a PostgreSQL sequence is explicitly not transactional and a rolled-back write would leave a hole in the stream that /sync would have to be taught to skip. State snapshots are stored per event and deduplicated by content hash, so the table grows with state changes rather than with traffic — and that is what makes "the state after a forward extremity" answerable at all. The room's listing columns are denormalised onto its row because the public directory orders every published room by member count and pages the result, which cannot be done by reading each room's state in turn. Federation-disabled behaviour from PLAN.md section 3 is enforced here. Restricted joins are the exception that works: the rule needs a signature from the authorising user's server verified, and while federation is off that server is always this one. adminapi: room list and detail, purge, force-leave, and room and event counters on the dashboard. clientapi gains its own rate-limit buckets for createRoom and for joining, both of which write events rather than read them. Tested against the real event core and a real database rather than fakes: what is under test is whether an event this server signs is one the authorisation rules accept, and a fake of either would only prove that the pipeline calls what the fake expects. The storage tests run against both SQL drivers. docs/rooms.md describes the pipeline, the storage decisions and the known gaps — chief among them that history visibility is room-level rather than per-event, and that /sync still reports no rooms, both of which belong with the event stream in Phase 4. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
143 lines
4.6 KiB
Go
143 lines
4.6 KiB
Go
package httputil
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"io"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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)
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// MaxRequestBody caps a request body at 1 MiB. Endpoints that accept larger
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// payloads (media upload) override it explicitly.
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const MaxRequestBody = 1 << 20
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type loggerKey struct{}
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// WithLogger attaches a request-scoped logger to the context.
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func WithLogger(ctx context.Context, l *slog.Logger) context.Context {
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return context.WithValue(ctx, loggerKey{}, l)
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}
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// LoggerFrom returns the request-scoped logger, or the default one.
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func LoggerFrom(ctx context.Context) *slog.Logger {
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if l, ok := ctx.Value(loggerKey{}).(*slog.Logger); ok && l != nil {
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return l
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}
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return slog.Default()
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}
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// WriteJSON writes v as JSON with the given status. Matrix requires
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// application/json on every response, including errors.
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func WriteJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, v any) {
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body, err := json.Marshal(v)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Error("marshalling response failed", "error", err)
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"errcode":"M_UNKNOWN","error":"Internal server error"}`))
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return
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(status)
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if _, err := w.Write(body); err != nil {
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slog.Debug("writing response failed", "error", err)
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}
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}
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// WriteRawJSON writes JSON that is already encoded.
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//
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// It exists for the one endpoint whose response body *is* a stored value:
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// GET /rooms/{roomID}/state/{eventType}/{stateKey} answers with the state
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// event's content and nothing else. Re-encoding it through a map would
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// reorder its keys and rewrite its numbers, and a client comparing the
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// content it set with the content it reads back would see a difference that
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// is not there.
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func WriteRawJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, body []byte) {
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if len(body) == 0 {
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body = []byte("{}")
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(status)
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if _, err := w.Write(body); err != nil {
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slog.Debug("writing response failed", "error", err)
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}
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}
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// WriteError sends err as a Matrix error envelope. Anything that is not a
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// *MatrixError is logged in full and reported as M_UNKNOWN, so internal
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// details never leak to the client.
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func WriteError(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, err error) {
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var merr *MatrixError
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if !errors.As(err, &merr) {
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LoggerFrom(r.Context()).Error("unhandled handler error",
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"error", err, "method", r.Method, "path", r.URL.Path)
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merr = InternalError()
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}
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if merr.status >= 500 {
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LoggerFrom(r.Context()).Error("request failed",
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"errcode", merr.Code, "error", merr.Message,
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"method", r.Method, "path", r.URL.Path)
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}
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WriteJSON(w, merr.StatusCode(), merr)
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}
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// DecodeJSON reads a JSON request body into v, enforcing MaxRequestBody and
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// mapping a missing, oversized or malformed body onto the right Matrix error.
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func DecodeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, v any) error {
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present, err := DecodeOptionalJSON(w, r, v)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if !present {
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return NotJSON()
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}
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return nil
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}
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// DecodeOptionalJSON is DecodeJSON for an endpoint whose body may legitimately
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// be absent, reporting whether there was one. A malformed body is still an
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// error: only a genuinely empty one is "not sent".
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//
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// DELETE /devices/{deviceId} is the case this exists for. A client sends it
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// with no body at all, because it does not know until the 401 comes back that
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// the endpoint is interactive.
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func DecodeOptionalJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, v any) (bool, error) {
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body := http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, MaxRequestBody)
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data, err := io.ReadAll(body)
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if err != nil {
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var tooLarge *http.MaxBytesError
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if errors.As(err, &tooLarge) {
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return false, NewError(http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, ErrCodeTooLarge, "Request body too large")
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}
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return false, NotJSON()
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}
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if len(bytes.TrimSpace(data)) == 0 {
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return false, nil
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}
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if err := json.Unmarshal(data, v); err != nil {
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var typeErr *json.UnmarshalTypeError
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if errors.As(err, &typeErr) {
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return false, BadJSON("Invalid value for field %q", typeErr.Field)
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}
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return false, NotJSON()
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}
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return true, nil
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}
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// Handler is an http.Handler whose errors are turned into Matrix envelopes by
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// Wrap, so handlers can `return httputil.Forbidden(...)` instead of writing
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// the response themselves.
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type Handler func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) error
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// Wrap adapts a Handler to http.Handler.
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func Wrap(h Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if err := h(w, r); err != nil {
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WriteError(w, r, err)
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}
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})
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}
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