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813c439af6e19b9be79b8d6363e44e4a5b29553c
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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Chris Lu
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813c439af6 |
admin: regenerate the gzipped static mirror (#10859)
The toast and modal changes edited static/js/ without rerunning gen_static_gz.go, so the embedded assets served to browsers still carry the old scripts and TestStaticGzMirror fails on master. |
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Chris Lu
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bd34565e56 |
admin: keep the copy confirmation in front of the access key modal (#10856)
* admin: raise nested modals above the ones already open Bootstrap gives every modal and every backdrop the same z-index, so a modal opened while another is showing paints behind it and its buttons cannot be clicked. Viewing an access key secret and then copying a field left the confirmation stuck behind the details modal with no way to dismiss it. Give each nested modal, and the backdrop Bootstrap creates for it, a z-index above what is already on screen, and put back the scroll lock that Bootstrap drops as soon as any one of them closes. * admin: confirm clipboard copies with a toast The access key details modal offers three copy buttons, and each one raised a modal that had to be dismissed before the next copy. Confirm with a toast instead, so the credentials stay in view and nothing has to be clicked away. |
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Chris Lu
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8a532cc0cf |
mini: state the format of a -tableBucket, do not infer it (#10851)
* mini: state the format of a -tableBucket, do not infer it
A table bucket holds one format and that format decides which catalog can
serve it, but the flag only took names. The format came from
miniTableBucketFormat(): Iceberg whenever its port was up, Lance only when
it was not. So -tableBucket=vectors on a default mini quietly made an
ICEBERG bucket that the Lance namespace then refused every table in, and
the only way to get a Lance one was -s3.port.iceberg=0, which buys it by
deleting the other catalog. One flag, two meanings, decided by an unrelated
port.
Each entry is now name[:FORMAT], unsuffixed meaning ICEBERG as before:
weed mini -tableBucket=warehouse,vectors:LANCE
Both catalogs stay up and both buckets are reachable. A name whose format
has no endpoint here is skipped with a warning rather than created out of
reach, and the Iceberg-only S3_TABLE_BUCKET default-routing hint gets the
Iceberg names alone, without their suffixes.
* mini: do not reuse a table bucket that holds another format
CreateTableBucket answers BucketAlreadyExists on the name alone, so
-tableBucket=vectors against a bucket created as LANCE logged "already
exists" and moved on, and the Iceberg default-warehouse hint then pointed
at it. Every table create against that catalog fails with "table bucket
vectors holds LANCE tables", far from the flag that chose it.
ensureMiniTableBuckets now reads the format of a bucket it did not create,
warns when it is not the one asked for, and returns only the buckets that
hold what was requested. S3_TABLE_BUCKET is seeded from that list, so an
unprefixed Iceberg request falls back to its own default rather than
committing into a Lance bucket. A bucket predating declared formats reports
an empty one and still accepts either.
* mini: normalize S3_TABLE_BUCKET whichever way the spec arrived
The rewrite that keeps Lance names out of the Iceberg default warehouse only
ran when the flag supplied the spec. Set the variable directly, as the docker
quickstart does, and it reached the catalog untouched: S3_TABLE_BUCKET=
vectors:LANCE,warehouse made the unprefixed default the literal string
"vectors:LANCE", a bucket no lookup finds, while warehouse sat behind it.
The variable is both mini's input and the catalog's routing hint, so it is
now always rewritten from the buckets that came back holding Iceberg tables,
and unset when there are none rather than left pointing somewhere stale.
* mini: reuse a table bucket only when its format reads back
An ordinary S3 bucket wearing the name answers CreateTableBucket with the
same BucketAlreadyExists as a table bucket does, and the format lookup that
follows returned "" for a failed read exactly as it does for a bucket
predating declared formats. So -bucket=data -tableBucket=data reported
nothing and published data as the Iceberg default warehouse, where every
unprefixed request 404s on a bucket that is not a catalog.
The lookup now returns its error, and only a bucket that reads back as the
format asked for is reused. Anything else is left alone with a warning
naming why, rather than routed to and discovered later.
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Chris Lu
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83753ccdad |
test: drive the Lance namespace with LanceDB (#10850)
* test: drive the Lance namespace with LanceDB
The Iceberg catalog is checked against Spark, Trino, ClickHouse, Doris,
Dremio and RisingWave. The Lance one had only its own reference client,
which is the same thing as checking it against ourselves.
LanceDB connects with connect_namespace("rest", ...), which speaks the
routes this catalog implements, so the suite exercises the protocol rather
than our idea of it: list the catalog, open a table through it, read the
schema, run a vector search and a filtered scan, create a table, and read
the same dataset straight off its URI with no catalog at all.
table_names -> ['lancedb-p0guidmm$ml$embeddings']
open_table -> 64 rows
search -> [1, 0, 2]
create_table -> 4 rows, listed by the catalog
direct read without the catalog -> 64 rows
Seeding is pylance, because the namespace records where a table lives and
does not carry its data. That split is the design rather than a limit of
the test.
One interop note the test encodes: a gateway without STS vends
storage_options carrying an endpoint and a region but no credentials, and
LanceDB uses what the namespace vends on some paths. The container gets
credentials in its environment as well, which is what a deployment without
STS would do.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm
* test: pin the LanceDB client, and index before searching
Three from review.
The client's dependencies were unpinned, so an unrelated upstream release
could change what an old commit reproduces. Pinned to the versions this
suite was verified against; the client is as much the thing under test as
the server.
The search was called ANN and was not: without an index LanceDB scans.
The test now builds an IVF_PQ index over 1024 rows first, which is worth
more than the wording fix - an index writes into a directory of the table
that the S3 door has to admit, and that guard has refused a Lance
directory before. It builds, covers all 1024 rows, and searches.
The assertion moved with it. Demanding the exact nearest neighbour was
right for a brute-force scan and wrong for a quantized index, which
answered 0 as readily as 1; both are correct, so the check is now the
neighbourhood.
And the pushdown check accepted any failure. It now requires the refusal
to be the catalog's Unsupported and requires that nothing was left behind,
or, when the client falls back, that the table is complete.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm
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Chris Lu
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6f3b5a4f4d |
metrics: graph the plugin workers (#10849)
Nothing displayed the worker metrics, and the panels that look like they did are about something else: Workers Connected, Worker Slots and Worker Events in the Admin / Maintenance row read SeaweedFS_admin_*, which the older maintenance queue feeds. A cluster running plugin workers - Go or Rust - reads zero there while they are connected and busy. A Plugin Workers row graphs what the workers themselves publish: how many are connected, jobs and their failures, detection and proposal rates, job duration, slot usage, stream events, and what the Lance jobs reclaimed. The panel worth having is Objects Seen vs Skipped, since a sweep with nothing to do and a sweep that could read nothing report the same number of proposals. Also a commented scrape target in the sample Prometheus config. It is 9328 rather than 9327: the sample compose already gives 9327 to the S3 gateway, so the port the worker's own usage text suggests collides with it on a single host. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm |
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Chris Lu
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f56a7a1557 |
seaweed-worker: serve health, readiness and metrics (#10848)
* seaweed-worker: serve health, readiness and metrics A Rust worker had no surface of its own. If it wedged, the only signals were its stdout and whatever admin could infer from a stream that had gone quiet; nothing could be scraped and nothing could be alerted on. --metrics-port serves /health, /ready and /metrics, the same three the Go worker serves under -metricsPort, so one scrape config covers workers in either language. Off by default, loopback unless --metrics-ip says otherwise, since the endpoint is unauthenticated. Names follow the Go convention, SeaweedFS_worker_*. The counters live in core and are raised where the stream already knows what happened - connect, close, detection, execution, preview - so a worker for another format gets them without writing any of this. Slots are published from the heartbeat that already computes them, so a scrape and the admin UI cannot disagree. The pair worth having is objects_seen_total and objects_skipped_total. A sweep that proposed nothing because there was nothing to do and a sweep that proposed nothing because it could not read anything are the same number of proposals; they are not the same event, and until now only a log line told them apart. The Lance jobs add what they reclaimed - fragments, rows brought under an index, versions, bytes - on the same registry, so one endpoint serves both. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * seaweed-worker: fix the metrics address, the count, and a dead field Three from review. --metrics-ip ::1 failed at startup: the address was built by joining host and port with a colon, and "::1:9327" is not an address. It is parsed as a host and combined with SocketAddr::new now, so an IPv6 literal works, with or without the brackets an operator will reasonably type after seeing one in a URL. proposals_total counted before the send rather than after, so a stream that closed mid-sweep left the counter claiming proposals admin never received. And MeteredSender carried a Metrics clone and a job type it never read, kept alive by two statements that existed only to silence the warning about them. Everything is recorded by the caller, so both are gone. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm |
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Chris Lu
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fc97f8ea8f |
mount: index directory state by path (#10827)
Every directory-state lookup went through path2inode, the map that holds one full path per inode in the table, and then through dirStates. Directories now carry their own path and are indexed by it directly. There are orders of magnitude fewer directories than files, so this map stays small whatever the mount holds, and it is what a file needs before it can stop carrying a full path of its own: a child's path is its parent's plus its name. No behavior change - the two indexes are asserted to agree. |
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Chris Lu
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8c7d714d5e |
Lance catalog, and a Rust plugin worker to maintain it (#10841)
* iceberg: skip tables the maintenance worker does not own A Lance dataset registered through the Lance namespace's Iceberg REST adapter arrives as an Iceberg table with a placeholder schema and table_type=lance, and keeps its fragments under data/ - the same subdirectory the orphan cleaner walks. Every fragment is unreferenced by the Iceberg metadata, so a maintenance pass deletes the dataset. Views share the entry shape and were only skipped because parsing their metadata happened to fail first. Gate the scan and the execution path on the entry actually being an Iceberg table. Maintenance is off by default, so this was latent rather than live. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * s3tables: let a table declare a format the catalog does not interpret CreateTable accepted ICEBERG and nothing else. A Lance table has no metadata file for the catalog to maintain - the entry records a name and the dataset root, and the client owns everything under it - so accept LANCE, and carry the declared format on the entry instead of hardcoding it back on the way out. ListTables now reports format and metadataLocation, so listing a catalog that holds both kinds takes one pass rather than a GetTable per row. AWS omits both fields; adding them is additive. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * s3tables: move the in-memory filer into its own package The Lance namespace tests need the same harness, and copying it would leave two of them to keep in step. Extracted as it was, plus the two fidelity gaps that only surface once a paginating caller uses it: ListEntries ignored startFromFileName and limit, so a caller that paginates re-read the first page until it hit its own cap and reported the same entry over and over, and GetFilerConfiguration was missing, which CreateTableBucket needs to resolve the buckets directory. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * lance: serve the Lance Namespace REST spec A second catalog surface beside the Iceberg one, over the same table buckets: the namespace and table metadata operations, the $-delimited identifier codec, the spec's numeric error model, the directory-catalog marker files, and storage_options vending through the STS path the Iceberg catalog already uses. Listens on -port.lance, 9101 by default, and inherits ARNs, policies and tags from the storage layer, so a Lance table needs no second permission model. Identifiers map bucket / namespace / table onto the three levels Lance clients already use, which is why there is no warehouse selector to invent. The data plane needs Lance format support that does not exist in Go and answers with the spec's Unsupported code rather than a bare 404. Two things it deliberately will not do: create a table bucket as a side effect of creating a namespace inside one, since a bucket carries its own policy and lifecycle, and resolve an Iceberg table's location for a Lance client, which would hand it a table another engine owns. The design note this follows is in design-lance-catalog.md, including the .lance directory suffix it proposed and this does not implement. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * mini: give the Lance port the same treatment as the Iceberg one The flag was registered but nothing else knew about it, so mini would start the server without reserving its port, waiting for it, or saying where it is. Adds it to the startup service list, the conflict resolver, the gRPC allocator's reserved set, the readiness wait, the stop reporting and the banner. The admin server still takes only the Iceberg port, because there is no Lance page for it to link to. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * lance: stop deregister and repoint from deleting the dataset Deregistering preserves data by definition, and this did the opposite: the catalog entry is the dataset directory, so DeleteTable took the files with it. Registering over an existing name had the same shape, destroying the dataset the name used to hold. Found by driving the running server rather than the in-memory filer, where both looked like success because the table did stop being listed. Deregistering is now a state on the entry - the marker file hides it, and declaring or registering the name again brings it back. Repointing a name at another dataset is an UpdateTable against the version token, so neither dataset loses files. Drop is left alone; it is the operation that does remove data. The storage endpoint now falls back to the advertised -ip where the Iceberg derivation gives up. An Iceberg client brings its own s3.endpoint and advertising the wrong one hijacks it, but storage_options is the only place a Lance client learns where the store is, and without it object_store quietly talks to real AWS. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * s3tables: refuse to create a table over one of another format Creating a table that already exists is idempotent, and that path returned the existing table without looking at its format. A Lance declare over an Iceberg table answered 200 and handed back a directory Iceberg owns, so the client would write its dataset on top. The view check immediately above it already guards the same class of collision. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * s3tables: let a table bucket hold a format other than Iceberg The S3 door validated every object written into a table bucket against Iceberg's file layout, so a Lance client could not write its dataset at all: it got 403 on data/*.lance, on _versions/, and on the _transactions/ directory it turned out to write as well. Table buckets were only neutral containers by intention; in practice they were Iceberg-shaped and enforced as such. The allowed set is now the union of what the supported formats write, because the validator runs where the table's format is not in hand. Underscore-prefixed directories are treated as belonging to the format, since enumerating them means guessing at the next one - _transactions is exactly the one this missed - and their contents are checked only for traversal. Iceberg writes none of them, so it loses nothing. Marker files at the table root are admitted too, which the namespace/table/dir/file shape had rejected as too shallow. Describe also honours the request-body spellings of with_table_uri, load_detailed_metadata and check_declared. The spec puts them in the query string, but real clients send both. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * design: record what the implementation found The table bucket being an Iceberg-shaped container, enforced at the S3 door, was the premise this design never questioned and the one that had to change before anything worked end to end. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * iceberg: prove the data loss the foreign-format guard prevents The guard landed with a unit test for the predicate and nothing showing what it saves. These seed what the Lance namespace's Iceberg REST adapter actually leaves behind - an Iceberg table with a placeholder schema and table_type=lance whose directory holds a Lance dataset - and assert both halves: orphan collection does flag the dataset's fragments, because the Iceberg metadata beside them references nothing, and the scan never reaches the table. An ordinary Iceberg table in the same shape is still scanned, so the guard is not just skipping everything. Confirmed against a running gateway first: our Iceberg catalog accepts the adapter's registration, and a real Lance client then writes a dataset into that table's location. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * s3tablestest: make the in-memory filer safe to race against Two gaps that only matter once a test drives concurrent writers, which is what an exclusive create has to be tested with: the entry map had no lock, and CreateEntry ignored O_EXCL entirely, so both writers of the same name would have won and the test would have passed while proving nothing. The BeforeUpdate hook runs before the lock is taken. Its whole purpose is to land a competing write in a handler's read-to-write window, and that write needs the lock the hook would otherwise be holding. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * lance: make the namespace an external manifest store Lance commits a version by writing _versions/{v}.manifest with put-if-not-exists. The S3 layer in front of this same filer evaluates If-None-Match by looking the entry up and then writing without a precondition, so two writers can both pass the check and one commit is lost. The filer itself has the primitive: CreateEntry with o_excl. Adds the four version operations a Lance client actually calls - create, list, describe and batch-delete - recording one entry per version under _lance_versions/, and advertises managed_versioning so the client routes its commits here. Reserving a version is the exclusive create, so exactly one of several racing writers wins and the rest rebase. Off by default, behind -lance.managedVersioning. Turning it on moves where a table's version history lives, and a reader that does not come through this namespace no longer sees all of it; that is the operator's call, not a default. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * design: record what managed versioning does and does not reach The first commit through a namespace-backed store works and is recorded the way the protocol specifies. Later commits do not, because lance 4.0.0 refuses put_if_exists on that path in its own code, so the feature is capped upstream rather than here. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * test: integration tests for the Lance namespace Everything this surface got wrong so far - a deregister that deleted the dataset, an S3 door that refused every Lance file, a version reservation that could not actually be exclusive - passed against an in-memory filer first. So these run against a live gateway, and where the claim is about data they check storage rather than visibility. Five Go tests on the shared harness: namespace and table lifecycle including that deregister keeps the bytes and drop removes them, that a Lance client cannot resolve or declare over an Iceberg table, that a Lance dataset's files get past the table-bucket layout guard while junk still does not, and that eight writers racing for one version produce exactly one winner. One Docker-gated test drives the real Lance client, which is the only way to check that the location and storage_options the namespace vends are between them enough to write and read a dataset. It overrides the endpoint with the container's view of the same gateway, because the shared harness binds a wildcard address and so vends none. The harness gains a Lance port and turns managed versioning on; the flag touches nothing outside that surface. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * s3tables: a directory with no namespace metadata is a missing namespace Three callers resolved a namespace by reading its metadata attribute and each tested only for a missing entry, so a directory that carried no metadata came back as an internal error saying "attribute not found". Creating a table under a namespace that does not exist answered 500. Collapses the three copies into one helper that reports both conditions as absent, which is what they are: a directory without namespace metadata is not a namespace. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * iceberg: stop reporting storage-layer refusals as server faults writeManagerError recognised a missing table bucket and sent everything else to 500, so a missing namespace, a duplicate name and a commit conflict all reached the client as InternalServerError with nothing to act on. Creating a table in a namespace that does not exist is the case that turned up: 500 where the spec wants 404 NoSuchNamespaceException. Maps the storage error types onto the exception names this package already uses, and keeps the existing bucket message, which explains how to select a table bucket. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * iceberg: skip a foreign-format table by name, not by failing to parse it A table the namespace created as LANCE carries no Iceberg metadata, so the worker skipped it only because the parse failed, and logged that as damaged metadata. The catalog records the format on the entry and this never read it. Reading it turns an accident into a decision, and separates a mixed catalog from a corrupt one in the logs. The property check beside it still covers the other shape: a real Iceberg table wearing table_type=lance, which is what the Lance namespace's Iceberg REST adapter writes. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * design: answer whether a Lance table needs maintenance It does, and index optimization has no Iceberg equivalent: rows written after an index was built are not covered by it, so a vector search quietly misses them. None of the three jobs can run in the Go worker, and there is no useful subset, because deciding what an old version still references means parsing Lance manifests. Version cleanup at least has an answer that needs nothing from us - Lance can enable it on the dataset itself. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * design: the Lance maintenance worker is a plugin worker, in Rust Framing it as a sidecar was wrong. plugin.proto already defines a language-agnostic gRPC contract for external maintenance workers, and "weed worker -admin=..." is the Go reference implementation of it from outside the admin process. seaweed-volume already compiles protos out of weed/pb with tonic_build, so a Lance worker is that build plus plugin.proto and the lance crate. Scheduling, retries, dedupe, progress and the admin settings page all come from the protocol: a worker that answers RequestConfigSchema with a descriptor gets its configuration form rendered without a line of Go. The data plane is the part that genuinely does need a process answering HTTP, and this had the two conflated. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * seaweed-worker: Rust plugin worker workspace, with Lance as the first one plugin.proto is language-agnostic and the Rust toolchain was already in the tree, so a Lance maintenance worker needs no new integration surface: core is the contract and nothing else, and a worker crate beside it supplies handlers and a binary. A second worker is a new member here rather than a fork of the protocol, which is why this is seaweed-worker and not seaweed-lance-worker. Verified against a running admin: it connects, is accepted, and admin prefetches descriptors for lance_compact, lance_optimize_indices and lance_cleanup_versions, so their settings pages render from the Rust side without a line of Go. The stream stays up across heartbeats. The job bodies are stubs that report failure. Doing the work means adding the lance crate and opening the dataset, and claiming success before that would be worse than saying so. Two things running it caught that reading the proto did not: the admin address has to be converted to the gRPC port the way pb.ServerToGrpcAddress does, or the dial fails as an h2 frame error; and the generated field names differ from the Go ones in several places, so JobCompleted carries success rather than a state enum. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * lance worker: implement compaction Detection lists tables from the namespace, opens each one, and proposes a job for any with more fragments than the policy allows; opening a dataset reads its manifest and not its data, so a sweep stays cheap. Execution re-resolves the table rather than trusting what detection saw - it may have been repointed, and the vended credentials expire - then compacts and reports the fragment counts either side. Verified against a live gateway: a twelve-fragment dataset became one fragment with all twelve rows intact. The test drives the handler directly and skips unless WEED_LANCE_NAMESPACE names a namespace, the way the Go integration tests skip without Docker. Running it turned up a gap the design had not: a gateway without STS vends no credentials at all, so the worker could not open anything and detection quietly proposed nothing. --access-key/--secret-key are the fallback, and whatever the namespace vends still wins over them. Two API assumptions did not survive contact either. Datasets open through DatasetBuilder::with_storage_options, not ReadParams, and lance 10's ObjectStoreParams has no storage_options field at all. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * lance worker: implement index optimization and version cleanup Index optimization is the job with no Iceberg equivalent: rows appended after an index was built are invisible to a search of it until this runs. Detection reads num_unindexed_rows from each index's statistics and proposes a table once more rows sit outside its indices than the budget allows; a table with no indices is skipped, which is different from one whose indices have fallen behind. Cleanup applies a retention window, refusing rather than silently dropping a tagged version, and leaving unverified files alone because they may belong to a commit still in flight. Both verified against a live gateway: 512 uncovered rows became 0, and a fourteen-version table lost its old ones. Each test now seeds what it needs, including building an IVF_PQ index and appending rows outside it. The first version of these depended on state a script had left, so the second run found the work already done and asserted nothing - a test that passes by doing nothing is worse than no test. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * lance: answer an empty catalog with an empty list, not null ListAllTables built its result from a nil slice, so a namespace holding no tables answered {"tables":null} on a field the spec marks required. A generated client may decode that differently from an empty list. Found running the namespace on a dev box, where the catalog was empty. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * admin: give Lance maintenance its own scheduler lane Lane assignment is a hardcoded map, so the three lance_* job types fell through to the default lane. That lane serialises its work under the cluster admin lock because volume management shares global state, which would queue a table's compaction behind volume balancing for no reason - Iceberg has its own lock-free lane for exactly this. Adds the lane, maps the three job types to it, and puts it in the sidebar beside Iceberg and Lifecycle. The lane routes were already generic, so only the nav was hand-written. The lane-coverage test spelled out the three known lanes, so a fourth failed it. It now checks against AllLanes(), which is the property it was reaching for and does not need editing next time. Found by connecting the Rust worker to a real admin: it registered fine and its job types were known, but they were filed under "default" and had no page. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * lance worker: log what detection saw "Detection proposed nothing" and "the worker could not read the table" look identical from the admin side, and the second is what a missing credential produces. One line per table separates them. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * lance worker: fix a leaked heartbeat and a silent reconnect loop spawn_heartbeat returned a handle to an empty task rather than the ticker it had just spawned, so aborting it aborted nothing and every reconnect left another heartbeat running against a dead channel. A stream that admin closes cleanly is not an error, but reconnecting in silence hides why. Two workers sharing an id evict each other forever and the log shows nothing but a login every five seconds - which is exactly how this presented on a dev box, and it took a look at the admin's own log to see it. The message now names the id to check. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * lance: a namespace cannot be created without its parent Storage keeps a namespace's parts flattened, so creating "a.b" with no "a" was accepted and left an intermediate that only existed inside a name. Listing derives child names by slicing those parts, so it reported "a", while describe and exists on "a" both answered 404 - a client walking the tree got a 404 on something the listing had just handed it. The spec asks for NamespaceNotFound when the parent is missing, which is also what keeps listing and describe telling the same story. Namespaces created through the S3 Tables API still bypass this, so listing keeps deriving intermediates rather than hiding whatever is already there. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * admin: say why a non-Iceberg table shows no schema The table pages read Iceberg metadata for schema and snapshots, and a Lance table has none, so both panels rendered "No schema available" - which reads as an empty table rather than a table this page cannot describe. The dataset behind the one that prompted this holds 1024 rows. The format is already on the entry and shown two rows above, so the empty states now use it: the catalog records where a LANCE table lives, not what is in it. Reading the schema for real needs Lance format code, which is the same wall as the data plane. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * seaweed-worker: run rustfmt over the workspace Committed the crates unformatted, so `cargo fmt --all --check` failed on files nothing had touched since. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * plugin: let a worker report what it saw about an object Admin cannot read a Lance table: it knows where the dataset lives and nothing else, so the details page had a location and two empty panels. The worker already opens every dataset during detection to decide whether it needs compacting, so it knows the schema, the row count and the fragment count at that moment. It just had no way to say so. Add a WorkerObservations body to the worker stream. Admin caches the last observation per object and serves it back, timestamped, for display; nothing schedules from it. The Lance compaction sweep reports what it opened, and the S3 Tables details page fills its schema panel from the cache when it has no metadata of its own, badged with when the worker looked and which worker it was. Nothing about this is Lance-specific past the reporting side, which is the point: any format admin cannot parse can describe itself the same way. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * design: record the observation channel Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * plugin: ask a worker for sample rows of a table admin cannot read Browse Data reads an Iceberg table's Parquet files directly, so it shows real rows. For a Lance table it showed "Table has no Iceberg metadata" and an empty grid, because there is no Go Lance reader and never will be one worth maintaining. The worker has the reader. Add RequestObjectPreview / ObjectPreviewResponse to the stream, mirroring the config-schema round trip that already exists, and give the Rust worker a PreviewProvider that scans the dataset and formats the rows with Arrow's own formatter, so a vector column reads as a vector. Admin picks the worker from the observation store: whichever one last described this table is the one that can read it. Unlike an observation the rows are not cached. They are the table's data rather than a description of it, and a copy sitting in admin would be both stale and nobody's business. The page fetches on load, bounded at 200 rows and a 15 second round trip, and drops the snapshot and data-file panels that only mean something for Iceberg. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * design: record the preview channel Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * test: disable the lance listener when two gateways share a host * test: keep AllocatePorts away from the lance default port * s3tables: let a table bucket declare the format it holds A bucket is a catalog, and a catalog serves one protocol. Format was recorded per table, so nothing could answer "where do I point a client at this bucket" without opening a table first, and an empty bucket had no answer at all. CreateTableBucket takes an optional format, stored with the rest of the bucket metadata and returned by Get and List. Empty means ICEBERG, which is what AWS S3 Tables serves and therefore what an SDK that has never heard of the field means. CreateTable refuses a table of another format, and CreateView refuses outright in a bucket that is not Iceberg, since a view is Iceberg metadata. Buckets that already exist carry no declaration and keep accepting anything, so nothing is migrated and nothing that worked stops working. The Lance namespace declares LANCE for the buckets it creates, which is what stops one of them being described to a client as an Iceberg catalog. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * admin: take the Lance port the way it takes the Iceberg one The UI cannot name the endpoint that serves a Lance bucket without it, and every format-aware page below needs to. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * admin: show which format a table bucket holds The bucket list printed an Iceberg endpoint for every bucket, including ones holding Lance datasets, where that endpoint serves nothing. It was the most visible place the UI assumed one format. The list gains a Format column and its endpoint column follows the bucket's declaration. The banner names both endpoints rather than asserting everything is Iceberg, and says so only for the servers that are actually running. Create Bucket picks a format with two cards rather than a dropdown, since what matters is not the name but which clients can read the result, and the endpoint under them updates as you choose so the operator leaves the modal knowing where to point one. A bucket from before the declaration existed shows "unset" in an outline badge, explained on hover. It is a fact about the bucket's age, not a fault, so nothing nags about it. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * admin: carry the bucket's format into the pages inside it Namespaces and tables are reached through a bucket, so both now say which catalog they belong to rather than making you go back up to find out. The tables list gains a Format column and a Rows column filled from what a worker last observed, since for a format admin cannot read that is the only row count there is; a table nothing has looked at shows a dash, not a zero. Create Table stops offering a choice the bucket has already made: in a declared bucket the format is fixed and says why, and only an undeclared one still offers both. Before this the select had exactly one option, hardcoded, which made a Lance table impossible to create from the UI at all. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * admin: let the table page speak the table's own format Partitions and Snapshot History are Iceberg's shape. Rendering them empty for a Lance table reads as a fault; a Lance table has neither, and says so by not showing them. In their place is a Versions panel, which is what that format calls its history, carrying the worker's timestamp so it is clear the numbers are a cached look rather than something read live. The breadcrumb carries the format badge, so the page names what it is looking at before you read a panel and wonder why it is empty. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * admin: show how to connect to either catalog, and group the two format workers The client examples on the buckets page were Iceberg's alone, so the one thing an operator wants after creating a Lance bucket - what to type to reach it - was not written down anywhere in the UI. Both formats now get a pair of snippets, and only for a server that is running. In the Workers menu, Iceberg moves below Lifecycle so it sits next to Lance: the two table-format workers together, the two cluster-wide ones above them. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * shell: create a table bucket of either format s3tables.bucket -create takes -format, so a Lance bucket can be made without going through the UI. The integration harness passes it too: its Lance tests were creating Iceberg buckets and getting away with it only because nothing checked. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * design: record that a bucket declares its format Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * lance: drop managed versioning; the store already orders commits The namespace offered itself as an external manifest store, so that a commit could reserve a version through a real put-if-not-exists. That was designed around a gateway that no longer exists: If-None-Match: * is reduced to a filer WriteCondition and evaluated at the object's owner under its per-path lock, or under the object write lock on the fallback path. Sixteen writers racing one fresh key get a single 200 and fifteen 412s, every time. Lance needs nothing else. commit_handler_from_url hands every s3:// dataset a ConditionalPutCommitHandler, which puts with PutMode::Create, which object_store sends as If-None-Match: *. So the feature solved a problem this store does not have, while moving a table's version history out of the dataset and into the catalog - and lance could not use it past the first commit anyway, since its own namespace-backed store answers "put_if_not_exists is not supported" to the second. The version operations answer Unsupported with the rest, managed_versioning is false, and the flag is gone. In place of the reserve-once test there is one that races eight writers at the manifest key through S3, which is the path a commit actually takes. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * lance worker: honour the version floor, the slot limits, and a shutdown Five findings from review, all of them things the worker claimed to do and did not. The version floor was checked when a cleanup job was proposed and ignored when it ran, so a table whose versions had aged past the retention window in between could be taken below the count the operator asked to keep. Execution now computes the floor itself and passes it as before_version; CleanupPolicy ANDs its clauses, so a version has to be both too old and below the floor to go. Both settings are clamped to the range the form offers, since Duration::hours panics on a large enough value and a negative min-versions wraps to a huge usize. Admin's shutdown was answered by returning from the stream, which the reconnect loop read as a healthy close and logged straight back in: the worker could not be stopped. serve_once now says which of the two happened. The advertised concurrency limits bounded nothing - every request spawned a task - and the heartbeat reported zero slots in use whatever was running. Both now go through semaphores sized from the limits, with the permits held for the life of the request and reported in the heartbeat. A namespace call had no timeout, so a gateway that accepted the connection and went quiet held a detection slot forever. And one table whose stats could not be read failed the whole sweep, losing the proposals for every table already scanned; it is now skipped and warned about, like a table that cannot be opened. The tests drove one shared catalog concurrently, which is why one of them asserted "no proposals at all" and passed by luck. They now take a lock and judge only their own tables. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * admin: fix the review findings on the format-aware pages The endpoint hint in Create Bucket built its HTML by concatenating the bucket name the operator is typing, so a name like <img onerror=...> ran in the admin origin as they typed it. It is built from DOM nodes now. A preview reply looked its channel up under the lock and then sent outside it, which Shutdown can close in between: a Gosched in that gap panics with "send on closed channel" every time. The send now happens under the lock. Observations were looked up by path alone, so a table dropped and remade in another format at the same path was described by the observation left behind. Lookups now have to agree on the format. Also: the Lance namespace caps a request body rather than reading whatever arrives; the details action no longer says "Iceberg" over a Lance table; mini stops advertising a catalog port when it is not running S3; a format whose server this cluster does not run cannot be picked in the modal or accepted by the API, since a bucket nothing can reach is not worth creating; and the unused catalogPortFor helper is gone. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * lance worker: let the control stream use mTLS The channel was hardcoded to http://, so off loopback the stream carried preview rows and execution commands in the clear - and a cluster with grpc TLS turned on would refuse the worker outright. --tls-ca, --tls-cert and --tls-key take the same certificates the Go worker reads from the [grpc.worker] section of security.toml, and must be given together: a CA on its own would quietly mean one-way TLS, which a mutual setup rejects anyway. Without them the stream stays plaintext, which is what the Go worker also does when nothing is configured. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * lance: answer null properties rather than an empty map The catalog does not keep a table's properties. Declare echoed the request's back and describe answered {}, both of which claim they were stored and are empty. Null says the catalog does not keep them, which is what the spec distinguishes and what is true here. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * lance worker: test the slot accounting The heartbeat reporting and the waiting are the two things the semaphores are for, and neither is observable from outside without catching a sweep mid-flight. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * test: fix the mixed-format catalog test, and name the binary it drives The integration suite passed locally and failed in CI on TestLanceRefusesIcebergTables. Both were right: CI builds the binary first, my tree had one from the day before, so locally the test drove a gateway with no format enforcement at all. The test itself no longer holds as written. It made a bucket, put an Iceberg table in it, and checked the Lance surface hid it - but a bucket that declares LANCE now refuses the Iceberg table outright. The invariant still matters from the other side, so it starts from an Iceberg bucket instead: Lance must not describe or list a table whose format it does not serve, and must refuse to declare one beside it. The harness now prints which weed binary it is about to run and when that was built. `make test` rebuilds first; a plain `go test` will happily drive a weeks-old binary and report a pass for code it never ran, which is exactly what happened here. Also make the row-limit conversion in the preview request explicitly bounded: CodeQL flagged the int-to-int32 conversion, and clamping by reassignment beforehand is not a form it recognises. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * lance: prove concurrent commits are kept, and preselect the only format on offer Two more from review. The commit test asserted that exactly one writer wins the conditional PUT, which is the mechanism, not the claim. The claim is that nothing is lost: the losers see the conflict, rebase and commit again. So there is now a test that has eight writers append to one dataset at once and counts the rows afterwards - all eight batches survive. That is also the sequence managed versioning could not finish, since its store refuses the second commit outright. And when Iceberg's endpoint is not running, the format picker offered two options with neither selected, so Create Bucket submitted no format at all, fell back to ICEBERG, and was refused by the guard added last round. Lance is preselected when it is the only format this cluster serves. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * Clamp the remaining worker settings, and bootstrap buckets in a served format Compaction and index optimization read their thresholds and cast straight to usize and u64, so a negative arrives as an enormous number and turns the threshold into "never": compaction and reindexing both go quiet with nothing to say. The cleanup job was fixed last round; these are the same bug. Clamped to the values that stay meaningful rather than to what the form offers - zero uncovered rows is a real setting, meaning reindex as soon as anything is not covered, so the floor there is zero and not the form's thousand. mini pre-creates the buckets named by -tableBucket, and did so without a format, which now means Iceberg. Started with the Iceberg endpoint off and the Lance one on, that left buckets nothing could reach and which refused every Lance table. It takes the format from the endpoint that is actually running, and creates nothing when neither is. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm * s3: allow-unordered is a listing parameter, not an unimplemented subresource The guard that stops a bucket GET with an unknown subresource from being answered with a listing does not know about allow-unordered, so it answers 501 NotImplemented - to a parameter the listing handlers already read and already validate against delimiter. This is why test_bucket_list_unordered and test_bucket_listv2_unordered fail in the Ceph s3-tests suite. They fail on master too; this is not a Lance change and can be taken on its own. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm |
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Chris Lu
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814ee75af4 |
s3: allow-unordered is a listing parameter, not an unimplemented subresource (#10846)
The guard that stops a bucket GET with an unknown subresource from being answered with a listing does not know about allow-unordered, so it answers 501 NotImplemented - to a parameter the listing handlers already read and already validate against delimiter. This is why test_bucket_list_unordered and test_bucket_listv2_unordered fail in the Ceph s3-tests suite. They fail on master too; this is not a Lance change and can be taken on its own. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Rkp1Mw5E89Jp6dzJFYiMrm |
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Chris Lu
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e5edd8be3c |
s3: place multipart part chunks by the destination object's storage rule (#10845)
Multipart parts stage under /buckets/<bucket>/.uploads/<id>/, so the filer resolved filer.conf storage rules against that path when the gateway assigned volumes for them. A rule scoped to a key prefix - fs.configure -locationPrefix=/buckets/b/data/ -ttl=30d - then matched a small object but not the parts of a large one, so an object whose entry carried the rule's TTL had its bytes spread over TTL-less volumes. Assign part chunks against the destination object's filer path instead, the way the x-seaweedfs-destination header made the filer resolve it before the S3 write path moved off the filer proxy. Covers PutObjectPart and both UploadPartCopy paths. The part entry itself is still written under .uploads, so a read-only rule there still rejects it. The lifecycle XML Expiration.Days TTL keeps passing 0 for parts: that rule targets the user-visible object key and would start its clock before CompleteMultipartUpload. |
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Chris Lu
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abd61de52c |
S3: stamp the gateway's own uid/gid on PutObject and copy entries (#10844)
* fix(s3): stamp the gateway's own ids on single-shot PutObject entries putToFiler builds the entry in the gateway now instead of proxying a PUT to the filer, and it hardcoded Uid/Gid 0 while every sibling write path stamps filer_pb.OS_UID/OS_GID. On a non-root deployment that leaves single-shot PUTs and multipart parts owned by root while directories and completed multipart objects keep the real ids, so a mount reader can list the tree but gets EACCES on every open once objects are not world-readable. * fix(s3): stamp mode and ownership on copy destinations CopyObject and UploadPartCopy build the destination attributes themselves and then assign them over the entry filer_pb.MkFile just stamped, so the copy landed with mode 0000 and uid/gid 0 - unreadable on a mount even by the filer's own user. Build the destination with the same mode PutObject resolves for the request and the gateway's own ids. |
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Chris Lu
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804111745a |
mount: discard a path-cache insert that raced a purge (#10842)
* mount: discard a path-cache insert that raced a purge The Windows adapter's walk resolves a component with a Lookup RPC and inserts the result holding no lock, so a purge can land in between - and what the walk just resolved is then the very name the purge removed. Anything opening the old path concurrently with a rename repopulates the cache with the vacated name, which the next stat is served from for up to a second. The release path already guards its equivalent insert; the walk had nothing. The cache counts purges now. A resolve snapshots the generation before its lookups and insert discards the entry when any purge ran in between, parking the reference in the graveyard so the in-flight caller keeps a valid inode either way. Seen once in CI as TestRenameOverExisting failing with 'source survived the rename': every SeaweedFS layer is synchronous with the rename, but a background open of the source - an antivirus scan of the just-written file fits - can requalify the stale name through this window. The assertion also reports what stat returned now, and whether it persisted, so a recurrence indicts a specific layer instead of reading as a mystery. * mount: cover the path-cache discard by key, and let a discard rest Review follow-ups. The generation was global, so any purge between a walk's snapshot and its insert discarded the entry whatever its name - and an open retries resolve-then-steal only four times before failing with EIO, so sustained unrelated churn could fail opens of untouched paths. Purges are remembered by key now and only one that covers the inserted name discards it; past the remembered window the insert is discarded without a check, which only costs a retry. A discard that itself tripped the sweep also handed its own reference straight to forget while the walker was still using the inode. The graveyard holds two generations now, so an appended reference always survives the sweep of the call that appended it - which the displaced-entry and purge paths needed too. Also restores the original path-cache test suite this branch had overwritten instead of extended, and rewords the semantics-test failure so it no longer claims the source survived when stat returned a transient error. * mount: take an open's reference directly instead of stealing it back resolveAndSteal cached the final component only to steal it back, so an open depended on that insert surviving whatever purges raced it - four attempts and then EIO. The keyed purge window narrowed how often an insert is discarded, but past the window the discard is blind again, so the cliff had only moved. A cached entry is still stolen; anything else is now looked up directly, with the caller owning the reference from the start. No retry loop, and no way for churn - covered, unrelated or overflowing the window - to fail an open. Also covers the whole-cache purge: purge of the root with prefix set clears every entry, but the covers check tested for a '/'-prefixed key that a normalised key never has, so it covered no in-flight insert at all. |
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Chris Lu
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da1e5e714f |
mount: move the inode table when a rename arrives from the cluster (#10822)
* mount: leave the target alone when a move has no source MovePath cleared whatever sat at the target before it checked that the source was still there, so a move it then declined to make had already taken the target's mapping apart. The same rename reaching the table twice - once for an open handle, once for the invalidation behind it - was enough to leave the moved inode with no path at all. * mount: move the inode table when a rename arrives from the cluster A rename made by another client reaches this mount only as a metadata event, and the only table update on that path sat inside the open-file-handle branch. Every other inode the kernel still addresses by nodeid kept resolving to its pre-rename path, so the next operation on it went to a path the filer no longer has. Move the entry for every rename invalidation. The filer sends one event per moved entry, so a renamed directory's children follow their parent without a descendant walk. * mount: move the inode table exactly once per rename event Making MovePath return early on a missing source was the wrong half to fix. The source is also missing when the rename came from a client that never visited it, and there the destination really was replaced and has to be unlinked - the early return kept the name resolving to a file the rename destroyed, so a dirty handle on it could still flush over what took its place. The two cases are indistinguishable from inside MovePath, so leave it alone and stop calling it twice: invalidateOpenFileHandle reports whether it moved, and the handler moves only when it did not. Both paths mark a replaced file's handle deleted, which the no-handle path previously did not do at all. * mount: leave a rename alone unless the source is still ours to move Two ways the fallback move could act on state it did not own. A handle whose version guard skipped the event never reached RememberPath, so moving the table under it left the handle flushing to the pre-rename path; the handle path owns its inode's rename, so the fallback now runs only for an inode without one. And the subscription can redeliver a rename once it falls out of the 4096-entry dedup ring. A replay found no source and a live target, unlinked the mapping the first delivery had just made, and marked the moved file's handle deleted - worse than the stale path this set out to fix. Only a source still in the table is moved now. That gives up unlinking a destination the rename replaced when the source was never visited here, which is where this started. It is what the mount already did before this branch, and it is the safer of the two: retaining a stale name costs a wrong lookup, while unlinking the wrong one costs a file's dirty data. * mount: decide a rename move inside the table's lock The source-presence check sat outside MovePath, so two invalidations for one rename could both see the source and the loser would unlink what the winner had just placed - the same damage the check was added to prevent. MovePath makes the decision under its own lock now and reports that nothing moved. The handle a rename destroyed is also marked from the caller rather than from inside invalidateOpenFileHandle, which was setting isDeleted bare on a second handle while holding the first one's lock. markHandleDeleted already takes the lock the flush reads that flag under, and marking from the caller keeps it to one handle lock at a time. The invalidation test harness wires onEntryInvalidation now, the way the mount does, rather than reaching past it. * mount: apply a rename ahead of the handle's version fence The fence exists so an old event cannot roll a handle's entry back to stale content. A rename carries no content: it says the name the inode answered to is gone. Skipping one on the strength of the fence left the inode and the handle both pointing at a name the filer had vacated, and no fallback ran either, since a handle owns its inode's rename. Applied before the fence now, and only when MovePath reports the source was still ours to move - which is what keeps a replayed rename from remembering a path the handle has already moved past. |
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Chris Lu
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cd3db76eed |
ci: stop installing FUSE headers nothing links against (#10840)
Four workflows ran apt to install libfuse3-dev before every FUSE job. Nothing needs it: go-fuse implements the protocol in pure Go, no cgo in the tree references fuse, and the package does not even provide the fusermount3 the mount actually execs - fuse3 does, and it is already on the runner image, which is why the setuid-repair step finds it. So the step downloaded a dev package to build against headers no compiler ever opened, and it is the step that has been hanging whenever the Ubuntu mirror goes slow. Configuring /etc/fuse.conf is all that is left. |
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Chris Lu
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e0c4732e5e |
rust: stop writing when a durable write's index flush fails (#10825)
* rust: stop writing when a durable write's index flush fails A durable write flushes the .dat, publishes the needle map row, then flushes the .idx. If that last flush failed we returned the error and carried on: the row stayed live, the volume stayed writable, and the handler answered 500 without replicating. The primary then served a needle its replicas never saw, for a write the client was told had failed - and if the unflushed row was lost on restart, the durable .dat tail took the volume read only anyway. Taking the row back out is not an option: it means undoing published state on a disk that is already failing, and a truncate afterwards would leave an .idx row pointing past the end. So the volume stops taking writes instead, the same as when the truncate after a failed .dat flush cannot be done. Nothing more gets appended past a record whose index is in doubt, and the master routes writes elsewhere once the volume heartbeats read only. The divergence against the replicas is still there, but it is bounded and it is visible. A failed nm.put after the .dat is down leaves the same durable but unindexed record, so it takes the same route. * rust: drop the import the rollback removal left behind NeedleValue came in with rollback_unflushed_write, which went away when the durable path moved to flushing before it publishes. Nothing has used the type since. * rust: mark the test-only heartbeat helper as such collect_heartbeat has only ever been called from the tests - the send loop uses collect_heartbeat_with_snapshot, which it wraps - so a lib build rightly called it dead code. * rust: flush the index on a durable write that dedups A durable write matching content already in the volume flushed the .dat and returned before reaching the index flush. So a fsync=true write that deduped against an earlier non-durable one was acked with the row that indexes it still in the page cache - the same false promise the index flush exists to rule out, and the same read-only volume on restart if the row is lost. The dedup path now flushes both files, and the quarantine on a failed index flush moved into flush_idx so it applies wherever the flush is reached rather than only at the one call site that had it inline. |
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Chris Lu
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3b18a635df |
ci: call the apt helper from the workflow's working directory (#10832)
The e2e workflow sets defaults.run.working-directory: docker, so the call I added resolved to docker/docker/apt-install and every FUSE Mount run has failed with 'sudo: docker/apt-install: command not found' since it merged. |
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Chris Lu
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baead6901c |
ci: build protoc into the crate instead of installing it per job (#10830)
Every workflow that builds the Rust volume server first installed protoc from a package manager - twelve steps across apt, brew and choco. That is 37s per job on a good day, and this week archive.ubuntu.com stalled long enough for four jobs to burn their whole timeout without reaching a build. protoc-bin-vendored ships the compiler as a build-dependency, so it now arrives through the cargo registry the workflows already cache and there is nothing left to install. cargo build works on a machine with no protoc at all, which is worth as much locally as it is in CI. It also pins the version. The apt protoc on ubuntu-22.04 is 3.12, old enough to reject proto3 optional, which is why build.rs passes --experimental_allow_proto3_optional; the vendored one is 31.1. The flag stays, since it costs nothing and keeps a build against an older PROTOC working, and an explicit PROTOC still overrides the vendored binary for packagers who supply their own. |
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Chris Lu
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1564244b1a |
ci: install the runner's own packages through the mirror fallback too (#10831)
The e2e job overwrote the runner's sources.list with two azure-only lines and installed fuse from it, so the same mirror outage that took out the image builds failed the step outright - this time on the runner rather than inside the container, where the image-side fallback cannot reach. Install through the same helper, and widen its rewrite to match any archive host so it works whether the pristine list came from the base image (archive.ubuntu.com) or from a CI runner (azure.archive.ubuntu.com). Keeping the runner's original list also restores the security and backports pockets, which the hand-written two-line replacement dropped. Verified against the outage itself: with the pristine list pointed at Azure, the build logged the skip after Azure timed out for real and installed from archive.ubuntu.com. |
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Chris Lu
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05013ad3da |
ci: fall through to another Ubuntu mirror when one is unreachable (#10828)
The e2e image pointed both archive and security at azure.archive.ubuntu.com and nothing else, and the samba and pjdfstest images inherit that list. When Azure is unreachable the build has nowhere to go: Acquire::Retries just retries a dead host, every package fails, and apt exits 100 before a single test runs. Two different workflows lost runs to it tonight. Install through a helper that starts from the pristine sources.list each time and walks a list of mirrors, so Azure stays the preferred one - the reason it was pinned in the first place - without being the only one. Verified both paths against a real build: the normal one installs from Azure, and with the first entry pointed at an unroutable host the fallback logs the skip and installs from archive.ubuntu.com. |
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Chris Lu
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da4f06ec12 |
Give the local Unix socket gRPC transport room to breathe (#10824)
* Give the local Unix socket gRPC transport room to breathe Unix socket buffers default small and never autotune: 208KB on Linux, 8KB on macOS. Once the buffer cannot absorb what gRPC's loopyWriter emits for the in-flight streams the writer blocks on Write, and since v1.82.1 grpc-go counts per-RPC bookkeeping toward its control-buffer throttle, so both peers stop reading and the connection deadlocks for good. weed mini wedged at roughly 320 concurrent S3 PUTs with every filer RPC parked in waitOnHeader and no handler running. Force 8MB on both ends of the sockets we open. Best effort, since a kernel may clamp it lower; that only lowers the concurrency this survives. TCP loopback never hit this because its buffers start large and grow. * Set the buffer on accepted connections too Linux does not carry the listener's SO_SNDBUF onto sockets returned by accept, so only the dialing half was getting the headroom: measured 8388608 on the dialed side against the 212992 default on the accepted side. Wrap the listener and re-apply per connection. macOS inherits either way, which is why this did not show up locally. |
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Chris Lu
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bb223967bd |
mount: fold an inode's single link into its entry (#10818)
InodeEntry held its one path in a slice, so every inode the kernel references cost a 16-byte backing array and a second heap object on top of the 32-byte entry. The extra links of a hard-linked file now hang off a pointer instead, which keeps the struct in the same 32-byte size class and leaves the ordinary single-link file with nothing to allocate. Populating the table with 1M children: 237.5 -> 221.5 B/inode at 85-character paths, 301.3 -> 285.6 at 148. |
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Chris Lu
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9f15e3935c |
mount: reuse the listed entry's path instead of rebuilding it (#10817)
readdir built dirPath.Child(name) for every child while entry.FullPath was already that exact string, from NewFullPath in the meta cache store or from FromPbEntry on the read-through path. One allocation per entry, and on a wide tree with long paths that is most of what a listing allocates. BenchmarkReadDirectory/kernel_readdirplus over 200k entries: 2,039,656 -> 1,839,318 allocs/op, 174.5 -> 167.8 MB/op, 152.6 -> 135.1 ms/op. |
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Chris Lu
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887910b377 |
rust: honor fsync on the volume server write path (#10816)
The Rust volume server ignored the fsync parameter completely: nothing parsed it, and write_volume_needle -> write_needle -> append_needle never flushed. So a ?fsync=true upload was acked out of the page cache, and since ReplicatedWrite forwards the parameter, a Go primary handing a durable write to a Rust replica got the same empty promise. The upload handler now reads fsync the way Go's r.FormValue does, off the decoded query fields, and threads it down to the volume. A durable write appends, flushes the .dat, publishes the needle map entry, then flushes the .idx, and only then is it acked. Nothing points at bytes that are not down yet, so a failed flush only has to take its own append back off the end - the index never moved and the volume's counters never saw the rejected write. If that truncate cannot be done the volume stops taking writes, rather than letting a later append bury the rejected record mid-file where the tail integrity check cannot see it. The .idx flush is what keeps the ack honest: load() rebuilds the map from .idx, so an acked write whose row was lost comes back as a .dat tail the integrity check cannot account for, and the volume loads read only. A dedup hit flushes too: there is nothing to append, but the write it matched may have been non-durable, and the caller is asking for the content to be on disk. Batched writes carry the flag per request rather than one flush per batch, so the write queue's module doc no longer claims otherwise. |
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Chris Lu
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358fd314ea |
test(s3/versioning): read the whole version body instead of one Read (#10815)
A single Read on the response body can return the last bytes together with io.EOF, so asserting NoError on it fails even though the body is complete. Use io.ReadAll, like every other test in this package. |
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Chris Lu
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1354b58675 |
s3: stop unrouted bucket subresources from being answered with a listing (#10814)
* s3: answer GetBucketReplication, GetBucketWebsite and GetBucketNotificationConfiguration None of the three had a route, so they reached the unconstrained ListObjectsV1 catch-all and a client asking for a bucket's replication config got 200 and a <ListBucketResult> back. Replication and website report their configuration as absent the way AWS does; notification returns the empty configuration AWS returns for a bucket with no events wired up. * s3: stop an unrouted bucket subresource from being answered with a listing ListObjectsV1 is the catch-all GET on a bucket, so every subresource without a route of its own - ?torrent today, whatever AWS adds next - came back 200 with a <ListBucketResult>. A client that asked for a configuration and got a listing either fails its XML decode in a way that reads like corruption, or worse, tolerantly parses it. Refuse the request instead. The allow-list is the ListObjects parameters rather than the subresources, so a new one fails closed. Presigned URLs sign their credentials into the query string, so X-Amz-* and the SigV2 trio have to stay listable. |
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Chris Lu
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f41595fb10 |
mount: drop consumed entries when reading a directory through (#10802)
The cached readdir trims the head of the handle's entry stream as the client walks past it; the read-through path never did, so a directory too large to cache -- the only kind that takes that path -- was held whole in the handle for the length of the walk. Hoist the trim to cover both paths. |
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Chris Lu
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3cf7d306a5 |
Give the WebDav chunk reader a bounded, invalidatable location cache (#10801)
* mount: re-resolve volume locations after a failed chunk read NewChunkGroup passed nil as the ReaderCache's CacheInvalidator, so retryFetchAfterCacheInvalidation was dead code on the FUSE read path. A mount that cached a volume's locations while one server was down kept retrying that server after it died, then returned EIO, even though the master and filer both resolved the live replica. The S3 gateway already passes its filerClient; do the same for the mount. * test: FUSE integration tests for volume server failover One mount appends while a second tails, and a volume server is killed, started or restarted mid-stream against a 001-replicated cluster of three volume servers. Automates the scenario matrix reported for Docker Swarm mounts, including the large-file variant and a no-chaos control. * test: report the filer's own view when append content mismatches A mismatch between what the writer wrote and what the reader sees can come from either side's cache. Read the file back through the filer's HTTP handler as well, and let the mount verbosity be raised from the environment, so a failing run says which layer lost the data. * test: wait for the reader mount to converge before comparing A mount caches metadata for about a second, so reading the file the instant the writer's last close returned can legitimately come back short. Poll the reader until it matches or the timeout expires; content that is wrong rather than merely late never converges and still fails, now with the writer's mount and the filer's own view alongside it. * test: detect a failover cluster child that exited at startup Signal(0) succeeds for a zombie and nothing reaped these children until shutdown, so a process that died on startup looked alive until the readiness timeout expired. Reap each child as it is started and consult the result. * test: read a file the killed volume server actually holds Placement decides which two of three servers back each volume, so killing volume N and reading readfile-N could pass without the victim ever holding a replica of it. Resolve each file's volumes through the filer and the master, and pick one the victim backs, preferring a file the reader has not cached. * ci: stop persisting checkout credentials in the failover workflow The job does not use the token after cloning. Also tag the README's command block as bash and match the timeout the workflow actually uses. * test: discard the ignored errors errcheck flags in the failover harness * test: resolve manifests when mapping a file to its volumes A manifest chunk's own fid names the volume holding the manifest, not the volumes holding the data, so a large enough file would point the failover victim at the wrong server. * test: pin the stale-location recovery path with a primed reader Reading a file for the first time after a server dies proves nothing: the lookup is fresh and returns the survivor. Kill one holder and wait for the master to drop it, read a file on that volume so the reader caches the lone survivor, restart the first server, then kill the survivor. The reader's only cached location is now dead while the data is live elsewhere, which is the case the invalidator exists for: EIO without it, recovery with it. * filer: re-look-up a chunk's locations as soon as they all fail A read that fails against every location it was given is far more likely to be holding a stale list than to be hitting a cluster that is briefly slow, but the retry loops spent the whole backoff ladder, about 13 s, before the caller got a chance to invalidate and look the chunk up again. Give the loops a refresh hook and let the reader cache invalidate on the first fully failed pass, so recovery starts in milliseconds. Clients without an invalidator keep the old behavior. The filer's streaming read path has its own fetch loop and is not covered. * webdav: give the chunk reader a bounded, invalidatable location cache WebDav resolved chunk locations through filer.LookupFn, whose own doc asks long-running processes to prefer wdclient.FilerClient: its cache is unbounded, and it has no way to invalidate an entry, so the reader cache was constructed with a nil invalidator and a WebDav server that had cached a location kept reading from it after the volume moved or died. Use FilerClient, as the mount and the S3 gateway already do. * filer: refresh locations on the random-read path too readChunkSliceAt bypasses the chunk cacher in random-access mode and fetches the range directly, which left it without the invalidation the cacher does: a random reader parked on a stale location had no way back at all. Hoist the refresh hook onto the reader cache so both paths share it. * filer: compare chunk locations as a set, not in order Lookups shuffle the locations they return, so comparing positionally reads a reshuffle of the very same replicas as a fresh set and spends an immediate retry on locations that just failed. weed/filer already had an order-independent comparison for this; move it next to the retry loops so both callers share one helper. |
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Chris Lu
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f3dc530919 |
Re-look-up a chunk's locations as soon as they all fail (#10800)
* mount: re-resolve volume locations after a failed chunk read NewChunkGroup passed nil as the ReaderCache's CacheInvalidator, so retryFetchAfterCacheInvalidation was dead code on the FUSE read path. A mount that cached a volume's locations while one server was down kept retrying that server after it died, then returned EIO, even though the master and filer both resolved the live replica. The S3 gateway already passes its filerClient; do the same for the mount. * test: FUSE integration tests for volume server failover One mount appends while a second tails, and a volume server is killed, started or restarted mid-stream against a 001-replicated cluster of three volume servers. Automates the scenario matrix reported for Docker Swarm mounts, including the large-file variant and a no-chaos control. * test: report the filer's own view when append content mismatches A mismatch between what the writer wrote and what the reader sees can come from either side's cache. Read the file back through the filer's HTTP handler as well, and let the mount verbosity be raised from the environment, so a failing run says which layer lost the data. * test: wait for the reader mount to converge before comparing A mount caches metadata for about a second, so reading the file the instant the writer's last close returned can legitimately come back short. Poll the reader until it matches or the timeout expires; content that is wrong rather than merely late never converges and still fails, now with the writer's mount and the filer's own view alongside it. * test: detect a failover cluster child that exited at startup Signal(0) succeeds for a zombie and nothing reaped these children until shutdown, so a process that died on startup looked alive until the readiness timeout expired. Reap each child as it is started and consult the result. * test: read a file the killed volume server actually holds Placement decides which two of three servers back each volume, so killing volume N and reading readfile-N could pass without the victim ever holding a replica of it. Resolve each file's volumes through the filer and the master, and pick one the victim backs, preferring a file the reader has not cached. * ci: stop persisting checkout credentials in the failover workflow The job does not use the token after cloning. Also tag the README's command block as bash and match the timeout the workflow actually uses. * test: discard the ignored errors errcheck flags in the failover harness * test: resolve manifests when mapping a file to its volumes A manifest chunk's own fid names the volume holding the manifest, not the volumes holding the data, so a large enough file would point the failover victim at the wrong server. * test: pin the stale-location recovery path with a primed reader Reading a file for the first time after a server dies proves nothing: the lookup is fresh and returns the survivor. Kill one holder and wait for the master to drop it, read a file on that volume so the reader caches the lone survivor, restart the first server, then kill the survivor. The reader's only cached location is now dead while the data is live elsewhere, which is the case the invalidator exists for: EIO without it, recovery with it. * filer: re-look-up a chunk's locations as soon as they all fail A read that fails against every location it was given is far more likely to be holding a stale list than to be hitting a cluster that is briefly slow, but the retry loops spent the whole backoff ladder, about 13 s, before the caller got a chance to invalidate and look the chunk up again. Give the loops a refresh hook and let the reader cache invalidate on the first fully failed pass, so recovery starts in milliseconds. Clients without an invalidator keep the old behavior. The filer's streaming read path has its own fetch loop and is not covered. * filer: refresh locations on the random-read path too readChunkSliceAt bypasses the chunk cacher in random-access mode and fetches the range directly, which left it without the invalidation the cacher does: a random reader parked on a stale location had no way back at all. Hoist the refresh hook onto the reader cache so both paths share it. * filer: compare chunk locations as a set, not in order Lookups shuffle the locations they return, so comparing positionally reads a reshuffle of the very same replicas as a fresh set and spends an immediate retry on locations that just failed. weed/filer already had an order-independent comparison for this; move it next to the retry loops so both callers share one helper. |
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Chris Lu
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606a90b3b1 |
filer: close the empty-folder race by checking after each mutation (#10799)
* filer: re-list a folder after deleting it, and put it back if it is not empty The emptiness check inside the delete and the removal of the folder entry are not atomic, so an entry can land between them and be left reachable by its own path but out of every listing. Looking again after the delete catches the ones whose create event has not arrived yet, and does not depend on the event stream or on the observation window holding. * filer: create the directories holding an entry after the entry A parent checked before the insert can be taken by the empty-folder cleaner before the entry lands, which leaves the entry reachable by its own path but out of every listing. Creating the parents afterwards cannot be undone by a delete that was authorised before the insert, and pairs with the cleaner re-listing after its own delete: whichever of the two acts second sees what the other did. Going second means the entry is already stored when the parent fails, so it is taken back out and the caller still sees the error it used to get. * filer: narrow a directory that came back wider than the one it replaced A writer recreating its own missing parent has only the entry it is inserting to go on, so the directory it mints can grant access the deleted one denied - a 0700 folder comes back 0751. The cleaner read the real attributes before deleting, so its restore now puts the original mode back instead of leaving the inferred one in place. It only ever narrows, so a directory deliberately tightened since is left as it is. |
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Chris Lu
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1ddec72707 |
Recover from a dead volume server on the mount read path (#10798)
* mount: re-resolve volume locations after a failed chunk read NewChunkGroup passed nil as the ReaderCache's CacheInvalidator, so retryFetchAfterCacheInvalidation was dead code on the FUSE read path. A mount that cached a volume's locations while one server was down kept retrying that server after it died, then returned EIO, even though the master and filer both resolved the live replica. The S3 gateway already passes its filerClient; do the same for the mount. * test: FUSE integration tests for volume server failover One mount appends while a second tails, and a volume server is killed, started or restarted mid-stream against a 001-replicated cluster of three volume servers. Automates the scenario matrix reported for Docker Swarm mounts, including the large-file variant and a no-chaos control. * test: report the filer's own view when append content mismatches A mismatch between what the writer wrote and what the reader sees can come from either side's cache. Read the file back through the filer's HTTP handler as well, and let the mount verbosity be raised from the environment, so a failing run says which layer lost the data. * test: wait for the reader mount to converge before comparing A mount caches metadata for about a second, so reading the file the instant the writer's last close returned can legitimately come back short. Poll the reader until it matches or the timeout expires; content that is wrong rather than merely late never converges and still fails, now with the writer's mount and the filer's own view alongside it. * test: detect a failover cluster child that exited at startup Signal(0) succeeds for a zombie and nothing reaped these children until shutdown, so a process that died on startup looked alive until the readiness timeout expired. Reap each child as it is started and consult the result. * test: read a file the killed volume server actually holds Placement decides which two of three servers back each volume, so killing volume N and reading readfile-N could pass without the victim ever holding a replica of it. Resolve each file's volumes through the filer and the master, and pick one the victim backs, preferring a file the reader has not cached. * ci: stop persisting checkout credentials in the failover workflow The job does not use the token after cloning. Also tag the README's command block as bash and match the timeout the workflow actually uses. * test: discard the ignored errors errcheck flags in the failover harness * test: resolve manifests when mapping a file to its volumes A manifest chunk's own fid names the volume holding the manifest, not the volumes holding the data, so a large enough file would point the failover victim at the wrong server. * test: pin the stale-location recovery path with a primed reader Reading a file for the first time after a server dies proves nothing: the lookup is fresh and returns the survivor. Kill one holder and wait for the master to drop it, read a file on that volume so the reader caches the lone survivor, restart the first server, then kill the survivor. The reader's only cached location is now dead while the data is live elsewhere, which is the case the invalidator exists for: EIO without it, recovery with it. |
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Chris Lu
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6fda8c67f3 |
Guard the gcs credential path in FetchAndWriteNeedle like the other backends (#10796)
* volume: accept only static-key gcs credentials on the fetch request An inline credentials document of a federated type points the SDK at a url, file or executable of the caller's choosing for the token exchange, so the request-supplied value is no longer just a key. * volume: guard the gcs token endpoint like the other remote endpoints Inline credentials pick where the token request goes, so route the gcs client through the same deny-list and rebinding-safe dialer used for S3 and azure. * rust volume: pin that gcs has no credential-driven dial path * volume: only check gcs credentials on a gcs remote conf Only the gcs backend reads that field, so another backend carrying a stale value should not fail the request. * gcs: load credentials with the type the caller expects The untyped loader is deprecated because it reads whatever the document claims to be; callers handling credentials they do not control now name the types they accept. |
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Chris Lu
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1bcd55eba2 | go 1.26 (#10797) | ||
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Chris Lu
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e383ee47cb |
filer: use bind variables for request-controlled values in the arangodb store (#10795)
* arangodb: bind list prefix, start file name and collection into the AQL query Concatenating them into the query text let a caller-supplied prefix or start name close the string literal and append arbitrary AQL, which runs with the filer's ArangoDB credentials against any collection. * arangodb: bind the folder path and collection into the recursive delete query A trailing-slash S3 key reaches DeleteFolderChildren through the directory-marker cleanup, so quotes in the path could turn the filter into a match-everything REMOVE over the whole bucket collection. * arangodb: match the real directory prefix in the recursive delete The prefix was built by re-joining the path segments with commas, so it never matched a stored directory and the subtree sweep did nothing. |
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Chris Lu
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5d5ea63b3f |
Fix what the Go 1.26 language bump breaks (#10794)
* worker: log the balance move stage through a constant format string Go 1.26's printf analyzer now follows printf wrappers reached through an interface, so passing the stage straight to Logger.Info is a vet failure. * s3api: bracket the IPv6 host in the signature test URL A bare IPv6 literal is legal in a Host header but never in a URL. Go 1.26 stopped parsing it leniently, so carry the two forms separately and set r.Host to the value the client would actually have signed. * mini: bracket IPv6 addresses in the readiness probe URLs An IPv6-only host hands mini a bare literal, and %s:%d pasted it into a URL unbracketed. Under Go 1.26 that URL no longer parses, so waiting for the admin server never succeeds and mini refuses to start. |
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Chris Lu
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f4bcec60d7 |
readme: fold RustFS into the MinIO comparison (#10788)
* readme: add RustFS to the file system comparison * readme: note RustFS write amplification and rigid layout * readme: correct RustFS version, parity and protocol details * readme: merge the RustFS comparison into the MinIO section |
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Chris Lu
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5c43c03b76 |
filer: restore a folder that received an entry while it was deleted (#10783)
* filer: restore a folder that received an entry while it was deleted The empty-folder cleaner checks that a folder is empty and then deletes it, and those two steps are not atomic. An entry created in between survives the delete but loses the directory holding it: still readable by its own path, yet absent from every listing until a later write happens to recreate the parent. Record the folders deleted in each pass and re-check them on the next one, putting back any that turned out to hold entries. The check waits a pass on purpose - a writer looks up the parent before inserting the child, so checking straight after the delete can still run ahead of the insert and see nothing. Restoring a directory that holds entries is always correct, and restoring one whose entry went away again just leaves an empty folder for a later pass to collect, so the repair needs no locking or coordination. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HdLXMUopwgofPb1ZEmiE6r * filer: keep failed restores queued and inherit the ancestor's ownership Two gaps in the restore pass. A folder whose count or restore hit a transient store error was dropped from the tracking list and never looked at again, leaving its entries out of listings until some later write recreated the folder - the very thing the pass exists to avoid. Put those back for the next pass, still under the cap. A restored folder was minted with a fixed mode and no owner, so a directory that had been private came back world-readable and owned by root. Take the mode and ownership from the nearest ancestor still present instead. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HdLXMUopwgofPb1ZEmiE6r * filer: let the redis stores keep a directory listing that still has entries On the redis stores the listing is not derived from the entries, it is the only record that they sit under that directory. DeleteEntry opened by dropping it outright, so an entry that arrived after the caller judged the directory empty lost its membership and became unreachable: readable by exact path, absent from every listing, and invisible to any later check, since counting the directory reads the listing that was just destroyed. Nothing could detect or repair it. Drop the listing in DeleteFolderChildren instead, alongside the children it describes, and leave it alone in DeleteEntry. redis3 needs it explicitly, since removeChildren clears the skip list nodes but not the list itself, and the plain redis store was leaking the key entirely. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HdLXMUopwgofPb1ZEmiE6r * filer: restore folders with their own attributes, and observe them for a window Five gaps in the restore pass. The restored directory was reconstructed from whatever ancestor happened to still be present, and the mode was ORed with 0111 on the way. A private directory under a world-traversable parent came back granting traversal it had denied. Read the folder's own attributes before deleting it and put exactly those back. That also removes the ancestor walk, which treated a transient store error as "not found" and silently fell through to a broader ancestor. A single check a pass later was not a delay at all. Ticker sends coalesce, so when a pass runs long the next one starts immediately, and a writer already past its parent lookup can insert after the check has read zero - after which the folder was discarded for good. Keep each folder under observation for a bounded wall-clock window and re-check it on every pass until it expires. This narrows the exposure rather than closing it; only making the emptiness check and the delete atomic would do that. A delete that returned an error was never observed at all, though the redis stores drop the folder before its parent-list member, so a failure return is not proof the folder survived. Record the folder before the delete instead. Restores now run shallowest first, so a folder taken by the parent cascade is rebuilt with its own attributes before anything below it needs it as a parent. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HdLXMUopwgofPb1ZEmiE6r * filer: recover a deleted folder from the create event for the entry that raced it Checking each deleted folder on a timer was the wrong instrument. It cost a listing per folder per pass, and it could only ever be a guess about when the racing write would land. The metadata stream already carries the answer. A folder is recorded before it is deleted, so any entry that can be orphaned is created after that record and its create event names that exact directory. Match the event against the recently deleted folders and the folder is known to need putting back, rather than inferred to. The window stops being a guess at the race and becomes what it should be: how far behind the event stream is allowed to run before a folder stops being watched. Listing is now done once, for a folder an event has already named, to skip the restore when the entry has since gone away again. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HdLXMUopwgofPb1ZEmiE6r * filer: bound how long a folder is watched, and rebuild ancestors from themselves Four gaps found reviewing the restore pass. A folder whose restore kept failing was never let go: the written-to check ran before the age check, so it was picked up, retried, put back, and counted again on every pass for the life of the process. Apply the window first, whatever state the folder is in. At the cap, the folder being recorded was the one turned away, though it is the one whose race is still live - the older entries are already close to ageing out. Give up one of those instead, picked as the oldest of a small sample so the cost stays flat under heavy deletion rates. An ancestor taken by the same cascade was left to the descendant's restore to recreate, which minted it from the descendant's attributes and handed back access the ancestor never granted. Rebuild those from what they were, ahead of anything below them. Reading a directory's attributes assumed an entry came back. Some stores return nothing with no error, so treat that as not found. The mode is also taken whole rather than through Perm(), which was dropping setgid, setuid and sticky. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HdLXMUopwgofPb1ZEmiE6r * redis3: take a directory listing left behind by a failed delete Removing the last name deletes the list, and if that delete fails the header survives pointing at a name that is gone. The retry finds nothing to remove, reports no changes, and returns before reaching the delete, so the key stays for good. Take it on that path too. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HdLXMUopwgofPb1ZEmiE6r |
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Chris Lu
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f530102c45 |
filer: do not sweep children when deleting a folder non-recursively (#10782)
* filer: do not sweep children when deleting a folder non-recursively doBatchDeleteFolderMetaAndData lists a folder and bails out if it has any children, then calls Store.DeleteFolderChildren unconditionally. On the non-recursive path that bulk sweep has nothing legitimate to remove: it only runs once the listing came back empty, so the sole rows it can delete are ones inserted after the check. The S3 empty-folder cleaner deletes through this path, so a PUT landing between the listing and the sweep loses its entry after the write was already acknowledged. Neither side sees an error - the client has its 200 and the cleaner logs an ordinary empty-folder deletion - and the chunks leak, since the cleaner passes shouldDeleteChunks=false and nothing was enumerated to collect. Workloads that scatter objects over many shallow prefixes empty and refill those folders constantly, which is what makes the window reachable. Sweep only when the delete is recursive, or when the whole-bucket shortcut skipped the listing and depends on it. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HdLXMUopwgofPb1ZEmiE6r * filer: pin the folder entry removal left by the racing-child test The surviving entry is reachable by path but drops out of listings until the folder comes back, and nothing in the test said so. Assert it, so the exposure that remains after this change is visible rather than implied. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HdLXMUopwgofPb1ZEmiE6r |
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Chris Lu
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7522e17b6d |
iceberg: vend table-scoped credentials to clients that ask for delegation (#10777)
* iceberg: vend table-scoped credentials to clients that ask for delegation The catalog recognised X-Iceberg-Access-Delegation: vended-credentials and then deliberately said nothing, because it had nothing to vend: it withheld even the S3 endpoint so the client would keep the credentials it was configured with. That left every engine expecting the catalog to hand out access - Snowflake, Databricks, Trino with vending, any multi-tenant setup - needing static S3 keys distributed out of band. Mint an STS session per request instead, scoped by a session policy to the table's own prefix plus the bucket listing needed to resolve it, and return it in the load response config and storage-credentials. The role to assume is named by -s3.iceberg.credentialRole; its trust policy is what decides whether a caller may assume it, and vending stays off until it is set. A failed mint falls back to the old silence rather than handing back an endpoint the client cannot sign for. * iceberg: keep vended credentials inside the table prefix Review follow-ups on credential vending: Listing was granted on the bucket ARN with no condition, so a credential vended for one table could enumerate every other table's object names. Constrain s3:prefix to the table's own prefix, which the S3 gateway already populates for list requests. A table location carrying * or ? would have gone into the policy's resource pattern unescaped and widened the session to sibling prefixes. Refuse to vend for such a location rather than escaping it; nothing the catalog generates contains those characters. DurationSeconds skipped the 900..43200 bounds the other assume-role paths enforce, so -s3.iceberg.credentialDurationSeconds could ask for a session outside them. The check is now shared by all three entry points. * iceberg: return the vended credentials from buildFileIOConfig itself buildStorageConfig was a second name for what buildFileIOConfig already did; it now returns the storage credentials alongside the properties, and callers that only want the properties drop them. * iceberg: split the vended bucket grants, and refuse a whole-bucket scope The prefix condition sat on a statement that also granted GetBucketLocation and ListBucketMultipartUploads, neither of which carries an s3:prefix to satisfy it, so both were denied for every vended credential. GetBucketLocation moves to its own unconditioned statement. ListBucketMultipartUploads is dropped: Iceberg writers complete and abort by upload id, and granting it either leaks in-flight keys bucket-wide or breaks on the same missing prefix. A table whose location has no prefix - one registered at the bucket root - would have been vended read and write over every other table in the bucket. Refuse, the way a location with wildcards is refused. |
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Chris Lu
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ec37ef5aaa |
iceberg: add view rename, scan-report and snapshots=refs to the catalog (#10776)
* iceberg: add view rename, scan-report and snapshots=refs to the catalog Three gaps against the REST spec that clients hit in normal use: Views had no rename, though tables did and views are stored the same way, so the move is the same catalog-only pointer move. Tables and views share a namespace directory, so both renames now refuse the other kind instead of moving it. Engines POST a scan or commit report after planning; a 404 there turns into an error line per query. Accept the report and discard it - the catalog keeps no metrics store. LoadTable ignored ?snapshots=refs and always returned the whole snapshot history, which is what clients use the parameter to avoid on long-lived tables. * iceberg: authorize view rename against the view ARN, tighten the metrics endpoint Review follow-ups: The shared rename checked the source against a table ARN whatever the kind, so a policy scoped to a view's own ARN never matched and one written for a table ARN was evaluated for a view. The entry kind now carries the ARN builder. The metrics endpoint truncated a report at 1 MiB and then failed to parse it, answering 400 for a query that had actually succeeded. Read one byte past the limit to tell "fits" from "cut short", and discard an oversized report instead of rejecting it. Empty bodies and reports without a report-type are now rejected, which the REST schema requires. ?snapshots= is defined for LoadTable, so it no longer filters what CreateTable echoes back. |
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Chris Lu
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d044839ab2 |
iceberg: make a table commit a compare-and-swap (#10775)
* iceberg: make a table commit a compare-and-swap
The catalog validated the caller's version token, ran its authorization
checks, and only then wrote the new metadata xattr. Two engines
committing against the same base both passed that check and both wrote,
so the second silently dropped the first one's snapshot. Both also derive
the same v{N}.metadata.json name and the file write overwrote, leaving
the surviving pointer aimed at the loser's metadata - and the loser's
conflict cleanup then deleted the winner's file.
Write the metadata file with an exclusive create and update the xattr
conditionally on the bytes the handler read, the way the maintenance
worker already commits. A writer that lost the race re-reads and retries,
and reports 409 CommitFailedException once out of attempts.
* iceberg: stage a commit under a unique name when the versioned one is taken
Two follow-ups from review of the commit compare-and-swap:
Refusing to overwrite v{N}.metadata.json also refused to get past a file
left behind by a commit that died between staging and updating the
pointer. Every later commit derived the same name, saw the collision, and
reported a conflict, so the table stayed uncommittable until an orphan
sweep removed the file. Stage under v{N}-{uuid} instead: neither writer's
file is overwritten and the catalog pointer still decides who won, which
is how the maintenance worker has always staged its own metadata.
metadataVersionFromLocation learned to read the version back out of that
name.
The conditional update guarded only the metadata attribute while the
write replaced the whole entry, so a policy or tag written in the same
window was silently reverted. Guard every catalog attribute, which turns
that into a conflict the caller retries on fresh state.
* iceberg: give saveMetadataFile the exclusive flag instead of a second name
saveNewMetadataFile, saveMetadataBlobExclusive and uniqueMetadataFileName
were three new names around one existing helper. The flag now rides on
saveMetadataFile and saveMetadataBlob, and the unique-name construction
sits where it is used.
* iceberg: reuse the filer CAS helpers #10773 added, and stage transactions exclusively
#10773 landed mutateEntryExtended, which already writes an entry back under a
whole-entry precondition and retries. Drop the helper this branch added and
route the table commit through it: the check that the metadata is still the
one this request read now lives in the mutation, where it sees current state.
The policy the request was authorized against is asserted too, so an
administrator restricting it mid-commit sends the caller back through
authorization instead of having a stale decision applied. Bucket and
namespace policies live on other entries and a single-entry precondition
cannot cover them.
Multi-table transactions stage their metadata exclusively for the same
reason single-table commits do, and carry the name they landed on into the
pointer flip.
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Chris Lu
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a80259d362 |
iceberg maintenance: fix the test build master merged broken (#10780)
#10774 gave buildTestMetadata its refs and age parameters while #10773 added a caller with the old arity. Each was green against a master that did not yet have the other, and the merge of both does not compile, so vet and the unit tests fail on master. |
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Chris Lu
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5f6dd4d3e5 |
iceberg maintenance: keep the snapshots that branches and tags pin (#10774)
* iceberg maintenance: keep the snapshots that branches and tags pin expireSnapshots only ever protected the current snapshot, so a snapshot held by a tag or a non-main branch was expired once it aged out of the retention window. iceberg-go's RemoveSnapshots drops any ref whose snapshot is gone without complaint, so the tag disappeared and the files behind it were deleted as unreferenced. Protect every ref target, and honour a branch's own min-snapshots-to-keep / max-snapshot-age-ms over the ancestors behind its head. Detection skips pinned snapshots for the same reason: proposing a job whose only outcome is a no-op keeps the worker busy forever. * iceberg maintenance: re-plan when a ref appears mid-commit, and stop proposing no-op expiry Three follow-ups from review of the ref-aware expiry: The commit guard only compared the table head, so a tag created between planning and commit could pin a snapshot the plan was about to expire. Re-check the refs against the metadata the commit actually reads. Detection now asks snapshotsToExpire what execution would remove instead of approximating with its own count-and-age rules. Expiry always requires a snapshot past the retention window, so a table over the quota whose snapshots are all young was being proposed for a job that could only no-op. The branch retention test could not tell "retained the whole lineage" from "honoured min-snapshots-to-keep", because the branch had exactly as many ancestors as the count. Give it one more, and cover max-snapshot-age-ms too. Both need snapshots genuinely older than a retention window, which iceberg-go will not accept at build time, so the fixture backdates the metadata after building it. * iceberg maintenance: fold the metadata test builders back into one buildTestMetadata, buildTestMetadataWithRefs, buildTestMetadataAged and buildTestMetadataNow were four names for one thing. Keep the original and give it the refs and age it needs. |
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Chris Lu
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eef6f3d1e6 |
s3tables: add the maintenance configuration APIs (#10773)
* s3tables: add the maintenance configuration APIs Stores the configuration verbatim as the wire shape under a new s3tables.maintenance extended attribute, so Get hands back what Put took and no translation layer can drift from the AWS model. Nothing reads the configuration yet. Put merges a single type into the stored map so configuring compaction does not drop snapshot management, and asserts the attribute's prior value so two concurrent Puts cannot silently clobber each other. * iceberg: apply the maintenance configuration in the worker The worker now reads the per-table and per-bucket maintenance configuration written by the control plane, so the wildcard plugin config is a default rather than the only setting a table can have. Table properties still win by default, since a table declaring its own layout is what every engine honours and the compactor has to agree with whoever writes the files. Clearing table_properties_override makes the maintenance configuration authoritative instead. Status is not part of that contest: a disabled type drops its operations and no property can re-enable them, so the operator's kill switch always holds. Manifest and delete-file rewrites have no AWS equivalent and ride with compaction. Detection reads both attributes from entries it already lists. * s3tables: report maintenance job status The worker records the outcome of each run in its own extended attribute, separate from the configuration so operator and worker writes do not contend, and GetTableMaintenanceJobStatus reads it back. Only the types a run touched are written, so a partial run cannot erase what an earlier one recorded. The reader fills in the rest: Disabled when the configuration switched a type off, Not_Yet_Run otherwise. Status is advisory, so a lost race is logged rather than failing a job whose work already committed. * s3tables: route the maintenance APIs over REST The five actions were only reachable by X-Amz-Target dispatch, which the AWS CLI and SDK do not use for this service. They address the operations by path, so the APIs were unreachable from any official client. * s3tables: fix the table bucket ARN field name GetTableBucketMaintenanceConfiguration emitted tableBucketArn where the wire field is tableBucketARN, as every other response in this package already spells it. Official SDK deserializers ignore the unknown key, so the required field came back unset. * s3tables: carry the compaction strategy through to the worker IcebergCompactionSettings modelled only targetFileSizeMB, so a request naming a strategy was accepted and then dropped on the way to storage. The worker now maps binpack and sort onto its own rewrite strategy and lets auto defer to the worker configuration. z-order is rejected rather than accepted and quietly binpacked. * s3tables: report bucket-level maintenance status GetTableMaintenanceJobStatus read only the table's configuration, so unreferenced file removal — which is configured on the bucket — reported Not_Yet_Run or a stale success after an operator disabled it. The merge helper now lives in this package and the worker shares it. * iceberg: delete orphans only after the non-current window AWS marks a file non-current once it has been unreferenced for unreferencedDays, then deletes it a further nonCurrentDays later. The cutoff was taken from unreferencedDays alone, so a 3/10 configuration hard-deleted on day three and threw away the ten day recovery window. remove_orphans deletes in one step rather than marking, so the cutoff is now the sum of the two. * s3tables: assert every attribute when rewriting an entry UpdateEntry writes the whole entry back from the snapshot the caller read, and its precondition only covers the keys the caller names. Both maintenance writers named one key, so a job status write could revert a maintenance configuration an operator had just disabled, turning an advisory write into a silent re-enable. Both now assert the entry's full attribute set, including the target key when absent so a concurrent create also fails the precondition. * s3tables: assert absent attributes when rewriting an entry The precondition covered the attributes present when the writer read the entry, so an attribute created between that read and the write was absent from it. A first-time PutTableMaintenanceConfiguration disabling a type therefore lands, passes the per-key checks, and is then deleted by the stale whole-entry write. Every attribute this package stores is now asserted, absent ones included. The metadata commit and planning index writers rewrite the same entries and had the same exposure, so both use the shared snapshot too. * iceberg: implement the auto compaction strategy auto was accepted, stored and read back, but left the worker on its own default, so a sorted table configured as auto was compacted with binpack. AWS defines auto as sorting tables that declare a sort order and bin-packing the rest. That needs the table metadata, so the choice is made where the rewrite plan is resolved: an unsorted table falls back to binpack rather than failing the way an explicit sort request does. * s3tables: validate the maintenance setting ranges PUT accepted zero, negative and oversized values for every numeric setting. The worker then ignores a non-positive value and saturates an oversized one, so the configuration read back was not the one that ran. AWS bounds all five to 1..2147483647, which is now enforced. The fields are pointers so an explicit zero is distinguishable from an omitted one and can be rejected rather than silently ignored. * s3tables: give every entry writer the same compare-and-swap updateExtendedAttribute asserted the entry's attributes, but the helpers behind the metadata, policy and tag handlers still wrote the whole entry unconditionally. Any of them could land on a stale snapshot and delete a maintenance configuration an operator had just written. They all share one read-modify-write loop now, so the precondition and the bounded retry apply wherever an entry is rewritten. * s3tables: move the maintenance configuration with a renamed table RenameTable carried the metadata, version, policy and tags to the new name but left the maintenance configuration and job status behind. A table with snapshot management disabled came back enabled under its new name, and the stale configuration stayed on the old name where a table created there would inherit it. The decoupled-delete cleanup left the same two attributes behind. * s3tables: accept every AWS partition in ARNs The route regexes and the ARN patterns both hardcoded arn:aws, so valid aws-cn and aws-us-gov ARNs never reached a handler. The router now shares the partition-tolerant prefix with the parser, and a generated ARN uses the partition its region belongs to so it parses back. * s3tables: generate ARNs in the region's partition The handler's own ARN generators still formatted arn:aws directly rather than going through the partition-aware builder, so a China or GovCloud deployment routed the request but then returned a commercial ARN and matched IAM policies against it. The round-trip test missed this because parsing accepts any partition, so it now asserts the prefix the region implies. * s3tables: complete the ARN partition table aws-iso-e, aws-iso-f and aws-eusc were missing, so eu-isoe-*, us-isof-* and eusc-* regions fell through to the commercial partition. * s3tables: do not let a rename swallow a concurrent maintenance write Rename copied the source attributes early and cleared the source at the end, so a Put landing in between missed the copy to the destination and was then deleted by the cleanup. It succeeded and vanished. The cleanup now clears the source only while it still holds exactly what was copied, and returns a conflict otherwise. Put checks the catalog identity inside the same conditional mutation, so it also cannot write to a name that a rename or delete has already soft-deleted. |
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Chris Lu
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a1d3fe236f |
iceberg: let table properties override the worker config (#10772)
* iceberg: carry snapshot retention in milliseconds Config stored retention as hours, so any sub-hour value would have to be truncated to 0 and then clamped back up to the 168 hour default. Keep the plugin config key in hours and convert once at parse time. * iceberg: let table properties override the worker config Every other Iceberg implementation lets a table's own properties win over engine defaults; the worker ignored them entirely. A writer honouring write.target-file-size-bytes and a compactor rewriting to the plugin config's size would rewrite each other's output forever. Resolved once per job rather than per operation, so compaction committing new metadata mid-job cannot change the settings underneath it. * iceberg: clamp the orphan cutoff so it cannot overflow collectOrphanCandidates converts the cutoff to a time.Duration. Past roughly 2.5 million hours that multiplication wraps negative, putting the cutoff in the future so every file walked looks like an orphan and gets deleted, including data a concurrent writer has not yet committed. Reachable today through orphan_older_than_hours. |
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Chris Lu
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b45f8314c5 |
ec.encode: require the shards to agree on size before deleting the volume (#10769)
* ec.encode: require the shards to agree on size before deleting the volume Before an encode deletes the volume it just encoded, it asks whether enough shards exist and whether they are spread across nodes. Both are questions about presence: nothing asks whether those shards are whole. Every shard takes one piece of each block row, so they are all written to the same length. One that disagrees was truncated, half copied, or landed on a disk that filled up -- and counting cannot see it, so the source volume is deleted on the strength of a set that cannot rebuild it. Compare the sizes the cluster already reports (shard_sizes travels in the heartbeat) and hold the deletion back when they disagree, naming the odd shard and its holder. Sizes reported as zero are skipped rather than read as a disagreement: a volume server that predates shard-size reporting, or one that has not heartbeated them yet, must not strand every encode in the volume-plus-shards state this check exists to avoid. * ec.encode: judge shard sizes on the newest encode generation only The size check collected every shard the master reports for the volume, while the recoverability check beside it counts only the newest encode generation. A re-encode can change the ratio, so an orphaned older generation -- one the pre-encode sweep could not reach, but the master still hears about -- has shards of a different length by nature. Merging those into the comparison makes a healthy current set look inconsistent, and because the orphan keeps being reported, every retry fails and the encode is left holding the volume and its shards for good. Collect sizes the way CollectEcShardBitsByNode collects bits: fenced to the newest EncodeTsNs, with unstamped entries forming the one legacy generation. |
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Chris Lu
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76a1983c86 |
test: re-lock and retry every chaos command, not just the balance (#10770)
The harness kills shells mid-command, and the master releases the dead session's lock only when it notices the connection is gone. That cleanup lands after the harness has already re-acquired the lock, so it can clear the lock this run holds and the next command refuses with need to run "lock" first to continue recoverInterruptedBalance answered that the way an operator would -- run lock again and retry -- but the encode and decode recoveries called shellCommand once and required success, so the same reap failed the run outright. Move the retry into shellCommand: the reap can land during any command that follows a kill, not only a balance. |
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Chris Lu
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fbd85d31b0 |
ec.decode: check the rebuilt .dat is complete before the shards can be deleted (#10768)
A decode ends by deleting the shards it read, and the only thing standing between that and a bad reconstruction is verifyDecodedVolumeBeforeDelete, which asks whether .dat and .idx are non-empty. A .dat truncated to a single byte passes, and the shards -- the only other copy of everything past the cut -- are deleted on the strength of it. The server already knows the answer it never checks: FindDatFileSize returns the extent the EC index references, and WriteDatFile rebuilds to it. Compare the two once the file is written and fail the decode instead of reporting a short volume as a good one. Longer than the extent still verifies -- padding is not missing data -- so only a genuinely short rebuild is rejected. Needle counts cannot answer this: .idx is written from .ecx, so the count matches by construction and a truncated .dat still reports every needle. |
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Chris Lu
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829064af71 |
ec.decode: finish the cleanup an interrupted decode left behind (#10767)
A decode deletes the shards only after the regenerated volume is mounted and verified, so a run interrupted in that last phase leaves the volume in place with its shards partway through deletion. The re-run then finds both, tries to collect the shards again to rebuild a volume that already exists, and fails on the first shard the interrupted run had removed: generate normal volume 3 ...: ec volume 3 missing shard 6 Nothing recovers from there: the shard set is deliberately being destroyed, so every retry fails the same way while the decoded volume sits there, already complete. Finish that cleanup instead. A volume beside the shards is not enough to act on -- an encode interrupted before it deleted the original leaves the same shape, as does a decode killed while generating, whose volume may be half written -- so require a data shard to be gone. Only the deletion phase removes one, and it is also exactly the state no decode can recover from, so finishing is the only move left rather than a choice between two. The deletion still runs behind verifyDecodedVolumeBeforeDelete, the check that guards it in a normal run. |
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Chris Lu
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97a155d14d |
admin: show capacity per storage tier and stop counting remote-tiered bytes as local disk usage (#10766)
* admin: show capacity per storage tier and stop counting remote-tiered bytes as local disk usage A remote-tiered volume reports its cloud object's size, so summing volume sizes inflated the dashboard's used-vs-capacity numbers (the local .dat is gone after volume.tier.move). Split the accounting: DiskUsage now only counts bytes on local disks, with the cloud bytes surfaced separately per server and per remote storage name. The dashboard gains a Storage Tiers table breaking volumes and EC shards down by tier (each local disk type plus each remote storage), using the per-disk-type statfs numbers already in the VolumeList response. The volumes page badges remote-tiered volumes with their storage name, and the EC shards page fills in real per-shard sizes instead of hardcoding 0. * admin: review fixes for the tier capacity display - A disk that predates disk_total_bytes now contributes its logical bytes to the tier's DiskUsed, so a tier mixing old and new volume servers doesn't underreport usage; the usage bar always reflects the displayed Disk Used value (the DataSize fallback in UsagePercent is gone, and the percent math is overflow-safe). - getTopologyViaGRPC defaults a zero VolumeSizeLimitMb to 30000 MB like GetClusterVolumeServers, keeping slot-based capacities consistent. - The dashboard volume-servers column reads Usage / Capacity to match its cell content, and the hdd disk-type default is shared between the volumes-page badge and countUniqueDiskTypes. |
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Chris Lu
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1c926e8fac |
test: systematic EC interruption verification — exhaustive model check + deterministic kill matrix (#10764)
* ec: bounded-exhaustive model check of the volume lifecycle The randomized chaos harness samples the state space; this enumerates it. The lifecycle is a state machine whose steps mirror the pipelines in this package, and the checker explores every schedule within the bound: a crash at every step boundary, an error return running the rollback (itself crashable at every step), a volume-server restart applying the startup reconciliation rules in every quiescent state, and the prescribed restart-based recovery from every crashed state. Checked in every reachable state: durability (a readable copy always exists), at most one generation mounted, and — a property the sweep discipline turns out to guarantee — at most one generation's files on disk. From every quiescent state the recovery must converge to a clean volume. Runs in well under a second. * test: deterministic EC interruption matrix Enumerate every phase of every interruptible EC operation and kill a real weed shell exactly when the phase announces itself on the command output, instead of at a random moment: four encode phases, four decode phases, and the balance's move phase (set up with -rebalance=false so a move is guaranteed). Each scenario prepares its precondition, kills at the marker, runs the prescribed recovery, and verifies every stored byte still reads back identical. The interruption recoveries move out of the randomized ops into shared chaosRun helpers both drivers use. * test: make the randomized EC chaos walk opt-in The systematic layers — the interruption matrix and the lifecycle model check — carry the CI coverage deterministically; the randomized walk stays for exploratory runs, behind EC_CHAOS_SEED. * ci: bound the EC integration suite by the job budget, not go test's default The suite with the interruption matrix runs close to the default 10m binary timeout on slower runners. * test: require every interruption-matrix marker to appear A marker that never prints means a pipeline refactor renamed or dropped the progress line; silently degenerating into a no-interruption run would let CI pass without exercising the boundary the scenario names. Also recheck the marker channel after the wait: a shell that prints and exits at once makes both channels ready, and select picking the exit case must not report a printed marker as missed. |
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Chris Lu
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602746f51d |
test: EC lifecycle chaos harness, with four fixes it found (#10763)
* ec: let the encode's balance see a migrating volume's shards across disk-type buckets Shard generation writes beside the source .dat, so a cross-tier encode (source on hdd, -diskType=ssd) leaves the fresh shards in the source disk-type bucket. The encode's internal balance ingested only the target bucket, saw no shards, and planned no moves; the spread guard then correctly aborted the encode (and before that guard existed, the shards silently stayed clumped on the generation host in the wrong tier). EcBalance now takes the encode batch as migratingVolumeIds and ingests those volumes' shards from every bucket, while everything else keeps the bucket filter so a plain ec.balance never drags deliberately tiered shards onto another disk type. The in-memory model delete also becomes bucket-agnostic: a node holds a given shard in exactly one bucket, and a bucket-scoped delete missed cross-bucket moves in the dry-run model. * volume: decode reads shard 0 from its resolved path, not the EC volume's base dir On a multi-disk server a volume's shards can sit on several disks; the store registers each shard with its own path and CollectEcShards resolves them, but FindDatFileSize derived the .ec00 path from the EcVolume's base directory. When shard 0 lived on a sibling disk, VolumeEcShardsToVolume failed with 'open ...ec00: no such file or directory' and ec.decode aborted. * ec: decode re-copies shards the topology claims but the target does not hold An interrupted earlier decode or balance can leave the master believing the decode target holds a shard whose file never landed: the mount registered but the partial copy was cleaned, or the file was swept. The collect step took the topology's word for it, excluded the shard from the copy set, and the decode failed with 'missing shard'. Probe the target's live inventory (VolumeEcShardsInfo) and treat anything it cannot serve as still-to-copy. * ec: decode discovers shards across disk-type buckets Shards sit wherever encode generation and balance left them: a cross-tier encode leaves them in the source disk-type bucket, a partial migration straddles buckets. ec.decode scoped its shard discovery to the -diskType bucket and reported a decodable volume as having no shards at all. Union across buckets, the way the encode's shard verification already does. * test: EC chaos lifecycle harness Randomized, seeded sequences of the EC lifecycle against a live cluster in the production-shaped layout: multiple data disks per server, a separate -dir.idx directory so .ecx/.ecj sidecars are shared across disks, and a tagged ssd tier. Operations cover encode (hdd and ssd targets), balance, shard damage plus rebuild, decode, re-encode, deletes, scrub, tier moves, crash-restarts, sidecar fault injections (a data-dir .vif pushed into the shared idx dir; a stale-generation shard planted beside a newer encode), and interruptions: a real weed shell subprocess killed mid-encode, mid-decode, and mid-balance, with the recovery re-run required to converge. One invariant holds after every step: every stored byte reads back identical and every deleted needle stays deleted. EC_CHAOS_SEED and EC_CHAOS_STEPS make runs reproducible and scalable. A known gap is tolerated and logged rather than fixed here: a shard mounted on two disks of one node (orphan adoption after an interrupted copy) is invisible to ec.balance's dedup and unaddressable by ec.shard.unmount's shard@address form, so no cleanup path exists yet. * test: fail payload-corruption checks on the test goroutine t.Fatalf inside require.Eventually's condition runs on the poller's goroutine, where Goexit kills only that goroutine and the corruption message can be lost behind a generic timeout. Record the mismatch, end the polling, and fail on the test goroutine. Also assert the full shard count in the cross-bucket decode-discovery test. |
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Chris Lu
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944d967502 |
refactor: extract EC orchestration into a shared weed/ec package (#10760)
* shell: move ErrorWaitGroup to weed/util * shell: remove unused CandidateEcNode and EcRack types * ec: extract EC orchestration logic from weed/shell into weed/ec Move the EC node/topology model, balance engine, encode pipeline, decode pipeline, and rebuild engine into a new weed/ec package so shell commands and maintenance workers can share the logic. Shell commands keep flag parsing and delegate through a small ec.Env (dial option, topology fetch, volume locations, lock check). Tests move along with the code. * shell: remove unused proportional-rebalance type stubs * ec: move scrub, replication check, and shard unmount engines into weed/ec * worker: share the EC generation-aware shard counter from weed/ec * ec: gofmt * shell: drop EC aliases with no remaining callers * ec: guard a missing topology hook and nil disk entries in topology helpers * ec: drop trailing newlines from decode error strings * ec: re-check the shell lock before applying shard unmounts * shell: trim -node entries in ec.scrub |
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Chris Lu
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f66d6ffc4a |
s3: option to disable bucket auto-creation on upload (#10759)
* s3: add option to disable bucket auto-creation on upload * command: expose -autoCreateBucket in s3, filer, server, and mini * s3: apply the bucket auto-create policy to directory marker uploads * s3: validate the bucket name before the auto-create disabled check * s3: cover the disabled auto-create gate at all three upload entry points |
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Chris Lu
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02b3ec6e90 |
sftp: url-encode the upload path (#10758)
sftp: url-encode the upload path so filenames can't inject filer query commands
The SFTP put handler concatenated the user-controlled filename straight into
the filer upload URL, so a name containing "?" was parsed as a query string.
Build the URL via url.URL{Path: ...} so "?" becomes %3F and stays a literal
path character.
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Chris Lu
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c2ea452b9d |
skiplist: fix TestFindGreaterOrEqual flake (compare against largest key, not value) (#10757)
skiplist: compare against the largest key, not its value, in TestFindGreaterOrEqual |
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Chris Lu
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d713ab49f9 |
volume: validate replica targets and restrict gcs credentials in FetchAndWriteNeedle (#10755)
* volume: validate replica upload targets in FetchAndWriteNeedle The replica leg forwarded the fetched needle to a caller-supplied address without checking it, so a malformed target could redirect the upload to an unintended host or path. Require each replica target to be a bare host:port whose host is not loopback / link-local / unspecified, reusing the address deny-list; cluster peers legitimately sit on private networks, so RFC 1918 / CGNAT stay allowed and -volume.allowUntrustedRemoteEndpoints still opts out. Validate every target up front so a bad one fails the request before the local write, and upload through a client that re-checks the resolved address at connect time so a replica hostname cannot rebind to a blocked address after validation. Mirrored in Rust (validation moved ahead of the local write; the Rust S3 path's connect-time re-check is still a follow-up there). * volume: only accept inline gcs credentials in FetchAndWriteNeedle The gcs credentials value on this request could name a local filesystem path, which the SDK reads from disk. Accept only inline JSON here; the server-side GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS env var still supplies a path. The Rust volume server has no gcs backend, so there is nothing to mirror. |
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Chris Lu
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9125b9c835 |
volume: extend the remote-endpoint guard to the azure backend (#10754)
* remote_storage/azure: allow a per-request HTTP client Thread an optional *http.Client through NewAzBlobClient and add azure.MakeWithHTTPClient, mirroring the S3 backend. When set, the client overrides the azblob transport so a caller can pin the dial path. The existing makers pass nil, so behavior is unchanged. * volume: extend the remote-endpoint guard to the azure backend The endpoint validation and rebinding-safe dialer in FetchAndWriteNeedle covered the S3-SDK backends. The azure backend also dials a caller-supplied AzureEndpoint, so route both families through a single guardedRemoteClient helper that returns the endpoint each backend dials and a constructor bound to the guarded HTTP client. azure is guarded only when AzureEndpoint is set; an empty endpoint derives the public host from the account. -volume.allowUntrustedRemoteEndpoints still opts out. * rust volume: assert the azure endpoint has no remote-client path The Rust volume server has no azure backend, so make_remote_storage_client rejects the type before any client is built. Add a regression test pinning that invariant. |
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Chris Lu
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94f8e2caf9 |
EC: handle zero-sized shard files uniformly (moves, rebuilds, startup cleanup) (#10753)
* volume_move: treat zero-sized EC shards as absent in move verification A zero-sized shard file is residue of a failed operation (issue 10730), not a shard - but VerifyEcShards only checked presence, so a copy that landed as an empty file passed verification and the source was deleted behind it. Size zero now reads as absent, with a distinct error naming the zero-sized shard so the operator can tell a broken copy from a missing one. * storage: exclude zero-sized EC shards from rebuilds and clean up stale ones The reproducer in issue 10730: a zero-sized shard file left by a failed operation was selected as a Reed-Solomon input and failed the whole rebuild with an input size mismatch, because input discovery checked existence, not substance. - RebuildEcFiles treats a zero-sized shard file as missing and regenerates over it in place (the reclassified-corrupt path: temp file beside the residue, atomic rename). - The startup/rescan shard loader, which always skipped zero-sized files, now deletes them once they are older than an hour - young enough files can be an in-flight copy's just-created file, since the same scan runs from LoadNewVolumes while serving. Regression tests: a rebuild with one emptied shard regenerates it byte-identical; the loader deletes a stale zero-sized shard and leaves a fresh one alone. * storage: age-check each zero-shard cleanup candidate individually The shard scan merges the data and idx directory listings, so the age-checked entry and a deletion candidate can be different files sharing one name - a stale zero-sized file in one directory next to a fresh same-named file in the other (possibly an in-flight copy's just-created one) could get the fresh file deleted. Each candidate's own modification time now decides, both directories are handled in one pass, and the split-directory case is pinned by a test. |
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Chris Lu
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0de7ff5eb8 |
ci: run the gated redis store tests (#10746)
* redis2: route the orphan cleanup existence checks to the master * scaffold: the redis_cluster2 read routing key is useReadOnly * ci: run the gated redis store tests * redis2: poll for the redis expiry instead of a fixed sleep * redis2: assert the value key exists before testing its expiry |
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Chris Lu
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0481f712b1 |
redis2: orphan cleanup existence checks must not read replicas (#10745)
* redis2: route the orphan cleanup existence checks to the master * scaffold: the redis_cluster2 read routing key is useReadOnly |
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Chris Lu
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ae2cc8225e |
rust volume: mirror the VolumeConsolidateIndex RPC from Go (#10752)
The Go volume server has VolumeConsolidateIndex, which moves a volume's .idx out of the data directory into the configured -dir.idx directory (where an EC decode/reconstruct can leave it co-located) and reloads the volume in place. The Rust port's proto omitted the RPC entirely, so its generated VolumeServer trait was one method short of Go's. Add the proto message and rpc, the gated grpc handler, and Store::consolidate_volume_index / Volume::relocate_index_to, mirroring Go's Store.ConsolidateVolumeIndex and Volume.RelocateIndexTo -- including the cross-device copy fallback and the reopen-against-the-old-dir path when the move fails. Integration tests cover the real move (index relocated, volume still serves reads and the move is idempotent), the no-op paths (index already in place, no separate idx dir) and the not-found error, plus the grpc handler end to end. |
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Chris Lu
|
7f27c572c4 |
log_buffer: end bounded reads that find the buffer empty (#10750)
A bounded LoopProcessLogData (stopTsNs set) on a buffer that never took a write since process start fell into the ResumeFromDiskError branch, which never checks stopTsNs when ReadFromDiskFn is nil and HasData() is false. The read parked on the notification loop forever while the subscription's idle heartbeats kept the stream looking alive, so a bounded SubscribeMetadata pass on a freshly restarted idle filer never completed. Terminate like the caught-up path does, returning a nil error: leaking the pending ResumeFromDiskError would latch the filer's outer loop into its gap machinery, which parks the bounded subscriber all over again. |
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Chris Lu
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4f50c5b0d4 |
feat: throughput limits for replicate, EC shard, and worker-driven moves (#10749)
* feat: throughput limits for replicate, EC shard, and worker-driven moves VolumeCopy was the only rate-limitable transfer; EC shard copies, replica creation, and worker-driven moves all ran at whatever the receiving server's maintenance rate allowed, with no per-operation control. - proto: VolumeEcShardsCopyRequest and the balance / ec_balance task params and configs gain io_byte_per_second; 0 keeps today's behavior (the volume server's own maintenance rate governs). - volume server: VolumeEcShardsCopy throttles with one WriteThrottler per request, shared across the shard, .ecx, .ecj, .vif, and .ecsum copies so the limit caps the transfer as a whole - the same shape as VolumeCopy. - volume_move: ReplicateVolume accepts the limit; EcMoveOptions carries it through MoveEcShards/CopyAndMountEcShards into the copy request, with fake-client tests asserting propagation. - shell: ec.balance gains -ioBytePerSecond; volume.tier.move's replication top-up honors the command's existing -ioBytePerSecond instead of running unthrottled. - worker: balance and ec_balance configs gain io_byte_per_second (surfaced in the admin config schema), carried through detection and plugin job parameters into task params and handed to the shared mover; batch balance jobs inherit the limit from their detection results. The limit is per copy stream, so maxParallelization multiplies the aggregate ceiling. * worker plugins: expose io_byte_per_second in the plugin config and derive it The plugin-driven detection path derives its task Config from the plugin configuration values, and both balance and ec_balance left IoBytePerSecond at zero there - a configured limit silently reverted to the server maintenance rate. Both derive functions now read the field (clamped at zero), and the plugin descriptors expose it with defaults so the configuration form carries it. |
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Chris Lu
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7d0fff32db |
redis2: expire entries without destroying a concurrent recreate (#10744)
* redis2: expire entries without destroying a concurrent recreate * redis2: repair the member when redis expiry wins the compare-and-delete race |
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Chris Lu
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c0f33d599b |
rust volume: mirror Go volume server logic to gate the admin RPCs (#10748)
rust volume: gate the remaining admin RPCs behind check_grpc_admin_auth
The Go volume server gates 29 destructive VolumeServer RPCs on the
-whiteList admin check; the Rust port only gated 14. Add the gate to the
other 15 -- batch_delete, read_all_needles, fetch_and_write_needle, the
EC-shard generate/rebuild/copy/unmount/to-volume RPCs, both tier-move RPCs,
volume_copy, volume_tail_receiver, set_state, scrub_ec_volume and
volume_needle_status -- so a configured whitelist restricts them the same
way it already does on the Go side.
check_grpc_admin_auth also required peer info before checking whether any
control was configured, unlike Go's `if vs.guard == nil { return nil }`.
Short-circuit when no whitelist and no signing key are set, so in-process
callers keep working with security inactive and only the gate ordering
changes for configured servers.
tests/admin_auth_coverage.rs mirrors the Go coverage test: every handler
must either gate or be listed as intentionally open with a reason, so the
two implementations can't silently drift apart again.
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Chris Lu
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4500bdf88e |
iceberg: accept lowercase parquet file format when planning compaction (#10751)
* iceberg: accept lowercase parquet file format when planning compaction * iceberg: expect absolute added-file paths in compaction integration test |
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Chris Lu
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76d3fd0e9d |
grpc: optional client_cert/client_key for outgoing mTLS connections (#10747)
* grpc: optional client_cert/client_key for outgoing mTLS connections * scaffold: list client_cert/client_key in each grpc section |
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Chris Lu
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abd36cbf92 |
redis2: harden the orphaned index member cleanup (#10743)
* redis2: derive the orphan cleanup keys inside the helper * redis2: skip orphan cleanup in super large directories * redis2: detach orphan cleanup from the request context and log a failed restore * redis2: keep a directory member whose child index is still live * redis2: run restore-path tests under both key prefixes and fix the test harness * redis2: check cleanup errors in tests |
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Chris Lu
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4fb5d15019 |
redis: remove orphaned directory index members on listing (#10742)
* redis: remove orphaned directory index members on listing * redis: check cleanup errors in tests |
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Chris Lu
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8714f42abf |
erasure_coding: share the EC shard teardown primitive (#10740)
The unmount+full-teardown of EC shards was duplicated: the plugin-worker EC task had unmountAndDeleteEcShards and the shell had unmountAndDeleteEcShardsQuiet, byte-identical apart from a fence parameter and a sentinel error. That duplication is how the teardown fence semantics drifted between the two paths. Distribute, mount and verify already live in weed/storage/erasure_coding and are shared by both callers; move the teardown there too, as UnmountAndDeleteEcShards plus the shared ErrFullTeardownNotAcked sentinel. Both paths now call the one function, so the fence semantics cannot diverge again. The shell keeps a thin type-converting wrapper and aliases the sentinel; behavior is unchanged. |
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Chris Lu
|
6408f32232 |
EC worker: clear stale/interrupted shards at task start and on failure (#10738)
* EC worker: clear stale/interrupted shards at task start and on failure
The EC encode task cleared stale shards from a prior interrupted encode only
at 55% progress (after mark-readonly, copy, and generate), and used a
generation-fenced teardown. Two gaps left orphan shards behind:
- a retried encode's prior attempt carries the same admin-issued encodeTsNs,
and the server's teardown fence preserves same-or-newer generations, so the
prior attempt's shards were never cleared;
- shards left by an interrupted distribute often have an unreadable .vif
generation (the sidecar never landed), which the fence also preserves.
Both survive the next volume-server restart as orphans and make detection
refuse the volume (Manual intervention required).
Move the cleanup to a Step 0 preflight that runs before any destructive step,
and switch it to the server's blanket (generation-independent) teardown -- the
same wipe the shell ec.encode pre-cleanup uses. The admin dedupe key already
prevents a concurrent newer encode of the volume, and the blanket path aborts
rather than clobber a live newer mount.
Add rollbackDistribute: a failure after distribute begins but before verify
commits the EC copy now tears down the shards it wrote and restores the sources
to writable, so a terminally-failed encode (a single-attempt job, or the last
of a retry series, which has no successor preflight) leaves nothing behind.
The preflight also rejects a plan with no targets or no source before marking
the source readonly.
* EC worker: reject malformed targets and keep source readonly on incomplete teardown
Address review feedback:
- ensureCleanEcStart only rejected an empty target slice; a target with an
empty Node (or no shard ids) passed the length check, was then silently
skipped by cleanupStaleEcShards, and let Execute mark the source readonly
with nothing to distribute to. Validate each target before the first
destructive step. Add regression cases.
- rollbackDistribute marked the source writable even when the shard teardown
returned an error, exposing a writable source beside stale (possibly mounted)
shards -- reads/writes could diverge and orphan cleanup will not remove a
writable source. On an incomplete teardown, leave the source readonly for the
next preflight or an operator to reconcile.
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Chris Lu
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fa48ce20fc |
shell: roll back a failed ec.encode instead of leaving readonly volumes and orphan shards (#10741)
* shell: roll back a failed ec.encode instead of leaving readonly volumes and orphan shards ec.encode marks the source volumes readonly and generates EC shards before it verifies the shards and deletes the originals. If any step in between failed, the command just returned the error: the volumes were left readonly and the partially-produced EC shards survived as orphans, cleaned up only by the next ec.encode run (via clearPreexistingEcShards) if the operator retried. Add a deferred rollback that runs when the batch fails before the originals are deleted: it tears down the EC shards produced this run and restores the sources to writable, reusing the existing clearPreexistingEcShards and markVolumeReplicaWritable helpers. Once the shards are verified recoverable the batch is committed to the EC copy and does not roll back. Both rollback steps are idempotent, so a failure before the volumes were marked readonly is safe. * shell: re-read volume locations when restoring writable in ec.encode rollback Address review: rollbackFailedEcEncode restored writable using the location snapshot taken before doEcEncode, but doEcEncode re-reads locations and marks every replica of that later snapshot readonly. A replica added or moved in between would be left readonly. Re-read locations in the rollback and fall back to the pre-encode snapshot only if the re-read fails. |
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Chris Lu
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db5a086d04 |
read cold remote objects straight from the origin while caching (#10731)
* refactor: extract remote mount resolution into shared helpers * refactor: share the adaptive remote cache wait policy * filer: stream cold remote reads from the origin while caching * s3: stream cold remote reads from the origin instead of 503 retries * test: cover the S3 origin stream-through path * remote mounts: match on path components and prefer the longest mount * fail short origin streams instead of silently truncating * s3: try the origin before failing a cold read on a local cache error * s3: gate origin streaming on the entry's resolved version * return the cache RPC's NotFound as a canonical status and classify it everywhere * filer: keep multipart-range cold reads on the retry path |
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Chris Lu
|
a0347ca545 |
test: assert EC shard identity and empty-view in multi-disk lifecycle tests (#10723)
test: assert EC shard identity and empty-view, not just counts, in lifecycle Follow-up to the multi-disk EC lifecycle tests (#10721), addressing review feedback. The phase checks compared shard counts. A reconcile that put a shard on the wrong disk, or loaded a different shard than the file on disk, keeps 6/5/3 right while corrupting the mapping. Compare the exact registered shard set per disk at every phase instead, via a shared assertRegistered helper. The cross-disk mount phase now also pins that shard 0 landed on disk2 with the existing shards, not merely that it is findable. The sidecar-disk-lost scenario only logged the registered view, so a change that registered shards without reachable sidecars would pass despite the documented expectation that the view stays empty. It now asserts countRegistered == 0: a registered-but-unreadable shard is worse than an unregistered one, because the master advertises it. The first store's closer is now deferred as a closure the moment the store is created, so a Fatalf in an early phase no longer leaks it and its notification-drainer goroutine; the closure reads the reassigned variable so it also covers the post-restart store. |
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Chris Lu
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78e7e04377 |
plugin scheduler: drain started jobs past the window close instead of killing them (#10728)
* plugin scheduler: drain started jobs past the window close instead of killing them * plugin scheduler: never drain-cap an attempt below its declared estimated runtime * plugin scheduler: cap estimated_runtime_seconds before the Duration conversion |
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Chris Lu
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0799084e98 |
refactor: share volume and EC shard move logic between shell and workers (#10727)
* operation: add shared volume_move package for volume and EC shard moves The shell commands (volume.move, volume.balance, ec.balance, tier moves) and the maintenance workers (balance, ec_balance) each carried their own copy of the move RPC sequences, and the copies had drifted: the worker verified the target before deleting the source but dropped the disk type and IO throttle; the shell passed those but deleted the source unverified. volume_move.Mover carries the merged sequences, keeping the stricter behavior from each side: - LiveMoveVolume: check-then-hard-freeze the source (VolumeStatus's IsReadOnly also covers low-disk and readonly-but-can-delete states, which still accept needle deletes), copy with disk type and IO throttle, tail, verify the target is not behind the source before the destructive source delete (a target that is ahead holds writes it accepted during the tail and the move commits to keep them), and restore the source's writability when a failure precedes the delete and this move did the freezing. Aborts clean up the incomplete target copy; a failed cleanup or an ambiguous source delete keeps the source readonly (ErrSourceKeptReadonly) so callers do not thaw a source next to a possibly-authoritative copy. With a readonly source, an existing or unknown-state target refuses the move outright: no client-side observation can prove such a copy is a stale remnant rather than the authoritative copy of an unfinished move. - MoveEcShards: copy with the .ecx/.ecj/.vif/.ecsum sidecars, mount, verify the target registered every shard before unmount+delete on the source, and reject same-server moves (the EC delete is server-wide). Server identity is the grpc endpoint (SameServer), so node:8080 and node:8080.18080 compare equal while test servers sharing a degenerate HTTP address stay distinct; addresses are validated non-fatally before dialing and before being embedded in copy/tail requests, since both the client dialer and the receiving server normalize them through a parser that aborts the process on a malformed port. The Rust volume server's codes.NotFound counts as a definitively absent probe answer alongside the Go server's plain-error code Unknown. All RPCs go through an injectable ClientFunc, so the sequences are unit tested against a fake volume server client: RPC order, request fields, and that verification failures keep the source intact. * shell, worker: delegate volume and EC shard moves to operation/volume_move LiveMoveVolume and the copy/tail/delete/mark-writable helpers become thin wrappers over the shared mover, keeping their signatures; the EC helpers keep their per-step output and delegate the RPCs. BalanceTask and ECBalanceTask keep their parameter validation, progress reporting, and guards (same-node cross-disk rejection, dedup keep-node verification, shard ids range-checked before the uint8 narrowing) and hand the RPC sequences to the mover. volume.tier.move skips its thaw-on-failure when the mover deliberately kept the source readonly, since reopening the replicas beside a possibly-authoritative target copy would fork the volume. The tail-failure tolerance moves inside the mover: a failed tail is tolerated only when the volume was already readonly before the move began, backstopped by a stability re-read across the idle window, so volume.balance's -skipTailError-by-readonly heuristic and tier-move's unconditional skip both become the same authoritative rule. * volume_move: keep the source readonly when a failed copy leaves a target of unknown origin A failed copy can leave a complete, mounted copy on the target (the server finishes after the client loses the stream). The abort probed the target only when its pre-copy state was known-absent; an unknown prior state skipped both the probe and the cleanup and then reopened the source - two writable replicas of one volume, diverging from the next write on. The abort now probes the target on every failed copy and restores the source only when the target provably holds nothing. A copy whose provenance cannot be proven (unknown prior state, a pre-existing replica, or an unreachable target) is never deleted, and the source stays readonly with ErrSourceKeptReadonly naming the recovery. * test: teach the plugin worker harness the shared move sequence The fake volume server lacked VolumeStatus, which the shared mover now issues before freezing the source, and the batch execution test's status-read accounting predates the pre-copy target probe and the verification reads. Mirrors the harness the enterprise tree already carries. |
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Chris Lu
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2a513e71a4 |
test: drive ec.encode/balance/rebuild E2E with a byte-identical payload check (#10722)
The existing multi-disk EC integration test asserts on shard counts. Counting cannot tell a healthy volume from one a repair reassembled out of the wrong inputs — both have fourteen shards. This drives the real shell commands (ec.encode, ec.balance, ec.rebuild) against a live three-node, four-disk cluster and reads the stored bytes back after every step, so a rebuild that produced fourteen plausible-but-wrong shards fails here. An 8 KB random payload is stored, then encoded, balanced, damaged (two shard files removed and the servers restarted so the master relearns the reduced set from disk), and rebuilt. The rebuild output matches the shape of the support case that motivated this — "rebuildOneEcVolume", "missing shard N.0", "copied N.1 from ..." — and the payload is verified identical after each of upload, encode, balance, shard loss, and rebuild. Two ordering facts the test pins, both of which cost real debugging time: ec.rebuild is driven by the master's topology, not disk truth, so shards must be relearned (via restart) before a repair can target the right set; and the shell lock is dropped when the restart disconnects the master, so it has to be retaken before the rebuild. |
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Chris Lu
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3dfe4bdaaa |
test: walk an EC volume through a multi-disk node's whole life (#10721)
A multi-disk volume server keeps one .ecx / .ecj / .vif set per volume on a single disk while ec.balance scatters the shards across the others. Every EC operation on such a node crosses that split: startup registration, balancing the sidecar disk's shards away, rebooting in that state, and mounting a shard delivered to a disk that has no local sidecars. Each of those transitions is handled by a different mechanism (per-disk scan, cross-disk reconcile, mount-time .ecx lookup), individually tested but never as the sequence a production node actually lives through — where the output state of one transition is the input of the next. A regression in any hop shows up as shards that exist on disk while the master's view says otherwise, and every topology-driven repair then works against the wrong shard set. The layout, volume id and collection mirror a support case. The second test pins the failure floor when the sidecar disk itself dies: shards on the surviving disks may drop out of the registered view, since nothing can read them without the .ecx, but their files must survive so restoring the sidecars restores the volume. |
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Chris Lu
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65114575eb |
mount: invalidate hot directory listings by section (#10712)
* mount: invalidate hot directory listings by section A cached directory used to be dropped whole when it saw 64 changes in 2s: with a continuous writer the listing cycled through wipe, direct listing and full rebuild for as long as the writer kept going, and every sibling lookup fell through to the filer in between. Split each cached listing into name-range sections of 1024 entries. A burst of foreign changes invalidates just the section it lands in; entries stay served and events keep applying, and the next readdir re-lists only that range from the filer, reconciled through the version gate so it cannot roll back newer applied events. Lookups in an invalidated section read through until then. The mount's own writes no longer invalidate anything: they are ground truth for its cache. * meta_cache: drop the version floor with a deleted or moved directory The other teardown paths already clear both maps; a floor left behind here would fence the listing of a directory re-created at the same path. * mount: harden section refresh An unversioned listing (pre-upgrade filer) now only fills gaps instead of reconciling: without a snapshot to order against, an overwrite or the deletion sweep could roll back an event applied after the listing. The section table can be rebuilt or re-split between the listing and its apply, so the refresh only marks fresh or splits when the section still covers the range it read. Splicing bounds from a stale range into a rebuilt table could leave them unsorted. Bound the wait: a readdir gives a refresh five seconds before serving the maintained-but-unverified cache. Bound the size: a range grown past four sections aborts the refresh and drops the directory cache, re-tiling it with a full rebuild, with that request served direct. Cover the filer-facing path with a listing server: paging with the snapshot pinned across pages, the section cutoff, no calls for a fresh section, and the overgrown-range abort. * meta_cache: make the section table a self-contained state machine Churn counting, freshness, stale-range scanning and the refresh completion with its guard and split now live on dirSections itself, free of the lock, the store and the apply loop, so they test directly with synthetic clocks and tables. MetaCache keeps thin wrappers that hold its mutex and find the directory's table. * meta_cache: keep section internals out of the apply request The request now carries the completed build's table and one refresh as opaque values built by section code, and the boundary-derivation rule moves out of the build loop into a collector next to the rest of the section logic. * mount: fence refreshed sections with a snapshot floor A refresh versioned the entries it fetched and tombstoned the ones it swept, but a name absent from both cache and listing kept the old directory floor, so a delayed event between the two snapshots could resurrect it into a section already marked fresh. The section now carries its own floor, consulted next to the directory floor, covering every name in the range, present or absent — which also retires the refresh's per-entry version stamps and sweep tombstones. An unversioned listing sets no floor and vouches for nothing: it may still fill gaps, but the section stays stale and reads through until a filer that stamps snapshots re-validates it. A listing's reach is unknowable up front — a resumed handle can skip far ahead, and shrunken sections let one batch span many — so a readdir now re-validates every stale section from its start name to the end of the directory instead of the next two. * mount: fence tombstoned names with floors and gate the reconcile A tombstone answered for its name before the floors were consulted, so one at an old position let through events the newer listing floor should have fenced; a build never hit this because it prunes superseded tombstones, which a section refresh does not. The version gate now raises a tombstone to the floors like any other record. With no per-entry versions, only the section floor fences a reconcile's work, so a range the rebuilt or re-split table no longer has must not touch the store either: the range check moves ahead of the mutations, under the same lock the floor install holds. An unversioned refresh no longer retries: the section is remembered as unverifiable and skipped by the stale scan, or every batch of every readdir would re-list the same ranges against a filer that cannot vouch for them. * mount: clear beaten unversioned markers and skip refresh mid-build An unversioned marker outliving the snapshot write that replaced its content bypassed the section floor the same way an old tombstone did, letting a delayed pre-snapshot event roll the entry back. The refresh now clears the marker when its write wins; pinned local-only entries are not replaced at all, keeping their content and marker. A rebuild wipes and repopulates the store off the apply loop, so a refresh reconciling meanwhile could sweep children the build had already inserted and let it publish the directory incomplete. The refresh now skips a building directory, as events (buffered) and purges (skipped) already do; its staleness dies with the build's fresh table. * mount: clear the unversioned marker only after its replacement lands Clearing before the insert meant a failed write left the old local content claiming the listing floors, fencing the very events that were still entitled to correct it. * meta_cache: rename the section state machine to sectionList dirSections named both the type and the map of them. * mount: raise the default cacheDirMaxEntries to 100000 The low ceiling guarded against whole-listing rebuild churn: a big cached directory under writes kept re-streaming everything. Sectioned invalidation ended that — a burst now costs one range listing — so the remaining cost of caching a large directory is its one-time build, comparable to the single direct listing that read-through mode pays on every enumeration instead. * meta_cache: cover section border and edge cases A bound-named entry belongs to the section starting at the bound: the neighboring refresh's sweep stops before it, its own section's covers it. Churn past everything the build saw lands in the tail section, a rename spanning two sections invalidates both, and a listed entry at the section's end name is cut off with the ones beyond it. |
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Chris Lu
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a7d5443125 |
ec: confirm a surviving copy before deleting a duplicate EC shard (#10719)
* ec: confirm a surviving copy before deleting a duplicate EC shard The dedup phase of EC balancing removes a shard it believes exists elsewhere. It copies nothing first, so the shard surviving on another node is the only thing that makes the delete safe -- and it took the plan's word for that. The plan is built from the master's topology, which can name a location that holds nothing: such a server answers "CopyFile not found ec volume id N" when something later tries to read the shard there. A shard listed on a phantom location and on a real one looks duplicated, so dedup deletes one of them. When it picks the real one the last copy is gone, and the job reports success -- the loss only surfaces later, as a rebuild that cannot assemble enough shards. The move phase already refuses to work on trust: it verifies the shard registered on the destination before removing the source. Dedup now holds to the same standard. The planner records which node it chose to keep, and both executors -- the worker task and the shell's ec.balance -- confirm that node really holds the shard before deleting. A keep node that cannot be queried is unknown rather than confirmed, and blocks the delete. Tests drive the destructive path against an in-process volume server that tracks what is actually on disk separately from what the plan claims, which is the distinction the bug turns on. Without the guard, two of them fail by deleting the only copy and returning success. * ec: check the collection and bound the wait when confirming a survivor Two gaps in the dedup survivor check. The inventory RPC is keyed by volume id alone, so a server holding the same number for a different collection answers "yes, I have that shard" to a question about this one. Accepting that deletes the last real copy on the strength of an unrelated volume. The response already carries the collection, so verify against it rather than widening the RPC. The shell path also queried on a background context, so a keep node that accepts the connection but never answers would hang the whole balance run instead of reporting that the survivor could not be confirmed. Bound it. The check moves into VerifyShardsOnServer next to the existing helper, shared by both executors, so the two paths cannot drift. |
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Chris Lu
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5b519489c1 |
remote_storage: build all S3-compatible clients through one constructor (#10720)
* remote_storage: build S3-compatible clients through one constructor The eight non-s3 S3-SDK providers each duplicated the AWS session setup and only the s3 maker could take a custom *http.Client. Route every S3-compatible type (s3, wasabi, b2, aliyun, tencent, baidu, filebase, storj, contabo) through MakeWithHTTPClient with a single options table, and add S3CompatibleEndpoint so callers can resolve the endpoint a given type dials. No behavior change. * volume: apply the remote-endpoint check to all S3-compatible providers FetchAndWriteNeedle validated the endpoint and used the pinned dialer only for type "s3". Every S3-SDK backend (wasabi, b2, aliyun, tencent, baidu, filebase, storj, contabo) dials a caller-supplied endpoint through the same client, so gate on S3CompatibleEndpoint to apply the same check uniformly. -volume.allowUntrustedRemoteEndpoints still opts out. * volume: don't route the guarded remote-endpoint client through a proxy The guarded client exists to dial the validated endpoint directly and re-check the resolved IP at connect time. With http.ProxyFromEnvironment set, the dialer only validates the proxy's address while the proxy re-resolves the endpoint host, which reopens the rebinding window. Drop the proxy on this path; operators that need one can opt out with -volume.allowUntrustedRemoteEndpoints. |
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Chris Lu
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980471c818 |
storage: count a volume's needles in uint32 (#10718)
FileCount and DeleteCount were int, so each cost a word on every replica the master holds. A volume caps at 30GB on a 4-byte-offset build and 8TB on a 5-byte one, and neither holds 4.29 billion needles. That takes VolumeInfo from 120 bytes to 112, which is its own size class rather than rounding up into the 128 one, so a replica costs 135.7 bytes in the map instead of 151.7 -- about 25MB across the 1.6M replicas in a cluster the size of the one this came from. Counts are narrowed where they are read rather than assigned across, so a report claiming more than a volume can hold pins at the ceiling instead of wrapping to a small number. |
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Chris Lu
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5b145fe646 |
shell: send read jwt when downloading chunks in fs.mergeVolumes and fs.distributeChunks (#10717)
* shell: fs.mergeVolumes sends read jwt when downloading chunks * shell: fs.distributeChunks sends read jwt when downloading chunks |
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Chris Lu
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790e8d3fd6 |
clickhouse catalog test: cover latest ClickHouse and catalog-side CREATE TABLE (#10707)
* clickhouse catalog test: cover latest ClickHouse and catalog-side CREATE TABLE * verify catalog registration structurally and fix README image wording |
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Chris Lu
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214d3599d3 |
windows mount: cache file data, resolved paths and attributes (#10703)
* benchmark tool for mounted filesystems * ci: on-demand mount benchmark, native WinFsp vs rclone plus a Linux reference * windows mount: let the Windows cache manager cache file data WinFsp only turns the cache manager on for a file when FileInfoTimeout is infinite; at any finite value every application read and write is a synchronous trip into the mount process at whatever size the application issued. Metadata events already reach FspFileSystemNotify, which purges a changed file's cached pages and attributes, so an infinite timeout stays coherent. The dir listing, volume info and EA timeouts are pinned to one second so they do not silently inherit the infinity. * windows mount: cache resolved paths and attributes in the adapter WinFsp addresses every operation by path and has no FORGET, so the adapter walked the whole path through Lookup on each one, and in a directory the filer has not listed yet every walk was a filer round trip; nothing played the part of the kernel's dentry and attribute caches. The path cache owns one lookup reference per entry the way the kernel holds one until FORGET, serves attribute reads for files without an open handle, and is purged by the mount's own mutations and by metadata events, with the timeout as backstop. * windows mount: keep a closed file's attributes cached Open steals the path's cache entry for its handle and Release returned the reference with a purge, so the stat that follows every copied file walked to the filer again. Reading the handle's final attributes before it goes away and moving the reference back into the cache serves that stat locally, the way the kernel's attribute cache does after a close. Only if the path still names that inode, though: WinFsp reports the path the handle opened with, and after a delete-on-close or a rename caching it would resurrect an entry that is gone. * windows mount: persist entries at create, and let the flush stay at close WinFsp posts the cleanup and close that carry the flush after CloseHandle has returned, so deferring the filer entry to the flush let everything that reads through the filer race an unflushed close: a listing missed just-written files, and a directory rename moved a directory on the filer before its newest child existed there, leaving the straggler flush to recreate the child under the dead path. Flush-at-cleanup is not the answer either: it makes every handle's cleanup flush, and those flushes race the unlinks of delete-on-close, re-inserting the entry the unlink just removed. Persisting the entry at create takes the ordering question away. * mount: flush written pages before a truncate shrinks past them The shrink trims chunks, but written pages that have not become chunks yet are invisible to it, so the next flush wrote them back and the file grew again, resurrecting the truncated bytes. Windows hits this on every write-then-shrink because its flush runs after CloseHandle, but the gap is platform-neutral. * mount: order a file's unlink against its in-flight flush Unlink set the handle's deleted flag bare, so a flush already past its own check of that flag wrote the entry back right after the delete removed it, and a delete-on-close file outlived its last handle. The flag is now set under the handle's flush lock and re-checked under it, so a flush either completes before the delete or sees the flag and skips. An eagerly created handle also starts clean: the dirty mark existed to make the deferred filer create happen at flush, and eager creates have nothing to flush. |
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Chris Lu
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c6e1387f59 |
shell: multi-target fs.mergeVolumes and volume.mark -readonlyCanDelete (#10706)
* shell: fs.mergeVolumes distributes one volume across multiple -toVolumeId targets * volume: volume.mark -readonlyCanDelete rejects writes but keeps accepting deletes * seaweed-volume: mirror readonlyCanDelete volume state |
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Chris Lu
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0b1f0cafee | shell: keep the source readonly when the incomplete target copy cannot be deleted (#10705) | ||
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Chris Lu
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d4d8e097dd |
shell: volume.move cleans up when aborted after the copy phase (#10704)
* shell: volume.move restores source writability when aborted after the copy phase * shell: volume.move removes the incomplete target copy when aborted before the source delete * shell: give each abort cleanup RPC its own timeout |
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Chris Lu
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365d3e9e87 |
filer: TUS concatenation extension (#10702)
* filer: TUS creation accepts Upload-Concat partial uploads * filer: TUS final uploads concatenate completed partials * filer: TUS concatenation tests * filer: consumed marker pins TUS chunk ownership on completion * filer: TUS session delete decides chunk ownership after removing the session info * filer: TUS completion persists the consumed marker before creating the entry * filer: TUS completion re-verifies the session after persisting the consumed marker * filer: serialize TUS session ownership transitions per filer * filer: surface failed TUS consumed-marker rollbacks |
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Chris Lu
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89e6f9a16e |
shell: volume.delete and volume.move accept a -timeout (#10701)
* shell: volume.delete accepts a -timeout * shell: volume.move accepts a -timeout |
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Chris Lu
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7c87d78ea2 |
s3: a key deleted after enabling versioning must leave the listing (#10684)
* s3: a null object wins over a rescan when the latest-version pointer is absent The read path already resolves an absent pointer this way; the listing-path counterpart scanned .versions/ first and could surface an old version or delete marker over the current suspended-versioning null object. * s3: dedup a key against its .versions sibling in suspended buckets too A suspended bucket keeps its .versions directories, so a suspended-versioning null object and its .versions sibling emitted the same key twice. * s3: retract a null object from the listing when a delete marker shadows it Deleting a key whose null version predates versioning leaves the base-path entry in place and records the delete marker under <key>.versions. The listing appended the base-path entry and relied on the .versions sibling to replace it, but a delete-marker current version emitted nothing, so the deleted key stayed visible to ListObjects while GET and HEAD returned 404. * s3: keep a key's .versions sibling on the same page as the key When the page quota ran out between a base-path entry and its .versions directory, the page ended with the stale entry and the next page skipped the directory as a marker echo, so the replacement or retraction never happened. * s3: the null version is not latest when the .versions pointer names a newer one ListObjectVersions stamped IsLatest on every base-path null object, so a key deleted after enabling versioning reported IsLatest on both the delete marker and the null version. * s3: test listing after a pre-versioning null object is delete-marked * s3: find a key's earlier page entry by scan, not by adjacency A key such as k.bak sorts between k and k.versions, so the entry a .versions sibling replaces or retracts is not always the last one on the page. Scan back through the page for the key, and insert a late resolution in sorted position instead of at the end. * s3: settle trailing null objects by lookup when a page fills The quota can run out while keys still sit between a null object and its .versions sibling, and the sibling-adjacent page-boundary exception never fires for those. Track the trailing null objects whose sibling has not been ruled out and look each one up before declaring the page full; a retraction reopens the quota. * s3: do not resolve a .versions sibling its page has already moved past A page resuming from a marker inside the base key's extension region has already listed and settled the base null object on an earlier page, so resolving the .versions directory again re-emitted the key. * s3: test listing with keys between a null object and its .versions sibling * s3: pick the newer of the null object and the scanned versions Making the null object win outright whenever the pointer is absent misread multi-filer pointer lag: version files replicate ahead of the pointer, and a key overwritten or delete-marked after pre-versioning days would list its stale null again. The suspended-versioning write that legitimately makes the null current is also the newer entry, so mtime tells the two apart. * s3: a delete-marked null object no longer keeps its prefix alive The hidden-entries probe took any plain file as proof of a listable key, but a null object shadowed by its .versions sibling's delete marker is not one. Hold plain files pending until the sibling settles them either way. * s3: settle an evicted pending null instead of dropping it Nested keys like k, k!, k!! can hold more pending nulls than the cap. A silently evicted one could close the page unsettled, and the resume skip would then keep the stale entry for good. * s3: test deleted-prefix hiding and the pending-null cap * s3: cover the reported '!' intervening key with a live version * s3: an unstamped same-second version outranks the null object Second-resolution mtimes cannot order same-second writes, so the tie went to the stale null when the pointer lagged. The suspended write that makes a null current stamps the version it displaces before clearing the pointer, so the stamp is the authoritative signal and a tie without it goes to the version. * s3: a pointer-less versions listing still checks what replicated ListObjectVersions took a missing pointer as proof the null object is latest, but under pointer lag the sibling can already hold newer replicated versions or markers. Apply the same nullObjectWins rule as the listing recovery. * s3: a failed null-object settlement fails the listing Every getEntry error read as a missing sibling, so a transient filer error at a page boundary committed the unsettled null and the next page skipped its sibling for good. Only a definitive not-found means the null is live; other failures are retained on eviction and fail the request at page close. * s3: retract a CommonPrefix whose only backers were delete-marked nulls The directory probe settles this for the / delimiter, but any other delimiter derives prefixes from base-path keys directly, and a prefix built solely from null objects survived their delete markers. Count the unsettled null backers behind the newest prefix and retract it when the last one settles as a marker; a live resolution or any listable contributor confirms the prefix instead. * s3: test custom-delimiter prefix retraction * s3: an explicit signal marks the null object current, not the demotion stamp The NoncurrentSinceNs stamp survives promotion: delete the version that demoted another and the promoted one is current yet still stamped, so a lagging replica would resurrect the stale null. A suspended-versioning write now records Seaweed-X-Amz-Null-Version-Is-Latest on the .versions directory when it clears the pointer, every pointer update removes it, and the recovery paths trust the signal instead of the stamp. * s3: a filer failover retry rebuilds the listing page from scratch The failover wrapper reruns the callback on another filer after a transport error, and the partially built page, spent quota, and advanced marker leaked into the retry, which could then return a stale or duplicated page as success. * s3: only a prefix's own backers can debit it A delete marker for a version-only key (no base object) derived the same prefix as its neighbors and decremented backing it never contributed, retracting a prefix that a live null object still backed. Track backers by key so settlement is idempotent and only debits what was counted. * s3: test a version-only marker against a null-backed prefix * s3: a pointer recompute clears the null-current signal The routed finalize for delete markers, COPY, and multipart rewrites the .versions pointer through RECOMPUTE_LATEST, which left a suspended-era null-current signal in place. Version files never carry the signal, so mapping it in CopyExtended deletes it whenever the pointer recomputes. * s3: the pointer outranks the null-current signal in the versions listing The signal check guarded the pointer check, so a stale signal a recompute had not cleared yet would have let the null claim IsLatest alongside the pointed-at version. |
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Chris Lu
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753cb8cda8 |
master: stop copying the cluster to name it (#10700)
* topology: name a node's volumes without copying them ToVolumeLocations reads a volume id off every volume in the cluster, and got there through GetVolumes, which copies a whole storage.VolumeInfo per volume to be read for four bytes of it. Every client that connects asks for this. At 800k volumes the walk goes from 94.6MB to 16.0MB, which is the ids themselves. * master: log why a client send failed, not what was sent The message names every volume on a newly connected node, so a client going away had the master format a protobuf that size into text -- through the one log level that is always on. The error is the part worth having. |
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Chris Lu
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5e9b7833ee |
topology: keep the volume map's values out of its slots (#10680)
Go stores a map value inline once it fits in 128 bytes, and indirectly above that. Shrinking storage.VolumeInfo to 120 bytes therefore moved 1.6M of them into the map's own slots, which are allocated to capacity rather than to occupancy, and the map grew by 149MB even though each volume got smaller. Hold pointers, so the size of a volume record stops deciding how it is stored. Updates are written through the pointer already there, so a heartbeat that changes a volume allocates nothing, as it did when the struct was above the threshold and Go was doing this itself. At 800k volume ids across 3 servers the resident topology goes from 705.3MB to 546.6MB, with heartbeat cost unchanged at 111.6MB. |
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Chris Lu
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52d74df4d1 |
clients: stream the volume listings that ask for everything (#10679)
* master: stream volume listings A listing of 800k volumes is 36MB on the wire but 305MB as messages, and the master built all of it, then held it while grpc encoded it. Two of those at once is most of a small master's heap, and the maintenance scanner asks every 30 minutes. The topology goes out first, listing nothing, then its volumes in batches, so the master holds a batch rather than a cluster: 341MB of live heap for one listing becomes 4.4MB. It allocates much the same either way -- what changes is how much of it has to be live at once, which is what sets the heap ceiling. Batches are built under their disk's lock and sent outside it, so a slow reader stalls the stream rather than the topology. They therefore do not share one instant, which a single listing did not either: it takes each disk's lock in turn, so a volume moving during either can be seen twice or not at all. The client helper hides which kind of master answered: one too old for the stream is asked the old way and its reply cut into the same batches. Either way the topology handed over lists no volumes, so a caller cannot come to depend on finding them there. * admin: stream the listing the maintenance scan reads It asks for every volume in the cluster every 30 minutes. Reassembling it client-side keeps the scan identical -- ActiveTopology splits disks by the disk ids on the volumes, so it needs them in the topology -- while the master no longer builds the whole reply to send it. * topology: report a disk id that does not depend on map order A topology disk that fronts several physical disks took its reported id from whichever volume the map yielded first, so two listings of an unchanged disk could disagree. Take the smallest instead. * topology: test that a streamed listing rebuilds to the whole one The callers that stream now rebuild the listing from a topology sent without volumes plus the batches after it, so that has to come out the same as being sent it whole, at every batch size and under a filter. * clients: stream the volume listings that ask for everything The dashboard's list and export pages, the collection and ec shard pages, the topology view, the worker metrics and two shell commands each asked the master to build all 800k volumes into one reply. They read the same listing as before, rebuilt on their side, so the master no longer holds it. The three that already ask for one volume or one collection stay as they are: their replies are small, and streaming one costs a round trip to say so. |
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Chris Lu
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46ce8cbe84 |
master: stream volume listings (#10676)
* master: stream volume listings A listing of 800k volumes is 36MB on the wire but 305MB as messages, and the master built all of it, then held it while grpc encoded it. Two of those at once is most of a small master's heap, and the maintenance scanner asks every 30 minutes. The topology goes out first, listing nothing, then its volumes in batches, so the master holds a batch rather than a cluster: 341MB of live heap for one listing becomes 4.4MB. It allocates much the same either way -- what changes is how much of it has to be live at once, which is what sets the heap ceiling. Batches are built under their disk's lock and sent outside it, so a slow reader stalls the stream rather than the topology. They therefore do not share one instant, which a single listing did not either: it takes each disk's lock in turn, so a volume moving during either can be seen twice or not at all. The client helper hides which kind of master answered: one too old for the stream is asked the old way and its reply cut into the same batches. Either way the topology handed over lists no volumes, so a caller cannot come to depend on finding them there. * admin: stream the listing the maintenance scan reads It asks for every volume in the cluster every 30 minutes. Reassembling it client-side keeps the scan identical -- ActiveTopology splits disks by the disk ids on the volumes, so it needs them in the topology -- while the master no longer builds the whole reply to send it. |
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Chris Lu
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98f9e67b4d |
topology: provisional volume update must not erase the reported disk id (#10687)
Volume growth registers a provisional record before it can know which directory the server chose, while the server's own report -- pushed during the AllocateVolume RPC -- carries the real disk id. The merge is last-writer-wins, so whichever lands second sticks, and fresh volumes nondeterministically show disk 0 on multi-dir servers. Keep the reported disk id when the provisional update carries none, before the report digest is computed so the stored record stays consistent with what the server keeps reporting. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdTEEPbg4MtcoEGwqbgtZC |
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Chris Lu
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65b9ae7704 |
master: keep disk_id when registering volumes from incremental heartbeats (#10686)
The volume server names the directory index in every VolumeShortInformationMessage, but NewVolumeInfoFromShort dropped it, so volumes registered through the incremental new-volume path showed disk_id 0 at the master until a full report -- misreporting multi-dir servers in volume.list and the per-physical-disk topology views. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdTEEPbg4MtcoEGwqbgtZC |
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Chris Lu
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00c5572e8c |
volume: decode IPv6 transition addresses in the remote-endpoint guard (#10683)
* volume: decode IPv6 transition addresses in the remote-endpoint guard checkBlockedIP normalized only ::ffff: mapped IPv4, so NAT64 (64:ff9b::/96), 6to4 (2002::/16), Teredo (2001:0000::/32), and IPv4-compatible (::/96) addresses that embed an internal IPv4 (loopback, 169.254.169.254, RFC 1918) passed the endpoint guard even though the plain IPv4 forms are refused. Extract the embedded IPv4 from those forms and re-check it against the deny list, which covers both the up-front validation and the dial-time guard. Mirrored in the Rust volume server. * volume: require the full NAT64 well-known prefix before decoding Only 64:ff9b::/96 carries the embedded IPv4 in the low 32 bits, so also require bytes 4-11 to be zero before treating an address as NAT64; other 64:ff9b: prefixes place the IPv4 elsewhere and are left untouched. Add public-target coverage for 6to4, Teredo, and IPv4-compatible so every decoder is exercised on both a blocked and an allowed destination. Mirrored in the Rust volume server. |
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Chris Lu
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3911e4c548 | master: keep a racing registration out of a dying collection (#10677) | ||
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Chris Lu
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c8cc56be91 | iceberg: route unprefixed requests to the first table bucket (#10675) |