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60b06b688170383a8acfe756cfca5c0d6c021f61
1509
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Jay HemnaniandChris Lu
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60b06b6881 |
s3: sort ListMultipartUploads by key and honor key-marker (#11833)
* s3: sort ListMultipartUploads by key and honor key-marker * s3: skip upload folders without an object key in ListMultipartUploads * s3: order same-key multipart uploads by initiation time The upload id suffix is now a time-ordered UUIDv7, so sorting by upload id lists a key's uploads oldest first, like S3. Pagination is unchanged: ordering and the upload-id-marker comparison share the same key. selectMultipartUploads now builds the whole result, including NextKeyMarker and NextUploadIdMarker, and the pagination test pages with the response markers. --------- Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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Chris Lu
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117ea58a83 |
s3tables: accept .puffin deletion vectors in table data/ (#11844)
* s3tables: accept .puffin data files for Iceberg v3 deletion vectors Iceberg v3 writes deletion vectors as Puffin files under a table's data/ directory, so merge-on-read DELETE and UPDATE on v3 tables were refused with AccessDenied by the table-bucket upload validator. Fixes #11842 * s3tables: name all accepted data formats in rejection error The message stopped at .avro even though .lance and now .puffin are accepted. * s3tables: cover deletion-vector filenames in data layout test Uses the names real engines emit: Spark/Iceberg Java {seq}-{task}-{uuid}-{counter}-deletes.puffin, UUID-suffixed names, and the same under a partition directory. |
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Chris Lu
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0a96972a99 |
s3: verify X-Forwarded-Prefix only from trusted proxies (#11843)
* s3api: check the direct peer against the trusted-proxy allowlist * s3: verify X-Forwarded-Prefix only from trusted proxies * s3: note that trusted proxies must sanitize forwarded headers |
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Jay Hemnani
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4e5fed9e9e | s3: list the size of a directory marker that has a body (#11830) | ||
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Chris LuandDevin
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e7923c14d1 |
s3tables: honor resource policy Deny on remaining operations (#11825)
* s3tables: honor a table policy Deny for maintenance operations authorizeMaintenanceTable evaluated only the bucket policy, so a Deny in the table policy never vetoed PutTableMaintenanceConfiguration, GetTableMaintenanceConfiguration or GetTableMaintenanceJobStatus even though they act on the table ARN. The stored table policy is now checked for a matching Deny first via deniedByPolicy, a veto helper that keeps the admin exemption, and resource and bucket tags are loaded into the policy context so tag-conditioned Denies evaluate. readBucketPolicy is renamed to readPolicy and reused for the table path. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3tables: honor the stored policy's Deny on policy management operations PutTablePolicy, GetTablePolicy and DeleteTablePolicy only evaluated the bucket policy, so a Deny in the table's own policy was ignored and a bucket-level Allow could strip or replace the policy guarding a table. The existing table policy is now loaded and a matching Deny vetoes the call. PutTableBucketPolicy likewise consults the existing bucket policy for a Deny before replacing it. Resource and bucket tags populate the policy context so tag-conditioned Denies evaluate, and policy writes assert the policy authorized against is still in force, returning a conflict when it changed mid-request. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3tables: apply a table policy Deny to tag operations TagResource, ListTagsForResource and UntagResource evaluated only the bucket policy; a Deny in the table's own policy is now honored when the target ARN is a table. ListTagsForResource and UntagResource also returned early when the resource carried no tags attribute, skipping the permission check entirely; the check now always runs. Policy evaluation uses the canonical resource ARN rebuilt from stored metadata, so a request ARN with a forged account or region cannot dodge the Deny. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3tables: regression tests for resource policy denies Cover the case where a bucket policy grants an identity s3tables:* while the table policy denies it: the policy, tag and maintenance operations must stay denied so the protection cannot be stripped. Also cover a bucket policy that denies PutTableBucketPolicy under the open fallback, and a tag-conditioned Deny, which vetoes only while the stored tag matches. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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eea3f232da |
iam: scope CreateServiceAccount's ParentUser by policy resource (#11736)
* iam: scope CreateServiceAccount's ParentUser by policy resource AuthorizeIamAction evaluated the iam:CreateServiceAccount grant against a hardcoded arn:aws:iam:::* resource, so the policy's Resource never had a say; #11218 then bound the target to the caller outright. Evaluate self-target actions against the target identity's ARN instead: a wildcard resource keeps the deliberate any-target grant, a scoped resource confines issuance to the named parent identity, anything else is denied. buildResourceARN gains the ARN pass-through buildS3ResourceArn already has, so iam: ARNs reach the policy engine intact on the attached-policies route. Closes #11735 * ci: retrigger after unrelated weed/storage metrics flake * iam: fold IAM-ARN matching into awsIAMMatch, drop debug test - remove zz_debug_test.go (local debugging leftover) - fold awsIAMMatchResource into awsIAMMatch: the arn:aws:iam:: value prefix selects case-sensitive matching, so no separate name is needed - trim comments --------- Co-authored-by: batonogov <batonogov@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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Chris Lu
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4a57432488 |
s3: list children of the directory a ListObjects marker names (#11805)
* s3: resume into the directory a listing marker names * s3: keep delimited marker resumes exclusive * s3: descend a marker-named directory without repeating its key * s3: emit marker-named dir objects but keep internal folders hidden |
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Chris Lu
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8c55425d55 |
s3tables: tighten legacy OIDC subject re-anchoring (#11808)
* sts: recognize issuer-scoped parent user ids
ComputeParentUser output has a fixed shape (base64url SHA-256); let
callers distinguish it from bare subject strings.
* s3tables: keep legacy owner re-anchoring off local and scoped account ids
Re-anchoring a stored bare subject under the single trusted issuer must
only apply to strings that could actually be a legacy OIDC subject. A
stored owner naming the reserved or a configured local account, or an
already issuer-scoped id, can otherwise be claimed by any caller whose
token asserts that string as sub.
* s3tables: re-anchor legacy policy principals in map and array forms
A stored bare subject can appear as {"AWS": sub} or inside a principal
list, not only as a top-level string; re-anchoring only the string form
left legacy Deny statements unable to match the caller.
* s3tables: keep built-in legacy exclusions independent of the account checker
A missing local-account predicate must not disable re-anchoring entirely:
the reserved accounts, ARN-shaped values, and scoped-id shapes are never
OIDC subjects regardless, while legacy Deny statements for plain subjects
still need to resolve so a denied caller cannot fall through to an
identity grant.
* s3tables: exercise legacy Deny against an owner grant
The previous case denied the caller regardless of whether the statement
principal matched; make the caller the owner so a missed match shows.
Cover the array Deny form alongside the AWS map.
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Chris Lu
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88d9926b35 |
s3api: recheck suspended-version condition under the lock when the filer ignores condition_alt_key (#11806)
* s3api: recheck condition under lock when routed filer ignores condition_alt_key A filer that predates condition_alt_key silently drops the field and evaluates a suspended-versioning condition against the empty null slot alone, so a matching If-Match still gets a false 412. Recheck under the object lock instead of trusting that response: the lock path resolves the same entry the read path serves. Genuine precondition failures still return 412 from the recheck. * s3api: cover suspended If-Match against a filer ignoring condition_alt_key * s3api: resend against the resolved entry instead of the lock-path recheck Rechecking under the gateway object lock does not serialize against routed writers, which commit under the filer's path lock; a concurrent routed PUT could land between the recheck and the create and be overwritten with a stale precondition. Resend the same transaction with condition_key set to the resolved version file so the condition and the write stay under the same filer lock. When the resolved entry is the null slot, a delete marker, or unresolvable, the resend targets the object path and fails closed. |
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Chris Lu
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e596be10f0 |
s3api: evaluate object-tag policy conditions on delete, ACL and lock operations (#11807)
* s3api: resolve the target version in tag-condition policy lookups * s3api: apply tag-conditioned policy to object deletes * s3api: apply tag-conditioned policy to object ACL reads and writes * s3api: apply tag-conditioned policy to retention and legal hold * s3api: cover tag-conditioned delete, ACL and object-lock rechecks * s3api: let tag-conditioned grants redecide denied batch deletes * s3api: resolve the tagged version in delete policy tests |
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Nabil RagabandClaude Opus 5.5
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6ab6926c94 |
s3: read chunks from HTTPS volume servers with the global HTTP client (#11800)
readChunkRange sent the volume lookup's http:// URL through a bare http.Client, so with [https.client]/[https.volume] configured every read of an SSE-KMS object larger than one chunk (and every ranged read through this path) failed with "client sent an HTTP request to an HTTPS server" and the GET returned 500. Normalise the URL's scheme and use util_http's global client, which carries the [https.client] TLS configuration, as the other volume reads already do. Drop the now-unused volumeServerHTTPClient. Fixes #11799 Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Chris Lu
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e6a0534e3b |
s3api: make ambiguous routed-PUT recovery atomic and stop transaction replay (#11787)
* filer_pb: map PRECONDITION_FAILED to a sentinel error A conditional CreateEntry that the owner's path lock refuses comes back as FilerError_PRECONDITION_FAILED; mapping it to ErrPreconditionFailed lets the S3 gateway tell a rejected precondition apart from a transport failure and report 412 instead of retrying the write. * s3api: make the ambiguous-PUT recovery create conditional under the lock createAfterAmbiguousRoute verified state and then issued an unconditional create, so a write landing between the lookup and the create was still clobbered by the stale re-commit (issue #11631). The recovery create now carries a WriteCondition — IF_NOT_EXISTS for a proven-absent entry, IF_ENTRY_EQUAL for a directory it may need to write onto — which the owner filer evaluates under its per-path lock, making the check and the write atomic. A refused precondition loops back to re-read the state instead of overwriting whatever won the race. * s3api: do not fail over a routed transaction past a possibly-sent request withFilerClientFailover retried the callback on the next filer on any transport error, so an ObjectTransaction whose response was lost could be re-applied over a write that committed in between (issue #11631). A gRPC error cannot distinguish "never sent" from "committed", but channel readiness can: a non-replayable callback now runs only on a connection that just reached READY, and failover continues only over channels that never came up — the one failure mode that provably sent nothing. * s3api: run ambiguous-route recovery for empty PUTs too The recovery was gated on a nonempty chunk list, so a zero-byte PUT whose routed transaction lost its response still fell back to an unconditional create that could overwrite a newer write and delete its chunks. Chunk-count mismatch on an empty upload list is enough to distinguish a superseding entry from this PUT's — there is nothing to save by skipping the check. * s3api: keep conditional recovery creates off the replay path The conditional create in the ambiguous-PUT fallback rode the replayable WithFilerClient failover, so a committed create whose response was lost could be re-sent to another filer — where a delete in between would let IF_NOT_EXISTS pass again and resurrect an entry pointing at reclaimed chunks. Conditional creates now run through the non-replayable failover; an ambiguous result falls through to confirmCreateLanded, which resolves the committed entry rather than resending. * s3api: do not mark a filer unhealthy for an answered request A reply that reached the callback — including an application-level failure like a refused write precondition — proves the filer is alive. Checking received before the health bookkeeping keeps definitive application errors from tripping the failure circuit or flagging a live routed owner as unreachable. * s3api: do not claim an empty stored entry as an ambiguous PUT's own Two chunkless entries compare equal under sameFileChunks, so an older empty object satisfies "the route landed" even though it predates this write — recovery would return success while leaving the request's Content-Type and metadata unapplied. A landed PUT stores the entry exactly as built, so require mime/size/md5/content and the extended attributes to match before claiming it; anything else stays uncertain and the client retries. * s3api: prove ambiguous empty PUTs by write id and pin recovery to the owner - Conditional recovery creates are sent to the routed owner alone instead of failing over: the condition only serializes with routed writes under the owner's per-path lock, and another filer's forwarding is only as correct as its ring view. An unreachable owner now yields an uncertain result rather than a create under a different serialization boundary. - A proven-absent path no longer satisfies an empty, chunkless PUT: the routed commit may have landed and been deleted, and there are no chunks to verify, so IF_NOT_EXISTS could resurrect a removed object. Recovery returns uncertain for the client to retry. - Chunkless identity moves from metadata equality to a per-write id (x-seaweedfs-write-id) stamped into Extended: an identical older object can match mime/md5/content but not the id. Entries without this write's id are not claimed, and confirmCreateLanded can now positively confirm a committed empty object instead of always reporting failure. |
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Chris Lu
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e6633146d8 |
filer: shrink zip spool threshold in tests to fix 32-bit OOM (#11801)
* filer: shrink zip spool threshold in tests to fix 32-bit OOM TestSpoolZipReaderTempFile and TestSpoolZipReaderLimit each allocate ~33-70 MiB to cross the 32 MiB in-memory spool threshold. On linux/386 the weed/filer test binary already runs near the 4 GiB address-space limit, so these allocations reliably crash it with "out of memory" mid-suite. Make zipSpoolMemoryLimit a var and drop it to 1 KiB in those tests, which exercises the same memory-vs-temp-file spool paths with KiB-sized buffers. * s3 lifecycle: update stale runShard and WalkerFunc call sites in tests Recent master changes added a walks param to runShard (#11797) and made WalkerFunc take []int, but replay_view_test.go and run_bounded_test.go still use the old signatures, breaking go vet and test builds on merge. |
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Chris Lu
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602ddb31f2 |
s3: count stored versions as bucket contents on delete (#11775)
* s3: count stored versions as bucket contents A <key>.versions directory holding version entries is user data; skipping it let bucketHasUserObjects report an empty bucket while the recursive delete dropped every stored version. * test: rename stale reserved-folders case in bucket delete test .versions directories are now descended into, so the case only holds because the folder is empty. |
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Chris Lu
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44bb697495 |
s3api: hydrate runtime policies on propagated IAM updates (#11784)
* s3api: hydrate runtime policies on pushed identity upserts PutIdentity propagation (used on every IAM write when the credential store has a master client) carries the persisted identity proto. That proto records inline policies only as flattened legacy Actions; their runtime __inline_policy__ names live in the policy store and were dropped by the merge. For the interval until the next full reload, an identity whose policy denied e.g. DeleteObject routed to legacy CanDo, where "Write:bucket" authorizes deletes. Hydrate the pushed identity the same way a full load does, so the merged state always carries its runtime policy names and documents. * s3api: hydrate runtime policies on pushed group upserts PutGroup propagation has the same gap as identity pushes: the wire proto does not carry the group's runtime __inline_group_policy__ names, so members' attached-policy check lost them until the next reload. * s3api: attach only runtime inline policy names on pushes Listing the pushed identity's or group's own inline policies is enough to keep it on the attached-policy route; a whole-store hydration per pushed proto is not. Pushes now never write iam.policies, so a stale read can no longer overwrite a newer committed policy document. * s3api: carry inline policy documents on pushed upserts Attaching only runtime policy names left a window where a pushed identity or group referenced a document the local cache had never loaded, denying allowed requests until the next reload. Fetch the pushed entity own inline documents and publish them with the update; reads stay scoped to the pushed entity rather than the whole store, and inline runtime names are only ever populated from this store so a read cannot install a document older than the committed one. Resync the IAM manager only when a push actually installs documents. * s3api: order pushed inline policy reads against their installs A pushed UpsertIdentity or PutGroup read inline policy documents from the credential store and installed them without holding the ordering guard that full reloads already take, so a delayed push could overwrite a newer committed document with its stale read and restore a revoked grant until the next update or reload. Pushes now hold reloadMu across the store read and the install, the same snapshot-through-commit serialization the credential-manager load uses. MergeS3ApiConfiguration also applies config.Policies to the live iam.policies at commit instead of swapping in its earlier snapshot, so a policy installed while a merge prepared (a pushed inline document or a PutPolicy update) is no longer discarded. |
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74ed12d6b3 |
s3 lifecycle: replay only the rules that fit the retention window (#11789)
* s3 lifecycle: replay only the rules that fit the retention window runShard handed drainShardEvents the full snapshot, so rules the retention window assigns to the walk were also matched during meta-log replay. Their matches are not due yet, and drainShardEvents freezes the cursor at the first event with a not-yet-due match. With a 3-day and a 30-day expiration rule on one bucket and RetentionWindow of 8 days, every shard's cursor stopped at the first 30-day object's PUT and stayed there until that object came due. Each pass then re-read the log from that point and re-dispatched every 3-day expiration already handled, which surfaces as NOOP_RESOLVED dispatches, a growing cursor_lag_max, and passes that still report status=ok. Snapshot.ReplayView drops the replay-kind actions promoted to the walk and keeps every other action as compiled, and the drain uses it. Promoted rules are served by the walk as before. RulesForShard, PromotedHash and ReplayView share one isPromoted predicate. With RetentionWindow unset no active rule is promoted, so behaviour without a configured window is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3 lifecycle: scale the replay-view test with DaysToDuration The test took its retention window from DaysToDuration but dated its PUTs in hours, so under the s3tests build tag (one lifecycle day = 10s) every event fell before the seeded cursor and replay never ran. Express the event ages in DaysToDuration too, so the test exercises replay at both scales. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3 lifecycle: rehabilitate scan_only mode in the replay drain view ReplayView shared the base CompiledAction pointers, so a replay-kind rule locked into ModeScanOnly by a prior compile stayed invisible to router.Route's event_driven gate even when the runtime retention window kept it in the replay partition - and it is absent from the walk view too, so the rule would be served by neither. Clone non-promoted replay-kind actions the way RulesForShard does (Mode forced to event_driven), reactivating the scan_only case whose bootstrap rendezvous already completed, while preserving the base active bit for genuinely pre-bootstrap actions. Disabled actions are excluded for parity with the other views, and DESIGN.md now documents the view. * s3 lifecycle: keep drain activation observable, require walker with retention ReplayView now shares pointers for event-driven actions so a mid-pass MarkActive flip remains visible to the drain; only a scan_only-locked action is cloned to event_driven, and reactivated only when its bootstrap rendezvous completed (tracked via a new bootstrapComplete field on CompiledAction). validate() rejects RetentionWindow without Walker: promoted rules would lose their only dispatch path while the drain cursor still advanced past their events. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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Chris Lu
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443ae1cd83 |
s3 lifecycle: share daily bucket walk and prune listings (#11797)
* s3 lifecycle: share the daily bucket walk across shards The daily pass invoked the walker once per shard, and every shard's walk listed the full bucket tree while keeping only its own 1/16 of the entries — 16 full listings per pass by default (#11791). Run now groups the shards by the walk branch they'll take (recovery vs steady, using the same cursor data and hash checks runShard applies) and starts one shared walk per group, so a pass lists each bucket at most twice. WalkerFunc and WalkBuckets take a shard set instead of a single shard. runShard keeps its own decision and waits on its group's walk; a shard whose freshly-loaded cursor disagrees with the plan falls back to a per-shard walk, so mid-pass cursor rewrites can't under-cover a shard. * s3 lifecycle: skip the .versions/ pre-pass on non-versioned buckets walkBucketTree listed every directory twice — once looking for .versions/ dirs, once for regular entries. On a bucket that never had versioning enabled the first pass can only find coincidentally-named user folders, so the extra listing is pure cost (#11791). FilerListFunc now takes the walk view and consults Snapshot.BucketVersioned; non-versioned buckets skip pass 1 entirely. A *-suffixed .versions user folder on such a bucket is recursed into as a regular directory so real objects inside still surface; a nil view keeps the two-pass behavior. * s3 lifecycle: prune walk directories to active rule prefixes The daily walk listed every directory under a bucket even when no rule prefix could reach it. Collect the active rule prefixes of each bucket from the walk view (new Snapshot.BucketPrefixes) and skip recursing into directories whose keys can never match; a bucket with no active actions is skipped entirely, saving the listing. .uploads stays in scope regardless of prefixes because AbortMPU rules match DestKey, and .versions expansion is pruned only conservatively (the logical key is a string-prefix of the dir key). * s3 lifecycle: join planned walks before Run returns planWalks starts a shared walk goroutine per group, but a shard whose authoritative cursor load then fails exits runShard without waiting on it. Run returned while the walk still listed or dispatched deletes against connections the caller closes on return. Join every planned walk after the shard waitgroup. * s3 lifecycle: treat object-locked buckets as versioned in the walk Object Lock requires versioning and every writer sets both extended attributes, but IsBucketVersioned only read ExtVersioningKey. A locked bucket missing that attribute would have its .versions dirs walked as ordinary folders, hiding version siblings from lifecycle. Classify ExtObjectLockEnabledKey as versioned too. |
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Chris Lu
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42ff7f2b8e |
s3: report an empty probed directory as a common prefix, not a key (#11779)
The "<dir>/" existence probe emitted the empty directory as a FolderMimeType Contents entry, so delimited listings returned a fake readable key that breaks clients treating every key as an object. Delimited probes now report the directory as a CommonPrefix -- which the probe accepts for existence -- while the recursive (no delimiter) probe keeps the directory marker. |
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Chris Lu
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cabaf9c38d |
iceberg: collapse doubled /v1 prefix in catalog requests (#11767)
* s3: verify SigV4 against the request path the client sent
Internal routers that rewrite URL.Path (the Iceberg catalog doubled-/v1
collapse) broke signature verification: verifyV4Signature re-derived the
canonical URI from the rewritten path while the client had signed the
original one, so valid signed catalog requests were rejected. Stash the
client-sent path in the request context at rewrite time and prefer it when
computing pathForSignature.
* iceberg: collapse repeated /v1 prefixes before route matching
Move the doubled-prefix collapse from the catch-all into a middleware so it
also covers paths that match the {prefix} routes (/v1/v1/namespaces would
otherwise resolve "v1" as the table bucket; the name is unreachable anyway
since bucket names require 3-63 chars). Collapse all leading repetitions in
a single pass and re-dispatch once instead of recursing per segment, and
record the original path in context so signed requests still verify.
* iceberg: slice off repeated /v1 prefixes instead of concatenating
Stripping path[len("/v1"):] per iteration reuses the original string
instead of allocating a fresh copy of the remaining path each pass.
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ad2486919c |
iam: accept AWS action names for listing multipart uploads and parts (#11765)
* iam: accept AWS action names for listing multipart uploads and parts PutUserPolicy rejected s3:ListBucketMultipartUploads and s3:ListMultipartUploadParts as invalid actions, so no inline policy could grant these operations by their AWS names. Map both to Read, which is the action their routes are registered under. Fixes #11738 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Y1b55sEL1gA1c3FCMcQCbm * test: check each multipart listing action separately Granting both actions in one policy let a correct mapping for one hide a wrong mapping for the other. Test each action on its own and assert it grants only Read. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Y1b55sEL1gA1c3FCMcQCbm * iam: scope multipart listing grants to their resolved action A policy naming s3:ListBucketMultipartUploads or s3:ListMultipartUploadParts projected to a Read:<bucket> grant, which the legacy route check honored for every object in the bucket. Map the AWS names to dedicated action constants and let VerifyActionPermission fall back to the resolved request action, so the grant covers only the listing operation it names. * iam: narrow legacy ListParts and ListMultipartUploads mappings Both policy names projected to Write:<bucket>, granting full object writes on any bucket where listing was intended. They now map to the same scoped listing actions as their AWS names. * iam: bind the multipart listing fallback to the listing routes The legacy-action fallback in VerifyActionPermission resolved the operation with ResolveS3Action, which reads the promoted authorization object. For GET /bucket?uploads&prefix=foo/ the prefix becomes the object, so the request resolved to GetObject and a ListBucketMultipartUploads grant was denied. Resolving from query priority also did not match how the router picks a handler. Only fall back for the two listing routes, identified from the route vars the same way the router dispatches them, and add the scoped actions to MapToIdentitiesAction so GetUserPolicy in the standalone IAM API rebuilds valid policy actions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Y1b55sEL1gA1c3FCMcQCbm --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chrislusf@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Chris LuandDevin
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2521c202aa |
s3: accept signed streaming uploads when IAM is disabled (#11766)
* s3: skip seed-signature verification in chunked reader when IAM is off When no credentials are configured there is nothing to verify streaming chunk signatures against. Leave the credential unset so the reader decodes the aws-chunked body and skips per-chunk verification, matching the unsigned-streaming path. This also fixes SigV4-signed unsigned-streaming uploads on open gateways, which previously failed in calculateSeedSignature. setupIam() now sets isAuthEnabled to match the credentials it installs, so the signature-verification tests still exercise the enabled path. * s3: decode signed streaming uploads when IAM is disabled AWS SDK v2 clients (Trino, Spark, modern aws-cli) send PutObject bodies as STREAMING-AWS4-HMAC-SHA256-PAYLOAD. On a gateway without S3 auth this was rejected with ErrAuthNotSetup, breaking writes to table buckets and regular buckets alike. The auth check already short-circuits when IAM is off, so route both streaming payload types through the chunked reader. * s3: cover signed trailer streaming uploads without IAM Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Chris Lu
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268424a5e1 |
s3: extract zip members on PutObject (#11786)
* filer: add zip archive extraction helpers SpoolZipReader makes an upload body seekable for archive/zip, SanitizeZipMemberName rejects zip-slip and non-regular members, and CheckZipLimits caps member count and total uncompressed size. For seaweedfs/seaweedfs#11722 * filer: extract zip members on ?extract=zip upload POST/PUT to a directory path with ?extract=zip (or X-Seaweedfs-Extract: zip) writes each archive member as its own entry, so a bundle of small files lands in one request instead of one roundtrip each. Members keep their mtime, mode and mime-by-extension; directories are created; unsafe names are skipped and reported. extract.keep=true also stores the archive itself. For seaweedfs/seaweedfs#11722 * filer: bound zip spool memory by actual bytes A chunked upload has no Content-Length, so the old size hint let an unbounded body go through io.ReadAll. Read up to the memory threshold plus one byte first, then spill the prefix and the rest to a temp file, capped at ZipExtractMaxBytes total. * filer: guard zip member size total against overflow Declared member sizes summing past math.MaxUint64 wrapped the running total and slipped past the 1 TiB cap. * server: only take the inline fast path at a short first read uploadReaderToChunks read at most chunkSize bytes, then treated any read below SaveToFilerLimit as the whole file. When SaveToFilerLimit exceeded chunkSize, longer uploads were stored truncated. * server: resolve storage options per extracted zip member A member can land under a storage rule more specific than the request path. Re-running detectStorageOption0 per destination applies that rule's collection, replication, TTL, filename limit, and read-only guard to files and directories alike, while explicit query overrides still win. * server: accept raw request body for POST extract uploads Every POST was forced through MultipartReader, so a raw zip body always got a 400. Only parse multipart when the Content-Type is actually multipart. * server: extract zip directories before files and stop on cancel Processing directory members first keeps their stored mtime/mode from being overwritten by parents auto-created for an earlier file member. Checking ctx.Err() between members keeps a disconnected client from driving thousands more writes. * server: assert stored mtime and mode for extracted members * s3: add zip extraction header constants * s3: extract zip members on PutObject with extract header x-amz-meta-snowball-auto-extract or x-seaweedfs-extract: zip on a PutObject fans out the archive to one object per member under the object's directory, reusing putToFiler so chunking, collections, storage rules, versioning, and bucket-default encryption apply to each member. The archive itself is not stored. Explicit SSE request headers are rejected since one encryption config cannot represent independently created member objects. * s3: bound member fan-out by request cancellation Stop starting new member writes once the request context is done, matching the filer extract loop. * filer: bound compressed zip spool and reject non-local member names The 1 TiB uncompressed limit was also capping the compressed bytes spooled to the host's temp directory, so a handful of concurrent extractions could fill the filer's disk before any ZIP validation ran. SpoolZipReader now takes a separate compressed-size limit (the filer passes its TUS max upload size) with a 5 GiB default. SanitizeZipMemberName gains a filepath.IsLocal check: the segment loop already rejects "..", but CodeQL only treats member names as sanitized through a recognized guard, and the extra check also covers reserved Windows names. * server: honor destination rules for zip members and clamp maxMB An x-seaweedfs-destination header picks the storage rules for a logical destination while members still land under the request path, matching PostHandler. Directory members now also enforce the actual path's read-only rule instead of relying on option resolution to fail. maxMB up to 2048 overflowed the int32 chunk size, so an oversized query value made extraction (and ordinary autoChunk uploads) store members empty yet report success. The parsing is shared and clamped at 2047 MB. * s3: scope zip member writes through the per-key checks PutObject applies The extraction loop bypassed most of what a standalone PutObject would face: members were written without IAM authorization for their key, directory members replaced markers without entry lock checks, and lock headers persisted retention without the s3:PutObjectRetention or s3:PutObjectLegalHold permissions. authorizeMember now runs IAM, table-bucket path rules, bucket policy, lock-header validation, and non-versioned lock enforcement per member key, and directory members take the same guarded mkdir path as an explicit dir marker. The archive's own Content-Md5 and x-amz-checksum-* values are verified while the body spools instead of being silently dropped, members stop inheriting the archive's Content-Encoding, and non-versioned members resolve their lifecycle TTL like normal uploads. * s3: fail malformed lock headers before spooling the archive Per-member re-validation turned a bad object-lock header into one error entry per member inside a 200 response. Validate once up front like PutObjectHandler does, and keep only the dedicated retention/legal-hold permission checks scoped to each member key. * filer: return 413 for oversized archives and honor saveInside in extract Map filer.ErrZipTooLarge to 413 instead of 500 for client-side archive size violations. Extracted members written under saveInside now store as inline entry content instead of unreachable volume chunks. * s3: write extracted members under their own request context Point member writes at the member key via mux.SetURLVars so SSE-KMS builds the encryption context from the member ARN, not the archive's. Map the spool limit error to ErrEntityTooLarge. |
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Chris Lu
|
a8affc851d |
filer: extract zip members on ?extract=zip upload (#11782)
* filer: add zip archive extraction helpers SpoolZipReader makes an upload body seekable for archive/zip, SanitizeZipMemberName rejects zip-slip and non-regular members, and CheckZipLimits caps member count and total uncompressed size. For seaweedfs/seaweedfs#11722 * filer: extract zip members on ?extract=zip upload POST/PUT to a directory path with ?extract=zip (or X-Seaweedfs-Extract: zip) writes each archive member as its own entry, so a bundle of small files lands in one request instead of one roundtrip each. Members keep their mtime, mode and mime-by-extension; directories are created; unsafe names are skipped and reported. extract.keep=true also stores the archive itself. For seaweedfs/seaweedfs#11722 * filer: bound zip spool memory by actual bytes A chunked upload has no Content-Length, so the old size hint let an unbounded body go through io.ReadAll. Read up to the memory threshold plus one byte first, then spill the prefix and the rest to a temp file, capped at ZipExtractMaxBytes total. * filer: guard zip member size total against overflow Declared member sizes summing past math.MaxUint64 wrapped the running total and slipped past the 1 TiB cap. * server: only take the inline fast path at a short first read uploadReaderToChunks read at most chunkSize bytes, then treated any read below SaveToFilerLimit as the whole file. When SaveToFilerLimit exceeded chunkSize, longer uploads were stored truncated. * server: resolve storage options per extracted zip member A member can land under a storage rule more specific than the request path. Re-running detectStorageOption0 per destination applies that rule's collection, replication, TTL, filename limit, and read-only guard to files and directories alike, while explicit query overrides still win. * server: accept raw request body for POST extract uploads Every POST was forced through MultipartReader, so a raw zip body always got a 400. Only parse multipart when the Content-Type is actually multipart. * server: extract zip directories before files and stop on cancel Processing directory members first keeps their stored mtime/mode from being overwritten by parents auto-created for an earlier file member. Checking ctx.Err() between members keeps a disconnected client from driving thousands more writes. * server: assert stored mtime and mode for extracted members * filer: bound compressed zip spool and reject non-local member names The 1 TiB uncompressed limit was also capping the compressed bytes spooled to the host's temp directory, so a handful of concurrent extractions could fill the filer's disk before any ZIP validation ran. SpoolZipReader now takes a separate compressed-size limit (the filer passes its TUS max upload size) with a 5 GiB default. SanitizeZipMemberName gains a filepath.IsLocal check: the segment loop already rejects "..", but CodeQL only treats member names as sanitized through a recognized guard, and the extra check also covers reserved Windows names. * server: honor destination rules for zip members and clamp maxMB An x-seaweedfs-destination header picks the storage rules for a logical destination while members still land under the request path, matching PostHandler. Directory members now also enforce the actual path's read-only rule instead of relying on option resolution to fail. maxMB up to 2048 overflowed the int32 chunk size, so an oversized query value made extraction (and ordinary autoChunk uploads) store members empty yet report success. The parsing is shared and clamped at 2047 MB. * filer: return 413 for oversized archives and honor saveInside in extract Map filer.ErrZipTooLarge to 413 instead of 500 for client-side archive size violations. Extracted members written under saveInside now store as inline entry content instead of unreachable volume chunks. |
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Chris LuandDevin
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6da432b8bf |
filer: make a retried ObjectTransaction replay its recorded outcome (#11788)
* filer_pb: add request_id to ObjectTransactionRequest Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * filer: replay recorded outcome for a retried ObjectTransaction A failover replay carries the same request_id; under the same path lock the owner replays the recorded outcome instead of re-applying the mutations over whatever superseded them. Only application-level outcomes are recorded — a lookup error leaves the request free to re-run. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3: stamp routed object transactions with a request id One id per logical transaction so failover retries replay the recorded outcome instead of re-applying the mutations. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * filer: scope transaction replay tokens per path and keep them for their TTL The dedup key includes the lock path so a token reused on a different object cannot replay this outcome. Records are never evicted early — an early eviction would let a replay re-apply — so the expiry sweep is amortized and the map is bounded by the insert rate over the TTL. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * filer: bound the transaction replay cache at capacity * filer: do not record indeterminate transaction outcomes A mutation error can be transient or follow a partial apply; recording it replays that failure to a retry for the whole TTL instead of letting the same idempotent mutations converge. Only successful transactions and precondition failures are definitive outcomes worth replaying. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * filer: replay recorded mutation failures instead of re-applying --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Chris LuandDevin
|
00804b32fa |
s3tables: let an explicit policy Deny veto fallback and owner allows (#11772)
* s3tables: let an explicit policy Deny veto fallback and owner allows Table operations evaluated the table or namespace policy and the bucket policy as an OR, so an explicit Deny in one policy was overridden by an Allow in the other. Owner and identity grants also short-circuited before the resource policy was read. Deny statements are now evaluated first at both levels, matching AWS explicit-deny semantics. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3tables: fail closed when a resource side has no owner --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Chris LuandDevin
|
44657988ea |
s3: apply destination retention on copies instead of inheriting it (#11773)
* s3: apply destination retention on copies instead of inheriting it CopyObject carried the source object's retention mode, retain-until date and legal hold into the destination entry, so a copy onto a bucket with default COMPLIANCE retention produced an unlocked object that could be deleted early. Copied objects now take their retention from the copy request's lock headers or the destination bucket's default, matching PUT semantics; a versioned self-copy gets the same treatment while an unversioned metadata-only self-copy keeps the object's existing lock. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3: validate lock headers on metadata-only self-copies --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Chris LuandDevin
|
2d06e2d6c1 |
s3: evaluate tag conditions on copy-source and tagging subresources (#11771)
* s3: evaluate tag conditions on copy-source and tagging subresources Policy evaluation ran without the object entry on several paths, so a Deny conditioned on s3:ExistingObjectTag never matched: - CopyObject, UploadPartCopy and RenameObject checked the source key before its entry was fetched; repeat the check on a synthesized GET once the entry resolves. - GetObjectAttributes and Get/Put/DeleteObjectTagging never supplied the entry; recheck with the resolved entry. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3: fail closed on tag-policy lookups and honor tag-conditioned grants - recheckTagConditionedPolicyWithLookup returned success when the entry lookup errored, letting a tag-gated Deny slip past a transient miss; only ErrNotFound still falls through to the handler's own NoSuchKey. - A read or delete denied in the tagless first phase now gets one more evaluation with the resolved entry's tags in hand, so an s3:ExistingObjectTag-conditioned Allow can still grant a copy-source read or rename. The deferred recheck requires an explicit Allow; indeterminate results keep the original verdict, and the existence of the key never leaks past a deny. - RenameObject now applies the same tag-aware recheck to the source removal, so a tag-gated Deny on s3:DeleteObject blocks a rename the way it blocks a direct DELETE. - GetObjectAttributes evaluates the object-entry policy recheck before conditional headers, so a 304/412 response can no longer bypass a tag-based Deny. * s3: honor identity denies in the tag-aware source recheck The deferred recheck re-evaluates only the bucket policy, so a bucket Allow could lift an explicit Deny in the caller's attached or session policies on a copy/rename source. Apply the same applicable-policy Deny check the first phase uses. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Chris LuandDevin
|
446e6f3444 |
s3tables: scope OIDC-derived account IDs to the token issuer (#11774)
* s3tables: scope OIDC-derived account IDs to the token issuer Table ownership keyed off the bare sub claim, so two identity providers issuing the same sub collided on one account - a caller could act on tables owned by a different provider's user. OIDC bearer tokens now carry the same issuer-namespaced (sub, iss) hash STS sessions already expose as aws:userid, and getAccountID prefers it over the raw claims. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3tables: keep legacy owners working and scrub client-subject claims - OIDC bearer tokens without a subject are rejected, and a token-supplied aws:userid claim is always overwritten with the verified (sub, iss) hash, so a forged claim can no longer stand in for the principal. - Owners written before issuer scoping hold a bare subject; permission checks now re-anchor that subject under the caller's issuer, so the same (sub, iss) pair keeps its ownership while scoped owners remain issuer-isolated. The token issuer is asserted into claims alongside sub and carried through PolicyContext. * s3tables: anchor legacy subjects to the configured issuer set * s3: enumerate trusted issuers from registered providers too * s3: fail closed when the OIDC provider store cannot be listed trustedOIDCIssuers kept the registered issuers when ListOIDCProviders failed, presenting a partial set as complete. A deployment trusting one registered issuer A plus a stored issuer B would, on a listing error, report only A — the single-issuer shape under which a legacy bare subject re-anchors — letting a caller from A claim a stored subject that belongs to B and gain owner access. With no provider store the registered providers are provably complete, so keep returning them; with a store, a failed listing means the real set is unknown, so return none. --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Chris LuandDevin
|
d3a97f76bd |
s3: fix PutObject If-Match under suspended versioning (#11780)
* s3: keep suspended-versioning conditional writes off the routed condition A suspended PUT writes the null-version slot at the regular path while the entry the conditional headers evaluate lives under .versions/. The routed WriteCondition checked the request's etag against that empty slot, so a correct If-Match failed with 412. Passing uniqueWritePath sends conditional requests through the lock path, whose precondition resolves the same entry the read path serves; unconditional writes still route. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * filer_pb: add condition_alt_key to ObjectTransactionRequest * filer: evaluate a transaction condition against a fallback entry condition_alt_key names the entry consulted when the primary is absent, so a suspended-versioning write can check 'the null slot if present, else the latest version' atomically under the lock. * s3: route suspended-versioning conditional writes with a fallback key The gateway names the latest version file as condition_alt_key, so the transaction checks the entry the read path serves — null slot first, latest version when it is absent — under the same lock that applies the write. Conditional suspended PUTs route again instead of splitting check and write across a gateway lock that routed writes skip. * filer: resolve the condition fallback under the transaction lock The gateway named the pointed-at version file as condition_alt_key, resolved before the transaction ran: a concurrent version delete could move the latest pointer between the gateway read and the locked check, and a delete-marker latest read as an existing object. The alt key is now the .versions directory and the filer resolves the latest-version pointer under the same lock that serializes the write — a delete marker resolves to absent, and unresolvable pointer state fails closed. * filer: fail closed on alt-key lookups and skip directory primaries A transient FindEntry error returning a nil entry read as "versions dir absent" and let If-None-Match writes pass. Check the error before the entry. And a bare directory at the object path satisfied the primary lookup, so the .versions fallback never ran — directories are not the object, treat them as an absent slot. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * filer: scope directory-as-absent conditions to alt-key callers --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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|
dependabot[bot]andChris Lu
|
82f0a37efe |
build(deps): bump github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/storage/azblob from 1.8.0 to 1.8.2 (#11740)
* build(deps): bump github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/storage/azblob Bumps [github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/storage/azblob](https://github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go) from 1.8.0 to 1.8.2. - [Release notes](https://github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/releases) - [Commits](https://github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/compare/sdk/azcore/v1.8.0...sdk/azidentity/v1.8.2) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/storage/azblob dependency-version: 1.8.2 dependency-type: direct:production update-type: version-update:semver-patch ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com> * test: restore loadBucketMetadataFromFiler stub after TestGetBucketMetadata TestGetBucketMetadata replaced the package-level loadBucketMetadataFromFiler with a stub that sleeps one second per load and never restored it. Every test running after it in the same binary paid that sleep on each bucket metadata cache miss: TestPutObjectUploadACL (~245s) and TestCopyObjectDestinationACL (~46s) each created a fresh BucketRegistry per subtest, so the stub fired hundreds of times. In CI this stretched the Test job past 11 minutes and left it exposed to runner cancellation. Restore the real loader via t.Cleanup so the slow stub is scoped to the test that needs it. --------- Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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Chris Lu
|
3f8035deb7 |
security: share the admin gRPC peer authentication check
The local-peer fallback and bearer-token validation used by the filer IAM gRPC path move into weed/security so every admin-plane gRPC service can enforce the same contract. A client certificate verified by the server's TLS config now also counts as authenticated. |
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Chris Lu
|
a4c8d31cb8 |
s3api: ignore response header overrides on anonymous requests
AWS requires response-* query parameters to be signed; an anonymous caller must not choose how a stored object is served. |
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Chris LuandDevin
|
d69f45ee83 |
s3: validate multipart initiate ACLs like PUT
CreateMultipartUpload accepts canned and custom ACLs on initiation; run them through the same authorization path as PutObject so an explicit ACL requires s3:PutObjectAcl, and persist the validated grants on the upload entry for completion to apply. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Chris LuandDevin
|
3aaf80b33b |
s3: stop trusting internal ACL headers in ParseS3Metadata
Multipart initiation stored client-supplied Seaweed-X-Amz-Acl and Seaweed-X-Amz-Owner request headers onto the upload entry, and CompleteMultipartUpload copied them to the finished object, letting a caller forge ownership or a public ACL without s3:PutObjectAcl. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Chris LuandDevin
|
85f04b54fd |
s3tables: check data-path ancestors for catalog markers on DeleteTable
The decoupled-delete guard only inspects the resolved data path itself, but the catalog marker lives on a table's name path, so a location that resolves inside another table's directory (its marker-less data subdirectory) slips through and the recursive purge destroys the other table's data. Walk the data path's ancestors within the bucket and refuse when any carries a table or view catalog entry. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Chris LuandDevin
|
6f93f87446 |
s3tables: confine caller-supplied metadataLocation to the table's namespace
CreateTable/RegisterTable/UpdateTable (and the view equivalents) validate the location only for bucket and traversal, so a tenant can register a table whose location resolves into another namespace's directory and DeleteTable will purge it. Require the location to live under the caller's namespace subtree, the boundary per-namespace delegation uses. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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|
Zhe ChenandChris Lu
|
547befc070 |
s3api: preserve remote object ETags across cache fills (#11704)
* s3api: preserve remote object ETags across cache fills * s3api: align remote copy validators and reject stale ETags * s3api: keep remote ETag through metadata touches, drop it after resizes The remote-ETag check required Mtime to match RemoteMtime, so a utimens on a cold remote object returned an empty ETag until a later cache fill restored the remote value. It also trusted LastLocalSyncTsNs alone, so a setattr resize that leaves chunks and the stamp untouched kept serving the old remote ETag for different local bytes. Require FileSize to match RemoteSize for both the synced and remote-only paths and stop comparing modification times: content changes already surface through cleared sync stamps, chunks, or inline content, while a metadata-only touch leaves the remote bytes authoritative. Regression tests cover touched cold and cached entries and resized cached entries. --------- Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chrislusf@users.noreply.github.com> |
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fac021544e |
s3api: register the azurekms KMS provider under its build tag (#11691)
* s3api: register the azurekms KMS provider under its build tag weed/kms/azure registers itself with weed/kms from an init(), but the blank import that triggers it was commented out in auth_credentials.go (TODO: Fix Azure SDK compatibility issues). Nothing else imports the package, so building with -tags azurekms still ends with "KMS provider 'azure' not registered" at startup for any config using "type": "azure". Move the import into weed/s3api/kms_azure.go behind //go:build azurekms so default builds stay free of the Azure SDK, and drop the dead comment. Closes #11686 * ci: compile and test azurekms-gated code weed/kms/azure is excluded from every default build, so nothing in CI compiled it; that is how the provider shipped unregistered. Build the tree and run the kms tests with -tags azurekms on every Go change. --------- Co-authored-by: Yi-111-a <> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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d050464316 |
s3api: apply bucket default encryption when volume data encryption is enabled (#11681)
* s3api: apply bucket default encryption when volume data encryption is enabled When -s3.encryptVolumeData (s3a.cipher) is enabled, putToFiler skipped checking and applying bucket default encryption due to a '!s3a.cipher' guard. Volume-level data encryption and object-level Server-Side Encryption (SSE-S3 / SSE-KMS) operate at different layers, and explicit SSE headers already work alongside volume encryption. Remove the '!s3a.cipher' guard so PutObject without explicit SSE headers inherits bucket default encryption regardless of volume data encryption. Add regression test TestPutObjectAppliesBucketDefaultEncryptionWithVolumeCipher. Signed-off-by: Tyagiquamar <mohdquamartyagi@gmail.com> * s3api: decrypt the volume cipher on direct SSE chunk reads fetchFullChunk, fetchChunkViewData, and createEncryptedChunkReader fetched raw bytes over HTTP, so volume-encrypted chunks reached SSE-S3/KMS/C decryptors still ciphered. Route them through fetchChunkData: encrypted or compressed chunks go through RetriedFetchChunkData (cipher-aware, slices plaintext space for views); plain chunks keep the streaming range read. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: cover cipher-aware chunk reads with a fake volume server The fake volume now serves stored GETs with Range support, and TestFetchChunkDataDecryptsVolumeCipher verifies full-chunk and view reads return plaintext for ciphered chunks while plain chunks still slice via HTTP ranges. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: guard fake volume server stored map with its mutex The HTTP handler goroutine read v.stored while test goroutines wrote it, a data race go test -race can flag. Lock v.mu around the map read and the test writes. --------- Signed-off-by: Tyagiquamar <mohdquamartyagi@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chrislusf@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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b2eefb8a73 |
filer: fail the request, not the process, when chunks cannot be resolved (#11685)
* filer: fail the request, not the process, when chunks cannot be resolved CompactFileChunks and ViewFromChunks discarded the error from NonOverlappingVisibleIntervals and iterated the nil interval list it returns on failure. A CreateEntry or UpdateEntry whose context was cancelled therefore panicked in SeparateGarbageChunks and took the whole filer down, losing the metadata log it had not yet flushed. Both functions now return the error. cleanupChunks fails the request with it, the mount flush paths return it, the replication sinks and the S3 SSE range reader return it, and a ChunkStreamReader that cannot build its view fails every read with it and reports it as its SourceError instead of reading as an empty file. Fixes #11682 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * filer: propagate chunk resolution failures in scan paths NonOverlappingVisibleIntervals can fail without a cancelled context; the query engine and log-store callers discarded the error and dereferenced nil intervals. * query: propagate chunk resolution errors instead of skipping files When a manifest cannot be resolved, ReadParquetStatistics, countLiveLogRowsExcludingParquetSources, and computeLiveLogMinMax logged a warning and skipped the failed file, so queries returned understated counts and wrong min/max values. Surface the errors instead: the fast-path aggregation collector now returns a DataSourceError so the engine falls back to a full scan, and the row-count helpers return the error rather than a partial total. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chrislusf@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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Bharat Kaurav
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774c9927a7 |
s3api: validate ListObjectVersions max-keys and honor max-keys=0 (#11703)
* fix(s3api): accept max-keys up to 2147483647 and cap list pages at 1000 * add tests for ListObjects max-keys range and 1000 cap * refactor(s3api): return uint16 from parseMaxKeys to avoid narrowing casts * fix(s3api): validate ListObjectVersions max-keys and honor max-keys=0 * add test for ListObjectVersions max-keys=0 * fix(s3api): widen uint16 max-keys for ListObjectVersions |
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Peter Dodd
|
5f1a742726 |
fix: return NoSuchKey and drop stale entries when a remote-mounted object is gone from the remote (#11680)
A remote-only entry whose object was deleted from the remote storage outside the filer answered GET with 500 and stayed in the filer. The remote's not-found was lost on the way: the backends' ReadFile returned it as an untyped error, so FetchAndWriteNeedle failed with codes.Unknown and nothing downstream could tell it from any other failure. - remote_storage: GCS, S3 (NoSuchKey) and Azure (BlobNotFound) reads return ErrRemoteObjectNotFound. GCS reports a missing bucket the same way as a missing object, so it confirms the bucket with a listing. - volume server and filer: the not-found crosses gRPC as codes.NotFound carrying the sentinel's text, and the filer's cache RPC returns codes.NotFound, which the S3 gateway already maps to NoSuchKey. - s3api: the origin fallback answers NoSuchKey on a confirmed not-found. - filer: a confirmed not-found removes the stale entry, so the lazy remote-metadata cache converges on the remote. Only remote-only files outside .versions and without an active object lock are removed, only if unchanged since the fetch (checked on the object's write owner, under the lock S3 object writes take), and with a metadata-only delete: the filer skips its inline remote delete, and the delete events' entries carry a marker that makes filer.remote.sync and filer.remote.gateway skip their remote delete, while filer.sync still replicates it. The replicated DeleteEntryRequest carries keep_remote_object, so the destination's delete events are marked too. The store drops the marker from every write, so clients cannot plant it. |
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d3dc03c85a |
s3api: resolve volume data encryption in CopyObject SSE flows (#11646) (#11683)
* s3api: resolve volume data encryption in CopyObject SSE flows (#11646) * s3api: honor bucket-default KMS key on copy and fix transformed-upload metadata - Synthesize the destination bucket's default encryption as request headers before any SSE evaluation, so the configured KMS key ID and bucket-key setting reach the copy paths instead of only a boolean. - uploadTransformedChunkData returns the upload result so callers record the uploader's cipher key AND compression decision; a wrongly cleared IsCompressed made transformed copies unreadable. - decompressChunkVolumeCipher fails loudly when a compressed chunk does not decompress, instead of uploading still-compressed bytes marked uncompressed. - copyMultipartSSECChunk now strips the volume cipher and re-encrypts on upload like the other transform paths. - The ciphered inner upload now uses the caller's private BytesBuffer. * s3api: extract copy bucket-default header synthesis for coverage Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: test bucket-default encryption header synthesis on copy Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: validate copy encryption headers before bucket defaults and resolve empty KMS key * s3api: name the AWS-managed SSE-KMS default key once --------- Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chrislusf@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Chris Lu
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c023493cf0 |
s3api: tolerate session tokens on statically configured credentials (#11694)
* s3api: consolidate session token extraction into extractSessionToken Three call sites duplicated the same header/header/query lookup; share one helper named after the existing s3tables equivalent. * s3api: tolerate session tokens on statically configured credentials Credential vendors like Unity Catalog emit a session token with every vended credential, including static ones (UC's StaticAwsCredentialGenerator only engages when s3.sessionToken is set). Requests signed by a configured access key were routed to STS validation and rejected, so static credential vending never worked against SeaweedFS. Resolve the access key first: when it maps to a configured credential the signature alone authenticates the request, and the attached token is marked ignored so authorization does not route it into the STS session-policy path. STS-issued access keys are never in the static map, so temporary credentials still validate their token exactly as before. * s3api: cover static credentials carrying a session token * test: exercise UC static credential vending against SeaweedFS s3.sessionToken.0 selects UC's StaticAwsCredentialGenerator, which vends the configured keys verbatim. The vended session token is foreign to SeaweedFS and previously failed SigV4; now it round-trips through temporary-table-credentials into real S3 I/O. * s3api: reject temporary credentials in GetFederationToken after auth Token presence alone cannot distinguish a temporary credential from a statically configured one carrying a vended token. Move the check behind verifyV4Signature and key it on the operative session token so tolerated tokens keep the caller eligible. * s3api: test GetFederationToken with authenticated temporary credentials Sign the rejection cases with real session credentials so they reach the post-auth check, and cover a vended static credential being accepted. * test: check vended-credential delete error in UC integration test |
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Paolo Valletta
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4d306e1279 |
s3api: revoke the identities a config reload no longer declares (#11679)
* s3api: revoke the identities a config reload no longer declares A static config file reload merges with isFullState=false, so an identity deleted from -s3.config kept authenticating with all of its access keys until the process restarted. An operator revoking a leaked key got no error and no revocation. The file is the source of truth for the identities it declares, so a reload now drops the ones that have left it, together with their access keys and those of their service accounts. staticIdentityNames was only ever added to, which kept a removed name protected as well; the names the file itself declares are tracked separately from the AWS environment credentials, so a reload never revokes what the file never declared. * s3api: keep a file reload from replacing the dynamic store Removing the last identity from a config file emptied staticIdentityNames, so useStaticConfig turned false and the next reload of that file took the replace path: every filer-managed identity and its access keys disappeared until a dynamic reload brought them back. A static config file is authoritative for the identities it declares and never for the dynamic store, so a file load now always merges. The first file load at startup takes the merge path as well, from an empty state. Reported by the Devin and Greptile reviews of this PR. TestReloadStaticConfigWithoutIdentitiesKeepsDynamic reloads an emptied file twice and asserts that a filer-managed identity and its access key survive both; the existing test now also checks that the service account key was loaded before the reload and that the environment identity's key still works after it. * s3api: clear the environment credentials in the emptied-file test The AWS environment identity is static and is re-added after every merge, so on a runner that has AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID and AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY set it kept hasStaticConfig true once the file was emptied, and the next reload still took the merge path: the regression this test guards passed unnoticed. Clear both variables whatever the runner has set. With the pre-fix condition (hasStaticConfig alone) and the variables present in the environment, the test now fails with "reload 2: a filer-managed identity must survive a reload of an emptied file". Reported by the Greptile review of this PR. |
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Chris LuandDevin
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5d80ac39b8 |
s3api: verify under the write lock before re-committing an ambiguous routed PUT (#11649)
* s3api: verify under the write lock before re-committing an ambiguous routed PUT A routed PUT whose response was lost after the owner committed, or whose transaction returned a store error, fell straight into the lock path and re-sent the same entry. A concurrent PUT that had superseded the commit in the meantime had already deleted this entry's chunks as old, so the re-commit restored metadata pointing at dead needles and the object read back 404 permanently. The lock path now resolves the routed attempt's outcome inside the write lock first: a stored entry with the uploaded chunks means the route landed; a different stored entry or an unresolved lookup refuses the re-commit with ServiceUnavailable so the client retries with a fresh upload; only a proven-absent entry falls through to the normal create. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: tighten ambiguous routed PUT recovery - a match found only after an unanswered filer is not authoritative; the unreachable filer may hold a newer entry, so refuse instead of finalizing on it (both recovery paths) - a failed post-recovery finalization now rolls the recovered entry back, matching the create path's undo - a proven-absent entry is only re-committed after probing that the uploaded chunks' needles are still alive; a committed-and-deleted PUT would otherwise write back an entry pointing at reclaimed needles - the .versions latest pointer no longer flips back to an older version when a newer one committed while the write was uncertain Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: stamp late versions noncurrent when a newer latest pointer wins The keep-newer early return in updateLatestVersionInDirectory left the version just stored without ExtNoncurrentSinceNsKey, so the lifecycle engine could never age it out. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: only a failure past mutation 0 makes a routed PUT ambiguous A deterministic refusal at the PUT mutation (e.g. "existing entry is a directory") applied nothing, but marking it ambiguous sent the lock-path fallback through conservative recovery, which found the directory entry and refused with 503 instead of the correct 409. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3: keep all transaction errors ambiguous; route directory conflicts through the lock path * s3: verify uploaded chunks before re-committing over a directory A stored directory does not prove the routed PUT never committed: the route can land, a delete can remove the entry and its chunks, and a nested write can recreate the directory before recovery takes the lock. Re-committing then stores an entry pointing at dead needles. Probe the uploaded chunks first and refuse with ServiceUnavailable when they can no longer be verified. --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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838c554e33 |
s3api: reject SSE headers PutObject cannot honor, as CopyObject does (#11642)
* s3api: reject SSE headers PutObject cannot honor, as CopyObject does PutObject and CreateMultipartUpload did not check the server-side encryption headers they were given. An x-amz-server-side-encryption value that names no method, such as "aes:kms", matched none of the SSE paths, so the object was stored unencrypted and the request answered 200. SSE-C together with x-amz-server-side-encryption was also accepted, and one of the two silently won. CopyObject already rejects both through validateEncryptionCompatibility. Run the same check, with the same error codes, before PutObject and CreateMultipartUpload store anything. * s3api: answer rejected SSE headers with InvalidArgument, as S3 does S3 rejects an unknown x-amz-server-side-encryption value and SSE-C combined with another method with InvalidArgument. PutObject and CreateMultipartUpload now return that code, with S3's messages, through two new error codes; CopyObject keeps its own. Also run ceph/s3-tests' test_put_obj_enc_conflict_c_s3, _c_kms and _bad_enc_kms in CI, which check both handlers' responses end to end. * s3api: close the remaining ways a PUT could skip requested encryption - A repeated x-amz-server-side-encryption header is rejected: the encryption paths apply only the first value, so extra values could hide the method the client asked for. - KMS options (key id, encryption context, bucket key) are rejected unless the method is aws:kms, matching the S3 InvalidArgument error. - CreateMultipartUpload validates before auto-create, so a refused upload cannot leave a bucket behind. - Directory markers encrypt their inline content through the shared SSE path and record the same entry metadata as regular objects, instead of storing requested-encrypted bytes in plaintext. * s3api: read back what the SSE marker write stores - Repeated SSE-C and KMS option headers are rejected alongside a repeated x-amz-server-side-encryption, closing the same first-value bypass for customer-key and KMS fields. - Algorithm validity is checked before KMS options so an unsupported value keeps the "not supported" error. - serveDirectoryContent decrypts marker content with the stored SSE metadata and returns the SSE headers, so an encrypted marker reads back what was written; its Content-Length now reflects the bytes actually served. * s3api: HEAD of a marker skips decryption and keeps the stored size HEAD returns no body, so it now runs only the SSE-C key check instead of decrypting — matching HeadObjectHandler and avoiding a KMS round-trip — and chunk-backed directory entries report Attributes.FileSize again rather than the length of their (empty) inline content. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: keep GET Content-Length to the bytes serveDirectoryContent writes The FileSize override described chunk-backed markers on HEAD, but GET sends only the inline content, so it promised bytes it never wrote. * s3api: stream a chunk-backed directory on GET like any object A directory promoted over an uploaded object keeps the object chunks with empty inline content, so serving only entry.Content made GET deliver nothing while HEAD reported FileSize. GET now routes those entries through the regular volume-server stream, keeping the two methods consistent. * s3api: answer a busy volume read with RequestBytesExceed --------- Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chrislusf@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Chris LuandDevin
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9a9bd67efe |
s3api: do not re-run permission checks in the aws-chunked reader (#11655)
calculateSeedSignature called verifyV4Signature with shouldCheckPermissions=true, which runs VerifyActionPermission — a check that does not consult bucket policies. Every caller of newChunkedReader is already behind the Auth middleware, which does evaluate them, so a principal allowed only by the bucket policy was authorized upstream and then denied when the handler built the body reader: aws-chunked PutObject/UploadPart (botocore's default shape over TLS, PyArrow's over HTTP as well) failed with AccessDenied. The reader now verifies only the signature; a wrong secret is still SignatureDoesNotMatch. The non-streaming paths already work this way. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Chris LuandDevin
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9a365549c3 |
catalog: refused writes answer 403 to callers that can read the entry (#11650)
* s3tables: answer a denied write with 403 when the caller can read the entry Update/Delete/Rename answered every authorization refusal as not-found so the denial leaked no existence signal. For a caller allowed to GetTable (or GetView) the same entry, the veil hides nothing it could not load — yet a refused write was still answered 404, so clients saw a table they just loaded reported as missing. When the write check fails, re-check read permission on the same entry: readable entries get 403 AccessDenied; invisible ones keep the not-found answer. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * iceberg: map UpdateTable errors through writeManagerError on commit paths CommitTable and CommitTransaction answered any non-conflict UpdateTable failure, including AccessDenied and NoSuchTable, with a bare 500. A 500 reads as outcome-unknown to clients (PyIceberg raises CommitStateUnknownException) where a refused commit is a plain ForbiddenException, matching what the drop and rename handlers already emit through the same mapper. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3tables: keep the not-found veil over views and match the real read check on renames UpdateTable and DeleteTable read shared metadata without checking the entry kind, so a denied write on a view reported 403 to a GetTable-only caller where a missing name reports 404. The rename visibility check also fed resource tags into GetView evaluation that the real GetView path never supplies. * s3tables: gofmt handler_table.go Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Chris LuandDevin
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56fbc3deb5 |
s3api: align S3/IAM error responses with AWS (#11632)
* s3err: add InvalidArgument and AuthorizationHeaderMalformed codes Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: answer unrecognized bucket PUT sub-resources with 501 A PUT on a bucket carrying an unrecognized query (logging, metrics, intelligent-tiering, ...) fell through to the bare CreateBucket route and returned BucketAlreadyOwnedByYou or re-created the bucket. AWS answers these with NotImplemented. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: reject malformed copy-source and multipart PUT parameters A malformed X-Amz-Copy-Source or a non-numeric partNumber fell through to the plain PutObject route and stored the body as a regular object. Answer them with InvalidArgument-class errors instead of writing data. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: verify x-amz-content-sha256 against the streamed body A PUT carrying a hex or base64 payload hash now streams through a verifier that reports a mismatch once the stream is exhausted, instead of storing an object that does not match its declared hash. The error is deferred so intermediate reads that drop (n>0, err) results cannot silently swallow it. Sentinel values (unsigned/streaming payloads) remain exempt and malformed values fail fast. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: map truncated SigV4 headers to the error for the missing field AWS answers an Authorization header missing Credential= with InvalidArgument and one missing or malformed Signature= with AuthorizationHeaderMalformed, instead of a generic MissingFields. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: answer IAM/STS failures in the query-protocol envelope Embedded IAM and STS routes now report authentication, form-parse and authorization failures with the IAM ErrorResponse body instead of the S3 Error envelope, so IAM SDK clients can parse them. Requests signed for s3 keep the S3 envelope, keyed off the credential scope. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: return 403 AccessDenied when the request has no Date Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: answer throttling rejections as SlowDown ErrTooManyRequest and ErrRequestBytesExceed reported made-up codes; AWS serves these throttling rejections as SlowDown. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: reject versionId requests on buckets that never had versioning GET, HEAD and DELETE carrying a non-empty versionId on an unversioned bucket now fail with InvalidArgument instead of being answered as a plain object request. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: answer DeleteObjects over 1000 keys with MalformedXML Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: InvalidArgument for non-numeric or out-of-range part numbers partNumber=abc, 0 and >10000 all resolve to InvalidArgument, matching AWS, instead of InvalidPart. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * iam: correct LimitExceeded, InvalidAction and ServiceFailure mappings LimitExceeded is a conflict (409), an unknown Action is InvalidAction (404) rather than NotImplemented, and internal failures report the IAM receiver fault type. Applies to both the embedded IAM endpoint and the standalone iamapi server. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * iam: refuse DeleteUser while access keys remain Deleting a user with live credentials orphaned its access keys; AWS answers DeleteConflict until they are removed first. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test/s3: add S3/IAM error-response compatibility harness * s3: return InvalidArgument for malformed x-amz-content-sha256 A header value that decodes to neither 32-byte hex nor base64 is a malformed argument, not a hash mismatch. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test: stop spawned mini when readiness times out A slow-starting server otherwise survives the failure path and keeps the S3 port occupied for the next run. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test: register atexit cleanup before setup A failed setup previously skipped cleanup, leaking the bucket and IAM user on persistent servers. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3api: reject unrouted subresources on the DELETE bucket catch-all PutBucketHandler gained the same guard when the route-level check moved into the handlers; DeleteBucketHandler was missed, so an authorized DELETE /bucket?logging could delete the bucket instead of answering NotImplemented. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test: tolerate unset fixture variables in cleanup and cover DELETE ?logging Cleanup now runs its IAM/multipart steps only when setup reached them, so an early setup failure still removes the bucket. Added a DELETE bucket-subresource case asserting NotImplemented and bucket survival. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test: fail a case when its side-effect check reports a regression A non-empty check note now fails the case, so a deleted bucket or an object created by a malformed request cannot slip through behind a passing status check. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |