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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Chris LuandClaude Opus 5.5
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a074538c8f |
admin: manage S3 vector buckets (#12334)
* s3vectors: run an operation for trusted local tooling Like s3tables.Manager.Execute, Server.Execute runs one S3 Vectors operation through its handler as a given identity, without a signed request. The admin console can then manage vector buckets through the same validation, authorization and catalog steps as the API. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK * admin: list, inspect, create and delete vector buckets over the API /api/s3vectors runs the S3 Vectors operations through Server.Execute as the admin account: list vector buckets with their encryption, read one bucket with its policy and each index's data type, dimension, distance metric and non-filterable keys, create and delete a bucket, and delete an index. Going through the operations keeps the API's rules, such as ICEBERG buckets not being vector buckets and the implicit index namespace not blocking a delete. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK * s3vectors: export the rule for which table buckets are vector buckets IsVectorBucketFormat names the check ListVectorBuckets and isVectorBucket already make, so the admin console can tell the same buckets apart. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK * admin: vector bucket pages Object Store > Vector Buckets lists the vector buckets with their ARN, encryption and creation time, creates and deletes them, and opens one bucket with its indexes (data type, dimension, distance metric, non-filterable keys) and its policy, where an index can be deleted. A LANCE row on the Table Buckets page links to the same bucket's vector page, since both APIs serve it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK * admin: stop the vector bucket and index lists at the list limit A page cut short by filtered ICEBERG buckets let the next page carry the list past s3TablesAdminListLimit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * admin: say when a vector bucket or index list is cut at the limit The lists stop at s3TablesAdminListLimit while more remain, so mark them truncated and point to an S3 Vectors client for the rest. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * admin: indent the vector bucket policy A policy stored as one line ran off the right edge of the details page. Policies that are not valid JSON are shown as stored. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * admin: show a deeply nested vector bucket policy as stored Indenting multiplies the size of a deeply nested document, so a policy past 32 levels of nesting is shown without indenting. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Chris LuandClaude Opus 5.5
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ec968aa016 |
s3vectors: support TagResource, UntagResource and ListTagsForResource (#12335)
* s3vectors: tag vector buckets and indexes
TagResource, UntagResource and ListTagsForResource answer on
/tags/{resourceArn} (POST, DELETE, GET) and by name. Each authorizes its
own s3vectors action on the bucket or index ARN, then reads or writes the
catalog record's tags. A resource holds at most 50 tags.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* s3vectors: apply the tags passed to CreateVectorBucket and CreateIndex
The tags field was accepted and dropped. It is now stored on the new
bucket or index, and creating with tags needs s3vectors:TagResource in
addition to the create action.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test/s3vectors: cover resource tagging end to end
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* s3tables: keep tag operations to a bound table bucket
TagResource, UntagResource and ListTagsForResource run through Execute
with WithTableBucketCreatedAt now answer not found when the bucket name
holds another bucket, as the bound creates and deletes already do.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* s3vectors: bind tagging to the authorized bucket and to vector indexes
The catalog tag calls carry the creation time of the bucket authorizeVector
approved, so a bucket created again under the name is not touched. An index
ARN must name a Lance table: another table in the vector namespace of a
format-less bucket is refused, as DeleteIndex does.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* s3vectors: match a TagResource grant scoped to the bucket being created
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* s3tables: merge tag writes into the tags the record holds at the write
TagResource and UntagResource merged into the tags they read before the
compare-and-swap and wrote that map on every attempt, so a tag write that
landed in between was undone. The merge now runs inside the mutation.
WithMaxTags lets an in-process caller cap the merged set there.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* s3vectors: check the 50-tag limit inside the catalog's tag write
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* s3tables: check a tag operation's bound bucket after its reads
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* s3vectors: validate each tag key UntagResource removes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* s3vectors: validate untag keys one at a time
UntagResource sized a map by the number of submitted tag keys before
validating them, so a large body of repeated keys allocated far more than
the request itself, before authorization ran.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* s3vectors: authorize UntagResource before validating its keys
Validating a near-32 MiB body of tag keys costs about 13x its JSON
decode, so an unauthorized caller could make the gateway spend that
work on a request it then refuses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Chris LuandClaude Opus 5.5
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7298b4ed37 |
fix(s3tables,s3vectors): bind DeleteNamespace and the vector bucket cleanup to the authorized records (#12331)
* s3tables: bind DeleteNamespace to the authorized namespace The delete claimed whatever finished namespace held the name at claim time, so one deleted and created again by another owner after the authorization read was removed under the first one's authorization. The claim now requires the creation time that was authorized. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3vectors: bind DeleteVectorBucket's namespace cleanup to the authorized bucket After the bound DeleteTableBucket reported the bucket not empty, the index namespace cleanup ran unbound, so a bucket deleted and created again in between lost its empty index namespace under the first bucket's authorization. DeleteNamespace now honors the bucket binding, checking the bucket after reading the namespace, and the cleanup carries it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Chris LuandClaude Opus 5.5
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66a6598fdd |
fix(s3tables,s3vectors): bind table and vector bucket writes to the bucket they were authorized against (#12329)
* s3tables: bind table bucket policy writes to the authorized bucket PutTableBucketPolicy compared only the policy bytes, and DeleteTableBucketPolicy removed the policy unconditionally. A bucket deleted and created again under the same name between authorization and the write took a policy change nobody authorized for it. Both writes now require the bucket's CreatedAt and the policy they were authorized against, answer 409 otherwise and 404 for a bucket that is gone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3tables: bind bucket tag writes to the authorized bucket TagResource and UntagResource checked the creation time only for a table ARN. On a bucket ARN the merged tags landed on a bucket deleted and created again since authorization. extractResourceOwnerAndBucket now returns the resource's CreatedAt for both kinds, and the write requires it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3tables: bind bucket maintenance writes to the authorized bucket PutTableBucketMaintenanceConfiguration wrote onto whatever bucket held the name at write time. authorizeMaintenanceBucket now returns the bucket's CreatedAt like authorizeMaintenanceTable, and putMaintenanceConfiguration takes the check and creation time from both callers instead of an optional closure. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3vectors: bind vector bucket policy writes to the authorized bucket Put/DeleteVectorBucketPolicy authorized inside the compare-and-swap with the owner from an earlier bucket read, so a bucket deleted and created again by another account in between had its policy rewritten by the old owner. The mutation now requires the entry's createdAt to match the record it authorized against. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3vectors: bind DeleteVectorBucket to the authorized bucket DeleteVectorBucket authorized one bucket record, then ran the trusted catalog DeleteTableBucket on whatever bucket held the name by then, so an empty bucket deleted and created again by another account in between was deleted by the old owner. The catalog delete now accepts the authorized bucket's createdAt through an in-process context value and treats any other bucket as gone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3vectors: bind CreateIndex and DeleteIndex to the authorized bucket Both authorized the bucket, then ran trusted CreateNamespace, CreateTable or DeleteTable on whatever bucket held the name by then, so an index could be created in, or deleted from, a bucket another account created again in between. Those catalog operations now honor the bucket binding DeleteTableBucket already takes, and the vector handlers pass the authorized bucket's createdAt. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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4850def831 |
fix(s3tables): bind table and view writes to the record they were authorized against (#12328)
* s3tables: bind table and view writes to the record they were authorized against * s3tables: bind UpdateNamespace to the namespace it was authorized against UpdateNamespace writes back the whole record it read, owner and creation time included. A namespace deleted and created again before the write took the first one's owner and CreatedAt, which also undoes the CreatedAt binding creates now rely on. Refuse the write with 409 when the namespace at the path has another CreatedAt. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chrislusf@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Chris LuandClaude Opus 5.5
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ce292a4e5e |
s3: require Admin to put or delete a bucket's lifecycle configuration (#12327)
PUT and DELETE ?lifecycle were authorized as Write, so an identity granted only object writes on a bucket could add expiration rules or remove the ones the bucket administrator set. They now need Admin on the bucket, like the encryption, public access block and ownership controls writes. Identities authorized by IAM policies are unaffected: they are still checked against s3:PutLifecycleConfiguration. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Chris LuandClaude Opus 5.5
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d431c1b35a |
s3api: let the vectors route, not the credential scope, raise the body limit (#12326)
SigV4 verification picked the 32 MiB S3 Vectors body limit from the credential scope, which is not verified until the body is hashed. A request claiming the s3vectors scope on any other route could make the gateway buffer 32 MiB before authentication instead of 10 MiB. The vectors handler now sets the limit on the request context, and every other route keeps 10 MiB. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Chris LuandClaude Opus 5.5
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02d22800aa |
s3vectors: accept bodies up to the 32 MiB limit, report larger ones as a size error, log engine failures (#12320)
* s3api: hash an s3vectors body up to the Vectors API limit SigV4 verification of a non-S3 request hashed at most 10 MiB of the body and silently dropped the rest, so any S3 Vectors request over 10 MiB failed its signature check with 403, although the API accepts 32 MiB. The limit now follows the signing service, and a body over it is reported as ErrEntityTooLarge instead of being truncated; the embedded IAM answers that with InvalidInput, as it already does for a body over its own limit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK * s3vectors: answer an oversized request with a ValidationException A body over 32 MiB was refused as "403 AccessDenied: authentication failed". A declared Content-Length over the limit is now refused before authentication, and a streamed body over it, whether the signature check or the handler reads it, gets the same "request body exceeds 32 MiB" ValidationException. The limit is the one SigV4 verification uses. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK * s3vectors: log engine and catalog failures at the default level An engine error reached the client as a bare "internal error", and the cause was logged only with -v=1, so a misconfigured engine left nothing in a default log. Engine and catalog failures are now logged as errors, and a reported unavailability as a warning, with the operation, bucket and index. The response still leaves the engine's message out, since it can name internal hosts and paths, and points at the gateway log instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK * s3api: hash the signed body through readRequestBody streamHashRequestBody repeated readRequestBody's read-past-the-limit check; it now reads the body with readRequestBody and hashes the bytes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Chris LuandClaude Opus 5.5
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2eb219df61 |
s3vectors: encrypt the objects of a vector bucket declared AES256 (#12324)
* s3api: encrypt the objects of a vector bucket declared AES256 CreateVectorBucket recorded encryptionConfiguration sseType AES256 and returned it, but nothing on the write path read it: the index's data files, manifests and transactions were stored without SSE. A LANCE table bucket's record now supplies the bucket's default encryption whenever the bucket has none of its own, so PutObject, CreateMultipartUpload and CopyObject apply SSE-S3 to every object the engine writes. The S3 bucket metadata itself is unchanged. ICEBERG table buckets keep recording the declaration only: their catalog reads the manifests clients upload straight from the filer, which would see ciphertext. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK * s3tables: refuse an AES256 vector bucket on a gateway without an SSE-S3 key A vector bucket's AES256 is now applied to every index write, and SSE-S3 fails each write when the gateway has no KEK. Creating the bucket there succeeded and the first CreateIndex came back as InternalFailure. CreateTableBucket now refuses a LANCE bucket declaring AES256 when the gateway reports no SSE-S3 key, naming s3.sse.kek and s3.sse.key; CreateVectorBucket returns it as ValidationException. ICEBERG buckets, whose declaration is only recorded, and tooling that sets no checker are unaffected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK * s3api: refuse DeleteBucketEncryption on a bucket's declared encryption GetBucketEncryption reports a vector bucket's declared AES256, but DeleteBucketEncryption answered NoSuchBucketEncryptionConfiguration and the declaration kept applying. The declaration is fixed when the bucket is created, so the delete now returns MethodNotAllowed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK * test(s3vectors): keep an inherited WEED_S3_SSE_KEK out of the test cluster The gateway refuses to start SSE-S3 with both s3.sse.kek and s3.sse.key set, so a developer shell exporting WEED_S3_SSE_KEK made the AES256 bucket test fail. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Chris LuandClaude Opus 5.5
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d72f761d83 |
seaweed-vector: work on its defaults, and without identities or credentials (#12323)
* seaweed-vector: default --namespace to the gateway's Lance port The old default, http://localhost:8888/lance, is a path nothing serves: the Lance Namespace listens on its own port, 9101 by default on weed s3, weed server, weed filer and weed mini. With it, the filer answered the engine's catalog calls with a 500 and every CreateIndex failed with InternalFailure. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK * seaweed-vector: default --listen to a port no SeaweedFS server takes 127.0.0.1:8080 is the volume server's default port, so weed-vector next to weed server exited with "Address already in use (os error 98)". 8090 is not among the defaults of master, volume, filer, S3 and its Iceberg and Lance catalogs, IAM, WebDAV, SFTP, the message queue broker and agent, the admin server or weed mini, nor any of their gRPC ports (HTTP + 10000). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK * lance: take any key while the S3 server runs without identities Without identities the S3 port accepts any signature and treats the caller as the admin. The Lance catalog still checked an x-api-key or Bearer token against identities that did not exist, so weed-vector started with --storage-option credentials on such a server got 401 on every catalog call. The catalog now skips both checks when S3 auth is off and leaves the caller to the S3 authenticator, which admits it as the admin, as it already did for a request with no key. With identities configured nothing changes: an unknown key is still 401. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK * lance: tell clients to skip signing while S3 auth is off A client with no credentials of its own could not reach a table's data on a server without identities, though the S3 port takes unsigned requests there: lance fell back to the AWS default credential chain and failed with CredentialsNotLoaded. weed-vector without --storage-option failed every CreateIndex that way. The catalog now adds aws_skip_signature to the storage options it hands out while S3 auth is off, and leaves it out once identities exist. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK * seaweed-vector: bind the listener before registering with the master The engine spawned its master registration and then bound --listen, so an engine whose port was taken could reach the master before it exited: on weed server with 18080 taken the master logged "vector node 127.0.0.1:18080 added" and removed it in the same millisecond, and the gateway noticed it. Bind first, and name the address in the error instead of "transport error". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK * seaweed-worker: keep an unsigned store off the AWS default chain A store the catalog says takes unsigned requests needs no credentials, but lance builds the AWS default credential chain for any store without them, and the chain probes instance metadata on every dataset open. With no credentials of its own, weed-vector spent a second on each query (1030-1066 ms against 32-46 ms with --storage-option ones). The merge of the operator's fallback and the vended options, which the engine and the Lance worker each did in their own copy, moves into table_options, and gives such a store empty credentials. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK * test(s3vectors): serve an index with no identities and no engine credentials A second cluster runs weed s3 without -config and weed-vector without --storage-option, with no AWS credentials in either environment: weed s3 would turn them into an admin identity, and the engine would find them. On master its CreateIndex fails with InternalFailure. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Chris LuandClaude Opus 5.5
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ff7045a4e5 |
s3vectors: report the Euclidean distance, not its square (#12318)
A euclidean index answered QueryVectors with Lance's L2 distance, which is the squared Euclidean distance: [3, 4] was 25 from the origin, not 5. AWS defines the metric as the straight-line distance between the vectors. The gateway now returns its square root, so the single engine and the enterprise coordinator, which both hand back the raw Lance value, report the same distance. Ordering is unchanged. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Chris LuandClaude Opus 5.5
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d6c0d728e4 |
s3vectors: resolve the caller like table buckets and honor bucket-scoped identity actions (#12319)
* s3vectors: resolve the caller the way table buckets do The vector checks used the identity name as principal, while the catalog records a bucket's owner through getAccountID: the account id, or the issuer-scoped user id of a federated identity. An identity with an account or a federated identity did not own the vector bucket it created, a Deny naming its account did not bind it, and an Admin identity in the admin account did not get the admin bypass it has on table buckets. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK * s3vectors: honor identity actions scoped to a vector bucket An identity action such as s3vectors:QueryVectors:team-a granted nothing, because the vector policy context never named the bucket. Table buckets match <action>:<bucket> through the same context field, so pass the bucket the check is about. Creating a bucket stays unscoped, as for table buckets. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Chris LuandClaude Opus 5.5
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b9bc42c217 |
s3vectors: vend write credentials to index data only to the vector engine and Lance worker (#12316)
* security: share the filer admin token check CheckGrpcAdminPeer verifies an admin Bearer token inline. Move the check into IsFilerAdminToken so an HTTP endpoint can accept the same token. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * lance: recognize the cluster's own components by a signed token A request whose X-Seaweedfs-Cluster-Token header carries an admin token signed with jwt.filer_signing.key comes from a component that holds the cluster key: the vector engine or the Lance maintenance worker. Mark such a request as trusted. It still authenticates as an identity, which stays the principal for vended credentials. A dedicated header leaves the Authorization header to Lance OAuth clients. A gateway with no key trusts no one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * lance: vend write credentials to a vector bucket's indexes only to trusted callers An index in a vector bucket's vector namespace is also a Lance table, so a caller granted s3tables:UpdateTable could describe it, or declare it again, and get credentials that write the index data without passing the vector bucket policy. In that namespace both now vend read-only credentials unless the caller is trusted, and a declare from anyone else no longer writes the dataset markers. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * lance worker: prove the cluster key to the Lance namespace The gateway now vends write credentials to a vector bucket's indexes only to callers that send a token signed with jwt.filer_signing.key. The worker already takes that key for the admin stream; its namespace client now mints a token from it for every catalog request. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * weed-vector: describe the index the gateway created and prove the cluster key CreateIndex declared a table the gateway had just created, which only worked because declare is idempotent. Describe it instead. The Lance namespace vends write credentials to a vector bucket's indexes only to callers that send a token signed with jwt.filer_signing.key, so take the key with --filer-signing-key, the same flag the Lance worker has. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * lance worker: keep the cluster key out of Debug output Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * lance: answer a declare of an existing table with its own location CreateTable succeeds for a name that already exists without looking at the location requested, and declare kept using that location for the dataset markers and the vended credentials. Declaring an existing table with another table's location, such as a vector index, got credentials to that table's data. Use the location the catalog holds, which CreateTable now also reports for a new table. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * lance: sign cluster tokens with a key derived for the catalog A cluster token was a filer admin token signed with jwt.filer_signing.key and, by default, never expired. Sent to the Lance namespace on every request, often over plain HTTP, a captured one would also authorize the filer's IAM service. Sign it with a key derived from the cluster key for this one use, which the admin services do not accept, and mint it with a five minute lifetime. weed-vector drops its token lifetime flag. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * lance: follow a reloaded jwt.filer_signing.key The Lance namespace copied the cluster key at startup. A SIGHUP reload refreshes the gateway's filer guard but not that copy, so after a key rotation the restarted vector engine and worker were no longer trusted. Read the key from the guard on every check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * iceberg: keep a vector bucket's indexes read-only An index in a vector bucket is also a catalog table the Iceberg REST catalog loads, and LoadTable vended credentials that could write it to any caller granted s3tables:UpdateTable. A commit staged its metadata file in the index directory on the same grant. Apply the vector namespace rule to both, after the caller's own UpdateTable check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * iceberg: confine a created table's location to its namespace before writing Stage-create skips the registration that confines a location to the table's namespace, yet vends write credentials for that location. A caller allowed to create a table in any namespace of a bucket could name another namespace's prefix, a vector index included, and get write credentials to it. The non-staged create also wrote its first metadata file there before the registration refused the location. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * lance: a declare that finds an existing table answers like describe Creating a name that already exists is idempotent, so a caller allowed only to create tables could declare someone else's table and get write credentials to it, and clear its deregistered marker. Describe would have vended that caller read-only credentials. A declare now looks the name up first; when it only finds the table, writing needs UpdateTable, as it does for describe. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Chris LuandClaude Opus 5.5
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06b9d01423 |
s3vectors: match a filter value against the elements of an array (#12321)
* vector: compare json_array_contains elements as typed JSON values Lance's json_array_contains compares each element's text with the value, or with the value wrapped in quotes, so 1 matches "1", true matches "true", and 1.0 misses a stored 1. The filter swap now replaces it like json_extract and json_exists: the value is parsed as JSON once per batch and compared with jsonb's typed equality, and only literal arguments are swapped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK * s3vectors: match a filter value against the elements of an array A filter never looked inside an array: {"tags": "space"} and {"tags": {"$in": ["space"]}} both missed "tags": ["space", "classic"]. AWS documents that $eq, and so a bare value, matches an array metadata value when any element equals the input. $eq, a bare value and each $in member now also match through json_array_contains; $ne and $nin remain their negations. Range operators, $exists and nested objects are unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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ab204a03e6 |
fix(s3): verify SigV4 signature with decoded path behind X-Forwarded-Prefix (#12299)
* fix(s3): verify SigV4 signature with decoded path behind X-Forwarded-Prefix When SeaweedFS is hosted behind a reverse proxy that strips a URL prefix (X-Forwarded-Prefix) and forwards the percent-encoded request path, signature verification fails for object keys containing non-ASCII characters. The client signs the canonical URI as the single percent-encoded path including the prefix, but the server verifies against the already-encoded forwarded path joined to the prefix, producing a mismatch (SignatureDoesNotMatch). Decode the forwarded path and rejoin the prefix before verifying, mirroring the existing un-prefixed decoded retry. ASCII keys are unaffected because the decoded path equals the original, so the retry is skipped. Signed-off-by: Mohd Quamar Tyagi <104281681+Tyagiquamar@users.noreply.github.com> * s3: build the SigV4 candidate paths once and try them per host The forwarded-prefix and plain branches each repeated the decode-and-verify step for every host candidate. List the escaped and decoded paths once, the prefixed forms first, and verify them in the same order as before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Mohd Quamar Tyagi <104281681+Tyagiquamar@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chrislusf@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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d6ec6bc4e7 |
fix(s3tables): let DeleteTableBucket remove empty leftover directories (#12307)
* s3tables: let DeleteTableBucket remove empty leftover directories Page through the bucket instead of reading one page, and check each bare directory a deleted namespace left behind for files: empty ones go with the bucket, one holding files refuses with 409 naming it. The delete claims the bucket before scanning, and CreateNamespace refuses a claimed bucket and confirms it again after its write, so a namespace created meanwhile is seen by the scan or turned away instead of deleted with the bucket. The bucket is removed only while it still carries that claim, otherwise 409. A delete that refuses lifts the claim, retrying a failed release, since a claim left behind refuses every create in the bucket. The new namespace stays marked unfinished until that check passes, so no table or view is created in one that gets backed out; a create takes over a namespace still carrying the mark. Both checks accept only the bucket the create was authorized against, by its creation time: one recreated under the same name answers 404 and gets nothing written into it. The removal is not recursive. Each leftover is claimed first, only while it is still the directory the scan saw, and goes only while it holds no file or catalog record; the bucket goes only while nothing is left in it. A file uploaded or a namespace taken back after the scan is refused with 409 instead of deleted. * s3tables: keep directory-backed S3 objects in DeleteTableBucket * s3tables: keep a file that replaced a leftover directory in DeleteTableBucket * s3tables: claim only the authorized bucket in DeleteTableBucket * s3tables: assert the prefix-object mark when claiming a leftover directory * s3tables: hide unfinished namespaces from readers and DeleteNamespace * s3tables: stop CreateNamespace on any failed bucket check * s3tables: retry lifting claims on leftover directories * s3vectors: declare the index namespace again after losing it to a concurrent declare CreateNamespace now writes a namespace marked unfinished and confirms it after checking the bucket. A second CreateIndex that declares the namespace in that window takes the marked record over, and the first one's confirmation answers 409, which failed its CreateIndex. Declare it again, a bounded number of times, when the create answers a conflict. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3tables: name an unfinished namespace that keeps a bucket from being deleted A CreateNamespace that dies between its write and its confirmation leaves a namespace marked unfinished. Listings and GetNamespace hide it and DeleteNamespace answers that it does not exist, while DeleteTableBucket counts it, so the bucket could not be deleted and nothing said why. Name it in the BucketNotEmpty answer; creating it again takes it over. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3tables: read a refused empty-directory delete with filer.DeleteEntryError Use the filer's own reading of a non-recursive delete's answer instead of a copy of its message prefix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3vectors: release the held create when the concurrent-declare test fails Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3vectors: buffer the held create's result so it can exit after a failure Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3tables: retry lifting a refused namespace delete's claim A claim left on a namespace refuses every create in it, the same harm the bucket's claim does, so its release retries too. With no one-shot caller left, the retrying release takes the releaseDeleteClaim name. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3tables: keep the data under a hidden directory on bucket delete The scan filed every hidden entry by name for a recursive delete, so .hidden/data went with the bucket. A hidden directory waits with the leftovers instead: the walk refuses one that holds a file or an object, and removeEmptyTree takes only one that is still bare and empty. A hidden file is removed by name as before. --------- Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chrislusf@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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Chris LuandClaude Opus 5.5
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5a60ce04e3 |
vector: stop re-parsing a filter's JSONPath for every scanned row (#12302)
* vector: parse a filter's JSONPath once per batch instead of per row
Lance's json_extract and json_exists parse their JSONPath argument again
for every row they see. Every translated S3 Vectors filter goes through
them, so a flat scan paid about 1 µs per row before the predicate
compared anything, and a 10%-selective {"category": {"$eq": "c3"}} ran
about 50% slower than the same query unfiltered.
The path is always a literal, so the scanner now parses the filter as
before and swaps in copies of the two functions that parse it once per
batch. They call the same jsonb selector and serializer, so results and
errors do not change. Calls whose path is not a literal keep Lance's
functions. The filter SQL is unchanged, so the gateway, existing tables
and the distributed workers (which run query::ann) need no change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK
* s3vectors: read the field once per extractor in $in and $nin
$in and $nin rendered one IN per member, each with its own json_extract,
so an N-member list parsed the row's metadata N times. Members that share
an extractor (strings and booleans, or numbers) now go into one IN list,
so a list reads the field at most twice. Matching is unchanged: each
group still only sees its own JSON type and still coalesces NULL before
$nin negates it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK
* s3vectors: rename the $in literal map so codespell passes
Codespell reads "lits" as a misspelling of "list".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Chris LuandClaude Opus 5.5
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4be191173a |
vector: keep ListVectors pages and segments flat as an index grows; read only keys in GetVectors (#12300)
* vector: scan only the fragments a ListVectors page covers A page pushed its offset into the scan, but the scan still loaded every fragment first, reading each one's deletion file: about 105 S3 GETs per page at 50k rows against 25 at 10k. The page's fragments now come from the live row counts in the manifest, so a page reads only its own. Tokens and row order are unchanged; a manifest without the counts keeps the old scan. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK * s3vectors: list a ListVectors segment in the engine The gateway paged through the whole index for every segment and kept one row in segmentCount, so a segment cost segmentCount engine pages and 16 segments listed slower than one. The engine now takes segment_count and segment_index: it reads keys across the stride, keeps the segment's rows and takes their data and metadata alone, one call per page. A segment is still the rows whose position modulo segmentCount is segmentIndex, and its token still the position to resume from. An engine that predates the fields does not set segmented, and the gateway then pages through it as before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK * vector: read only the key column across the table in GetVectors The key lookup scanned every column. On S3, lance reads a column during the scan when a row of it is under 1000 bytes, so a 128-dimension vector was read for every row of the table to return 100 of them, and data and metadata were read even when the request did not ask for them. The scan now projects the requested columns and materializes everything but the key late, for the matching rows only. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK * s3vectors: start the legacy segment fallback from the page already read With an engine that ignores segment_count, the gateway dropped the page it had just read and fetched it again. The fallback now consumes that page first, so a one-row segment page still costs one engine call. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK * vector: check metadata on segmented ListVectors pages The segment test listed data only. Its rows now carry metadata on two in three keys, and every segmented row, read through take_rows, must equal the same row in a plain listing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK * vector: lease the version while a segment takes its data A segmented page with data or metadata reads keys first and then takes the other columns from the same version, so maintenance could reclaim its files in between. That path now holds a lease like GetVectors. A keys-only page is one scan and stays unleased, as plain pages are. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK * vector: leave GetVectors materialization to lance Forcing every column late made a 100-key GetVectors with data slower at 10k x 128 in the perf cluster: 54.7 ms against 46.3 ms. The take issued a read per row, where lance's heuristic reads a narrow vector column in one pass per fragment. The projection keeps the gain on its own: with neither data nor metadata requested, the call went from 38.6 ms to 25.3 ms and from 150 to 89 S3 GETs. At 50k x 384 the vector is already late under the heuristic, and a full lookup is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UpvafvK8JpagF94MHWqwK --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Chris LuandClaude Opus 5.5
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ab355b43b9 |
s3tables: keep the vector-namespace fence on a declare of an existing index (#12293)
s3tables: keep the fence on a declare of an existing index Deciding the existing-index exception before the handler ran left a window: an index deleted between that lookup and the handler's own check would be recreated, unfenced, by a caller without s3vectors:CreateIndex. Drop the up-front exception, so every CreateTable runs fenced and a fresh create is refused at its first write. The engine's declare still passes because the idempotent path writes nothing; for a build whose idempotent path re-applies state already in place, the fence answers an UpdateEntry that leaves the entry exactly as stored without writing. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Chris LuandClaude Opus 5.5
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e2826c48bd |
s3tables: make the vector namespace of a vector bucket read-only (#12292)
* s3tables: make the vector namespace of a vector bucket read-only S3 Vectors authorizes index operations against the vector bucket policy, but an index is also a catalog table in the bucket's "vector" namespace, and the S3 Tables API only checks s3tables grants. A caller the vector policy denies DeleteIndex could still delete the index, and its data, with DeleteTable. Untrusted writes that name the vector namespace of a LANCE bucket now run behind a fence that passes filer reads and refuses filer writes. The operation's own checks still answer everything short of a write, so a caller without the grant gets its usual denial and learns nothing about the bucket, and a CreateTable that finds the index already there, which is what the vector engine's declare does, still succeeds. A refused write answers 403 AccessDenied. Trusted callers (the gateway, the shell) are unaffected, and so is a namespace named vector in an Iceberg bucket. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * lance: refuse register and deregister in a vector bucket's vector namespace Every catalog write the Lance namespace makes goes through the S3 Tables handler and its vector namespace fence, but register over an existing table at the same location and deregister only add or remove a marker file in the dataset directory. Check the vector namespace before those writes, after the table read that already gates them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3tables: refuse deferred creates in a vector bucket's vector namespace Manager.AuthorizeCreateTable gates the Iceberg create paths that write metadata into the table bucket before the catalog registers the table. Those writes never pass the handler's fence, so the gate applies the same read-only rule once the caller's own create permission is confirmed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3tables: let a declare of an existing index past the vector namespace fence The vector engine declares every index the gateway has just created, and that CreateTable only reaches its idempotent path. Upstream that path writes nothing, so the fence never trips, but a build whose idempotent path repairs table state would refuse the engine. Decide the exception up front instead: a CreateTable naming a finished index in the vector namespace runs unfenced, while a new name or an unfinished create stays fenced. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Chris LuandClaude Opus 5.5
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9a09506be6 |
s3vectors: bound ListVectors parameters and lowercase distanceMetric (#12290)
* s3vectors: bound ListVectors maxResults and segment parameters segmentCount had no upper bound, so segmentCount=1000000, segmentIndex=999999 made the segment emulation scan the whole index to return nothing. Apply the AWS ListVectors windows before authorization and any engine call: maxResults 1..1000, segmentCount 1..16, segmentIndex in [0, segmentCount), and segmentCount and segmentIndex given together. The fields become pointers so an explicit 0 is rejected while an omitted one still takes the default. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3vectors: store and return distanceMetric in lowercase CreateIndex stored distanceMetric exactly as sent, so an index created with "COSINE" came back as "COSINE" from GetIndex and QueryVectors. AWS returns the lowercase enum values. Lowercase the metric when the index is created, and again when the record is read so indexes already stored in mixed case render the same. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Chris LuandClaude Opus 5.5
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21fc46692c |
s3vectors: authorize CreateVectorBucket as a vector action, close DeleteIndex race, fold policy service case (#12287)
* s3vectors: authorize CreateVectorBucket as an s3vectors action CreateVectorBucket went through the catalog's CreateTableBucket check, so an identity granted s3vectors:* was denied the create while s3tables:* was allowed it. Check s3vectors:CreateVectorBucket in the gateway, the same way the catalog checks a bucket create, and create the record on the internal manager under the caller's name so the caller stays the owner. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3vectors: delete only the index record DeleteIndex checked DeleteIndex read the record, checked it is a Lance index, then deleted by name. A table that replaced the index in between was deleted too. Send the checked record's version token, so a replaced record fails the delete with a 409 ConflictException. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3tables: reject s3vectors rules in any letter case validatePolicyDocument kept s3vectors actions and resources out of the shared policy slot with case-sensitive checks, so "S3Vectors:GetIndex" was stored as a rule that never takes effect. IAM service prefixes are case-insensitive; fold case in both checks. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Chris LuandClaude Opus 5.5
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3a8d756bdd |
s3: drop retired volume servers from the gateway location cache (#12281)
* wdclient: publish applied volume-location deletes to registered listeners The master already tells each connected client which volumes a server stopped hosting; only the MasterClient's own vidMap applied it. Expose the same filtered deletions (moves between a server's disks excluded) through OnVolumeLocationDelete so clients keeping a second location cache can drop the retired server too. * wdclient: drop retired volume servers from the FilerClient location cache The S3 gateway's FilerClient keeps its own vidMap, filled by filer lookups, and only forgot a retired volume server after a read against it failed (a ~15s header-timeout stall when the host still resolves). When built with a MasterClient, subscribe to its applied deletions so the cache forgets the server as soon as the master reports it gone. * wdclient: drop retired EC servers from the regular location map too Filer lookups cache EC locations alongside regular ones in vid2Locations, so an EC removal has to clear the retired server there as well as in the EC map for the delete to reach what reads actually use. * wdclient: tombstone pushed deletions against in-flight provider fills A filer lookup already running when a delete lands can return the retired location afterwards and re-cache it. Keep a short tombstone on each deleted (vid, url) pair so fills neither cache nor return it while the lookup source is still settling. * wdclient: clear the FilerClient location cache on master reconnect Removals the master pushed while the gateway link was down never arrive as deletes, so on reconnect the lookup-fed cache is dropped outright rather than kept generation-wise like the stream-fed one, and relearned through filer lookups as before. * wdclient: invoke push hooks outside their registration locks A callback that registers or replaces a hook would wait on the read lock the invocation already holds and stall the master stream. Copy the hook under the lock and call it after the lock is released. * wdclient: report pushed adds so confirmed re-adds clear the suppression A server coming back at the same URL inside the tombstone window stayed hidden from provider fills. updateVidMap now carries the additions it applied through the same hook (renamed OnVolumeLocationChange), and the registered cache untombstones them without eagerly caching them. * wdclient: amortize tombstone expiry over a delete batch A server leaving takes every volume it hosted with it, and scanning all recentDeletes per removed vid squared the batch. Prune lazily on reads and at most once per half TTL on writes. * wdclient: let every location cache subscribe to pushed volume changes The setters were single-slot, so a second FilerClient built on the same MasterClient would have silently replaced the first one's subscription. Registration now returns an unhook func, delivered to all listeners, and FilerClient.Close releases its own. * wdclient: hold the deletion fence until the master re-confirms a location * wdclient: check the deletion fence and the cache add under one lock * wdclient: drop provider answers that crossed a cache reset * wdclient: bound the deletion fence by evicting its oldest mark * wdclient: refresh a repeated removal instead of evicting another mark * wdclient: evict the oldest deletion-fence mark in constant time * wdclient: fence a server only once it serves the volume in no form ec.encode registers the shards before the regular copy is deleted from the same server, and ec.decode mounts the regular copy before the shards come off it. Both arrive add-first in separate heartbeats, so the later removal tombstoned a (vid, url) pair the server still serves and dropped it from the FilerClient map; the filer's answer naming that server was then fenced out and the volume read as not found until the gateway reconnected. Tombstone and report a removal only when neither map still names the url for that volume. * wdclient: serve a provider answer that crossed a cache reset The answer is as fresh as the provider's view; only the cache it would land in has been re-told. Dropping it failed every read whose lookup was in flight during a master reconnect with 'volume not found'. Return it and leave the new view to be filled by the next lookup. * wdclient: test the moved volume whose old server keeps proxying * wdclient: stop caching inside the master lookup provider The provider wrote every answered location through addLocation, which clears the deletion fence: a lookup still naming a server a pushed delete had just retired untombstoned and re-cached it. Fallback lookups already gate caching through fillLocation, and authoritative lookups bypass the cache by contract, so the provider no longer writes the map at all. * wdclient: count only master-pushed locations when suppressing a removal hasLocation could not tell a confirmed regular copy from a lookup fill: the master answers an EC volume with its shard servers, so the regular map holds shard locations that arrived by lookup, and entries an earlier generation learned linger past a reconnect. An EC removal whose url still showed either was suppressed, leaving the retired server served. The vid map now records the generation each regular location was pushed at, drops an unconfirmed regular entry alongside the shard that fed it, and answers hasServingLocation from pushed marks and current-generation entries only. * wdclient: test removals against lookup-cached and stale locations * wdclient: fence removals only in the gateway cache The fence and the pushed-location marks ran inside every MasterClient, including the filer's, whose map is also filled by lookups and cleared by InvalidateCache. A removal reported while the server still served the volume (e.g. a decoded copy whose mark a failed read had wiped) left the pair fenced until the master pushed it again, with reads failing as volume not found meanwhile. Only the S3 gateway's FilerClient now tombstones, from the removals its push-only MasterClient reports. That client decides a removal from the current generation of both its maps after the whole message is applied, so pushedLocations goes away, and the master lookup provider caches as before. The hooks follow the existing single-slot SetOn...Fn pattern and are wired next to SetOnPeerUpdateFn. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * wdclient: let a removal fence expire after a minute The master drops a broadcast when a client's channel is full, so the re-add that would lift a fence can be lost while the gateway stays connected. A mark held until that re-add then hid a live server, and a volume whose only copy it held read as not found until the next master reconnect. Bounding marks by a minute still outlasts a lookup in flight when the removal landed; expiring early only falls back to learning by a failed read, as before this change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Nicholas Oh
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f5989a21fb | s3: honor assignment fsync in streaming copies (#12277) | ||
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a94edebf00 |
fix(s3tables): keep the data under a deleted namespace (#12276)
* fix(s3tables): keep the data under a deleted namespace A rename leaves the source table directory holding data the renamed table still points at, and DeleteNamespace removed it recursively. The delete now keeps the directory, minus its catalog record, when files remain under it; CreateNamespace can take it back. * fix(s3tables): keep hidden-directory data, report name takeover as 409 - DeleteNamespace also looks for files under hidden directories, since a table location may sit under one. - CreateNamespace answers 409 when a file takes the name during the take-back of a kept directory. * s3tables: a vanished leftover holds nothing to keep A bare directory removed between the namespace listing and the walk made dirHoldsFiles answer its ListEntries NotFound, and the delete reported that miss as a 404 or 500 on a live namespace. Skip the gone directory instead: whatever it held is already gone, so it cannot keep the namespace. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3tables: a delete's gone entry is a conflict, not a success The filer answers a precondition delete on an entry that is already gone with FailedPrecondition carrying the not-found text, which DoRemoveRequest reads as a completed delete -- DeleteNamespace answered 200 for a delete that never ran. deleteDirectoryIfMatches now calls DeleteEntry directly, keeping the FailedPrecondition-to-conflict mapping and refusing a response-level error. keepAsLeftover likewise reports a directory removed since the scan as ErrConcurrentUpdate, so the handler answers 409 rather than 500. --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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Jay HemnaniandChris Lu
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ecd716e0e2 |
s3: allow POST Object uploads when auth is off (#12273)
* s3: allow POST Object uploads when auth is off With no identities configured every other handler skips authentication, but PostPolicyBucketHandler still verified the form signature, so a browser form upload failed with InvalidAccessKeyId (or a malformed credential error without signature fields). Skip the signature check when auth is off; the policy conditions are still enforced. * s3: update AuthPostPolicy comment for the auth-off path --------- Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com> |
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Chris LuandDevin
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05584c541c |
s3: take list markers as raw keys under encoding-type=url (#12275)
* s3: take ListObjects marker/start-after as raw keys Under encoding-type=url AWS url-encodes the response fields but treats request markers as raw keys: SDKs decode Marker/NextMarker/StartAfter and send the decoded key back. Unescaping the marker server-side read a literal "%XX" key as the key it encodes — StartAfter=a%2Bb resumed after "a+b", skipping it, and a paginator whose marker decoded to an earlier key got the same NextMarker twice and failed. Take the request value as-is; only the server's own base64: continuation token still decodes. The marker-echo dedup now compares contents in the response wire encoding and NextMarker in its raw form, since a raw "%XX" marker equals the escaped emission of a different key. * s3: take ListMultipartUploads key-marker as a raw key Same raw-marker rule as ListObjects: under encoding-type=url the emitted key markers are url-escaped keys, and a client decodes them before sending the marker back, so the request value is already the raw key. Keeping the token decode only for the non-url path, where the response could not carry the raw key and falls back to the base64: token form. * s3: cover ListMultipartUploads url key-marker at the handler The selectMultipartUploads tests bypass the request marker decoding, so a regression that unescapes an encoding-type=url key-marker would pass them. Drive a listing through ListMultipartUploadsHandler with a literal "a%2Bb" marker and assert it resumes after that exact key. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Jay Hemnani
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26783fbcb3 |
s3: keep an unset CORS MaxAgeSeconds unset (#12272)
A rule without MaxAgeSeconds was stored as 0, so GetBucketCors returned MaxAgeSeconds 0 and preflights sent Access-Control-Max-Age: 0. Store -1 for unset, which corsRuleFromProto already reads back as nil. |
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hsdfat
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9df2125bb0 |
fix(s3): reject non-integer max-parts, part-number-marker and max-uploads (#12270)
getObjectResources and getBucketMultipartResources dropped the strconv error, so a value that does not parse was read as 0. ListParts with max-parts=abc then reached the filer with limit 0, which the filer reads as its default listing limit, and returned every part with <MaxParts>0</MaxParts>; part-number-marker=abc restarted the listing from part 1; and ListMultipartUploads with max-uploads=abc answered an empty, untruncated list even with uploads in progress. Return the existing InvalidArgument errors (ErrInvalidMaxParts, ErrInvalidPartNumberMarker, ErrInvalidMaxUploads) instead, the way max-keys is validated. max-parts and max-uploads are parsed as 32-bit integers to match the documented 0..2147483647 range. |
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Chris LuandDevin
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97e1758bcc |
s3: auto-create bucket on POST Object uploads to a missing bucket (#12266)
* s3: auto-create bucket on POST Object uploads to a missing bucket PutObject and CreateMultipartUpload lazily create the bucket, but a signed POST Object upload answered NoSuchBucket. Mirror the PUT path: when the versioning-state lookup reports the bucket missing, run the shared handleAutoCreateBucket gate (bucket-name check, AutoCreateBucket option, admin identity) and then re-read the versioning state. The POST handler already records the verified signer identity in the request context, so the admin check and bucket-owner attribution work unchanged. * test: assert the POST auto-create upload lands, not just non-404 The missing-bucket POST test passed whenever the handler created the bucket, even if the upload then failed. Drive the full path through the existing putToFiler fakes — assigned volume accepts the chunk, object entry and payload land — and assert the 201 success response. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3: record verified post-policy signer's account id The POST policy path authenticates in the handler, after the internal account header was already scrubbed, so auto-created buckets and the uploaded objects stored no canonical owner. * test: assert POST auto-create records bucket owner, keep writes applied in denied case --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Chris LuandDevin
|
b70c6dc6ed |
s3: let bucket-scoped Admin grants auto-create matching buckets (#12268)
* s3: let bucket-scoped Admin grants auto-create matching buckets autoCreateBucket required a global Admin identity, so an identity scoped to a prefix like "Admin:outline*" could explicitly CreateBucket but was denied when an upload auto-created the same bucket. Gate on CanDo(ACTION_ADMIN, bucket) — the same check explicit CreateBucket enforces — so a prefix-scoped key lazily creates only matching buckets. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3: run auto-create bucket admin through the policy-aware path A scoped Admin identity with an attached IAM policy that denied s3:CreateBucket could still auto-create a matching bucket, because userCanAdminBucket only consulted legacy Actions. Evaluate the same VerifyActionPermission explicit CreateBucket gets, over a synthesized PUT /bucket request so the attached-policy check resolves to s3:CreateBucket on the bucket ARN regardless of the upload's shape. * s3: record verified identity as owner of auto-created buckets An admin authenticated outside the middleware (IAM integration, post policy signature) left no identity in the request context, so an auto-created bucket stored no owner and never reached the owner index. --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Nguyễn Lộc Phúcanduser.email
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7d8b72c2b4 |
fix(s3tables): answer 404 for a table name that was renamed away (#12258)
* s3tables: answer 404 for a table name that was renamed away A rename leaves the source directory in place to hold the data under it, with its catalog attributes cleared. UpdateTable, DeleteTable, the table policy calls and the table maintenance calls read the metadata attribute of that directory and reported its absence as an internal error, so they answered 500, and GetTablePolicy answered NoSuchPolicy. An absent metadata attribute now reads as a missing entry. tableMetadata reports it as both filer_pb.ErrNotFound and the attribute error, so callers that test for either keep working. The policy and maintenance handlers read the attribute through the new readTableMetadataAttr, which reports filer_pb.ErrNotFound, so each call answers NoSuchTable. * s3tables: a view record without its metadata reads absent too * s3tables: refuse a catalog write that lands on a metadata-less record --------- Co-authored-by: user.email <chrislusf@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Chris LuandDevin
|
ad6257ebbc |
filer.backup: add -s3.flattenVersions to mirror the current S3 view of versioned buckets (#12255)
* filer.backup: add -s3FlattenVersions to mirror the current S3 view Versioned buckets are stored as <key>.versions/v_<versionId> files plus a latest-version pointer on the .versions directory, so a backup mirror held internal version files and could never be restored through the S3 API. With -s3FlattenVersions the backup maps events on .versions directories onto the flattened object key: a new latest version uploads to <key>, a latest delete marker or a cleared pointer deletes <key> when -doDeleteFiles is set, and the suspended-versioning null object resolves to the regular path. Version files themselves are never mirrored. The initial snapshot seeds only the version the pointer names. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * filer.backup: serialize flattened writes per object key Same-path non-barrier dir updates run concurrently in the metadata processor, so two pointer updates for one object -- or a pointer update and a regular-path write to it -- could overlap and let the older upload finish last. Lock on the flattened key: versions events lock the object key, every other event its own path, via a striped mutex. * filer.backup: apply exclusions to the flattened object key File-name and path excludes ran against the .versions entry, so an excluded object was still copied flat and its deletion still removed the destination copy. Match the rules against the flattened key on both the apply and the versions-dir-removal paths. * filer.backup: re-resolve the pointer on version-file events A tag or attribute update on the current version touches the v_* file, not the .versions pointer, so dropping every version-file event left the mirror with stale tags until the next pointer flip. Re-resolve the pointer on each version-file event; noncurrent versions still stay out. * filer.backup: tolerate vanished versions dirs in flattened snapshot The flattened seed path returned source errors before the existing missing-source policy ran, so one version deleted mid-walk could force a full re-walk. Apply the same 404/superseded skip as the generic seed branch, and cover the review fixes with tests. * filer.backup: lock both flattened keys an event touches A rename or delete can retire one flattened key while writing another, so serialize on the old- and new-side keys together. Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * filer.backup: refresh the flattened key only for the still-current child A v_* event on a non-pointed version cannot move the flattened key, so skip the re-upload; tag and attribute updates on the current version still flow through. Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * replication: let resolved-latest writes bypass the source staleness check A filer sink skips a CreateEntry whose source path no longer holds the entry, but a flattened write lands on a key whose source path is not the one it was read from, so the check dropped every flattened upload. Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * filer.backup: reclaim destination chunks on flattened deletes Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * filer.backup: route regular-path events for versioned keys through the pointer A null-object write or delete at the regular path can coexist with a .versions pointer that names a live version; the pointer decides the flattened key, so deleting the null object must not remove it. Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * filer.backup: make the checkpoint identity cover the flattening mode Resuming a checkpoint taken in the other mode would skip the flattened re-seed and leave mirrored version files behind; a mode change now starts a fresh snapshot. Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test: cover flattened regular-path routing and per-mode checkpoints Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * filer.backup: resolve both sides of a flattened rename * test: cover flattened renames with one versioned side * replication: let resolved-latest writes overwrite a newer destination The stale-destination skip trusted a newer destination mtime, but a resolved-latest write can legitimately install an older version over the copy of a since-deleted latest. Skip only on provably identical content (matching chunk provenance, or equal ETag with full byte coverage). * filer.backup: rescan .versions when the latest null object is gone Deleting ?versionId=null removes the regular-path object without touching the null-is-latest pointer, so the flattened key kept its stale copy. Fall back to the newest remaining version (or a flat delete), the same rescan the S3 read path applies. * replication: compare inline and remote content in the destination-holds checks A chunk-less entry keeps its bytes in Content and a remote-only entry in the object RemoteEntry points at, but the identical-content shortcuts only compared chunk lists and chunk-derived ETags. Two different inline files looked identical, so a flattened re-copy or a same-mtime rewrite kept the previous version's bytes. Compare Content bytes and remote object identity wherever the checks claim the destination already holds the reference's content. * filer.backup: paginate the null-latest .versions rescan A limit=0 listing is capped at DirListingLimit server-side, and old-format version names sort oldest-first, so a history longer than one page left the flattened copy on an older version after the null object was removed. Page through the directory like the S3 read path does. * replication: require matching writable metadata for resolved-latest skips A skip keeps the destination's stored metadata, so identical bytes were not enough: stale attributes or extended entries (e.g. a superseded version id) survived under equal content. Compare the fields a rewrite controls — attributes minus filer-assigned inode/crtime, with the store's atime/ctime zero-defaults applied — plus the extended map, in both the provenance and ETag fast paths. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * replication: require the extended key to exist when comparing metadata * replication: ignore a stored rule TTL when the resolved write carries none * filer.backup: rename -s3FlattenVersions to -s3.flattenVersions Match the -s3.* flag naming convention used by the other s3 options. --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Nguyễn Lộc Phúcandchrislusf
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eba2cb926d |
fix(s3tables): refuse a create that a namespace delete can lose (#12239)
* s3tables: refuse a create that a namespace delete can lose DeleteNamespace checks the namespace for children and then deletes its directory recursively in a second filer call. The filer locks each path on its own, so a table created under the namespace between the two is not seen by the check and is removed by the delete, while both requests answer 200. The mirror case loses the table too: a create that passed its namespace check before the delete finished re-created the namespace directory through the filer's parent creation and recorded a table in a namespace that no longer exists. Each side now writes before it reads. DeleteNamespace claims the namespace record with a fresh token before it scans, deletes only while the record still holds that claim, and lifts its own claim when it stops. CreateTable, RegisterTable and CreateView re-read the namespace after writing their record and back out when it is claimed or gone: they remove what they wrote and answer 409 or 404 instead of reporting an entry that does not survive, or 500 when the record could not be removed and may remain. An entry the scan missed was written after the claim, so its create sees the claim; a create and a delete can both fail, but no longer both succeed. A create is also refused up front while a claim is held, but only after its authorization check, so a caller that may not create there does not learn of the delete. A create writes its record marked "create" and lifts the mark once the namespace is confirmed open. Until then GetTable, GetView, UpdateTable and a second create treat the record as absent, so no request is told about a table or view that the first create may still back out. * s3tables: keep a create's unfinished record out of reads and listings * s3tables: refuse catalog writes on a record an operation claimed * s3tables: answer 404 when a create's write path loses the namespace * s3tables: confirm the rename destination's namespace like a create * s3tables: cover unfinished-record reads, claimed-record writes, rename claim * s3tables: lift a leftover claim when a no-token delete clears the record * s3tables: answer 409 when a claimed record turns away a write UpdateView, TagResource, and UntagResource surfaced ErrConcurrentUpdate as a 500, so an expected conflict looked like a server fault to the caller. Map it to Conflict the way UpdateTable and the policy handlers already do. * s3tables: name the lost source when a rename finds it deleted * s3tables: report an entry deleted before its update as not found The filer answers an UpdateEntry on an entry removed since the lookup with codes.NotFound. mutateEntryExtended returned that error unchanged instead of filer_pb.ErrNotFound, so a rename whose source was deleted mid-claim answered 500 instead of NoSuchTable or NoSuchView. MemFiler now answers a missing entry the same way, so the rename tests for tables and views take the real filer's path. * s3tables: unpublish the destination when a rename's source clear fails * s3tables: refuse to delete a record another operation claimed * s3tables: release catalog claims on an uncanceled cleanup context * s3tables: answer 404 when a racing delete already removed the table * s3tables: keep the rename destination marked until the source clears * s3tables: guard the rename rollback against a recreated source and an unfinished destination * s3tables: drop the unfinished destination only once the source is restored * s3tables: re-resolve the purge target on the record a delete claims * s3tables: cover a delete that meets a moved metadata location * s3tables: answer 409 when a create's record changed under it * s3tables: adopt a record still marked by its unfinished create * s3tables: skip unfinished creates in the namespace empty check * s3tables: delete only the record the caller was authorized on DeleteView and DeleteTable check permissions on the record they read first, then read the name again to claim it. A record that took the name in between, such as a table or another owner's view created after a concurrent delete, was claimed and removed on the first record's authorization, and DeleteView never compared the caller's version token with it. The second read now repeats the first one's checks: a record of the other kind or an unfinished create answers 404, and a token that no longer matches answers 409. A delete without a token also compares the record's version token with the authorized one and answers 409 when they differ. * s3tables: re-check the parent after a create lifts its mark A create that passed checkParentOpen and paused before lifting its mark could still confirm while a namespace delete held the claim: the delete scans the still-marked record, skips it, and removes it under a create that already answered success. confirmParent now re-reads the same parent record after the mark clears and backs the confirmed record out when the namespace moved on. * s3tables: mark the rename destination with a claim of its own claimCatalogEntry adopted every create-marked record, including a rename's destination: a create landing after the source cleared could replace the destination before the rename published it, and with the source name reused the restore could leave the table on neither name. The destination now marks with the rename's own claim, which readers still treat as unpublished but a create must refuse, and the commit re-checks the destination namespace after the record goes live. The source keeps its rename claim until the commit lands so a namespace delete scanning the cleared record still refuses. * s3tables: compare the parent's createdAt, not its editable metadata A namespace update rewrites ExtendedKeyMetadata in place, so a create or rename whose second parent read landed across an UpdateNamespace saw a changed blob and reported the still-live namespace as gone: creates backed their record out and answered 404, renames undid their destination. createdAt survives the edit but changes on a delete+recreate, so it still identifies the record. * s3tables: retry lifting the rename's claim off the cleared source The release's only failure mode is a transient filer error — nothing else can write the cleared record — yet a single loss left the claim behind: the old name stayed refused to creates and the namespace counted the record as a child. Retry the release before warning. * s3tables: page the namespace scan before deleting it A page of skippable entries — bare directories or unfinished creates — ended the scan with hasChildren false, so a table on a later page was removed with the namespace. Keep listing with StartFromFileName until a child shows or the listing ends. --------- Co-authored-by: chrislusf <chrislusf@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Chris Lu
|
ee7e4a64d2 |
s3vectors: record request metrics on the dispatch path (#12241)
* s3vectors: record request metrics on the dispatch path The S3 API tracks every operation through S3RequestHistogram, S3RequestCounter, and S3InFlightRequestsGauge; the vectors dispatch rode the same listener with no instrumentation. The op name labels each series under s3vectors.<Operation>. * s3vectors: count auth rejects and keep bucketless metrics alive |
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Chris LuandDevin
|
72ad975803 |
s3vectors: bound GetVectors and DeleteVectors key lists (#12238)
* s3vectors: bound GetVectors and DeleteVectors key lists Both forwarded req.Keys to the engine unbounded; AWS caps these at 500, the same window a PutVectors batch shares. * s3vectors: cap GetVectors at the AWS 100-key limit GetVectors allows at most 100 keys per request while DeleteVectors allows 500, so give vectorKeysBounds the per-call maximum instead of sharing the put-batch window. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3vectors: assert out-of-window key lists never reach the engine Record get/delete calls on the fake engine and cover both handlers rejecting empty and oversized lists with 400 ValidationException. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ping QiuandClaude Opus 5.5
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2a1afadcd0 |
s3api: return NoSuchUpload when aborting an upload that was already completed (#12227)
s3: AbortMultipartUpload answers NoSuchUpload for an upload that no longer exists
Complete and abort both remove .uploads/<id>. abortMultipartUpload answered
204 whenever that record was missing, so aborting an upload that had already
completed reported success while the object stayed in place, and a client
could read it as the object being discarded. AWS returns 404 NoSuchUpload
("The specified multipart upload does not exist") for that case, and
ListParts here already does.
Answer ErrNoSuchUpload when the record is not found. checkUploadStillOpen
reuses abort for cleanup after the upload is gone; NoSuchUpload is not a
failed cleanup there.
The leftover-directory path from #11385 is unchanged: a .uploads/<id> that
outlived its completed object is still removed metadata-only and answered.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Chris LuandDevin
|
d0441bbdbb |
s3vectors: validate index ARNs and expand live integration coverage (#12222)
* test: align vector bucket policy coverage with vector actions * s3vectors: validate ARN service and resource shape before resolving indexes * test: exercise signed vector bucket policies and catalog lifecycle * ci: require the expanded vector integration matrix and all gateway tests * test: reject index ARNs in bucket-level API requests * s3vectors: scope ARN resolution to the gateway namespace * s3vectors: reject name fields that conflict with resolved ARNs bucketARNs and resolveIndexARNs already reject an indexArn that names a different bucket than vectorBucketArn, but a vectorBucketName or indexName disagreeing with the ARNs was silently dropped. Validate the plain names against the resolved ARN values the same way. * test: cover conflicting vector names and ARNs in live requests --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Chris Lu
|
cc5912b8b8 |
s3vectors: e2e conformance for vector bucket policy evaluation (#12221)
* s3vectors: reject empty boolean-operator lists and sub-objects in filters An empty $and/$or list or a nested empty object rendered '()'' — invalid SQL surfaced as an engine error instead of a clean ValidationException. * s3vectors: e2e conformance for vector bucket policy evaluation The handler-level test covers statements; this runs the whole stack a client sees — HTTP dispatch, authentication, policy evaluation, catalog, engine — and walks the full lifecycle: a non-owner is denied without a grant, an Allow on the bucket ARN grants every index under it, a Deny vetoes an Allow on the same action, and deleting the policy restores owner-only access. * s3vectors: prove deny precedence and grant removal in policy e2e * s3vectors: reject field operator objects with no operators * test: use an s3vectors action in the vector policy round-trip |
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Chris Lu
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9d5929a73f |
s3vectors: reject empty boolean-operator lists and sub-objects in filters (#12220)
* s3vectors: reject empty boolean-operator lists and sub-objects in filters An empty $and/$or list or a nested empty object rendered '()'' — invalid SQL surfaced as an engine error instead of a clean ValidationException. * s3vectors: reject field operator objects with no operators |
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Ping QiuandClaude Opus 5.5
|
3f954e34dc |
s3api: label bucket-level requests correctly in the access log (#12224)
* s3api: label bucket-level requests correctly in the access log getResourceType treated a request as bucket-level only when the object key was "/". NormalizeObjectKey strips the leading slash, so bucket routes arrive with an empty key and every bucket operation was logged as an object operation: ListObjectsV2 as REST.GET.OBJECT, DeleteObjects as REST.POST.OBJECT, and the lifecycle, ACL and policy calls likewise. Treat an empty object key as bucket-level too. The new test covers five bucket-level and two object-level request shapes; it fails without the fix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * s3api: label only POST ?delete as a batch delete in the access log With bucket-level requests now reaching the bucket branch, any method on /bucket?delete was labelled BATCH.DELETE.OBJECT. Only the POST route is DeleteObjects; label other methods as the plain bucket operation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Chris Lu
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ac7b4f4cf6 |
s3vectors: bound ListVectorBuckets and ListIndexes maxResults (#12218)
* s3vectors: bound ListVectorBuckets and ListIndexes maxResults Both pass maxResults to the catalog unbounded; AWS caps these list pages at 100, the same way ListVectors is bounded and topK is bounded. * s3vectors: raise ListVectorBuckets/ListIndexes maxResults cap to 500 AWS documents a valid range of 1-500 for both list APIs; the shared limit of 100 rejected legitimate page sizes. * s3vectors: reject explicit maxResults of zero on list calls AWS requires maxResults >= 1, but a plain int field cannot tell an omitted field from an explicit zero. Making MaxResults a pointer keeps the catalog default for omitted fields while a supplied zero fails validation. * s3vectors: test max ListIndexes page against an existing bucket |
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Chris LuandDevin
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f122f313e1 |
s3tables: keep the admin bypass off an identified caller's empty action list (#12217)
Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Chris Lu
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229ad84e2d |
s3tables: reject s3vectors resources in every ARN partition (#12215)
* s3tables: reject s3vectors resources in bucket policies An arn:aws:s3vectors: Resource is as dead as an s3vectors action: the evaluator compares against the generated s3tables ARN, so the rule the writer believes enforced never matches. * s3tables: reject s3vectors resources in every ARN partition * s3tables: test wildcard-partition and mixed-list s3vectors resources |
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Chris LuandDevin
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98fe70a247 |
s3vectors: keep bucket policies in vector form and evaluate them in the gateway (#12214)
* s3vectors: translate vector bucket policies to the catalog form The document is stored verbatim on the shared table bucket and evaluated against s3tables actions and ARNs, so a policy written for the vector API was a dead rule. Actions now map to the catalog operation the request authorizes against, and an arn:aws:s3vectors: resource becomes the bucket/.../table/vector/... ARN the index's catalog entry answers to. * s3tables: expose PrincipalFor and PolicyContext for façade evaluation A façade authorizing against its own action namespace needs the same identity resolution and evaluation context the catalog uses internally. * s3vectors: keep bucket policies in vector form and evaluate them in the gateway The earlier approach translated the document to catalog actions and ARNs, which lost the caller's original policy for GetVectorBucketPolicy and could not cover data-plane calls that never touch the catalog. The document now stays in s3vectors form under a dedicated bucket attribute and every handler evaluates it through authorizeVector against the action and ARN the request names; a dedicated key also keeps a vector grant from ever authorizing a catalog call. * s3vectors: close policy-mutation races and keep vector grants visible - Authorize Put/DeleteVectorBucketPolicy inside the policy slot's compare-and-swap, so a grant revoked between reads cannot authorize the pending write. - Assert the policy attributes stay absent in the update precondition, so a concurrent policy or tag write trips the retry instead of being silently reverted. - Migrate a raw vector document out of the shared policy slot on replace or delete, keeping its catalog rules. - Pass the unresolved identity to PolicyContext so open-by-default deployments still work. - Filter ListVectorBuckets on the vector policy itself, so buckets a caller was granted under s3vectors actions stay listed. * s3vectors: reuse SnapshotExtended for the vector-policy CAS precondition * s3vectors: skip buckets that vanish mid-list instead of failing the page * s3vectors: reject non-vector bucket formats inside authorizeVector * s3vectors: check bucket format after authorization in authorizeVector An unauthorized caller probing an ICEBERG bucket got NoSuchBucket,\nleaking that the bucket exists. The format check now runs after the\npermission check so denied callers always see AccessDenied. * s3vectors: cover legacy shared-slot policy removal on delete * s3tables: resolve the forwarded identity name like getAccountID in PrincipalFor A synthesized manager request resolves its caller through the identity- name branch of getAccountID, which normalizes the name (ARNs collapse to their trailing segment, whitespace trims) before falling back to the handler's account ID. PrincipalFor returned the raw name, so ARN-shaped identities never matched their own grants. * s3tables: assert the vector policy key in update preconditions s3vectors-policy is stored on table bucket entries but was missing from s3tablesExtendedKeys, so a catalog update that read the entry before the first vector policy was saved could overwrite it without tripping the compare-and-swap. Asserting the key makes such a race fail instead of silently erasing the policy. * s3vectors: reject rules the evaluator cannot honor in vector bucket policies The shared Statement shape has no negated fields, the vector evaluation supplies no condition keys, and a document that fails the typed decode is discarded wholesale at evaluation — including denies the writer believed active. Reject NotPrincipal, Condition, foreign-service actions and resource ARNs, and require the typed PolicyDocument decode. Also cover that an admin-named identity still reaches its own buckets. * s3vectors: read vector policy fields the way the evaluator decodes them Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * s3tables: match ARN policy principals through caller normalization Caller principals are normalized ids, so a statement naming a full IAM ARN could never match: an ARN-scoped deny was silently dead and an ARN-scoped allow unreachable. Compare arn: specs against the caller under the same normalizePrincipalID the ownership path uses, while an ARN caller keeps verbatim wildcard matching. * s3tables: grant the admin bypass on the caller's actions, not the name A principal that only normalizes to the admin id skipped every policy deny. When the request carries an identity, the bypass now requires the identity's own admin action — the same gate getAccountID applies — while name-only transports with no action list keep it. PolicyContext takes the request so it can carry IdentityActions, and the vector context helpers route through the shared identity keys so the resolved name and actions agree. * s3tables: match ARN policy principals only for deny statements Normalization drops the ARN's account and path, so an allow matched on the trailing name could grant a same-named caller the statement never verified. Denies keep the normalized match so the rule cannot be ducked through the same collapse. * s3tables: scope service wildcards to their own service s3tables:* counted as blanket admin inside the shared permission check, so an identity holding only catalog grants administered s3vectors operations too. hasAdminActionFor now requires the wildcard to name the operation's service; the global admin markers and s3:* stay service-agnostic. --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Chris Lu
|
4ef123d764 |
s3vectors: fix shared API behavior and test Go/Rust volume parity (#12216)
* s3vectors: reuse shared authenticated identity context * s3vectors: encode empty results as arrays * test: cover S3 Vectors with Go and Rust volume servers * ci: require both volume implementations in vector integration tests * s3vectors: keep identityOf as a shim over the shared identity context Concurrent branches add identityOf call sites; deleting the helper would break the build when they merge in either order. Route it through GetIdentityNameFromContext so every caller resolves the same identity. * test: wait for the vector engine to register before running The gateway resolves weed-vector lazily through the master cluster list, so a listening port does not mean the engine is reachable yet; the first vector write or query could race KeepConnected and fail. Restore the cluster.ps registration wait the previous harness had, and ignore the pytest cache directory the suite creates. * test: wait for master registration across OSS and enterprise Use the exact engine registration event after AddClusterNode completes. The current enterprise cluster.ps does not list vector nodes, so waiting on its output prevents the shared fixture from starting there. * s3vectors: keep contextWithIdentity as a shim alongside identityOf In-flight callers still write the caller name through it; route the write through SetIdentityNameInContext so both helpers agree on the shared key whichever lands first. |
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Chris Lu
|
88565df885 |
s3tables: reject s3vectors resources in bucket policies (#12213)
An arn:aws:s3vectors: Resource is as dead as an s3vectors action: the evaluator compares against the generated s3tables ARN, so the rule the writer believes enforced never matches. |
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Chris Lu
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15066c8a9f |
vector: implement drop_index and have DeleteIndex drop the data (#12204)
* vector: implement drop_index in the engine The RPC was a stub; it now resolves the table's vended location and removes every object under it through the same credential path open uses. A table the catalog can no longer describe is already dropped, so the call stays idempotent. * s3vectors: drop index data after the catalog delete DeleteTable carries the delete authorization, so it runs first; the engine DropIndex then removes the data under the index's location. NotFound and Unimplemented are tolerated so an index whose data went away with the catalog entry, or an older engine, still answers 200. * s3vectors: let the catalog delete carry the index data removal A vector index is colocated: the catalog entry sits at the dataset root, so DeleteTable's recursive delete already removes entry and data. The engine DropIndex call afterwards could only ever describe a missing or recreated record — a no-op in the common case, and a delete of a replacement index's files when the name was reused in between. |
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Chris Lu
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2dbf9c9108 |
s3: evaluate all conditional write headers under the object lock (#12211)
* filer_pb,filer: per-mutation preconditions on ObjectTransaction A transaction's request-level condition evaluates one entry before any mutation runs, so a commit guarding two paths — the object it publishes and the upload directory it assembles — could not be expressed. Give each ObjectMutation an optional condition (evaluated against condition_key, else the mutation's target, under the same lock just before the mutation applies) and report which mutation failed through failed_mutation on the response, so callers can tell a mutation guard's rejection apart from the request-level precondition's. * s3: evaluate multipart completion conditions under the object lock CompleteMultipartUpload checked conditional headers gateway-side before committing, and the routed commit transaction guarded only the upload directory — nothing made If-None-Match: * atomic with the publish, so concurrent conditional completions of the same absent key could all report success. The request's reducible write condition (If-None-Match/If-Match, star or single strong ETag) now rides the commit as the transaction's request condition on the owner filer: on the object path for unversioned buckets, falling back to the .versions directory for suspended and enabled versioning. The upload-exists guard moves onto the PUT mutation, keeping its check-before-publish ordering. Conditions the reducer cannot express stay on the distributed write lock, where check and commit already serialize. * filer,s3: resolve the latest version first for versioned conditional writes * filer: keep directory entries holding content out of the absent-slot rule * s3: keep a gateway-side upload-exists check for filers without mutation conditions * filer: honor null-version-is-latest resolving prefer-alt conditions * drop scratch multipart-race repro programs * s3: note the write lock does not cover routed writes on non-reducible conditions * filer: mirror the gateway's remote-etag precedence in condition evaluation storedEntryETag only knew the extended attribute and the chunk fallback, so a synced remote entry compared chunk-derived ETags while the gateway compares the remote ETag. Follow the same precedence: extended attribute, remote ETag while the entry still holds the remote bytes, Md5, then the chunk hash — and no ETag for an entry holding none. * s3: reduce all conditional write headers into owner-lock clauses Time-based headers, combined conditions, ETag lists, and weak ETags stayed on the distributed write lock because buildWriteCondition could not express them, leaving their gateway check racing owner-routed writes. Reduce every parseable header form to WriteCondition clauses — multiple clauses compose AND, ETag candidates carry the raw list for the filer's canonicalization, and RFC 7232 precedence keeps If-Unmodified-Since hidden by If-Match and If-Modified-Since hidden by If-None-Match — so the owner filer evaluates them under the same object-path lock as the commit. Only unparseable headers still fall back, where the lock path reports the same parse error. |
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Chris Lu
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2737315e9d |
s3: evaluate multipart completion conditions under the object lock (#12209)
* filer_pb,filer: per-mutation preconditions on ObjectTransaction A transaction's request-level condition evaluates one entry before any mutation runs, so a commit guarding two paths — the object it publishes and the upload directory it assembles — could not be expressed. Give each ObjectMutation an optional condition (evaluated against condition_key, else the mutation's target, under the same lock just before the mutation applies) and report which mutation failed through failed_mutation on the response, so callers can tell a mutation guard's rejection apart from the request-level precondition's. * s3: evaluate multipart completion conditions under the object lock CompleteMultipartUpload checked conditional headers gateway-side before committing, and the routed commit transaction guarded only the upload directory — nothing made If-None-Match: * atomic with the publish, so concurrent conditional completions of the same absent key could all report success. The request's reducible write condition (If-None-Match/If-Match, star or single strong ETag) now rides the commit as the transaction's request condition on the owner filer: on the object path for unversioned buckets, falling back to the .versions directory for suspended and enabled versioning. The upload-exists guard moves onto the PUT mutation, keeping its check-before-publish ordering. Conditions the reducer cannot express stay on the distributed write lock, where check and commit already serialize. * filer,s3: resolve the latest version first for versioned conditional writes * filer: keep directory entries holding content out of the absent-slot rule * s3: keep a gateway-side upload-exists check for filers without mutation conditions * filer: honor null-version-is-latest resolving prefer-alt conditions * drop scratch multipart-race repro programs * s3: note the write lock does not cover routed writes on non-reducible conditions |