tajniak81andClaude Opus 5
c96f88e994
Implements PLAN.md Phase 3: the roomserver, the room half of storage, the Client-Server room endpoints and the admin room endpoints. A client can now create a room, invite, join, leave, kick, ban, send messages and state, redact, name a room with an alias and find one in the public directory. Nothing talks to another server; every operation that would need to is refused with a message that says so rather than a bare M_FORBIDDEN. roomserver: one input pipeline every event goes through, whatever sent it — validate, authorise, resolve, persist, emit. The rules are not reimplemented here; internal/matrix is pure library code and this is what connects it to a database and to a room's history. The Client-Server handlers do no authorisation of their own, deliberately: whether Alice may kick Bob is a question about the room's power levels, and the one place that is answered correctly is the authorisation rules inside the pipeline. A mutex per room serialises writers. Two events racing into one room would each read the same forward extremities, both become one, and fork the room for no reason — which would then need state resolution to put back together. State resolution is wired in anyway for the multi-extremity case. It is unreachable from outside in this phase, and the alternative is a pipeline that authorises against one arbitrary branch of a fork without saying so. Room versions 3 to 12 all work and are each tested end to end. Version 12 earns that coverage: its room ID is the create event's own ID, its create event carries no room_id, and the create event is excluded from every other event's auth_events — so the state auth.Check is given is the event's auth_events plus the create event, which that version identifies by room ID rather than citing. createRoom sends the spec's events in the spec's order, each authorised against what the ones before it produced. A failure part-way leaves an incomplete room, which is the lesser evil: the alternative is holding every event of a new room in memory and writing them in one transaction, making the pipeline that authorises them a special case. The one failure a second client can cause at any time, an alias clash, takes the room row back out. Redactions stay two decisions, as the spec keeps them. The rules let almost any redaction into the room; whether it applies to its target is a separate test, run inside the same transaction as the redaction itself so that a client holding an event ID can always read the stripped event. storage: events keyed by event ID rather than by a surrogate, since an event ID appears in prev_events, auth_events, state snapshots and client requests alike. Stream ordering comes from a counter row bumped inside the write transaction, because a PostgreSQL sequence is explicitly not transactional and a rolled-back write would leave a hole in the stream that /sync would have to be taught to skip. State snapshots are stored per event and deduplicated by content hash, so the table grows with state changes rather than with traffic — and that is what makes "the state after a forward extremity" answerable at all. The room's listing columns are denormalised onto its row because the public directory orders every published room by member count and pages the result, which cannot be done by reading each room's state in turn. Federation-disabled behaviour from PLAN.md section 3 is enforced here. Restricted joins are the exception that works: the rule needs a signature from the authorising user's server verified, and while federation is off that server is always this one. adminapi: room list and detail, purge, force-leave, and room and event counters on the dashboard. clientapi gains its own rate-limit buckets for createRoom and for joining, both of which write events rather than read them. Tested against the real event core and a real database rather than fakes: what is under test is whether an event this server signs is one the authorisation rules accept, and a fake of either would only prove that the pipeline calls what the fake expects. The storage tests run against both SQL drivers. docs/rooms.md describes the pipeline, the storage decisions and the known gaps — chief among them that history visibility is room-level rather than per-event, and that /sync still reports no rooms, both of which belong with the event stream in Phase 4. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Complement
Complement is the official Matrix integration suite and this project's primary progress metric (PLAN.md section 9). It runs one container per homeserver per test and drives it over the real HTTP API.
make complement # the current target set
bash run.sh TestLogin # one test
COMPLEMENT_DEBUG=1 make complement # with the container logs
Needs Docker. run.sh builds the image, clones Complement into
.complement/ at the repository root (git-ignored) and runs the subset for
the phases that are done.
Files
| Dockerfile | the homeserver image, built from the repository root |
| entrypoint.sh | the deployment, entirely WARP_* environment variables |
| run.sh | build, clone, run |
Profiles
federation=off — what runs today. Only the Client-Server tests;
WARP_FEDERATION_ENABLED=false, port 8448 exposed but unserved.
federation=on — Phase 5. It needs a TLS listener on 8448 with a
certificate signed by the CA that Complement mounts at /complement/ca,
which is the first thing to add here when federation lands.
The test set
COMPLEMENT_TESTS in run.sh lists what is expected to pass. Phase 1:
TestRegistrationTestLoginTestDeviceManagement
Extend it as each phase lands rather than switching to the whole suite: a pass count that drops because a later phase is missing is noise, not information.
Two notes on the environment, both in entrypoint.sh:
- Rate limiting is off. The whole suite comes from the one address the
test runner has, so the limiter would spend the run returning
M_LIMIT_EXCEEDEDand tell us nothing about the server. Synapse's own Complement image does the same. - Registration is on, because the tests create their own users.
Tests that need later phases
Some subtests of the three above reach for endpoints that are not Phase 1
work. TestDeviceManagement calls /sync after creating a session, and
TestLogout checks that a revoked token cannot sync. Phase 1 answers
/sync with an empty but well-formed response for exactly that reason —
there are no rooms yet, so an empty sync is the complete truth, and it makes
token revocation observable. Phase 4 replaces it with the real syncapi.
The shared-secret registration subtests of TestRegistration probe
/_synapse/admin/v1/register and skip themselves when it 404s, which it
does here: that endpoint is Synapse's, and warp create-account covers the
same need.