tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
c96f88e994
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Implements PLAN.md Phase 3: the roomserver, the room half of storage, the Client-Server room endpoints and the admin room endpoints. A client can now create a room, invite, join, leave, kick, ban, send messages and state, redact, name a room with an alias and find one in the public directory. Nothing talks to another server; every operation that would need to is refused with a message that says so rather than a bare M_FORBIDDEN. roomserver: one input pipeline every event goes through, whatever sent it — validate, authorise, resolve, persist, emit. The rules are not reimplemented here; internal/matrix is pure library code and this is what connects it to a database and to a room's history. The Client-Server handlers do no authorisation of their own, deliberately: whether Alice may kick Bob is a question about the room's power levels, and the one place that is answered correctly is the authorisation rules inside the pipeline. A mutex per room serialises writers. Two events racing into one room would each read the same forward extremities, both become one, and fork the room for no reason — which would then need state resolution to put back together. State resolution is wired in anyway for the multi-extremity case. It is unreachable from outside in this phase, and the alternative is a pipeline that authorises against one arbitrary branch of a fork without saying so. Room versions 3 to 12 all work and are each tested end to end. Version 12 earns that coverage: its room ID is the create event's own ID, its create event carries no room_id, and the create event is excluded from every other event's auth_events — so the state auth.Check is given is the event's auth_events plus the create event, which that version identifies by room ID rather than citing. createRoom sends the spec's events in the spec's order, each authorised against what the ones before it produced. A failure part-way leaves an incomplete room, which is the lesser evil: the alternative is holding every event of a new room in memory and writing them in one transaction, making the pipeline that authorises them a special case. The one failure a second client can cause at any time, an alias clash, takes the room row back out. Redactions stay two decisions, as the spec keeps them. The rules let almost any redaction into the room; whether it applies to its target is a separate test, run inside the same transaction as the redaction itself so that a client holding an event ID can always read the stripped event. storage: events keyed by event ID rather than by a surrogate, since an event ID appears in prev_events, auth_events, state snapshots and client requests alike. Stream ordering comes from a counter row bumped inside the write transaction, because a PostgreSQL sequence is explicitly not transactional and a rolled-back write would leave a hole in the stream that /sync would have to be taught to skip. State snapshots are stored per event and deduplicated by content hash, so the table grows with state changes rather than with traffic — and that is what makes "the state after a forward extremity" answerable at all. The room's listing columns are denormalised onto its row because the public directory orders every published room by member count and pages the result, which cannot be done by reading each room's state in turn. Federation-disabled behaviour from PLAN.md section 3 is enforced here. Restricted joins are the exception that works: the rule needs a signature from the authorising user's server verified, and while federation is off that server is always this one. adminapi: room list and detail, purge, force-leave, and room and event counters on the dashboard. clientapi gains its own rate-limit buckets for createRoom and for joining, both of which write events rather than read them. Tested against the real event core and a real database rather than fakes: what is under test is whether an event this server signs is one the authorisation rules accept, and a fake of either would only prove that the pipeline calls what the fake expects. The storage tests run against both SQL drivers. docs/rooms.md describes the pipeline, the storage decisions and the known gaps — chief among them that history visibility is room-level rather than per-event, and that /sync still reports no rooms, both of which belong with the event stream in Phase 4. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
6.9 KiB
6.9 KiB
Configuration
Warp reads one YAML file. Every setting can also come from the
environment, and the environment wins. With no file at all the defaults
plus WARP_* variables are used, which is how the container image runs.
Where the file comes from, in order:
--config <path>$WARP_CONFIG./warp.yaml, if it exists- nothing — defaults and environment only
An unknown field is a fatal error. A typo in a security-relevant setting must not be ignored.
List-valued variables are comma-separated. A single - clears a list:
WARP_CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=-.
Settings
| YAML | Environment | Default | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
global.server_name |
WARP_SERVER_NAME |
— | Required. Part of every ID; cannot be changed later. |
global.private_key |
WARP_PRIVATE_KEY |
./keys/signing.key |
Written by warp generate-keys. |
global.well_known.client_base_url |
WARP_WELL_KNOWN_CLIENT_BASE_URL |
https://<server_name> |
Advertised to clients. |
global.well_known.identity_server_base_url |
WARP_WELL_KNOWN_IDENTITY_SERVER_BASE_URL |
empty | Omitted from the document when empty. |
global.well_known.server_address |
WARP_WELL_KNOWN_SERVER_ADDRESS |
empty | host:port for other homeservers. Empty = no delegation, other servers fall back to SRV/A. |
listen.address |
WARP_LISTEN_ADDRESS |
:8008 |
|
listen.read_header_timeout |
WARP_READ_HEADER_TIMEOUT |
10s |
|
listen.read_timeout |
WARP_READ_TIMEOUT |
60s |
|
listen.write_timeout |
WARP_WRITE_TIMEOUT |
120s |
Raise before long-polling /sync lands in Phase 4. |
listen.idle_timeout |
WARP_IDLE_TIMEOUT |
120s |
|
listen.max_header_bytes |
WARP_MAX_HEADER_BYTES |
1048576 |
|
listen.shutdown_timeout |
WARP_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT |
30s |
Grace period for in-flight requests. |
database.driver |
WARP_DB_DRIVER |
sqlite |
sqlite, postgres, pocketbase (not implemented). |
database.connection_string |
WARP_DB_CONNECTION_STRING |
SQLite file in the working directory | |
database.max_open_conns |
WARP_DB_MAX_OPEN_CONNS |
10 |
Ignored by SQLite: writes are serialised onto one connection. |
database.max_idle_conns |
WARP_DB_MAX_IDLE_CONNS |
5 |
|
database.conn_max_lifetime |
WARP_DB_CONN_MAX_LIFETIME |
1h |
|
database.auto_migrate |
WARP_DB_AUTO_MIGRATE |
true |
false makes startup fail while migrations are pending. |
client_api.cors_allowed_origins |
WARP_CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS |
["*"] |
The spec expects any origin. |
client_api.trust_x_forwarded_for |
WARP_TRUST_X_FORWARDED_FOR |
false |
Only behind a proxy that overwrites the header; the rate limiter keys on the result. |
client_api.access_token_lifetime |
WARP_ACCESS_TOKEN_LIFETIME |
0s |
0 = never expire. With a lifetime, clients may ask for a refresh token at login. |
client_api.refresh_token_lifetime |
WARP_REFRESH_TOKEN_LIFETIME |
0s |
0 = never expire. |
client_api.rate_limit.enabled |
WARP_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED |
true |
|
client_api.rate_limit.default.burst / .interval |
— | 30 / 100ms |
Every rate-limited endpoint without its own bucket. |
client_api.rate_limit.login.burst / .interval |
— | 10 / 1s |
/login and /refresh. |
client_api.rate_limit.register.burst / .interval |
— | 5 / 2s |
/register and /register/available. |
client_api.rate_limit.room_create.burst / .interval |
— | 10 / 1s |
/createRoom, which writes a dozen events per call. |
client_api.rate_limit.join.burst / .interval |
— | 10 / 1s |
The two join endpoints. |
federation.enabled |
WARP_FEDERATION_ENABLED |
false |
|
federation.allowlist |
WARP_FEDERATION_ALLOWLIST |
[] |
Non-empty = federate only with these. |
federation.denylist |
WARP_FEDERATION_DENYLIST |
[] |
Always wins over the allowlist. |
federation.allow_runtime_toggle |
WARP_FEDERATION_ALLOW_RUNTIME_TOGGLE |
true |
See below. |
registration.enabled |
WARP_REGISTRATION_ENABLED |
false |
|
registration.allow_runtime_toggle |
WARP_REGISTRATION_ALLOW_RUNTIME_TOGGLE |
true |
|
registration.tokens |
WARP_REGISTRATION_TOKENS |
[] |
Non-empty = sign-up also needs one of these, as the m.login.registration_token stage. |
logging.level |
WARP_LOG_LEVEL |
info |
debug, info, warn, error. |
logging.format |
WARP_LOG_FORMAT |
text |
text or json. |
logging.add_source |
WARP_LOG_ADD_SOURCE |
false |
File and line in every record. |
metrics.enabled |
WARP_METRICS_ENABLED |
true |
|
metrics.path |
WARP_METRICS_PATH |
/metrics |
Served on the same listener. |
The three rate limit buckets share one Go type, so per-bucket environment
variables would all collide on the same name; they are YAML only.
WARP_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED=false turns the whole limiter off, which is what a
test harness wants.
Rate limiting
Each bucket allows burst requests back to back and returns one slot every
interval, keyed per client address. Over the limit is
429 M_LIMIT_EXCEEDED with a retry_after_ms the client is expected to
honour.
Buckets are per endpoint class, so a client hammering /login cannot spend
the budget of /profile. The key is the client address and not the user,
because the limiter runs before the access token is resolved — a limiter
that had to query the database to find its own key would be a denial of
service of its own. Behind a reverse proxy, set
client_api.trust_x_forwarded_for: true, or every client shares one bucket.
The admin API under /_warp/admin/v1 is not rate limited: it needs an admin
token, and bulk operations from the panel are exactly the traffic a limiter
would get in the way of.
Settings that change at runtime
federation.enabled and registration.enabled are also stored in the
server_settings database table, which is what the admin API writes to.
- With
allow_runtime_toggle: true(the default) the stored value wins over the config file at boot, and the admin API may change it. The change takes effect on the next request; no restart. - With
allow_runtime_toggle: falsethe config file is authoritative and the admin API refuses to change the setting. Any previously stored value is kept but ignored, so re-enabling the toggle restores the administrator's last choice.
Everything else is read once at startup.
What federation off actually means
While federation.enabled is false:
/.well-known/matrix/serveranswers404 M_UNRECOGNIZED, and so will/_matrix/federation/*and/_matrix/key/*once they exist.- Nothing outbound runs — in Phase 0 there is nothing outbound yet; from Phase 5 the transaction queue, key fetcher and remote media fetch stay stopped.
- Client-Server endpoints that would need a remote server answer
M_FORBIDDENwith a message saying federation is disabled. - Events are still signed with the server key, and room and event IDs are unchanged. A room created while federation is off federates normally once it is switched on.