Merge branch 'master' of https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs

seaweed-volume/src/config.rs

@@ -188,6 +188,12 @@ pub struct Cli {
     #[arg(long = "securityFile", default_value = "")]
     pub security_file: String,
 
+    /// If true, FetchAndWriteNeedle accepts arbitrary remote S3 endpoints
+    /// including loopback / link-local hosts. Default rejects internal /
+    /// metadata endpoints.
+    #[arg(long = "volume.allowUntrustedRemoteEndpoints", default_value_t = false)]
+    pub allow_untrusted_remote_endpoints: bool,
+
     /// A file of command line options, each line in optionName=optionValue format.
     #[arg(long = "options", default_value = "")]
     pub options: String,
@@ -258,6 +264,9 @@ pub struct VolumeServerConfig {
     pub enable_write_queue: bool,
     /// Path to security.toml — stored for SIGHUP reload.
     pub security_file: String,
+    /// If true, FetchAndWriteNeedle skips remote S3 endpoint validation
+    /// (allows loopback / link-local / metadata hosts).
+    pub allow_untrusted_remote_endpoints: bool,
 }
 
 pub use crate::storage::needle_map::NeedleMapKind;
@@ -804,6 +813,7 @@ fn resolve_config(cli: Cli) -> VolumeServerConfig {
             .map(|v| v == "1" || v == "true")
             .unwrap_or(false),
         security_file: cli.security_file,
+        allow_untrusted_remote_endpoints: cli.allow_untrusted_remote_endpoints,
     }
 }
 

seaweed-volume/src/main.rs

@@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ async fn run(
             seaweed_volume::remote_storage::s3_tier::S3TierRegistry::new(),
         ),
         read_mode: config.read_mode,
+        allow_untrusted_remote_endpoints: config.allow_untrusted_remote_endpoints,
         master_url,
         master_urls,
         seed_master_set,

seaweed-volume/src/remote_storage/endpoint_guard.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,359 @@
+//! SSRF guard for caller-supplied remote storage endpoints.
+//!
+//! `FetchAndWriteNeedle` accepts an S3 endpoint URL chosen by the caller and
+//! dials it directly from the volume server, which typically has network
+//! access to cluster-internal hosts. Without validation a caller could point
+//! the server at loopback / link-local / RFC 1918 / cloud-metadata addresses
+//! and read internal services (SSRF). This mirrors the Go volume server's
+//! `validateRemoteEndpoint` (`weed/server/volume_grpc_remote.go`); operators
+//! that legitimately fetch from private hosts opt out with
+//! `-volume.allowUntrustedRemoteEndpoints`.
+//!
+//! NOTE: the Go server additionally pins the validated endpoint against DNS
+//! rebinding with a custom dialer that re-checks the resolved IP at TCP connect
+//! time (`guardedDialer`). The `aws-sdk-s3` client used here builds its own
+//! connector, so that connect-time re-validation is not yet ported; the
+//! up-front resolve-and-check below still blocks the common SSRF vectors. A
+//! narrow TOCTOU window (a hostname that resolves to a public IP here and then
+//! flips to a blocked one when the SDK dials) remains as a follow-up.
+
+use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr};
+
+/// AWS/Azure/GCP IPv4 instance-metadata-service (IMDS) address. It is
+/// link-local and thus already covered by [`is_link_local`], but is named
+/// explicitly so the rejection reason is unambiguous in logs.
+const IMDS_IPV4: IpAddr = IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(169, 254, 169, 254));
+
+/// Hostnames that target cloud instance metadata services, blocked regardless
+/// of how they resolve because some environments alias the IMDS address under
+/// a name.
+fn is_blocked_imds_host(host: &str) -> bool {
+    matches!(host, "metadata.google.internal" | "metadata")
+}
+
+/// Whether `ip` is in a link-local range: IPv4 169.254.0.0/16, IPv6 fe80::/10
+/// (unicast) and interface-local / link-local multicast (scope 1 and 2).
+fn is_link_local(ip: IpAddr) -> bool {
+    match ip {
+        IpAddr::V4(v4) => v4.is_link_local(),
+        IpAddr::V6(v6) => {
+            let seg0 = v6.segments()[0];
+            if (seg0 & 0xffc0) == 0xfe80 {
+                return true; // fe80::/10 link-local unicast
+            }
+            if (seg0 & 0xff00) == 0xff00 {
+                // ffXS:: multicast; reject interface-local (scope 1) and
+                // link-local (scope 2) the way Go's IsInterfaceLocalMulticast /
+                // IsLinkLocalMulticast do.
+                let scope = seg0 & 0x000f;
+                return scope == 1 || scope == 2;
+            }
+            false
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Whether `ip` is in a private range: IPv4 RFC 1918, IPv6 fc00::/7 unique-local
+/// (matching Go's `net.IP.IsPrivate`).
+fn is_private(ip: IpAddr) -> bool {
+    match ip {
+        IpAddr::V4(v4) => v4.is_private(),
+        IpAddr::V6(v6) => (v6.segments()[0] & 0xfe00) == 0xfc00,
+    }
+}
+
+/// Whether `ip` is in the RFC 6598 carrier-grade NAT range (100.64.0.0/10).
+/// The IPv4 private check does not cover CGNAT, so check it explicitly.
+fn is_cgnat(ip: IpAddr) -> bool {
+    match ip {
+        IpAddr::V4(v4) => {
+            let o = v4.octets();
+            o[0] == 100 && (o[1] & 0xc0) == 0x40 // second octet 64..=127
+        }
+        IpAddr::V6(_) => false,
+    }
+}
+
+/// Returns an error if `ip` is not safe to dial from a server that can reach
+/// cluster-internal hosts. Mirrors Go's `checkBlockedIP`.
+pub fn check_blocked_ip(endpoint: &str, ip: IpAddr) -> Result<(), String> {
+    // Normalize IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:a.b.c.d`) to its IPv4 form so the
+    // IPv4 deny rules apply. The OS routes these to the embedded IPv4 address,
+    // so without this `::ffff:127.0.0.1` / `::ffff:169.254.169.254` would slip
+    // past the IPv6-only checks. Mirrors Go's reliance on net.IP.To4().
+    let ip = match ip {
+        IpAddr::V6(v6) => match v6.to_ipv4_mapped() {
+            Some(v4) => IpAddr::V4(v4),
+            None => IpAddr::V6(v6),
+        },
+        other => other,
+    };
+    if ip == IMDS_IPV4 {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "remote endpoint {:?} targets instance metadata service {}",
+            endpoint, ip
+        ));
+    }
+    if ip.is_loopback() {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "remote endpoint {:?} resolves to loopback address {}",
+            endpoint, ip
+        ));
+    }
+    if ip.is_unspecified() {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "remote endpoint {:?} resolves to unspecified address {}",
+            endpoint, ip
+        ));
+    }
+    if is_link_local(ip) {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "remote endpoint {:?} resolves to link-local address {}",
+            endpoint, ip
+        ));
+    }
+    if is_private(ip) {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "remote endpoint {:?} resolves to private address {}",
+            endpoint, ip
+        ));
+    }
+    if is_cgnat(ip) {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "remote endpoint {:?} resolves to CGNAT address {}",
+            endpoint, ip
+        ));
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Outcome of the synchronous, DNS-free portion of endpoint validation.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+enum HostCheck {
+    /// Host was a literal IP and already passed [`check_blocked_ip`].
+    Validated,
+    /// Host is a name that must be resolved and each address checked.
+    NeedsResolution(String),
+}
+
+/// Validate the scheme and host without touching DNS. Pure and unit-testable.
+fn precheck_endpoint(endpoint: &str) -> Result<HostCheck, String> {
+    let trimmed = endpoint.trim();
+    if trimmed.is_empty() {
+        return Err("remote endpoint is empty".to_string());
+    }
+
+    let Some(scheme_end) = trimmed.find("://") else {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "remote endpoint {:?} must use http or https",
+            endpoint
+        ));
+    };
+    let scheme = trimmed[..scheme_end].to_ascii_lowercase();
+    if scheme != "http" && scheme != "https" {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "remote endpoint {:?} must use http or https, got {:?}",
+            endpoint,
+            &trimmed[..scheme_end]
+        ));
+    }
+
+    // Authority is everything up to the first '/', '?', or '#'.
+    let after = &trimmed[scheme_end + 3..];
+    let authority_end = after
+        .find(|c| c == '/' || c == '?' || c == '#')
+        .unwrap_or(after.len());
+    let authority = &after[..authority_end];
+
+    // Strip optional userinfo ("user:pass@").
+    let host_port = match authority.rfind('@') {
+        Some(at) => &authority[at + 1..],
+        None => authority,
+    };
+
+    // Extract the host, handling bracketed IPv6 literals and host:port.
+    let host = if let Some(rest) = host_port.strip_prefix('[') {
+        match rest.find(']') {
+            Some(end) => &rest[..end],
+            None => {
+                return Err(format!(
+                    "remote endpoint {:?} has a malformed IPv6 host",
+                    endpoint
+                ))
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        match host_port.find(':') {
+            Some(colon) => &host_port[..colon],
+            None => host_port,
+        }
+    };
+
+    if host.is_empty() {
+        return Err(format!("remote endpoint {:?} has no host", endpoint));
+    }
+
+    if is_blocked_imds_host(&host.to_ascii_lowercase()) {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "remote endpoint {:?} targets instance metadata service",
+            endpoint
+        ));
+    }
+
+    if let Ok(ip) = host.parse::<IpAddr>() {
+        check_blocked_ip(endpoint, ip)?;
+        return Ok(HostCheck::Validated);
+    }
+
+    Ok(HostCheck::NeedsResolution(host.to_string()))
+}
+
+/// Resolve `host` to its addresses with a short timeout, matching Go's 2s
+/// resolver deadline.
+async fn resolve_host(host: &str) -> Result<Vec<IpAddr>, String> {
+    let lookup = tokio::net::lookup_host((host, 0u16));
+    let addrs = tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(2), lookup)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|_| format!("resolve remote endpoint host {:?}: timed out", host))?
+        .map_err(|e| format!("resolve remote endpoint host {:?}: {}", host, e))?;
+    Ok(addrs.map(|sock| sock.ip()).collect())
+}
+
+/// Returns an error if `endpoint` is not safe to dial from a server with access
+/// to cluster-internal hosts. Rejects empty / non-http(s) endpoints,
+/// loopback / unspecified / link-local / RFC 1918 / CGNAT addresses, and
+/// well-known IMDS hostnames. Hostnames are resolved and every returned address
+/// is checked. Mirrors Go's `validateRemoteEndpoint`.
+pub async fn validate_remote_endpoint(endpoint: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
+    match precheck_endpoint(endpoint)? {
+        HostCheck::Validated => Ok(()),
+        HostCheck::NeedsResolution(host) => {
+            let addrs = resolve_host(&host).await?;
+            if addrs.is_empty() {
+                return Err(format!(
+                    "resolve remote endpoint host {:?}: no addresses",
+                    host
+                ));
+            }
+            for ip in addrs {
+                check_blocked_ip(endpoint, ip)?;
+            }
+            Ok(())
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    fn ip(s: &str) -> IpAddr {
+        s.parse().unwrap()
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_blocked_literal_endpoints() {
+        let cases = [
+            ("http://127.0.0.1:8080", "loopback"),
+            ("http://[::1]:8080", "loopback"),
+            ("http://169.254.169.254/", "metadata"),
+            ("http://0.0.0.0/", "unspecified"),
+            ("http://[fe80::1]/", "link-local"),
+            ("http://10.0.0.1/", "private"),
+            ("http://172.16.5.5/", "private"),
+            ("http://192.168.0.1/", "private"),
+            ("http://100.64.0.1/", "CGNAT"),
+        ];
+        for (endpoint, want) in cases {
+            let err = precheck_endpoint(endpoint).expect_err(endpoint);
+            assert!(err.contains(want), "{endpoint}: {err:?} missing {want:?}");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_empty_and_bad_scheme() {
+        assert!(precheck_endpoint("").unwrap_err().contains("empty"));
+        assert!(precheck_endpoint("ftp://example.com/")
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .contains("http or https"));
+        assert!(precheck_endpoint("example.com/")
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .contains("http or https"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_imds_hostnames() {
+        assert!(precheck_endpoint("http://metadata.google.internal/")
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .contains("metadata service"));
+        assert!(precheck_endpoint("http://metadata/")
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .contains("metadata service"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn accepts_public_literal_and_defers_hostname() {
+        assert!(matches!(
+            precheck_endpoint("https://52.216.10.10/"),
+            Ok(HostCheck::Validated)
+        ));
+        match precheck_endpoint("https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/") {
+            Ok(HostCheck::NeedsResolution(host)) => {
+                assert_eq!(host, "s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com")
+            }
+            other => panic!("expected resolution, got {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn check_blocked_ip_matches_resolved_categories() {
+        // Mirror Go's "host resolves to X" cases at the address level.
+        assert!(check_blocked_ip("e", ip("127.0.0.1"))
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .contains("loopback"));
+        assert!(check_blocked_ip("e", ip("169.254.10.20"))
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .contains("link-local"));
+        assert!(check_blocked_ip("e", ip("10.1.2.3"))
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .contains("private"));
+        assert!(check_blocked_ip("e", ip("172.20.0.5"))
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .contains("private"));
+        assert!(check_blocked_ip("e", ip("192.168.1.1"))
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .contains("private"));
+        assert!(check_blocked_ip("e", ip("100.64.0.42"))
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .contains("CGNAT"));
+        assert!(check_blocked_ip("e", ip("fc00::1"))
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .contains("private"));
+        assert!(check_blocked_ip("e", ip("52.216.10.10")).is_ok());
+        assert!(check_blocked_ip("e", ip("2606:4700:4700::1111")).is_ok());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_ipv4_mapped_ipv6() {
+        // IPv4-mapped IPv6 must be unmapped so the IPv4 rules catch it.
+        assert!(check_blocked_ip("e", ip("::ffff:127.0.0.1"))
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .contains("loopback"));
+        assert!(check_blocked_ip("e", ip("::ffff:169.254.169.254"))
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .contains("metadata"));
+        assert!(check_blocked_ip("e", ip("::ffff:10.0.0.1"))
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .contains("private"));
+        // A mapped public address still passes, and genuine IPv6 loopback is
+        // still caught by the V6 path.
+        assert!(check_blocked_ip("e", ip("::ffff:52.216.10.10")).is_ok());
+        assert!(check_blocked_ip("e", ip("::1"))
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .contains("loopback"));
+        // Bracketed mapped literal via the full endpoint path.
+        assert!(precheck_endpoint("http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/")
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .contains("loopback"));
+    }
+}

seaweed-volume/src/remote_storage/mod.rs

@@ -3,9 +3,12 @@
 //! Provides a trait-based abstraction over cloud storage providers (S3, GCS, Azure, etc.)
 //! and a registry to create clients from protobuf RemoteConf messages.
 
+pub mod endpoint_guard;
 pub mod s3;
 pub mod s3_tier;
 
+pub use endpoint_guard::validate_remote_endpoint;
+
 use crate::pb::remote_pb::{RemoteConf, RemoteStorageLocation};
 
 /// Error type for remote storage operations.
@@ -86,6 +89,26 @@ pub fn make_remote_storage_client(
     }
 }
 
+/// Endpoint URL that the volume server would dial directly for `conf`, or
+/// `None` for non-S3-compatible backends. Every type handled here routes
+/// through [`s3::S3RemoteStorageClient`] with a caller-supplied endpoint, so
+/// the SSRF guard must validate each one. Keep this match in sync with
+/// [`make_remote_storage_client`].
+pub fn s3_compatible_endpoint(conf: &RemoteConf) -> Option<&str> {
+    match conf.r#type.as_str() {
+        "s3" => Some(&conf.s3_endpoint),
+        "wasabi" => Some(&conf.wasabi_endpoint),
+        "backblaze" => Some(&conf.backblaze_endpoint),
+        "aliyun" => Some(&conf.aliyun_endpoint),
+        "tencent" => Some(&conf.tencent_endpoint),
+        "baidu" => Some(&conf.baidu_endpoint),
+        "filebase" => Some(&conf.filebase_endpoint),
+        "storj" => Some(&conf.storj_endpoint),
+        "contabo" => Some(&conf.contabo_endpoint),
+        _ => None,
+    }
+}
+
 /// Extract S3-compatible credentials from a RemoteConf based on its type.
 fn extract_s3_credentials(conf: &RemoteConf) -> (String, String, String, String) {
     match conf.r#type.as_str() {
@@ -155,3 +178,37 @@ fn extract_s3_credentials(conf: &RemoteConf) -> (String, String, String, String)
         ),
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn s3_compatible_endpoint_covers_all_s3_backends() {
+        let s3 = RemoteConf {
+            r#type: "s3".to_string(),
+            s3_endpoint: "http://s3.internal".to_string(),
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+        assert_eq!(s3_compatible_endpoint(&s3), Some("http://s3.internal"));
+
+        // A non-"s3" S3-compatible type still surfaces its own endpoint, so the
+        // SSRF guard cannot be bypassed by picking a different alias.
+        let wasabi = RemoteConf {
+            r#type: "wasabi".to_string(),
+            wasabi_endpoint: "http://wasabi.internal".to_string(),
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+        assert_eq!(
+            s3_compatible_endpoint(&wasabi),
+            Some("http://wasabi.internal")
+        );
+
+        // Non-S3 backends do not dial a caller-supplied URL directly.
+        let gcs = RemoteConf {
+            r#type: "gcs".to_string(),
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+        assert_eq!(s3_compatible_endpoint(&gcs), None);
+    }
+}

seaweed-volume/src/server/grpc_client.rs

@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ mod tests {
             white_list: vec![],
             fix_jpg_orientation: false,
             read_mode: ReadMode::Local,
+            allow_untrusted_remote_endpoints: false,
             cpu_profile: String::new(),
             mem_profile: String::new(),
             compaction_byte_per_second: 0,

seaweed-volume/src/server/grpc_server.rs

@@ -3490,6 +3490,25 @@ impl VolumeServer for VolumeGrpcService {
             .as_ref()
             .ok_or_else(|| Status::invalid_argument("remote storage configuration is required"))?;
 
+        // Reject SSRF-prone endpoints unless the operator opted out. Every
+        // S3-compatible backend (s3, wasabi, backblaze, ...) dials a
+        // caller-supplied endpoint URL directly via make_remote_storage_client,
+        // so validate whichever endpoint applies. An empty endpoint means the
+        // provider default (e.g. real AWS S3) and cannot target an internal
+        // host, so skip it. Extends the Go volume server's validateRemoteEndpoint
+        // gate, which only covered type "s3".
+        if !self.state.allow_untrusted_remote_endpoints {
+            if let Some(endpoint) = crate::remote_storage::s3_compatible_endpoint(remote_conf) {
+                if !endpoint.trim().is_empty() {
+                    crate::remote_storage::validate_remote_endpoint(endpoint)
+                        .await
+                        .map_err(|e| {
+                            Status::invalid_argument(format!("reject remote endpoint: {}", e))
+                        })?;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
         // Create remote storage client
         let client =
             crate::remote_storage::make_remote_storage_client(remote_conf).map_err(|e| {
@@ -4728,6 +4747,7 @@ mod tests {
                 crate::remote_storage::s3_tier::S3TierRegistry::new(),
             ),
             read_mode: crate::config::ReadMode::Local,
+            allow_untrusted_remote_endpoints: false,
             master_url: String::new(),
             master_urls: Vec::new(),
             seed_master_set: std::collections::HashSet::new(),
@@ -4832,6 +4852,7 @@ mod tests {
                 crate::remote_storage::s3_tier::S3TierRegistry::new(),
             ),
             read_mode: crate::config::ReadMode::Local,
+            allow_untrusted_remote_endpoints: false,
             master_url: String::new(),
             master_urls: Vec::new(),
             seed_master_set: std::collections::HashSet::new(),
@@ -4940,6 +4961,7 @@ mod tests {
                 crate::remote_storage::s3_tier::S3TierRegistry::new(),
             ),
             read_mode: crate::config::ReadMode::Local,
+            allow_untrusted_remote_endpoints: false,
             master_url: master_urls.first().cloned().unwrap_or_default(),
             master_urls,
             seed_master_set,

seaweed-volume/src/server/heartbeat.rs

@@ -1047,6 +1047,7 @@ mod tests {
             write_queue: std::sync::OnceLock::new(),
             s3_tier_registry: std::sync::RwLock::new(S3TierRegistry::new()),
             read_mode: ReadMode::Local,
+            allow_untrusted_remote_endpoints: false,
             master_url: String::new(),
             master_urls: Vec::new(),
             seed_master_set: std::collections::HashSet::new(),

seaweed-volume/src/server/profiling.rs

@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ mod tests {
             white_list: vec![],
             fix_jpg_orientation: false,
             read_mode: ReadMode::Local,
+            allow_untrusted_remote_endpoints: false,
             cpu_profile: String::new(),
             mem_profile: String::new(),
             compaction_byte_per_second: 0,

seaweed-volume/src/server/volume_server.rs

@@ -77,6 +77,9 @@ pub struct VolumeServerState {
     pub s3_tier_registry: std::sync::RwLock<crate::remote_storage::s3_tier::S3TierRegistry>,
     /// Read mode: local, proxy, or redirect for non-local volumes.
     pub read_mode: ReadMode,
+    /// If true, FetchAndWriteNeedle skips remote S3 endpoint validation,
+    /// allowing arbitrary (incl. loopback / link-local / metadata) hosts.
+    pub allow_untrusted_remote_endpoints: bool,
     /// First master address for volume lookups (e.g., "localhost:9333").
     pub master_url: String,
     /// Seed master addresses for UI rendering.

seaweed-volume/src/server/write_queue.rs

@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ mod tests {
                 crate::remote_storage::s3_tier::S3TierRegistry::new(),
             ),
             read_mode: crate::config::ReadMode::Local,
+            allow_untrusted_remote_endpoints: false,
             master_url: String::new(),
             master_urls: Vec::new(),
             seed_master_set: std::collections::HashSet::new(),

seaweed-volume/tests/http_integration.rs

@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ fn test_state_with_guard(
             seaweed_volume::remote_storage::s3_tier::S3TierRegistry::new(),
         ),
         read_mode: seaweed_volume::config::ReadMode::Local,
+        allow_untrusted_remote_endpoints: false,
         master_url: String::new(),
         master_urls: Vec::new(),
         seed_master_set: std::collections::HashSet::new(),

weed/command/volume.go

@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/server/constants"
 	stats_collect "github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/stats"
 	"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/storage"
-	"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/storage/erasure_coding"
 	"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/storage/types"
 	"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/util"
 	"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/util/grace"
@@ -248,9 +247,6 @@ var (
 	volumeWhiteListOption = cmdVolume.Flag.String("whiteList", "", "comma separated Ip addresses having write permission. No limit if empty.")
 	minFreeSpacePercent   = cmdVolume.Flag.String("minFreeSpacePercent", "1", "minimum free disk space (default to 1%). Low disk space will mark all volumes as ReadOnly (deprecated, use minFreeSpace instead).")
 	minFreeSpace          = cmdVolume.Flag.String("minFreeSpace", "", "min free disk space (value<=100 as percentage like 1, other as human readable bytes, like 10GiB). Low disk space will mark all volumes as ReadOnly.")
-
-	ecBitrotChecksum    = cmdVolume.Flag.Bool("ec.bitrotChecksum", true, "write a bitrot checksum sidecar (.ecsum) when generating EC shards, enabling silent-corruption detection on scrub/rebuild")
-	ecBitrotBlockSizeMB = cmdVolume.Flag.Int("ec.bitrotBlockSizeMB", 16, "EC bitrot checksum block granularity in MiB; must be a power of two and at least 1")
 )
 
 func runVolume(cmd *Command, args []string) bool {
@@ -285,24 +281,6 @@ func runVolume(cmd *Command, args []string) bool {
 		*v.mastersString = *v.mserverString
 	}
 
-	// Apply EC bitrot checksum settings.
-	erasure_coding.BitrotProtectionEnabled = *ecBitrotChecksum
-	// Bound-check before the multiply so a huge value cannot overflow int64 past
-	// the power-of-two check. Cap = shared MaxBitrotBlockSize, kept in sync with
-	// ValidateBitrotManifest.
-	const maxBitrotBlockSizeMB = erasure_coding.MaxBitrotBlockSize / (1024 * 1024)
-	if mb := *ecBitrotBlockSizeMB; mb >= 1 && mb <= maxBitrotBlockSizeMB {
-		if blockSize := int64(mb) * 1024 * 1024; blockSize&(blockSize-1) == 0 {
-			erasure_coding.BitrotBlockSize = blockSize
-		} else if mb != 16 {
-			glog.Warningf("ignoring invalid -ec.bitrotBlockSizeMB=%d (must be a power of two); using %d MiB",
-				mb, erasure_coding.BitrotBlockSize/(1024*1024))
-		}
-	} else if *ecBitrotBlockSizeMB != 16 {
-		glog.Warningf("ignoring out-of-range -ec.bitrotBlockSizeMB=%d (must be a power of two in [1, %d] MiB); using %d MiB",
-			*ecBitrotBlockSizeMB, maxBitrotBlockSizeMB, erasure_coding.BitrotBlockSize/(1024*1024))
-	}
-
 	minFreeSpaces := util.MustParseMinFreeSpace(*minFreeSpace, *minFreeSpacePercent)
 	v.masters = pb.ServerAddresses(*v.mastersString).ToAddresses()
 	v.startVolumeServer(*volumeFolders, *maxVolumeCounts, *volumeWhiteListOption, minFreeSpaces)